

Sulla, the Elites and the Empire

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VOLUME 8

Sulla, the Elites and the Empire

A Study of Roman Policies in Italy
and the Greek East

By

Federico Santangelo



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Illustration on the cover: Aureus struck by Sulla *imperator iterum* in 84–83 BC; recto with the head of Venus and the name '*SVLLA*'. See for further details the pages 204–207 of this volume. (RRC 359; © copyright The Trustees of the British Museum, London.)

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SERIES EDITORS' PREFACE

Impact of Empire is a series that focuses on the consequences of the actions and sheer existence of the Roman Empire in the wide, culturally heterogeneous region it dominated, that is a large part of Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. The series originates from the international network 'Impact of Empire' which brings together ancient historians, archaeologists, classicists and specialist in Roman law, and will publish the proceedings of the workshops organised by this network. It furthermore includes monographs and edited volumes which make an original contribution to scholarship about the impact of the Roman Empire on its surroundings. The series includes Republican as well as imperial history, and is intended for students of and specialists in Roman history.

In this first monograph of the series, Federico Santangelo discusses Sulla's "impact" on Italy and the Greek East. Displaying impressive command of both the ancient source material and the relevant modern scholarly literature, Santangelo explores political, economic and religious issues to show how Rome's relationship with local elites changed during the Sullan period and to analyse Sulla's personal contribution to that process. Works on Sulla are usually biographies or studies on special topics. Santangelo's stimulating study offers a different and challenging approach. His book makes an important contribution to our understanding of the relationship between subjects and empire in a crucial period of Roman history.

Lukas de Blois, Olivier Hekster,
Gerda de Kleijn and John Rich, July 2007

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sparring-partner I could possibly hope for. My Lampeter colleagues, and especially Ian Repath, created the excellent working conditions that enabled me to complete the revision of the manuscript. At Brill, Kim Fiona Plas and Gera van Bedaf have overseen the preparation of the book with outstanding professionalism and efficiency.

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My research would have been much harder, and definitely less engaging, if I had not had the chance to work in excellent libraries, both in London and in Paris. I feel a special bond with the Library of the Institute of Classical Studies-Joint Library of the Hellenic and Roman Societies in London, and not just because I have received all sorts of help and support from its outstanding staff. Let us hope that this unique institution will be allowed to be the world-class research centre that it is today for many more years to come.

I have, of course, many personal debts too, but I should like to recall only one here. As usual, Lorna has just made everything way better than it could possibly have been without her.

Lampeter–London, June 2007

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AE</i>	<i>L'Année épigraphique</i> , Paris 1888–.
<i>CIL</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, consilio et auctoritate Academiae litterarum regiae Borussicae editum</i> , Berlin 1863–.
<i>FD</i>	<i>Fouilles de Delphes</i> , Paris 1902–.
<i>HRR</i> ²	H. Peter, <i>Historicorum Romanorum reliquiae</i> , Leipzig 1914 ² .
<i>ID</i>	<i>Inscriptions de Délos</i> , Paris 1926–1972.
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> , Berlin 1873–.
<i>IGR</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes</i> , Paris 1906–1927.
<i>ILLRP</i>	A. Degrassi, <i>Inscriptiones Latinae liberae rei publicae</i> (Biblioteca di Studi Superiori 40), Florence 1963.
<i>ISE</i>	L. Moretti-F. Canali de Rossi, <i>Iscrizioni Storiche Ellenistiche</i> , Florence–Rome 1967–2002.
<i>InvDidyma</i>	A. Rehm, <i>Didyma II. Die Inschriften</i> , Berlin 1958.
<i>InvEph</i>	<i>Die Inschriften von Ephesos</i> (Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 11.1, 12–17.1–4), Bonn 1979–1984.
<i>InvIlion</i>	P. Frisch, <i>Die Inschriften von Ilion</i> (Inschriften griechischen Städte aus Kleinasien 3), Bonn 1975.
<i>InvKnidos</i>	W. Blümel, <i>Die Inschriften von Knidos</i> , I (Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 41), Bonn 1992.
<i>InvMylasa</i>	W. Blümel, <i>Die Inschriften von Mylasa</i> , I–II (Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 34), Bonn 1987–1988.
<i>InvPriene</i>	F. Hiller von Gaertringen, <i>Inschriften von Priene</i> , Berlin 1906.
<i>InvStratonikeia</i>	M.C. Sahin (ed.), <i>Die Inschriften von Stratonikeia</i> , I (Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien 21–22.1–22.2), Bonn 1981–1989, 3 vol.
<i>MAMA</i>	<i>Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua</i> , Manchester–London 1928–.
<i>MRR</i>	T.R.S. Broughton, <i>The Magistrates of the Roman Republic</i> , New York–Atlanta, 1951–1986.
<i>OGIS</i>	W. Dittenberger, <i>Orientis Graeci inscriptiones selectae. Supplementum Sylloges inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , Leipzig 1903–1905.
<i>RC</i>	C.B. Welles, <i>Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period. A Study in Greek Epigraphy</i> , New Haven–London–Prague 1934.
<i>RDGE</i>	R.K. Sherck (ed.), <i>Roman Documents from the Greek East. Senatus consulta and epistulae to the Age of Augustus</i> , Baltimore 1969.
<i>RE</i>	A. von Pauly et al., <i>Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> , Stuttgart 1893–.
<i>RRC</i>	M.H. Crawford, <i>Roman Republican Coinage</i> , Cambridge 1974.
<i>RS</i>	M.H. Crawford (ed.), <i>Roman Statutes</i> (BICS Supplement 64), London 1996, 2 vols.

<i>SEG</i>	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i> , Amsterdam 1923–.
<i>ST</i>	H. Rix, <i>Sabellische Texte</i> , Heidelberg 2002.
<i>Syll.</i> ³	W. Dittenberger, <i>Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , Leipzig 1915–1924 ³ .
<i>TAM</i>	<i>Tituli Asiae Minoris</i> , Vienna 1901–.

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* The maps published in this volume have the sole practical purpose to provide the reader with some general geographical orientation. Therefore, they have no pretence to exhaustiveness, and they prioritise the areas and the communities that are mentioned in the book.

EDITORIAL NOTE


I have consistently Latinised Greek toponyms (e.g. Pergamum instead of Pergamon), except when the Greek toponym is used in Latin too (e.g. Claros, Delos), or there is no Latin equivalent for it (e.g. Akraiphia). On the other hand, I have not altered the Greek personal names known from inscriptions (e.g. Menippos, Medeios, Diodoros Paspáros, etc.), as they are usually quoted by modern scholars in their original form. Translations are mine unless otherwise stated.



Map 1. Italy



Map 2. Mainland Greece and the Aegean islands



Map 3. Asia Minor

INTRODUCTION

This book is, first of all, a book on Sulla and his contribution to the making of the Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean world. Research on Sulla and his age is by no means a new undertaking. At least ten biographies have been published in the last century alone.¹ Many accounts of the age of Sulla have also been written, and no reference work ignores its importance in the final crisis of the Roman Republic.² Most students of the Roman Revolution have tried to provide an interpretation of this character, of his policies and of his aims. Sulla's great enemies, Gaius Marius, Cinna and Mithridates Eupator, have received considerable scholarly attention too.³ Still, it may be useful to open this book with a brief summary of Sulla's biography and of the defining events in which he took part.

The life of L. Cornelius Sulla spanned over six decades, between 138 and 78 BC. He was the descendant of an old patrician family, which had not produced a consul since 212 BC and certainly was not in position to compete with the financial wealth of other families of comparable rank.⁴ Sulla was an exceptionally ambitious man, who happened to live in exceptionally challenging times. Indeed, some of the crucial issues that he would face in his lifetime started to take shape when he

¹ Zachariä 1834; Gerlach 1856, 25–48; Leutwein 1920; Levi 1924; Baker 1927; Berve 1931; Kahrstedt 1931; Lanzani 1931; Lanzani 1936; Carcopino 1947; Valgiglio 1956; Volkmann 1958; Badian 1970; Keaveney 1982a; Hinard 1985b; Letzner 2000; Hölkeskamp 2000; Brizzi 2002; Christ 2002.

² Cybulski 1838; Mommsen 1919, 250–377; Linden 1896; Last-Gardner 1932; Schur 1942; Sambito 1963; Gabba 1972b; Evola Marino 1974; Santalucia 1976; Rossi 1980, 321–412; Lepore 1990; Seager 1994. For a full survey of modern scholarship on this period, see Gómez-Pantoja 1990 and Gómez-Pantoja 1991.

³ Marius: Carney 1961a; Passerini 1971; Evans 1994. Cinna: Bennett 1923; Lovano 2002. Mithridates: Reinach 1890; Reinach 1895; McGing 1986; Ballesteros Pastor 1996; Strobel 1996 (also cf. Olshausen 1972).

⁴ Plut. *Sull.* 1.1–2. About the decline of Sulla's family, see Katz 1982. About the possible connections between the *Sullae* and the Sibyl, see Gabba 1975, 13–14; *contra*, *RRC*, 250.

was just a child. In 133BC the Gracchan crisis marked a watershed in Roman political life and posed problems such as the consequences of increasing competition within the elites and the role of the people in Roman politics. The same year saw Attalus III's decision to bequeath his kingdom to Rome, with the creation of the Roman province of Asia following a few years later.

Nothing certain, however, is known about Sulla's youth, and not much is known about his early career either.⁵ He seems to have made efforts to gain a better financial position that would ensure that he was able to compete in the Roman political arena with some hope of success. In 106BC he is known to have served as a quaestor alongside the consul Marius during the war against Jugurtha, the King of Numidia. Sallust provides a memorable portrait of Sulla in this campaign, which I will discuss more fully at the beginning of the first part. Sulla's intervention was crucial for Roman victory in the war; it was he who convinced Bocchus, the king of Mauretania, to betray Jugurtha and to surrender him to the Romans. His special relationship with Bocchus would prove to be useful in the coming years too. When Sulla was praetor, Bocchus generously funded his effort to organise unprecedentedly lavish games: free lions and tamers were seen in Rome for the first time.⁶ More importantly, and most strikingly, Bocchus decided to fund the making of an equestrian statue of Sulla that was displayed on the Capitol. The relief found near the church of Sant'Omobono may form part of this monument, although its iconography is not incompatible with a later dating, after the victory in the First Mithridatic War.⁷ The rela-

⁵ The first thirty years of the life of Sulla are almost completely unknown: a tentative discussion in Keaveney 1980; Keaveney 1982a, 6–12.

⁶ Sen. *brev.* 13.6.

⁷ Plut. *Sull.* 6.1. On the relief, see Bertoldi 1968; Giuliani 1968 (both dating it to the second century BC); Hölscher 1980, 357–371 (= Hölscher 1994, 60–74, 228–233); Hölscher 1984, 17–18, 78 (= Hölscher 1994, 149–151, 255); Schäfer 1989, 74–83; Sehlmeier 1999, 192–197. Cf. Hafner 1989, suggesting an unconvincing dating to the age of Scipio Africanus; Behr 1993, 126–127 takes no stance on the problem. Iconography suggests that the monument celebrates Sulla and Rome at the same time: Hölscher 1980, 365 (= Hölscher 1994, 67). The presence of two trophies may be explained by the need for symmetry rather than by a dating after the victory on Mithridates: Schäfer 1989, 78. If this is the case, it is however harder to explain why the palm branch in the eagle's beak has two wreaths: *RRC*, 373; Hölscher 1980, 366, fn. 106 = Hölscher 1994, 67–68, 231, fn. 106. Ramage 1991, 112–113 argues that the relief is part of monument built after the Eastern campaign and located next to the statue offered by Bocchus. The arguments of Schäfer 1989, 78 are unconvincing, as they give too much importance to the *corona graminea* that Sulla received in the Social

tionship between Marius and Sulla had apparently been cooperative until that time. Marius' choice to have Sulla as one of his staff in the war against the Cimbri and the Teutones confirms it. Bocchus' statue, however, was bound to cause some tensions between the two men. Marius was not prepared to accept a serious challenge to his status of the most illustrious general of the Republic, which he had earned in the past decade. The emphasis on Sulla's prowess conveyed by the monument was probably to be seen as an unbearable insolence. It should be borne in mind, however, that Sulla could not even hope to compete with the six-time consul at this stage of his career. Some rift may have intervened between the two men in the Nineties, but it would be misconceived to speak of a rivalry.

After a first electoral defeat, in 96 Sulla was elected to the praetorship—a clear sign that his career was taking an encouraging path.⁸ The following year, he was assigned the province of Cilicia, a recently created command, the main purpose of which was usually the fight against piracy. Sulla's task, however, was more complex, as he was expected to stretch his field of action beyond the territory of inland Cilicia. He had to restore to the throne of Cappadocia the King Ariobarzanes, who had just been deposed by Gordius, a local associate of Mithridates VI Eupator, the ruler of the kingdom in North-Eastern Asia Minor known to the Romans as 'Pontus'. The activism of this monarch, of Persian descent but entirely familiar with the practice and ideology of Hellenistic kingship, had been a regular feature in Asia Minor for at least a decade.⁹ Mithridates had a clear hegemonic plan in the region, which he however pursued, for the moment, with a policy of formal friendliness towards Rome, and without interfering with the territory of the province of Asia.¹⁰ Indeed, he was careful not to intervene directly in Cappadocia, but used Gordius as a proxy. Sulla's

War. No safe conclusion about the dating may be reached before a full study of the stone and of its provenance is carried out. It is conceivable that the monument was destroyed by the associates of Marius and Cinna in 88 or 87, and that it was restored after Sulla's victory, with an iconography that took up some motives related to the Eastern campaign.

⁸ Plut. *Sull.* 5.1–3.

⁹ On Mithridates' expansion in Asia Minor, see Bertrand 1978, 791–794; McGing 1986, 108–118; Hind 1994, 144–149.

¹⁰ On Mithridates' opportunism in this phase, see Glew 1977b, 381–390; Harris 1979, 273 downplays his role in the outbreak of the war; de Callatay 2000, 355–359 argues on numismatic grounds that he did not start preparing an open confrontation with Rome until April 89.

expedition to Cilicia appears to have been a relative success, since Ariobarzanes was restored to the throne and Gordius was driven away. There was no trace of a long term solution, though, since Rome did not decide to reconsider her military presence in the area and to provide Ariobarzanes with some sort of support. Moreover, piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean was as strong as ever. However, the Cilician command was a first chance for Sulla to become familiar with Asia Minor, a region in which he was to play such a prominent role in a decade's time.

When he returned to Rome, probably in 92 BC, Sulla had to face an attempt to put him on trial by a certain Censorinus, a political opponent of his. It was a relatively common experience for former Roman governors on their way back from the Greek East, and the trial was certainly an attempt to undermine Sulla's career prospects. The charges were dropped, however, and the attention of the Roman elite was very soon absorbed by a much more serious matter: the outbreak of the Social War. The causes of this conflict are complex and cannot simply be reduced to the frustration of the Italian Allies, triggered by the failure of the plans of the tribune Livius Drusus for the extension of Roman citizenship. At least a part of the Italian elites must have seen the war as a formidable chance to put an end to Roman hegemony. The attempt to build an 'Italian' confederation in Central Italy, with Corfinium as its capital, is a sign of the strength of this strategy.¹¹ Between 91 BC and 89 BC, Italy was in complete turmoil, and Rome struggled to organise an adequate response to the emergency. Only the contribution of her best military talents avoided catastrophe.

Sulla was among the Roman commanders who were in charge of a contingent of troops. Like Marius and others, he formally was a *legatus* serving one of the consuls, first L. Julius Caesar in 90 BC and then M. Porcius Cato in 89 BC.¹² His field of action was mainly between Campania and Hirpinia. His main achievement was the conquest of two important centres of the revolt: Pompeii and Nola. Again, there is reason to think that the experience of these territories which he gained

¹¹ Mouritsen 1998 is a strong challenge to the *idée reçue* that the aim of the Italian Allies was obtaining Roman citizenship; a similar approach in Pobjoy 2000. The best presentations of the traditional view, for which I still incline in many respects, are Brunt 1988, 93–130 and Gabba 1994c. Dench 2005, 125–130 offers a nuanced and intelligent compromise between the two approaches.

¹² On the Roman senior chain of command in the Social War, see Keaveney 1987, 207–214.

in this period became very useful in the later phases of his career, especially during the Civil War.

Sulla's achievements in the Social War were no doubt the main credential he presented when, in October 89 BC, he placed his consulship bid for the following year. Holding the supreme magistracy in 88 BC was more significant than ever. A series of laws concerning the enfranchisement of the Italian Allies had just been passed, between 90 BC and 89 BC, but the process that would lead to their full involvement in the citizen body was far from complete—in fact, it would take two decades to be fully accomplished. Moreover, as one of the consuls, Sulla could reasonably hope to gain the command of the war against the King Mithridates, who in 89 BC had taken advantage from the Social War and launched a massive offensive against the province of Asia. Mithridates had been welcomed as a liberator by the Greek cities, partly because the burden of Roman rule had by then become unacceptable and partly because he had managed to build a very enticing propaganda. The invasion coincided with the mass-murder of thousands of Roman and Italian residents in the province, mainly businessmen and tax-collectors, by the Greek native population. The episode—also known as the 'Asian Vespers'—was carefully masterminded by Mithridates himself, but it is, first of all, a most powerful sign of how deep the rift between the Greeks and Romans had become.¹³

The financial implications of the invasion for the stability of the Roman economy are easy to imagine. For five years, Rome received no revenues from its richest province. That the coming of Mithridates was an unprecedented threat in the history of Roman supremacy in the Mediterranean was confirmed by the great success that the King met in Greece too. A great number of cities, most prominently Athens, declared their loyalty to the King, who duly sent troops to support the campaign of emancipation of Greece. The Roman military presence in Asia was too weak to contrast such a major upheaval. Mainland Greece was simply free from Roman garrisons, as Rome was in direct control only of the province of Macedonia. A Roman army needed to be sent to the Greek East, and the dispute over its command was unsurprisingly very tense.¹⁴ By then, a clash between Marius and Sulla had become inevitable. The booty and the political credit that the even-

¹³ On the massacre of the Italians, see Thornton 1998, esp. 271–290 (it includes an excellent summary of earlier literature).

¹⁴ I will only provide a brief account of this very complex phase of Roman political

tual winner of that war could expect to gather were a most attractive prospect. Moreover, Marius had been coveting the Mithridatic command since the previous decade, when he had visited Asia Minor and personally warned the King against harming the interests of Rome in the region.¹⁵

At a first stage, Sulla was assigned the command, as he was by far the most experienced of the two consuls. The tribune P. Sulpicius Rufus, an ambitious associate of Marius, secretly drafted a bill for the transfer of the command to Marius, which was passed by the popular assembly. He needed Marius' support to carry out a wider legislative programme, which included measures against debt and for the distribution of the new citizens enfranchised after the Social War in all the tribes. Indeed, the destinies of the two bills were closely linked to each other. The discussion of the citizenship bill led to a violent confrontation between the followers of Sulpicius and those of the Senate. The consuls, who opposed Sulpicius' proposals, declared a suspension of public business (a *iustitium*), but Sulpicius openly violated it and led a band of armed supporters into an assembly presided over by the consuls. Sulla was compelled to seek refuge in Marius' home, fearing for his own life. It is unclear what the two men agreed upon on that occasion. At any rate, Marius allowed Sulla to leave Rome safely and to join the army at Nola. Only at this stage did Sulpicius pass his legislation, including the bill on the Mithridatic command. It was not simply an act of defiance towards the Senate and Sulla. It was a major breach of constitutional practice too.¹⁶

Sulla devised a reaction that was both extremely bold and lucid. He realised that he had to make a legal case for his right to hold the Mithridatic command. He skilfully gained the support of his legions by hinting that, had Marius gained the command, he would have recruited new troops for the Eastern campaign. He realised that his

history, which has received a number of reliable discussions: Luce 1970; Keaveney 1983b; Powell 1990, 450–459; Seager 1994, 166–170; de Blois 2007, 169–172.

¹⁵ Plut. *Mar.* 31.4. For a general discussion of the agenda of the mission, see Luce 1970, 162–168, mainly focussing on Marius' personal ambition; Carney 1961a, 47 is still interesting. The role of the 'Marians' in the area and the influence they had in the making of Roman policy in the region has probably been overrated by Coarelli 1982a, 445–451.

¹⁶ His reaction had probably better legal grounds than has often been assumed: see Levick 1982, and cf. already Cantalupi 1900, 56–57, 63–64. For a summary of ancient negative views on Sulla, see Dahlheim 1993, 97–98.

opponents could not rely on a military force comparable to his. Hence, he decided to march towards Rome and regain control of the situation. He found no opposition, as expected. The act was perceived as an unprecedented breach of political practice, even more than Sulpicius' move. Significantly, all Sulla's officers deserted him at this stage, with the notable exception of a quaestor almost certainly to be identified with L. Licinius Lucullus (who indeed became, from then on, Sulla's closest associate).¹⁷ The soldiers, however, firmly backed their general.

Marius quickly realised the gravity of the situation and fled Rome. Sulla summoned the Senate and obtained the vote on a decree that declared Marius, his son, Sulpicius and other nine individuals public enemies. A law was passed restoring Sulla's command, and Sulpicius' law on the new citizens was annulled. This arrangement, however, was only a step in a much longer political crisis. After Sulla's departure, the consul of 87 BC, L. Cornelius Cinna, soon allowed the return of the Marian exiles and used their support to increase his own personal power, in a bitter clash with the Senate. He was re-elected to the consulship in 86 BC, with Marius as his colleague. Sulla, in the meantime, was declared *hostis*, a symmetrical move to the one that he had made before leaving Italy.

Still, he had been free to rally his army and to concentrate on the mission to the East. In 87 BC he landed in Epirus, and he decided to concentrate on the conquest of Athens, whose strategic and symbolic importance could hardly be underestimated. Many communities quickly abandoned Mithridates' cause and reasserted their loyalty to Rome and to Sulla; Athens was conquered and plundered, but Sulla decided not to destroy it. The decisive confrontations with the army of Mithridates, led by the general Archelaus, took place in 86 BC at Chaeronea and Orchomenus, in Boeotia. Sulla's success was so clear that even the troops sent by Cinna and his associates to Asia Minor in 86 BC, led by L. Valerius Flaccus and later by Flavius Fimbria, ultimately joined him. Sulla's success left the King little hope of reserving the destiny of the war, and indeed Mithridates sought an appeasement. With a *coup de théâtre*, Sulla accepted the offer,

¹⁷ App. *b. c.* 1.57.253. This identification was suggested by Badian 1962, 54–55 (= Badian 1964, 220) and, independently, by Wosnik 1963, 52. Cf. Thonemann 2004, arguing that Lucullus was quaestor in 87 BC: also cf. Sayar-Siewert-Taeuber 1994, 118–119. This hypothesis seems to be based on an excessive confidence in the accuracy of the official titulature used in inscriptions; there are no compelling arguments either to refute or to accept it.

and a deal was struck between the two men at Dardanus, in Troad. The state of affairs that preceded the outbreak of the war was confirmed almost without changes. Rome regained control of the province of Asia, while Mithridates was allowed to keep his kingdom. Caria, which was formerly autonomous, seems to have been included into the Roman province at this stage. Sulla's decision was by no means ill-founded. He needed to hasten his return to Italy and to concentrate his energies on the imminent confrontation with his enemies. Before sailing off, however, Sulla carried out a general reorganisation of the province of Asia, whose scope went far beyond his intention to punish those who had joined Mithridates. An ample section of the second part will be devoted to the study of this resettlement and of its consequences.

Sulla's arrival to Italy, in Spring 83 BC, marked the beginning of a Civil War—the first in a series of civil wars that led to the fall of the Roman Republic. Much had changed during Sulla's absence. Marius had suddenly died in 87 BC a few days after taking up the consulship, while Cinna, the real *dominus* of the Roman political scene for the following three years, was killed in 84 during a mutiny of the troops that he planned to lead overseas to fight Sulla in Greece. The leaders of the 'Marian' camp—barely a working definition by now—were the son of the great man, Marius the Younger, Cnaeus Carbo (consul in 85 BC and 84 BC), L. Scipio Asiagenus and C. Norbanus. Most of their support seems to have been concentrated in Rome, in Latium and in Etruria; their resistance, at least, was concentrated in these territories. Sulla's march in Southern Italy met no serious opposition until Capua. The first battle of some importance took place near the Mount Tifata, and ended with the defeat of Norbanus. Sulla—still formally a public enemy—promptly reassured the populations of Southern Italy about his intentions, pledged not to affect their newly acquired citizenship rights, and presented himself as the champion of peace and concord. Although he had only six legions on his side, he showed an extraordinary strategic ability. He also was extremely ruthless when it came to clashing with his enemies. After defeating Marius the Younger at Sacriportus, in Latium, he compelled him to seek refuge in the city of Praeneste. He then made sure that there was no viable escape for him, headed for Rome, and quickly took hold of the city. Soon afterwards, the Marian forces, which included a strong Samnite contingent, made a desperate attempt to attack Praeneste and liberate the besieged. Sulla blocked them near Rome, outside the

Colline Gate, and on 1 November 82 BC he defeated them in a battle that irretrievably settled the destiny of the war.

Its aftermath was marked by yet more bloodshed. The Samnites who fought with the Marians were systematically massacred. A full attack was launched against Praeneste; Marius committed suicide, and all his associates who happened to be in the city were massacred. It was the opening act of the organised massacre known as the first ‘proscription’, which was accompanied by a law (the *lex Cornelia de proscriptione*) that legalised the confiscation of the patrimonies of the victims and gave impunity to their killer. Proscriptions were to become a trademark of late Republican history. A section of this book (1.5) will be devoted to a close study of their impact on Rome and Italy.

By now Sulla had power of life and death, both in fact and in law. His victory in the Civil War brought about an unprecedented resettlement of Roman institutions. The new strong man tailored himself a completely new position. He took up the dictatorship, but did not set a deadline for the end of the magistracy. He also set himself the explicit task of laying down new laws. It was a substantial change in the nature itself of Roman dictatorship. From a magistracy that was used in emergencies and had been left dormant since the Hannibalic War, it became a magistracy conferring virtually unlimited powers on an individual, with a strong emphasis on the drafting of new laws.¹⁸ Indeed, the range of the provisions taken by Sulla in this period was exceptionally broad. An impressive number of *leges Corneliae* (Cornelian laws) were passed, covering issues as diverse as the composition of the Senate, the age limits for the accession to magistracies (*lex annalis*), the organisation of criminal courts, the powers of provincial governors (*lex de maiestate*) and of the tribunes of the plebs, the recruitment of priests, the prevention of forgeries (*lex de falsis*), the limitation of private expenditure and luxury (*lex sumptuaria*)—and more. Sulla even managed to persuade the Senate to let him change his name. He became Lucius Cornelius Sulla *Felix*, the Fortunate, although in the official documents compiled in Greek *Felix* is replaced by *Epaphroditos*—a name whose complex meaning will be discussed in the third part.

¹⁸ There are many valuable discussion of Sulla’s dictatorship and the constitutional problems related to it: Wilcken 1941, 7–12; Sambito 1963; Wosnik 1963, 96–111; Nicolet 1982; Mancuso 1983; Wittman 1984; Hinard 1988; Hurlet 1993, 29–83 (with an excellent survey of earlier scholarship); Sordi 1993; Hinard 1995.

In 81 BC, after having carried out the whole range of his reforms, Sulla decided to resign from the dictatorship. He held one more consulship in 80 BC—no doubt to make sure that his legacy would become somewhat more stable—and he then retired to private life at the end of his mandate.¹⁹ The ancient sources suggest that it was a sudden, unexpected decision. Inevitably, there has been much speculation about the reasons that determined it.²⁰ On balance, I am inclined to think that Sulla's deteriorating health might have played a significant, possibly even decisive role.²¹ It certainly is a much more safely attested factor than other explanations that have been offered in the past. Sulla died in 78 BC, a year after his resignation, in his Campanian villa between Cuma and Puteoli. It is unclear what role he played in Roman politics during his retirement. At any rate, just before dying, he appears to have been busy drafting new laws for the city of Puteoli, where some internal discord had arisen.

Biography can be a very useful form of historical investigation. Yet, I do not intend to pursue that line of enquiry. My aim is to study Sulla as a privileged viewpoint on the first quarter of the first century BC, and to focus on his role in the making of the Roman Mediterranean empire. Sir Ronald Syme famously spoke of the 'example' of Sulla, which not even his constitutional reforms could prevent from influencing the later development of late Republican history.²² In this book I will try to

¹⁹ I follow the chronology suggested by Badian 1962b, 230 and Badian 1970b, 8–14; see also Hinard 1999 and Keaveney 2005. The slightly later chronology (abdication from dictatorship at the beginning of 79, after holding the consulship in 80) suggested in Vervaeke 2004, 60–68 is unconvincing.

²⁰ Carcopino 1947 famously argued that Sulla resigned because the nobility prevented him from fulfilling his monarchic ambitions; see also Worthington 1992. For an opposite interpretation, cf. Stockton 1966 and Wooliscroft 1992. Thein 2006 has some interesting guesswork about the limits of Sulla's power. Hahn 1974/1975 is probably right in saying that the monarchic interpretations of Sulla are all indebted to App. *b. c.* 1.99.463, where the Sullan age is defined as the beginning of the *basileia* and the end of the Republic. It is unclear what the Byzantine erudite Theodosius the Deacon meant by saying that Sulla was εἰς μᾶτην δημοκρατίας (*Acroasis*, 1.255–259); diverging interpretations in Baldwin 1983 and Canfora 2006 (cf. Canfora 2004, 9–10).

²¹ See Carney 1961b; Africa 1982; Schamp 1991; Jenkins 1994; Cilliers-Retief 2000. According to Keaveney-Madden 1982, 94–95 both Pherecydes and Sulla suffered from scabies, although of course their deaths were caused by other diseases. In Sulla's case, the likeliest cause of death was liver failure; see also Bondeson 1997, 52–55.

²² Syme 1939a, 17; cf. Badian 1996, 401. Cf. Vell. 2.28: *primus ille, et utinam ultimus, exemplum proscriptionis inuenit* ("he was the first to set the example for proscription—would that he had been the last!") and 2.66: *instauratum Sullani exempli malum, proscriptio*

show that Sulla's impact was not limited to Roman internal politics. Sulla also played a very significant, if not even crucial, role in the reconstruction of the empire after a long crisis that culminated with the First Mithridatic War, and in the organisation of Italy that followed the enfranchisement of the Allies.

However, this book is not just about Sulla and his policies. The local elites and their attitudes to Roman rule will have a central place in my discussion. One of my central contentions is that Sulla realised that the Social War and the First Mithridatic War were the outcomes of a severe strain in the relationship between Rome and the elites in Italy and in the Greek East—the *domi nobiles*. After making his decisive contribution to the military solution of the conflicts, he concentrated his energies on a systematic administrative reorganisation, which redefined the relationship between Rome and the local elites. This initiative also had momentous consequences for the structure itself of the empire.²³ It was, more than anything else, a crucial step towards its stabilisation.

Sulla's contribution to the development of Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean world was made possible by his victory against Mithridates Eupator and by the ensuing reconquest of Greece and Asia Minor. It is true that he did not defeat Mithridates completely, and that Rome's definitive victory over this staunch enemy was only ensured by Pompey's campaign in the 60s. However, after Sulla's victory the threat diminished beyond all recognition. After 84 BC, there was a widespread awareness in the Greek East that Roman rule was an irreversible reality, as the refusal of the cities of Asia Minor to join Mithridates in the Third Mithridatic War shows most clearly. The political and fiscal stabilisation brought about by Sulla's success can hardly be underestimated, although it has often been taken for granted by modern scholars.

(“the evil of the Sullan example was repeated: the proscription”). Syme's point was implicitly developed in Laffi 1967.

²³ Cic. *off.* 2.8.27 notes that before Sulla Rome used to be more a *patrocinium orbis terrae* (“a protectorate of the whole world”) than an *imperium*: see Kienast 1982, 2–3. This is, however, more a polemical reference to Sulla and the proscriptions than a general point, and we should not make too much of it. On the other hand, it is perhaps not a coincidence that the word *imperium* starts to be used to define “some notion of concrete shape and size” in the generation after Sulla (Richardson 1991, 7; but Richardson 2003, 140 argues that no “territorial significance” of the word may be found in the sources until the Augustan age). However, *Rhet. Her.* 4.9.13 might already be using the word in a concrete sense: see Calboli 1993, 291, stressing the identification between empire and *oikoumene* (*contra*, Richardson 1991, 6).

The resettlement of the province of Asia was the pivotal feature of this process. Resuming the revenue flow from the Greek East to Italy was the preliminary condition that enabled the Roman elite to restart the competition for supremacy soon after Sulla quit the scene in 78 BC. For this very reason, the age of Sulla may be viewed as the period that provided the essential foundation for the eventual decline of the Republic and the parallel consolidation of the Mediterranean hegemony. As we learn from an important passage of Cicero, the close links between Italian and Eastern matters were already apparent to the contemporaries of Sulla.²⁴ The importance of the reorganisation of the Roman presence in Asia Minor is indisputable, but it cannot be fully appreciated without the realisation that the main goal of Sulla after defeating Mithridates was to make his way back to Italy as soon as possible to fight the Civil War.

My discussion falls into three parts. In the first part, I will look at the most powerful factor of crisis that Rome had to come to terms with between the 90s and the 80s BC: the traumatic and deep strain in her relations with local elites, both in Italy and in the Greek East. Between the Social and the First Mithridatic Wars, a considerable part of the leading groups in these two crucial regions became enemies of Rome. Some actively worked for the destruction of the empire, while others engaged in a conflict whose apparent aim was sharing some of the rewards of the empire—namely, Roman citizenship. The main achievement of Sulla and of his close associates is to have reversed this process, and to have regained the friendship, or at least the cooperation, of the local elites. To attain this result, winning both wars that Rome had been compelled to fight was definitely not enough: a major political

²⁴ Cic. *imp. Cn. Pomp.* 7.19: *deinde, quod nos eadem Asia atque idem iste Mithridates initio belli Asiatici docuit, id quidem certe calamitate docti memoria retinere debemus. nam tum, cum in Asia res magnas permulti amiserant, scimus Romae solutione impedita fidem concidisse. non enim possunt una in ciuitate multi rem ac fortunas amittere ut non pluris secum in eandem trahant calamitatem* (“moreover, we certainly ought to remember what the same Asia and this same Mithridates taught us at the beginning of the Asiatic war, since we were taught it through disaster. For, when many people had lost large fortunes in Asia, we know that there was a collapse of credit in Rome owing to the suspension of payment. It is, indeed, impossible for many individuals in a single city to lose their property and fortunes without involving even more people in the same ruin”). My debt to the interpretation of Roman economy outlined in Crawford 1977a; Hopkins 1978, 1–96; Hopkins 1980; Crawford 1985, esp. 152–218 and Hopkins 1995/1996 will be apparent throughout this book.

operation was necessary. In his study on Augustus and the Greek world, G.W. Bowersock pointed out that by the end of the first century BC the unity of the empire was guaranteed by a powerful network of personal relationships among Roman and local elites.²⁵ What he said of the Greek East is certainly true, *mutatis mutandis*, of Italy too. In the first section of this book, I will therefore try to study the beginning, or rather the *new* beginning, of this process after the major shocks of the wars against the Italian allies and Mithridates, and I will try to show the importance of Sulla's contribution to it.

The second part of this study will be devoted to Sulla's impact on the administration of the empire. A new compromise between Rome and local elites required, especially after a phase of intense conflict, a clear system of rewards for those who had kept their loyalty and a range of sanctions for those who had refused to accept the Roman hegemony. The discussion outlined in the first part must therefore be complemented by the analysis of the administrative development of the empire. In the East, distinguishing between friends and foes was quite easy: support for Mithridates was the basic criterion for identifying those who deserved punishment.²⁶ On the other hand, the situation in Italy was more complex, as the Social War had been followed by a civil war, in which what was at stake was no longer loyalty to Rome or to Mithridates, but loyalty to Sulla or to his enemies. The consequences of Sulla's initiatives on the making of Roman Italy were very significant, as both the proscriptions and the colonisation show.

Rebuilding consensus for, and even confidence in, the empire also required a strong attention to ideology, and it is on this aspect that the third part will concentrate. Modern scholarship has long recognised the importance of religious motifs in Sulla's political discourse and propaganda. It appears, however, that the importance of religion in his imperial strategy has not been adequately assessed. The use that Sulla made of the kinship between Venus and Rome in his relations with the Greek East is extremely significant, and must be studied as a crucial aspect of Sulla's contribution to the consolidation of the empire. This theme also played an important role in the aftermath of the Mithridatic War, when Sulla tried to represent himself as a new founder of Rome.

²⁵ Bowersock 1965, 6–13.

²⁶ The distinction made in Bernhardt 1985, 57 between the cities who chose to follow Mithridates and those who were compelled to do that was irrelevant from Sulla's point of view.

Its influence on other prominent figures of the late Republic, namely Pompey and Caesar, is indisputable.

I intend to approach Sulla's contribution to the making of the Roman empire from three different points of view, which may complement each other in many ways: the evolution of political and social relations, the administration of the empire, and the religious aspects of the imperial ideology. On the one hand, I will try to assess the importance of Sulla at each of these levels. On the other, I will try to show their interconnections. Like all empires, the Roman empire is by definition many-fold, even labyrinthine. This study is an attempt to make sense of it in a specific phase of its development, by taking the remarkable contribution of an individual as a starting point.

PART I

PUNISHMENT AND REWARDS.
SULLA AND THE ELITES

INTRODUCTION

Between the 90s and the 80s of the first century BC, the Roman empire went through its most severe crisis between the Second Punic War and late Antiquity. Two almost contemporaneous wars, the Social War in Italy and the Mithridatic War in the Greek East, put its very survival into question, and compelled the Roman elite to a reaction on a full scale. The crisis triggered by these two conflicts had major consequences on internal political life too, and ultimately led to a civil war, from which the general and former consul Lucius Cornelius Sulla, the winner of the Mithridatic War, emerged as the winner, and assumed full powers, which enabled him to carry out a series of constitutional reforms.

The aim of this study is to identify Sulla's role in the organisation and in the consolidation of the empire after this crisis. Attention will be devoted to the geographical areas where Sulla operated, namely Italy and the Greek East, which, at that stage, were surely the most important regions of the empire.¹ Italy was the political centre of the empire already before the extension of Roman citizenship to the Allies. The province of Asia was exceptionally remunerative, and so important for the financial stability of the empire. The stability of Greece was a very significant condition for Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean.

The most striking aspect of the critical period Rome managed to make her way through is that many of the local elites became her enemies, and actively plotted to destroy her empire. A few decades after the victory of Sulla, however, the traces of this almost fatal crisis were barely noticeable. A political process had taken place, which had led the Roman and the local elites to interact much more closely than in the past, and the empire to derive new, unprecedented vigour from such cooperation.

¹ Although he tried to intervene in the succession to the throne of Egypt in 81 (App. *b.c.* 1.102.476), Sulla was not seriously interested in strengthening Roman control on the kingdom, especially because he lacked time and resources to do so: Santangelo 2005.

I will try to show that Sulla's contribution to this process was in fact substantial, although it is usually underrated by current scholarship. As I have anticipated in the introduction, the first step to be taken in doing so is to study the role that the elites in Italy and in the Greek East played in the crisis of the Roman empire. I am aware of the profound differences between the societies, and the elites, I am going to deal with. I am confident that these differences will emerge quite strongly from my discussion too. However, I believe that some similar patterns, both in the way the elites acted and in the methods that Sulla chose to deal with them, will be apparent from the discussion of different contexts.

I will discuss the Greek East first, and Italy in the second section of this part. This choice derives from chronology, of course, but it is a logical one too. I believe that some of the strategies Sulla used in Italy may be better understood in light of what he had done and learnt in the East. It was in the East that he had to face the most substantial threats to the survival of the empire.² Indeed, I am going to start my discussion by dealing with the elements that made such an impressive crisis possible.

² Badian 1958, 245 stresses Sulla's "ability to learn, especially from his enemies"—although he refers to those he had in Rome and in Italy.

CHAPTER ONE

A SILENT CRISIS, A NOISY COLLAPSE

As handbooks often remind us, Sulla poses a paradox common to all radical conservatives. Apparently, his aim was to bring Roman politics back to the balance of power that preceded the Gracchan crisis, but he was prepared to seize supremacy using the most traumatic ‘political method’, even by marching on Rome and organising the elimination of his opponents.¹ Furthermore, many initiatives of Sulla are so difficult to interpret because we do not know a single line of speeches, and we have very little of his autobiography.²

On the other hand, what we know from the literary tradition about Sulla’s behaviour and attitude is quite extraordinary, already from the very beginning of his career. As I shall try to show, his exceptional personality interestingly fits into the context of a general crisis of Roman imperial strategy. We know that he belonged to a patrician family, which had completely tarnished its political credibility five generations before him; this compelled him to build a political career on his own efforts. We are told about the first important moment of his career in a famous section of Sallust’s *Bellum Iugurthinum*, where he enters the narrative as he arrives in Africa as Marius’ quaestor, probably in 106 BC, bringing allied cavalry reinforcements.³ The exceptional importance of this source prompts a detailed discussion.

The description provided by Sallust, who could make use of a wide range of sources on that period, typically fits the model of the ‘paradoxical portrait’, whose importance in Roman historiography does not need to be restated here.⁴ Besides having an undisputable literary value, this description may be used as an interpretation of a certain phase

¹ On the concept of ‘political method’ in late Republican history, see Meier 1965 and Meier 1966.

² The fragments and *testimonia* of Sulla’s memoirs are edited in *HRR*², 1.195–204 and in Chassignet 2004, 171–184. There is a vast bibliography on this topic: Suerbaum 2002; Chassignet 2004, XCIX–CIV, 240–247.

³ Sall. *Jug.* 95.1; also cf. Val. Max. 6.9.6 and Plut. *Sull.* 3.1–6.

⁴ La Penna 1968, 226–227, 256; La Penna 1976, 283–285 (= La Penna 1978, 208–211); Labate 1977/1978, 38–39.

of the Roman imperial strategy and as the symptom of a broader crisis, which will be more fully dealt with later in this part. It also is an important assessment of the role played by Sulla in this process, and it is mainly in this respect that it must be attentively considered.

Sallust says that, when he first joined the Jugurthan campaign, Sulla was an inexperienced commander. However, he soon managed to gain a remarkable expertise. Besides being extremely ambitious, he was prepared to respect his commander-in-chief Gaius Marius and to keep his loyalty to him. At the same time he knew how to obtain respect and obedience from his soldiers through using his *comitas* with them, sharing their labour and their daily efforts.⁵ Significantly, the portrait of Sulla emerges in a narrative whose central argument is the crisis of the Roman elite, paralysed and blinded by its internal divisions and factional disputes. Marius, the commander-in-chief of the Roman army, despite being a *homo novus*, was already part of this world and shared all its limits. On the other hand, Sulla proved himself capable of a different approach. He was much more than Marius' *alter ego*.⁶ He knew how to lead his soldiers, how to motivate them and retain their loyalty; at the same time, he knew how to be ruthless, if necessary. His negotiations with the local dynast Bocchus, leading to the treacherous capture of Jugurtha, were the clearest example of his talents.⁷ However, although the merit of the victory was mainly to be credited to him, Sulla did not hesitate to hand the prisoner to Marius, thus enabling him to obtain his triumph and most of the political dividends of the success.

It is quite safe to argue that Marius and Sulla were still on good terms at this stage of their careers, and that their cooperation continued unabated until the campaign against the Cimbrians.⁸ Sallust stresses Sulla's loyalty: "in the meantime he did not undermine the reputation of the consul or of any good man, like those who are moved by evil ambition, and his only aim was not to be surpassed by anyone in counsel or in action, and he did outclass most people".⁹ This is a very significant point, especially because it features in a work written

⁵ Sall. *Jug.* 96.1–4; see Paul 1984, 238.

⁶ Cf. C. Kraus 1999, 221, 241–242.

⁷ On the negotiations between Sulla and Bocchus before the capture of Jugurtha, see Sall. *Jug.* 105–112. On Jugurtha's capture, see Sall. *Jug.* 113; Diod. 35.39; Plut. *Sull.* 3; id. *Mar.* 10.

⁸ Plut. *Sull.* 4.1–2; *uir. ill.* 75.3.

⁹ Sall. *Jug.* 96.3: *neque interim, quod praua ambitio solet, consulis aut cuiusquam boni famam laedere, tantummodo neque consilio neque manu priorem alium pati, plerosque anteuinire.*

by an author who had no sympathy whatsoever for Sulla and his later achievements.¹⁰

In a time when the Roman elite as a whole was proving itself inadequate to face the role of Rome as a world-power, and was losing cohesion in a fierce competition for political supremacy, Sulla stands out as a new politician, exceptionally dynamic, but capable to embody the old patrician virtues (“Sulla was a noble of patrician family... of great courage, a pleasure-seeker, but even hungrier for glory”) and, potentially, an innovative model of leadership too (“eloquent, clever and quick to befriend people, with an incredibly astute mind when it came to dissimulate his aims, generous with many things, and especially with money”).¹¹

Of course, Sallust’s portrait of Sulla is not to be taken as completely reliable evidence. It was certainly influenced by a favourable tradition that Sulla’s *Memoirs* had contributed to shape and, perhaps even more importantly, it had to fit the broad historiographical and literary agenda of the monograph. Sallust may have had a point in stressing the novelty of Sulla’s relationship with his soldiers:

“he addressed the soldiers in a friendly way, he granted favours to many at their request and to others of his own will; he was not keen to accept any for himself, but paid them more promptly than a debt of money; he never asked anyone for a loan, and he rather made efforts so that as many men as possible had a debt to him; he talked in jest or seriously with the humblest soldiers... he soon became very dear to Marius and to the soldiers”.¹²

However, he was certainly wrong in depicting him as a figure who confined his ambition only to the field of military value: “his only effort was not to be surpassed by anyone in counsel or in action”.

¹⁰ Sall. *Jug.* 95.5–6: *atque illi felicissimo omnium ante ciuilem uictoriam numquam super industriam fortuna fuit, multique dubitare, fortior an felicior esset. nam postea quae fecerit, incertum habeo pudeat an pigeat magis disserere* (“fortune was never greater than his merits—he was the most fortunate before the victory in the civil war—and many doubted whether he was more valourous or more fortunate. As to what he did later, I do not know whether one should discuss it with shame or with sorrow”). See Paul 1984, 237.

¹¹ Sall. *Jug.* 95.4: *Sulla gentis patriciae nobilis fuit... animo ingenti, cupidus voluptatum, sed gloriae cupidior... facundus, callidus et amicitia facilis, ad simulanda negotia altitudo ingeni incredibilis, multarum rerum ac maxime pecuniae largitor*. La Penna 1968, 226–232, esp. 227–228; Labate 1977/1978, 39–40; Zecchini 2002, 46–47.

¹² Sall. *Jug.* 96.2–4: *militēs benigne appellare; multis rogantibus aliis per se ipse dare beneficia, inuitus accipere, sed ea properantius quam aes mutuū reddere, ipse ab nullo repetere, magis id laborare ut illi quam plurimi deberent; ioca atque seria cum humillimis agere... breui Mario militibusque carissimus factus*.

In fact, the special relationship that Sulla built with Bocchus before the capture of Jugurtha would soon have significant political consequences in Rome. Plutarch says that Sulla did not hesitate to portray the scene of Jugurtha's capture on his seal and, more importantly, that Bocchus himself financed a statue of Sulla to be put on the Capitol, celebrating this military achievement. The political consequences were quite predictable.¹³ Plutarch's evidence is clearly at odds with Sallust's narrative. Sulla's career ambitions, however, do not concern us here. What matters to our purposes is that Sallust stressed the importance of a figure like Sulla, emerging in a critical moment for the empire. He was more than a skilled commander: he had a great potential as a political leader, capable to build relationships that could turn useful both for himself and for Rome.¹⁴ It is on this aspect that I intend to concentrate my discussion.

As Sallust knew all too well, the war against Jugurtha, in which Sulla played such a decisive role, was one of the symptoms of a much wider crisis which Rome was undergoing at the close of the second century BC. The conflict in Northern Africa derived from a sudden strain in the relations with a local dynast who used to be on very good terms with Rome until some time before. It was soon followed by the attack of the Cimbrians from the north, which had completely independent causes, and derived from the persisting weakness of Rome in Transalpine Gaul.¹⁵ Moreover, the development of that conflict shows that the Roman presence in Cisalpine Gaul was not strong enough either, in spite of the extensive colonisation plans carried out in the second century BC. The fragmentary evidence for this period suggests that the involvement of Rome in the area did increase after the German wars.¹⁶

The most serious threats to the consolidation and the stability of the empire, however, came from the East. The creation of the province of Asia, following Attalus III's bequest of his kingdom to Rome in

¹³ On the deteriorating relationship between Marius and Sulla, see Epstein 1987, 50.

¹⁴ On Sulla's leadership style, cf. Plut. *Sull.* 6.14–23 (esp. 14 on his use of adulation); *Compar. Lys. Sull.* 2.5–7, 3. The talent for captivating sympathy and support plays an even more significant role in the parallel characterisation of Lysander: see Plut. *Lys.* 2.4 and 19.1–6, with Schepens 2001, 548–550.

¹⁵ Cf. however Justin 38.3.6, mentioning talks between Mithridates Eupator, the Cimbrians and other Gallic populations, which probably took place in 103, soon after the beginning of the war.

¹⁶ The best discussion is Badian 1966, 907–910.

133BC, had not stabilised the region.¹⁷ The most immediate danger to Roman interests came from piracy, which was remarkably strong in the region somewhat loosely defined as Cilicia. The military craft of the *maritimi praedones* had become a serious political problem. After being intensively exploited by Rome to supply her slave market, it had gone out of control. Moreover, another regional power was gaining an increasingly important role in the Greek East. The kingdom of the Mithridatids in northeast Asia Minor, inaccurately called ‘Pontus’ by most modern scholars, was steadily increasing its power and influence under the lead of the King Mithridates VI Eupator.¹⁸ Seemingly, the King’s good relations with Rome were not yet in any doubt, although, from the Roman point of view, his activism certainly did not contribute to stability in the region.

Mainland Greece appears to have been a less critical front, but some external threats were at work nearby too. There is evidence that at the very end of the second century the Thracian Chersonesus was under pressure from a barbarian population, the Caeni, and that the governor of Macedonia Titus Didius was assigned the task of dealing with them by expanding the usual boundaries of his (already fairly wide-ranging) *prouincia*.¹⁹ We owe this information to a legal document whose importance for the understanding of this period can hardly be underestimated: a statute voted probably in 100/99BC, preserved by two inscriptions found in Delos and Cnidus, and known as the *lex de prouinciis praetoriis*.²⁰ It was this statute that provided the essential framework for the administration in the provinces of the Greek East in the early years of Sulla’s career.

¹⁷ Sherwin-White 1977, 66 rightly stresses how remarkable and unexpected the annexation of the Kingdom was, “though historians generally take it for granted”.

¹⁸ See the recent survey in de Callatay 2003, 223–229. The concepts of ‘Pontic kingdom’ and ‘Pontic ethnicity’ are anachronistic, since they derive from the name of the Roman province of Pontus: see Mitchell 2002.

¹⁹ Cf. Obseq. 43, recording a victory over the Thracians in 104BC.

²⁰ The statute is now edited, with a new commentary, by M.H. Crawford, J.M. Reynolds, J.-L. Ferrary and P. Moreau in *RS*, no. 12, 230–270; also cf. *IvKnidos* 31. For a discussion of the history of text, with special regard to the debate following the publication of the Cnidus copy, see *RS*, 231–237. The relevant passage of the statute is Cnidus copy, col. IV, 5–30; for an historical discussion, see Hassall-Crawford-Reynolds 1974, 213 and *RS*, 264. The name of the statute accepted here, proposed by Ferrary 1977, seems preferable to *lex de piratis persequendis*, or to *lex de Cilicia et Macedonia prouinciis*, suggested by Kallet-Marx 1995, 226 and Dmitriev 2005b, 85.

One of its aims was to favour the reorganisation of the Roman presence in the East by redefining the *prouvinciae* of the governors deployed in the area. The clause on the Thracian Chersonesus is a symptom of an important aspect of the crisis that the statute tried to tackle. Rome had an inadequate number of magistrates with *imperium* in charge of provincial administration in the East. This was a serious disadvantage in such a turbulent context and, indeed, it was an important factor in the outbreak of the First Mithridatic War.

Even under the new statute the governor of Macedonia had to stretch his field of action up to Thrace. Until the first assignment of the Cilician command, probably decided in 103/102, the governor of the province of Asia had been the only Roman official entrusted with fighting piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Rome's direct involvement in the Greek East was still inadequate if compared to her role in the Mediterranean world and to the demands of her empire. This caused serious problems, which had been debated at least since Pydna and were also a matter of interest in Sallust's *Bellum Jugurthinum*: to what extent Rome was prepared to get directly involved in the East, how her elite should face such a challenge, and how the decision-making process in Roman foreign policy should work.

The *lex de prouinciis praetoriis* was an attempt to deal with some of these matters, and it marked several substantial developments. It was not just a law aiming at the consolidation of Roman supremacy in the Mediterranean. Its very existence implied a less prominent role for the Senate in the administration of the Empire. By this statute, the people intervened in the provincial administration and made innovative choices, such as refusing to send senatorial legates to the Caenic Chersonesus, which was an exception to the usual procedure that led to the inclusion of a new territory under Roman rule.²¹ Moreover, the statute was inspired by the need to defend Roman interests in the Mediterranean, certainly with an eye to the demands of Roman *negotiatores* and their need for security. These groups tended to be loyal to Marius and his associates, although their interests were certainly not in conflict with those of the majority of the senators.²²

Indeed, one of the most interesting aspects of the *lex de prouinciis praetoriis* is the evidence it provides for the emergence of a new dimension

²¹ About the political significance of this statute, see Hassall-Crawford-Reynolds 1974, 219 and Ferrary 1977, 654–660.

²² Mitchell 1993, 29–30.

in Roman legislative texts: a concept which one may call, with modern terminology, ‘Roman interest’. The section of the statute dealing with the *prouincia Cilicia* specifies that its function was to ensure that “the citizens of Rome and the allies and the Latins, and those of the foreign nations who enjoyed the friendship with the Roman people, may sail in safety”.²³ The explicit reference to Roman citizens and allies operating in the East is an aspect of the wider problem of mobility within the empire and, specifically, of the mobility of people to and from Italy, the political centre of the empire.

Migration from Italy had been an important aspect of the consolidation of Roman presence and rule in the Greek world from the mid-second century BC. Its impact on the economic and social history of Italy was equally striking. The experience shared by Roman and Italian *negotiatores* in the Greek East created the perception of Italian unity long before the enfranchisement of the Allies, virtually eliding status distinctions between citizens and non-citizens.²⁴ It showed more and more clearly that the discrimination between the Romans and their *socii* was anachronistic in the context of the Mediterranean empire, and it ensured that the need for the involvement of the Allies in the administration and the full exploitation of the Empire would be treated as an urgent issue. In a way, this background aspect of the Social War may already be noticed between the lines of the *lex de prouinciis praetoriis* too. The increasing importance of the Italian presence in the Greek East had compelled the Roman elite to revise its strategies accordingly.

However, there was another important aspect about this crisis, which we cannot expect the text of this statute to shed light on. Roman rule in the Greek East was not building any consensus, and not even any bond of trust. On the contrary, it was failing to reward its subjects in any way, and to ensure the protection they needed. The pressure of the tax-collectors on the economy of Asia Minor was unrestrained, and favoured by corrupt officials. Piracy was poorly controlled by the Roman fleet, and kept the coasts of Asia Minor under constant threat.

²³ Cnidus Copy, col. III, l. 31–37: ἐν ἐπιμελείαι (—), ὥστε τοὺς | πολίτας Ῥωμαίων καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους Λα- | τίνους τε τῶν τε ἐκτὸς ἔθνων, οἵτινες ἐν | τῇ φιλίας τοῦ δήμου Ῥωμαίων εἰσὶν, μετ’ ἄσ- | φαλείας πλοίξεσθαι δύνωνται τὴν τε Κίλι- | κίαν διὰ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν νό- | μον ἐπαρχίαν στρατηγικὴν πεποιημέναι (the English translation above is by M.H. Crawford).

²⁴ Gabba 1954a, 78–82 (= Gabba 1973, 239–245) is still invaluable. On the cultural integration on the Italians in the Greek East, see Càssola 1970/1971 (= Càssola 1993, 197–212); Errington 1988; cf. already Hatzfeld 1919, 379–380.

Ultimately, the presence of Rome was worsening the position of the local communities, and it was causing a serious loss of trust among their elites. The conditions for Mithridates' breakthrough were gradually being prepared.

Sulla's career started in this critical phase of Roman imperialism, and he soon had to deal with difficult situations. After his praetorship, probably in 96 BC, he was sent to the East.²⁵ At first glance, the literary sources are not very clear even about the exact denomination of his *prouincia*.²⁶ Appian is quite explicit: in the famous speech he addresses to Mithridates during the conference of Dardanus, Sulla openly claims to "have brought Ariobarzanes back to Cappadocia, while I was governing Cilicia".²⁷

As in many discussions of the making of the Roman Empire, the original meaning of the word *prouincia* (a mission, rather than a territory, a magistrate is entrusted with) must be borne in mind.²⁸ Since 103/102, Rome had begun appointing promagistrates to the *prouincia Cilicia*, also mentioned in the Greek text of the *lex de prouinciis praetoriis* as ἐπαρχία Κιλικία.²⁹ As recalled above, the purpose of this command was to fight piracy, and explicit evidence survives for the victory obtained in 102 by Marcus Antonius, the famous orator, on *maritimos praedones, id est piratas*.³⁰ Thanks to the statute, we also know that it was a military command, entrusted to a praetor at the end of his mandate, with an explicit and well identified target.³¹ It must be stressed that the statute does not ratify any territorial annexation in this area. In fact, there

²⁵ Brennan 1992, 144–158. For a full overview of the scholarly literature on these problems, see Hatscher 2001.

²⁶ Plut. *Sull.* 5.6; Liv. *Per.* 70.6; App. *b. c.* 1.77.350; *Mithr.* 57.231; *vir. ill.* 75.4.

²⁷ App. *Mithr.* 57.231: ἐς μὲν Καππαδοκίαν ἐγὼ κατήγαγον Ἀριοβαρζάνην, Κιλικίας ἄρχων ("I restored Ariobarzanes to the throne of Cappadocia when I was in charge of Cilicia").

²⁸ About the early history of the *prouincia Cilicia*, see Syme 1939b, 302 (= Syme 1979, 123); Levick 1967, 21–24; Sherwin-White 1984, 97–101; Freeman 1986. The arguments of Bertrand 1989, who claims that the word *prouincia* had originally a territorial connotation, are not convincing.

²⁹ Cnidus Copy, col. III, l. 35–37.

³⁰ Liv. *Per.* 68; see also Obs. 44. Sherwin-White 1976, 4 argues that Antonius led operations in the mainland, but there is no evidence supporting this claim.

³¹ Ἐπαρχία στρατιωτική certainly does not mean *prouincia militaris*, as suggested by Sherwin-White 1976, 7, but "praetorian province": see Brennan 2000, 358, with further bibliography. Bertrand 1989, 194–195 misses the point by stating that the province was not "ectoplasmique" by 100 BC: even so, it still was not closely related to an identifiable territory.

is no evidence for the establishment of the command as a permanent one, nor that a Roman governor was already present in Cilicia when the statute was voted in Rome.³²

Sulla is the first known magistrate to be assigned the *prouincia Cilicia* after Marcus Antonius. Plutarch gives his views about Sulla's actual task in a passage with an interestingly Thucydidean flavour: he "was sent to Cappadocia, the ostensible purpose of the expedition being to restore Ariobarzanes on his throne, but with the real purpose to stop Mithridates, who was restless and was about to add to his dominion and power a territory not smaller than that he had inherited".³³ Therefore, Sulla was formally ordered to restore the authority of a king who was a friend and an ally of the Romans and had asked for their support; in fact, however, the issue had a broader political relevance. Mithridates was unwilling to comply with the deliberations of the Senate, which had declared the freedom of Cappadocia and then accepted the appointment of a new king, but he was careful not to get directly involved in the conflict. Ariobarzanes was dethroned by Mithridates' friend Gordius with the help of the Armenian King Tigranes II.³⁴ However, the troops of Mithridates apparently were not in the region during Sulla's command, and did not fight against the Romans—unless the clash between Sulla and Archelaus briefly mentioned by Frontinus took place during Sulla's Cilician command.³⁵ At any rate, Plutarch's account implies that a war against Mithridates could not be formally declared.

According to the *lex de prouinciis praetoriis*, Cilicia was a province for the policing of the Eastern Mediterranean. However, we do not

³² See the commentary *ad loc.* in *RS*, 261–262. The treatment provided by Liebmman-Frankfort 1969, 447–457, esp. 447–450 (accepted by Merola 1996, 292–296) is misleading: see Crawford 1990, 106.

³³ Plut. *Sull.* 5.6: εἰς τὴν Καππαδοκίαν ἀποστέλλεται, τὸν μὲν ἐμφανῆ λόγον ἔχων πρὸς τὴν στρατείαν Ἀριοβαρζάνην καταγαγεῖν, αἰτίαν δὲ ἀληθῆ Μιθριδάτην ἐπισχεῖν πολυπραγμονοῦντα καὶ περιβαλλόμενον ἀρχὴν καὶ δύναμιν οὐκ ἐλάττωνα τῆς ὑπαρχούσης. This passage might derive from Sulla's autobiography.

³⁴ On this alliance, see Just. 38.3.1–3. On the whole dynastic crisis, see Dmitriev 2006, with a full summary of earlier bibliography.

³⁵ Front. *Strat.* 1.5.18: *idem aduersus Archelaum praefectum Mithridatis in Cappadocia, iniquitate locorum et multitudine hostium pressus, fecit pacis mentionem interpositoque tempore etiam induciarum et per haec auocata intentione aduersariorum euasit* ("the same [Sulla], when he was fighting in Cappadocia against Archelaus, general of Mithridates, embarrassed by the difficulty of the ground and the great number of the enemies, proposed peace; then, taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the truce and using it to divert the attention of the opponents, he slipped away").

have any evidence for a military confrontation with the pirates during Sulla's mission.³⁶ The victory of Marcus Antonius in 102/101 had not been definitive, of course. The extent of that success is unclear, while the incidence of piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean and its survival on a large scale until Pompey's campaign are well known.³⁷ The lack of evidence does not rule out that some confrontation actually took place between the pirates and Sulla. The actual link between the fight against piracy and the restoration of Ariobarzanes, however, is usually overlooked in modern scholarship. Rather than postulating that Sulla prioritised the solution of the dynastic crisis over the fight against the pirates, it may be argued that they just were the two faces of the same coin. From Rome's point of view, stopping Mithridates' aggressive plans may have seemed a way to contrast piracy more effectively too.

The first contact he had with an envoy of the King of Parthia may also be seen as part of a strategy seeking to stabilise the area, which of course included the fight against piracy.³⁸ *Amicitia* was established between the two parties, and some agreement appears to have been reached about the respective areas of influence: the Euphrates was agreed to be the frontier between the area controlled by the Romans and their friend Ariobarzanes, and the territory in the hands of the Parthians and their ally Tigranes.³⁹ Parthian neutrality was to prove quite significant in the near future, namely during the phase of general instability triggered by the First Mithridatic War.

³⁶ Tac. *ann.* 12.62 is not relevant, *pace* Dmitriev 2005b, 92.

³⁷ At any rate, there is reason to believe that Rome kept exploiting piracy to supply her slave market: Ferrary 1978, 780–781.

³⁸ Plut. *Sull.* 5.8–10. On the symbolic implications of the meeting, see Gisborne 2005, 112–113. There is a number of informed treatments of Rome's early relations with the Parthians: see Dobiaś 1931, 218–221 (probably still the best discussion available); Keaveney 1981a, 195–199.

³⁹ See Liv. *Per.* 70.7: *Parthorum legati a rege Arsace missi uenerunt ad Syllam, ut amicitiam populi Romani peterent* ("the ambassadors of Parthians, sent by King Arsaces, went to Sulla to ask for the friendship of the Roman People") and Fest. *Brev.* 15.2: *primum a Lucio Sylla proconsule Arsaces, rex Parthorum, missa legatione amicitias populi Romani rogauit ac meruit* ("at first Arsaces, King of the Parthians, asked the proconsul Lucius Sulla for the friendship of the Roman people by sending an embassy, and he obtained it"). Cf. Vell. 2.24.3. Keaveney 1981a, 198 argues that a *foedus* was concluded; *contra*, Sherwin-White 1984, 219–220. I do not think that the later marriage between Mithridates of Parthia and Tigranes' daughter is as a symptom of a hostile attitude towards Rome, caused by Sulla's diplomatic recklessness, as suggested by Debevoise 1938, 46–47. Although Mithridates' envoy Pelopidas told the Romans that Arsaces was a "friend" of the King (App. *Mithr.* 15.54), there is no evidence that Mithridates ever received military support from the Parthians.

Brennan has persuasively suggested that Sulla remained in Cappadocia for three years, by an ordinary system of prorogation that the lack of competition for the *prouvincia Cilicia* made it easy to enact.⁴⁰ Marcus Antonius, who had operated in the area for a short time, appears not to have obtained remarkable or lasting results. His experience must have warned against adopting hasty solutions. The magistrates in charge of the province of Cilicia no doubt controlled some territory, which was functional to the development of military operations and to the policing of the hinterland. The bulk of the province was Pamphylia, although Lycaonia, usually a part of Asia, was occasionally included in it.⁴¹ The *lex de prouinciis praetoriis* makes it clear that Lycaonia already belonged in the *prouvincia Asia* in 100/99 BC, while, a few years later, Sulla and Oppius appear to have controlled it as part of the *prouvincia Cilicia*, since a mission to Cappadocia required the passage of troops through Pamphylia and Lycaonia.⁴²

Little is known, however, about the scope of Sulla's mission, and this makes an assessment of its impact quite difficult. Apparently, he could not use a large Roman contingent: the lack of ἴδια δύναμις was compensated by the contribution of auxiliary troops provided by some Cappadocian communities and by other σύμμαχοι πρόθυμοι—a kind of 'coalition of the willing', which certainly included Rhodes.⁴³ An honorific inscription celebrating the diplomatic achievements of a Rhodian notable—unfortunately anonymous—includes a reference to Sulla στραταγὸν ἀνθύπατον Ῥωμαίων (*IG* 12.1.48 = *Syll.*³ 745, l. 1–2). This *Lucius Cornelius L. fil.*, whose *cognomen* was engraved on a missing part of the stone, should almost certainly be identified with Sulla, who is the first in a list of Roman magistrates with whom the dedicatee had diplomatic relations. Each magistrate seems to be referred to by the function he had when he met the anonymous Greek, and the order in which they are listed is clearly chronological. L. Licinius Murena

⁴⁰ See Brennan 1992, 137–144, who does not share the extreme, and untenable, view of Cagniat 1991, 297–303, whereby Sulla was a marginal political figure until his successful command in the Social War in 89.

⁴¹ Ferrary 2001a, 102–103; Ferrary 2003, 406–407. On the ἐπαρχεία Λυκαονία in the *lex de prouinciis praetoriis*, see *RS*, 260–261. On the borders of the *prouvincia Asia*, see Dmitriev 2005b, esp. 72–83.

⁴² See Cnidus copy, col. III, l. 22–27. The problem is discussed by Ferrary 2000a, 168–170, partly correcting Syme 1939b, 299–300 (= Syme 1979, 120–121). About Q. Oppius, see Bertrand 1978, 798 and Brennan 2000, 358–359.

⁴³ *Plut. Sull.* 5.7. It seems however excessive to argue, with Brunt 1971, 434, that he had only a "personal escort of Romans".

is called ἡμπεράτωρ—a title he assumed in 83/82, before coming back to Rome in 81 to celebrate his triumph—while Lucullus is called ἀντιπαμίαν, having been left in Asia by Sulla at the end of the war as a pro-quaestor. Sulla is called στρατηγὸν ἀνθύπατον Ῥωμαίων, a title corresponding to the rank of a propraeor with a proconsular *imperium*.⁴⁴ Moreover, the absence of any reference to Sulla's military achievements and to his proclamation as *imperator* during the First Mithridatic War makes it very probable that the text refers to the Cilician command. The parallel reference to Murena's title, obtained during the same conflict, would otherwise be difficult to explain.⁴⁵

The political context that *Syll.*³ 745 refers to must be discussed by looking at the development of the relations between the island and Rome. An important passage of Polybius, mainly devoted to the account of the speech delivered to the Senate by the Rhodian ambassador Astymedes, is evidence for the new alliance concluded with Rome in 164 BC, after the crisis of three years earlier.⁴⁶ Rather than on a military basis, it was founded on a mutual declaration of friendship and on a formal commitment on the part of the Rhodians to comply with the requirements of Rome. After failing to confront piracy effectively when it could present a danger to the Seleucids, Rhodes chose to take part in the fight undertaken by Rome.⁴⁷

A passage of the *lex de provinciis praetoriis* shows that Rhodian ambassadors were given the right to obtain audiences *extra ordinem* by the Senate, in order to receive messages addressed to “the kings”.⁴⁸ They played the role of intermediaries between Rome and the Hellenistic kingdoms that took part in the fight against pirates. Certainly, Rome did not ignore the issue of naval safety even when a Cilician com-

⁴⁴ See Magie 1905, 10, 84; *contra*, Mason 1974, 160–161 (where *Syll.*³ 745 is wrongly dated to 82 BC).

⁴⁵ Ferrary 2000a, 181; *contra*, Wosnik 1963, 77–79 and Berthold 1984, 222, fn. 24, who date the text to the period of the First Mithridatic War. Murena is called ἡμπεράτωρ in an inscription from Messene too (*IG* 5.1.1454: on the Sullan connections in the Peloponnese, see Accame 1946, 139). Eilers 1996 convincingly suggests, on the basis of *IoPriene* 121, that Murena held a proquaestorship in Asia Minor in 100 BC ca.; see Ferrary 2000a, 171–172. Eilers is surely right in saying, at 182, that this may have influenced Sulla's decision to put Murena in charge of the province of Asia after the Mithridatic War.

⁴⁶ Plb. 30.31.

⁴⁷ Bresson 2002, 147–156 shows that the Italian community on the island was far from insignificant in the Republican period, although modern scholars have repeatedly stated the contrary.

⁴⁸ Delphi copy, block B, l. 12–20.

mand was not assigned to a magistrate. The loyalty of the island would remain unfailing even during the First Mithridatic War, as was the case with neighbouring Caria. Sulla duly rewarded Rhodes' loyalty at the end of the conflict with the confirmation of its freedom and autonomy. The Senate later endorsed it, after receiving a delegation led by the orator Apollonius Molon.⁴⁹

Despite the swiftness of Rome's allies, it is clear that, as far as the fight against piracy was concerned, Sulla's Cilician command brought no discontinuity with the past. From a strategic point of view, the results of the mission were quite poor: the dynastic crisis in Cappadocia was temporarily solved, but it was soon to be reopened by the military activity of Mithridates, which caused the outbreak of the First Mithridatic War. Sulla himself was aware of the persisting problems in the area even after the reorganisation of Asia and, when in power, he fostered the assignment of other promagistrates to Cilicia: Cn. Cornelius Dolabella in 80–79 and Servilius Isauricus in 78–74.⁵⁰ The intrinsic limits of Sulla's *prouincia* must be taken into account too. He was entrusted with a complex mission without receiving adequate military support, having to rely on Rome's local allies. However, by the end of his command, Sulla had at least gained valuable first-hand knowledge of the Greek East. In light of what he achieved some years later, the importance of this background becomes apparent.

The increasingly precarious balance of the Roman East would collapse a few years after Sulla's mission to Cilicia. Mithridates' victorious campaign brought Rome's Mediterranean hegemony on the verge of collapse. Sulla's experience in Cilicia and—more importantly perhaps—his excellent record in the Social War, which I will discuss later, were no doubt important factors in earning him the consulship for 88 BC. It was no easy year for holding the supreme magistracy. By then, the offensive led by Mithridates in the Greek East was at its highest

⁴⁹ See Cic. *Brut.* 90.312: *eodem tempore Moloni dedimus operam; dictatore enim Sulla legatus ad senatum de Rhodiorum praemiis uenerat* ("in the same period we attended the lectures of Molon; he had come to Rome during the dictatorship of Sulla to address the Senate on the privileges of the Rhodians"). Molon addressed the Senate in Greek: Val. Max. 2.2.3, with Wallace-Hadrill 1998, 82–83. The embassy is likely to have taken place in 81 BC: the Senate probably confirmed the deliberations taken by Sulla, issuing a *senatusconsultum* in which the privileges of the Rhodian community were listed, as in those for Stratonicea or Tabae. On the Rhodian coinage during the Mithridatic siege, see Ashton 2001.

⁵⁰ Syme 1939b, 303 (= Syme 1979, 122). About Dolabella, see Gruen 1966, 389–398. About Servilius Isauricus, see Sherwin-White 1984, 152–158.

peak. Not only was he in control of the whole Roman province of Asia, where many Greek cities had greeted him as a liberator and thousands of Roman citizens had been killed in the so-called ‘Asiatic Vespers’. Greece was affected by Mithridates’ attack too and its cultural centre, Athens, was among the most enthusiastic supporters of the King. The phase in which the empire had been under serious threat from various sides was over. By then, the Eastern part of the empire was simply no longer in Roman hands.

The war against Mithridates was not just one of the many *diapontioi polemoi* that Rome had sustained over the last century.⁵¹ It was a war in which the survival of the empire was at stake, and the winner would obtain an extraordinary legitimisation to achieve prominence in Roman politics, if not complete supremacy. More importantly, the victorious general would be in a position to satisfy the greed of his army by exploiting the booty obtained from the reconquest of the Greek East.⁵² The soldiers’ loyalty would be ensured for some years to come. When he decided to march on Rome, in 88 BC, Sulla was certainly aware of that.

⁵¹ On the “transmarine wars”, cf. Plb. 18.35.1: ... πρότερον ἢ τοῖς διαποντίοις αὐτοὺς ἐγχειρῆσαι πολέμοις, ἕως ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἔθων καὶ νομίων ἔμενον (“...before they undertook wars across the sea, until they preserved their own principles and practices”). On the exceptional gravity of the crisis opened by the First Mithridatic War, see e. g. Ferrary 1998, 825.

⁵² Sall. *Cat.* 11.5 stresses the role of the accumulation of wealth brought about by the Mithridatic War in the moral decline of Roman society.

CHAPTER TWO

A COMPLEX STRATEGY: SULLA BETWEEN ATTICA AND BOEOTIA

The level of the military threat that Mithridates posed to Rome must not be overrated. The victories that the so-called ‘king of Pontus’ obtained at the beginning of the conflict were mainly owed to the inadequate presence of Roman legions in the Greek East and to the parallel commitment in the Social War, rather than to the qualities of his forces. As soon as Rome decided to intervene directly, the army led by Sulla, which soon included the contingent taken to Asia by Flavius Fimbria, quickly got control of the situation.¹ According to Appian, Mithridates realised that defeat was close immediately after Sulla’s arrival in Greece. Hence, he ruthlessly chose to ravage Asia Minor, aware that he would not manage to keep it for long.² It is the political strategy chosen by the King, however, that deserves to be considered more carefully here. His initiatives, although not supported by an adequate military force, were founded on an understanding of the economic aspects of Roman supremacy, based on the circulation of silver coinage, fiscal revenues and goods in the Mediterranean world. In this system Asia Minor played a pivotal role: for about five years, Mithridates effectively stopped the flow of revenues from *prouincia Asia* to the Roman West (those from Greece were comparatively almost irrelevant), undermining the financial stability of Italy. Moreover, his alliance with the pirates, however unclear to us in its details, was making the Eastern Mediterranean inaccessible to Roman ships and trade.³

Although his background was Persian, Mithridates was able to talk to the Greeks like a Hellenistic king.⁴ In Athens, for instance, he accepted

¹ On Fimbria’s victories in Asia Minor, see Liv. *Per.* 83.1–2; Memn. *FGrHist* 434 § 24; *vir. ill.* 70.2–4. On the betrayal of his army, see Liv. *Per.* 83.8; *vir. ill.* 75.4; Vell. 2.24.1. See also de Blois 2007, 172–173.

² App. *Mithr.* 92.416; cf. Liv. *Per.* 82.5.

³ See Marasco 1987, 135–143; de Souza 1999, 116–118.

⁴ On the Persian background of the Mithridatids, see Bosworth-Wheatley 1998; Mitchell 2002, 50–59; Mitchell 2005b, 528–529. See Reinach 1887, 107–108 and Rei-

election as eponymous archon for 88/87 BC, using a typical propagandistic device of the Hellenistic dynasts in an explicitly anti-Roman key.⁵ At the same time, his whole strategy was innovative. He aimed at the unification of Asia Minor under his rule; no one had ever attempted, or attained, this goal since the day of Alexander the Great. What remains of Mithridates' propaganda in the Greek cities of Asia Minor shows his attempt to foster a common Asiatic identity, involving both the Greek and the non-Greek elements.⁶ He carefully handled the matter of local and civic identities, especially when they could be used in open polemic against Rome. His decision not to abolish the *Moukieia*, the festival which the cities of the province of Asia organised in honour of Quintus Mucius Scaevola, a governor who successfully limited the abuses of the publicani in the 90s, is quite instructive in this respect.⁷

Indeed, the main question unveiled by Mithridates' attempt was the deep crisis in the relationship between Rome and the local elites in the East. Mithridates had been actively supported by most of the cities he had to come to terms with, whose elites, usually without evidence of internal clashes being left on the record, were happy to take the newcomer's side. Rome had to pursue a double plan: winning the war, and then rebuilding a constructive relationship with those she had just defeated and brought back under its rule. It was Sulla who was expected to carry it out successfully. The complexity of the situation became quite clear as soon as he arrived in Greece.

Greece was necessarily the first step of Sulla's campaign, both for geographical and strategic reasons: it was on his way to Asia Minor—the core of the conflict and of Mithridates' influence—and it was a region where Rome could still rely on a number of allied communi-

nach 1888, 450 on the presence of Pegasus on Mithridates' coinage, a typically Persian feature that the King used during the expansion of Asia Minor, and later abandoned, probably after he had to flee Pergamum. On the Hellenisation of the 'Pontic' elite, see Olshausen 1974; Ballesteros Pastor 1994.

⁵ Habicht 1976, 127–135 (= Habicht 1994, 216–223). *IG* 2².1713 reports ἀναρχία for that year: see Dow 1934, 144–146; Dow 1949, 120.

⁶ Mithridates' self-representation and propaganda have received considerable attention: see Salomone Gaggero 1977; Glew 1977a; McGing 1986, 89–108; Desideri 1990; Ramsey 1999 (also invaluable for its chronological discussion); Muccioli 2004, 151–158.

⁷ Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.19.51: *Mithridates in Asia, cum eam provinciam totam occupasset, Mucia non sustulit* ('Mithridates did not abolish the *Moukieia* in Asia, after occupying the whole of that province'). On Scaevola's outstanding record in Asia, see Diod. 37.5; Cic. *fam.* 1.9.26; Cic. *Att.* 5.17.5; Cic. *Att.* 6.1.15; Val. Max. 8.15.6; cf. Badian 1972, 89–92. His governorship may be dated between 99 and 97: see Ferrary 2000a, 163–165, 192.

ties, which could be of great help in starting a reaction to the attack. According to Plutarch, all the cities except Athens sent envoys to Sulla declaring or confirming their loyalty to Rome as soon as he arrived in Greece.⁸ According to Appian, however, some regions had been reached by Mithridates' offensive. Before Sulla's arrival, Archelaus had earned himself the support of the Achaeans and the Laconians.⁹ Most Boeotian communities had joined Mithridates too. Thespieae, traditionally a pro-Roman city, remained loyal from the start and was besieged by the Mithridatic army. Only the actions of the *legatus pro quaestore* Brutius Sura, sent there by the governor of Macedonia, Sentius, saved a deeper penetration of Archelaus into Boeotia.¹⁰ An inscription celebrates Sura's worthy actions in favour of the city.¹¹ It was not difficult for Sulla, however, to regain the support of this region as soon as he passed by.¹² The military weakness of the cities in the area certainly avoided him any serious problem.

The situation in Attica was more complicated. Athens had enthusiastically backed Mithridates early in 88 BC, as soon as the news of Roman defeat in Asia Minor reached the city. An embassy was sent to the King, led—it is unclear in what capacity—by the Aristotelian philosopher Athenion, who came back bringing Mithridates' equally enthusiastic friendship and alliance.¹³ The Athenians welcomed him with a magnificent procession; the influential corporation of the artists of Dionysus joined this manifestation of enthusiasm, and performed sacrifices in honour of the new strong man of Athenian politics—whom Posidonius brands an intruder and an illegally registered citizen (παρέγγραφος).¹⁴ The allegiance of the city was confirmed by the eventual appointment of Athenion to the hoplite generalship and by the

⁸ Plut. *Sull.* 12.1: τὰς μὲν ἄλλας πόλεις... ταῖς δ' Ἀθήναις.

⁹ App. *Mithr.* 29.113; cf. Memn. *FGrHist* 434 §22; Flor. 1.40.8. There is no evidence that Sparta supported Mithridates: Cartledge-Spawforth 1989, 94–95.

¹⁰ Plut. *Sull.* 11.5; App. *Mithr.* 29.114.

¹¹ Published in Plassart 1949, 830–832, no. 11. Thespieae already had a record of strong loyalty to Rome before the Mithridatic War: see the prosopographical study in C.P. Jones 1970.

¹² App. *Mithr.* 30.117.

¹³ Posidon. *FGrHist* 87 F 253 (= Athen. 5.211d–215b): see Desideri 1973, 249–258; Kidd 1989, 41–46; Bringmann 1997 (quite speculative). Cf. Liv. *Per.* 81, Vell. 2.23.2; Plut. *Sull.* 12.1; App. *Mithr.* 30.116–122; Flor. 1.40.10; Paus. 1.20.5–6; Oros. 6.2.5.

¹⁴ It remains to be properly explained how Athenion managed to be entrusted with the embassy to Mithridates, if Medeios was still in power: Kallet-Marx 1995, 207.

capture and murder of the Roman citizens based in Attica.¹⁵ Athens seemed eager to start a new phase of complete independence from Rome, under a democratic constitution and the benevolent patronage of a philhellenic dynast.¹⁶

Surely it would be rash to define this revolt as a victory of democracy. Pausanias oversimplified things when he wrote that only the “turbulent element” of the Athenian people (τὸ ταραχώδες τοῦ δήμου) supported Mithridates, while the “respectable” citizens (Ἀθηναῖοι ὧν τις λόγος) left the city and joined the Romans.¹⁷ However, the victory of Athenion certainly was a defeat for the aristocracy that had been controlling Athenian politics for the last decades. There are several reasons why it was simply unacceptable to Rome and her commander, and the immediate reconquest of the city was an absolute priority of the campaign. To sketch a summary list: the strategic position of Athens, its commercial importance, its wealth and, perhaps most importantly, its huge cultural prestige, unrivalled in the Greek world. Undertaking a reconquest of the Greek East without getting hold of its main intellectual centre was simply unthinkable.¹⁸ Plutarch makes an odd comment on this aspect: he dismisses Sulla’s commitment to seize the city before moving on with the campaign as a “fight against the shadows” (13.1: σχιαμαχεῖν). He could not be more wrong. There were tangible reasons why the Greek East just could not be regained without Athens. Her cultural prestige was perhaps the most prominent one, and Sulla was perfectly aware of it.

¹⁵ The election of Athenion to hoplite general and the later developments in the war make it hard to agree with Kallet-Marx 1995, 211–212, who suggests that Athens did not commit herself to supporting Mithridates after the embassy to the King.

¹⁶ The decision to join Mithridates was certainly influenced, to some extent, by the King’s self-representation as a new Dionysus. On the choice made by the Athenian Dionysus’ *technitai* in this crisis, see Le Guen 2001, 336–337, summing up earlier bibliography; Aneziri 2003, 49–51. Cf. the different attitude towards Sulla of the *technitai* of Ionia and Hellespont, whom he even rewarded them with fiscal immunity after the war. An inscription found at Cos (*RDGE* 49) contains a letter to the *technitai* confirming their privileges and one inviting the city to respect them: see Segre 1938 (= Segre 1993, 16–17, ED 7); Sherk 1966; *RDGE*, 263–266 (no. 49); Le Guen 2001, 284–288 (TE 56) and Aneziri 2003, 247–248, 394–395 (D18a–b).

¹⁷ Paus. 1.20.7; see Bernhardt 1985, 40–42; Bultrighini 1990, 25–26. Candiloro 1965, 135–145, 158–167 is an unconvincing attempt to explain the choice of Athens as an upheaval of the lower classes, who were unhappy with the “agreement” (141) between Rome and the local aristocracy.

¹⁸ See Gabba 1999, esp. 78–80.

The pro-Mithridatic revolt came at the end of a period of serious political tension in Athens. The speech given by Athenion as he returned from his talks with the King, reported by Posidonius and included in Athenaeus' antiquarian work *Deipnosophistae*, contains the implicit message that Mithridates' alliance would put an end to the "anarchy" created by the Roman Senate.¹⁹ Here 'anarchy' does not mean 'absence of archons', as in other cases of Athenian history, since the magistracy of Medeios, who was eponymous archon for three years in a row (91/90, 90/89, 89/88), is safely attested for 89/88. It probably means that an archon who has served for three consecutive years is not a proper archon, and that new ones were not being elected any more.²⁰ The political implications of Mithridates' message, however, were very clear, and Athenion's speech—basically, the only literary source for this period that is not openly pro-Roman—is very useful in this respect. Mithridates was keen to offer Athens his patronage: in a Greek East controlled by the King, Athens would keep its leading cultural role, and it would also return to a complete political autonomy, possibly even with a hint of democracy in its institutions; the Romans would simply disappear from the scene.

Athenion's speech is also significant because it shows that the King and his associates were prepared to seek the loyalty of the city by using appealing economic arguments. The message he addressed to the *demos* included a commitment to solve the problem of debt—a typical device of would-be tyrants throughout Greek history, and a symptom of the importance of the matter in first-century Athens. The evidence, unfortunately, does not reveal much about the identity of the creditors. It would not be surprising if some Romans were amongst them. The position of the Roman citizens resident in Attica during this period is, however, largely unknown, because evidence is lacking. Although we know a number of individuals, nothing is known about

¹⁹ Athen. 5.51.213c–d = *FGrHist* 87 F 36: τί οὖν, εἶπε, συμβουλεύω; μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι τῆς ἀναρχίας ἣν ἡ Ῥωμαίων σύγκλητος ἐπισχετῆναι πεποίηκεν, ἕως ἄν αὐτὴ δοκιμάσῃ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι δεῖ ("what am I supposed to advise you?" he said. "Tolerate no more the state of anarchy which the Roman Senate has decided to bring about until it decides how we are expected to rule ourselves").

²⁰ Cf. Badian 1976, 111; Ferrary 1988, 485–486. About Medeios, see Badian 1976, 106–108; Habicht 1995, 301. MacKendrick 1969, 54–61 views Medeios' rise as the peak of a phase of Athenian history dominated by the aristocracy, started in 129/128. See esp. 60–61 on the importance of aristocratic euergetism ("The ruling class, Medeios and his circle, were creditors. The debtor *demos* could be saved only by the fall of Rome"); but cf. Davies 1973, 229.

the political influence of their community in the city, if any.²¹ Not much is recorded for this period about the large community of Italians who were based in Delos either.²² The construction of the slave market known as the ‘*agora des Italiens*’, datable to the last quarter of the second century BC, bears the traces of considerable wealth.²³ The Italians based on the island certainly had a crucial function in the development of the conflict by contributing to keep Delos on the side of the Romans.²⁴ At any rate, the island refused to join Athens in her pro-Mithridatic choice, and the attack of the contingent sent by Athenion, led by Apellicon of Teos, was repulsed.²⁵ A new front of resistance to Mithridates, Archelaus and their associates was unexpectedly opened in a crucial position, giving Sulla some more time to refine his strategy. Despite their different choices, however, the destinies of Athens and Delos were inevitably linked to each other in this crisis.

No doubt, the reaction of Delos to Mithridates and to the attack launched by his Athenian associate must also be explained by the role of the part of the Athenian elite that had interests there and wanted to keep good relations with Rome and the Roman business community on the island.²⁶ The links between Athenian leading families and Delos are confirmed by the comparative study of the evidence from the island and of an inscription from Athens, dating to the very end of the second century BC and containing the list of the contributors to seven celebrations of the Pythais, a procession from Athens to Delphi whose organisation required a financial effort on the part of Athenian leading families.²⁷ Some members of the Athenian elite mentioned in the inscription

²¹ Habicht 1997.

²² Hatzfeld 1912 provides a full prosopography of the Italians attested at Delos; cf. the updated list in Ferrary 2002b.

²³ Excavation report in Lapalus 1939; see the excellent discussion in Coarelli 2005b, in which earlier bibliography is summed up. On Delos’ central function in the Mediterranean slave market, see Strab. 14.5.2 = C 668, with Ferrary 1978, 783–784.

²⁴ Baslez 1982, 62–65.

²⁵ Athen. 5.214d–215b = Posidon. *FGHist* 87 F 36. See Roussel 1916, 315–327; Baslez 1982, 52–58.

²⁶ Gross 1954, 116; Candiloro 1965, 135–141. Schiller 2006 is an interesting, if somewhat unsophisticated, attempt to show that from the late second century BC the Athenian elite was a “*nobiles-like class*”, which included both the traditional aristocracy and families recently enriched by their business activities at Delos. *ID* 1562 and *SEG* 40.657 (dating to 102/101 BC) are evidence for religious links between Mithridates Eupator and Delos through the local sanctuary of the Great Gods of Samothrace.

²⁷ *IG* 2².2336: the best edition is Tracy 1982, providing a rich epigraphic and historical commentary.

did business at Delos, others frequented the local gymnasium, others held priesthoods or the office of Epimeletes on the island.²⁸

In Athens, on the other hand, the emergence of the pro-Mithridatic faction was sudden, and it followed the same pattern of most *στάσεις*: Medeios and his associates were compelled to leave power, without any resistance on their part being left on the record. Some of them were immediately killed, others were captured by Athenion's men while they were trying to escape and executed. Only a part of the pro-Roman Athenians managed to leave the city, and there is no evidence that any of them reached Delos.²⁹ On the other hand, some Athenians are known to have been with Sulla during the siege and to have begged him not to destroy the city after the conquest.³⁰ Sulla's decision not to ravage the city had, of course, a strong political significance, which needs consideration, especially in light of the dramatic siege that preceded it. It must be borne in mind, however, that a sack took place and that it made no doubt an impressive impact on the city.

The version of the conquest of Athens provided by the literary sources is the typical piece of history written by the winners; there is nothing comparable to Posidonius' account for the final part of the conflict. The extant literary tradition largely mirrors a Roman point of view. The Athenians are depicted as undisciplined, opportunistic, even unable to negotiate an honourable agreement before the beginning of the siege. The incarnation of Athenian inconsistency is the 'tyrant' Aristion, who succeeded to Athenion at some point during the war and was killed as the Roman troops stormed into the city.³¹ Plutarch reports the talks that preceded the siege in a very condensed fashion. Sulla dismissed Aristion's envoys as soon as they started to celebrate the past glories of the city, claiming that his only aim was to defeat the rebels.³² A. Chaniotis has rightly noticed that the evocation of the past was a typical feature of Athenian political discourse and diplomacy, but he has gone too far in arguing that Sulla misinterpreted this rhetorical

²⁸ Tracy 1979, 217–220, 229–231.

²⁹ See Touloumakos 1966, also providing a convincing interpretation of Athenaeus' difficult text. Badian 1976, 114–115 rightly remarks that the sources say almost nothing about the part of the Athenian elite that supported Rome.

³⁰ Plut. *Sull.* 14.9. On Sulla's 'clemency', see Barden Dowling 2000, esp. 336–340.

³¹ There is a vast bibliography on the problem of the correct identification of Aristion and Athenion. The case for the separatist position was first made in Niese 1887; Bugh 1992 has confirmed it conclusively. See Bugh 1992, 111–112, fn. 8 for a full summary of the scholarly production on this problem.

³² Plut. *Sull.* 13.5.

strategy.³³ It is safer to suggest that he was not interested in any kind of negotiation and that he needed a pretext to stop the talks. In fact, as noted above, his only aim, at that stage, was to conquer Athens. That was the only strategy that could put an end to all the hopes for a Mithridatic victory in Greece. Moreover, it was a chance to give his troops a first reward, allowing them to get their hands on the booty of a city that still had much to offer.

The extent of the devastations perpetrated by the Sullan army can be better appreciated through the archaeological record than through the literary tradition. As so often in Sulla's military career, conquering Athens was mainly about enforcing a detailed and rational plan of action; on this occasion, the assistance of his *legatus* C. Scribonius Curio was invaluable.³⁴ The steps to be taken were quite predictable: to organise an effective sack of the city and to ensure that a new political situation was brought about. A recent study by M.C. Hoff has shown that destructions safely datable to the beginning of the first century BC are attested in the Agora, especially in the southwest and northwest sides. The neighbouring streets also bear traces of a sack, involving structures like the Tholos and the Stoa Basileos, from all sides of the Agora. The Acropolis and the Erechteion appear not to have escaped the devastation either, and the latter is, in fact, the monument that suffered the heaviest damage. To the list must be added the Arsenal at the Peiraeus, a magnificent building which was completely destroyed after the defeat of the Mithridatic troops.³⁵

While he surveys the monumental landscape of the capital of Greek culture, Pausanias cannot help but detect the traces of an ancient sack, which represents, to his eyes, the definitive consolidation of Roman presence in its crudest form. As he famously puts it, "the behaviour of Sulla towards the majority of the Athenians was more cruel than that which a Roman would conceivably adopt".³⁶ Such a judgement implies a criticism of Sulla and, on the other hand, a not entirely

³³ Chaniotis 2005a, 145–146; Chaniotis 2005b, 215–216.

³⁴ On Curio, see Plut. *Sull.* 14.11; App. *Mithr.* 60.249; Paus. 1.20.6.

³⁵ Plut. *Sull.* 14.13; App. *Mithr.* 41.157; Strab. 9.1.15 = C 396, 14.2.9 = C 654; Front. *Strat.* 1.11.20; Flor. 1.40.10. The reference discussion is Hoff 1997, esp. 38–43; for the presumable chronology of the restorations, see *ibid.*, 42. Arafat 1996, 100–102 rightly notes that Pausanias' account is focused on Sulla's actions against the Athenians, rather than on the destruction of the monuments.

³⁶ Paus. 1.20.7: Σύλλα δὲ ἔστι μὲν καὶ τὰ ἐς τοὺς πολλοὺς Ἀθηναίων ἀγριωτέρα ἢ ὡς ἄνδρα εἰκὸς ἦ ἐργάσασθαι Ῥωμαίων ...

unfavourable assessment of Roman policies in Greece as a whole. Sulla is portrayed as a regrettable exception, definitely not as the rule: other Roman officials proved capable of governing Greece in fairness.³⁷ As has been rightly noted, they do not deserve to be compared to the Macedonians, whom Pausanias recurrently blames for having vexed and humiliated Greece.³⁸

The awe that the sack of Athens caused was probably increased by the long time the reconstruction took to be accomplished. Most of the damaged buildings and monuments were not rebuilt or refurbished before the Augustan age, with only some minor interventions being carried out in the meantime.³⁹ This is a symptom of economic weakness, if not of an open crisis, and in many respects it is not surprising. The Piraeus was heavily damaged; Delos had been ravaged by Archelaus and was gradually losing ground to its competitors, especially Puteoli.⁴⁰ In 69 it was affected even more severely by the attack of the pirates who joined Mithridates in his third war against Rome. From the early 60s on, it went through an even steadier commercial decline, as Rome started to fight piracy more effectively and to use different sources for her slave market, such as the Balkans.⁴¹ The part of the Athenian elite that had weighty interests at Delos inevitably faced serious economic difficulties.

From the political point of view, however, Athens did not lose much ground from the years preceding the war. Its territory appears to have kept its integrity. Sulla had no interest in depriving the city of its sphere of influence, traditionally reaching out to territories like Imbrus, Lemnus, Scyrus, and Delos of course.⁴² It has long been thought that Athens lost control of Salamis at some point soon after the Sullan conquest, but no evidence seriously supports this claim, as shown by C. Habicht.⁴³ Sulla appears to have been very mild towards Athens in

³⁷ See Arafat 1996, 104–105.

³⁸ Bearzot 1992, 17–18.

³⁹ Hoff 1997, 42.

⁴⁰ Direct commercial relations between Asia Minor and Italy became more intense after the defeat of Mithridates: see e.g. Rostovtzeff 1941, 959; Zalesskij 1982, 49.

⁴¹ As pointed out by the discovery of hoards of Roman denarii in the lower Danube basin: see Crawford 1977b, esp. 120–123. Bruneau 1968, 679–685, 688–689 argues that the destruction was less devastating than the literary sources suggest. Hoff 1989, 7 suggests that, conversely, Athens' function as a trade centre became more prominent in the late Republic and in the Early Principate.

⁴² On the role of Athens at Delos after the war, see Ferrary 1980, 40–41 and Baslez 1982, 65–66.

⁴³ Habicht 1995, 311–312; Habicht 1996.

this respect, and not to have undermined its supremacy in Attica. The adoption of this stance surely influenced the later development of his relationship with the city, as I will argue in the third part.

It is worth stressing the importance of the support that a part of the Athenian elite decided to give to Sulla, even when Mithridates was firmly in control of the city. This was not an exclusively Athenian phenomenon, as notables throughout Greece proved to be prepared to co-operate with Rome during and immediately after the war. The best explanation is probably that resentment against Rome was less intense than in Asia Minor, because the publicani had not operated there, and the fiscal pressure was not comparable to that imposed on the province of Asia.⁴⁴

The stabilisation of Athenian internal politics that took place in the aftermath of the war seems to have been quick and relatively smooth. Sulla's role in this process should not be overrated. Appian says, somewhat misleadingly at first sight, that Sulla restored almost identical laws to those previously decided by the Romans.⁴⁵ This persuaded some scholars to speak of a 'Sullan constitution' given to Athens after the reconquest, for which there is no evidence whatsoever.⁴⁶ Touloumakos is surely right in arguing that Appian is here translating the Latin expression *leges imponere*, meaning something like 'enforcing the peace conditions', by imposing the same context that was at work before the beginning of the war.⁴⁷

In Greek terms, perhaps, it would not be inaccurate to say that the πολιτεία of Athens changed again with the coming of Sulla, although no constitutional reform was brought about. A new political situation

⁴⁴ Significantly, in the Dardanus talks Sulla would blame Mithridates for having violated the freedom of the Greeks: App. *Mithr.* 58.237. After 145 BC, Greece had lost the fiscal immunity, the ἀφορολογισία, but it was still mainly independent from a political point of view (αὐτονομία-δημοκρατία), and there were no Roman contingents on its soil (ἀφρουρησία): see Ferrary 1988, 209.

⁴⁵ App. *Mithr.* 39.152: τοῖς ἄλλοις συνέγνω καὶ νόμους ἔθηκεν ἅπασιν ἀγχοῦ τῶν πρόσθεν αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ὀρισθέντων ("he forgave the others and gave to all of them laws in all respects similar to those previously decided by the Romans").

⁴⁶ See e. g. Accame 1946, 170–174; Geagan 1967, v, 1, 5; Rhodes 1972, 86, 222; Geagan 1979, 373; *contra*, Rawson 1985, 63–64 (= Rawson 1991, 463–464); Habicht 1995, 313–315. It may be correct to say that Sulla restored the constitution of Athens only in that he defeated a monarchy: see Ferrary 1988, 217–218. Cf. Plut. *Compar. Lys. Sull.* 5.5: τὴν πόλιν ἐλὼν, ἐλευθέραν ἀφῆκε καὶ αὐτόνομον ("after having captured the city, he restored it to freedom and autonomy").

⁴⁷ Touloumakos 1967, 89, fn. 3: "Friedensbedingungen stellen", usefully referring to several occurrences in Livy; cautiously accepted by Kallet-Marx 1995, 218, fn. 105.

emerged, and a more firmly pro-Roman section of the elite came to power. The evidence, however, is very scarce. There is no record of the activity of the Boule throughout more than three decades after the war, as the first surviving decree dates to 49/48.⁴⁸ We know that the traditional magistracies remained in vigour, and the hoplite generalship remained the most prominent one.⁴⁹ The broader context suggests that after the conquest of Sulla an oligarchic *politeia* was not just the choice of the Romans or, for that matter, of the Athenians, but was to a large extent related to the economic and social impact of the reconquest on the city.⁵⁰

After his victory, Sulla eliminated only the closest supporters of Aristion, forgiving “the living for the sake of the dead”, as he put it.⁵¹ The “respectable citizens”, as Pausanias brands the pro-Roman coalition, just came back to power as soon as the city was safe for them again. It was not easy, however, to come back to the *status quo* that preceded the war. Apart from being weakened by the crisis Delos went through, the families that had supported the oligarchic regime before the emergence of Athenion suffered losses during the revolt. The evidence we have for the names of the holders of the archonship is hard to interpret. However, at least from the 60s, when the names of the magistrates recorded in the inscription include the mention of the patronymic and of the name of the deme, a picture is conveyed of the persisting influence of a narrow circle of families. Some of them belonged in the elite of the old oligarchic regime, such as the son of Medeios from Piraeus, who was eponymous archon in 65 BC. Others were members of families that became prominent only after the crisis, like the family from Marathon to which belonged the archon Pammenes in 83/82,

⁴⁸ *IG* 2².1047. See Rhodes 1972, 257; Habicht 1995, 317.

⁴⁹ See Geagan 1997, 21–22. Eilers 2006 shows that not even the *lex Clodia de provinciis consularibus* of 58 BC affected the freedom of Athens.

⁵⁰ Oliver 1972, 101–102 and Geagan 1979, 376–377 tried to interpret *SEG* 26.120 as evidence for a return to democracy in 70/69 BC; cf. Geagan 1971, 101–108 and Oliver 1980 (= Oliver 1983, 52–55). However, the inscription is most likely to date to the age of Athenion: see the sound arguments in Badian 1976, 116–117; Ferrary 1988, 217–218; Habicht 1995, 320–321.

⁵¹ Plut. *Sull.* 13.9; App. *Mithr.* 39; Licin. 35.61. Cf. Strab. 9.1.20 = C 398: ... τὴν πόλιν ἐκ πολιορκίας ἑλὼν Σύλλας, ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμών, τῇ δὲ πόλει συγγνώμην ἔνευκε καὶ μέχρι νῦν ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ τιμῇ παρὰ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις (“Sulla, the Roman commander, after having captured the city with a siege, forgave it; and to this day it has lived in freedom ever since, respected by the Romans”). Strabo clearly minimizes the gravity of Sulla’s misdeeds: see Desideri 2000, 36. However, K. Bradley 1989, 91 is no doubt wrong in claiming that Sulla reduced into slavery ‘the remaining population of Athens’.

the archon Zenon in 54/53, the hoplite general Pammenes (the second after 24 BC, and probably the archon Zenon (the fourth) in 13/12 BC.⁵² This family emerged in Athenian politics soon after the war, without having had a significant role before. In a critical phase for the Athenian political establishment, its low political profile and low involvement in the revolt appear to have played an important role in ensuring its political success.⁵³

At any rate, Sulla seems to have had little or no direct role in the selection of the new post-war elite. It is significant that the literary sources, after dealing with the siege of Athens at great length, are uninterested in the settlement of Athenian internal affairs after the reconquest. Such a choice probably mirrors the priorities of Sulla himself. After the city was conquered and the most dangerous elements were eliminated, there was no need for Rome to intervene directly in the affairs of the city. The financial burden of the reconstruction and the crisis deriving from the sack of Delos compelled the city magistrates to seek the support and the patronage of members of the Roman elite, developing a pattern that had already been inaugurated during and soon after the siege, when several senators were asked to persuade Sulla to avoid the destruction of the city.⁵⁴

Moreover, Athens was safe for wealthy Roman citizens, like young T. Pomponius Atticus, and for the Athenian philosophers, like Philon from Larissa, who had fled the city when Athenion reached power. Their return would be a great encouragement for the youngsters of the Roman aristocracy to spend a part of their education in Athens.⁵⁵ The ties between Athens and Rome could only get closer. The stabilisation of the city, however, took several years. As I will try to show in the third part, it was probably accomplished only in 84/83, during Sulla's second stay in the city, on his way back to Italy. In 86, the first aim of Sulla was

⁵² Dow 1949, 123–124; Geagan 1992, esp. 34–35; Schiller 2006, 268–269. About Pammenes, see Sarikakis 1951, 77–78.

⁵³ Geagan 1992, 43–44. On the disappearance of several prominent families from the epigraphical evidence after 86 BC, see the judicious remarks of Lambert 2003, 86.

⁵⁴ Plut. *Sull.* 14.9. Cf. Plut. *Sull.* 22.1 on Sulla being joined by a *σχῆμα βουλῆς* (“the semblance of a senate”) during the final part of the Eastern campaign.

⁵⁵ On Philo's escape to Rome, see Cic. *Brut.* 89.306, with Touloumakos 1967, 88 and Yarrow 2006, 29–30. It is uncertain whether Antiochus from Ascalona fled to Rome in the same period: see Ferrary 1988, 447–448, fn. 43. At any rate, the Mithridatic War had a heavy impact on the Academy: see *ibid.*, 447–448. On the other hand, the head of the Epicurean school, Zenon of Sidon, did not leave Athens in 88, but he was probably compelled to do that, if briefly, after the Sullan reconquest: *ibid.*, 479–482.

to be in control of Athens and its port, so that he could concentrate on Boeotia, the other front of the conflict in mainland Greece. Its importance had increased during the siege of Athens, since a new contingent of Mithridatic troops had reached Greece from Thrace.

The case of Athens and her elite shows that the political history of Greece in this period was more complex than some sources would lead one to believe. The war was a very divisive issue, which changed the profile of the Greek elites, and many communities paid a high price for it. As mentioned above, Plutarch plainly says that all the cities except Athens followed Rome as soon as Sulla arrived in Greece. He does not say much, however, about what led them to change their attitude, and what sort of debate took place within the Greek world during this period. In the biography of Sulla he even fails to discuss the position of his hometown Chaeronea. In the prologue to the *Lives* of Cimon and Lucullus, however, he suggests that things were quite complicated there. At the outbreak of the Mithridatic War a Roman garrison was quartered in the city. A revolt led by the local young aristocrat Damon soon attempted to expel the Romans from the city.⁵⁶ According to Plutarch, the reason for the revolt was the intemperance of the commander of the Roman garrison placed in Chaeronea, who was attracted to Damon and was prepared to use any means to satisfy his lust. Therefore, Damon organised a conspiracy with sixteen comrades, and killed the official and his escort. When his fellow citizens sentenced him to death, he was already on the run. Some time later, Damon's gang took another revenge, broke into Chaeronea and killed the city magistrates who had proposed their death sentence—again, leaving unharmed soon after the deed. Lucullus was then resuming command of the Roman troops quartered in the region by Sura. He visited the city, acknowledged the responsibilities of the Roman official who had caused Damon's reaction and ordered the Roman garrison to join the rest of the army, which was then heading for Attica.

So far, the story may well fit the pattern of a 'crime of passion' with some serious, albeit temporary, consequences. Its late developments, however, point to a different conclusion. Damon, after spending some time ravaging the countryside with his associates, was suddenly forgiven by his fellow citizens, who sent embassies to him and invited him to

⁵⁶ Plut. *Cim.* 1–2.3: there is an impressive discussion of this passage in Ma 1994.

return to Chaeronea. He heeded the call and was soon elected to the local gymnasiarchy; yet, some time later, he was stabbed in the public baths. Plutarch argues, and actually appears to believe, that Damon's murder was the outcome of a sophisticated plan aimed at the elimination of a dangerous public enemy.

A more convincing and straightforward explanation can be suggested simply by looking at the development of the conflict and at the sequence of events in Chaeronea.⁵⁷ Damon's hostility was addressed, in equal measure, to the Romans and to the Chaeroneans who were supporting them, especially the local magistrates who convicted him. He appeared to act as the leader of a group with a clear political agenda. Moreover, an inscription from Chaeronea confirms that the presence of foreign troops could indeed be a problem and a potential threat to the city. Amatokos, the commander of the Thracian auxiliary contingent that joined the Romans in the war and was deployed in Chaeronea in the winter of 88/87, won the gratitude of the city for having restrained the greed of his soldiers.⁵⁸

The actions of Damon must be considered in the context of a militarily weak and not wealthy town, involved in a war for supremacy in the Greek East and fighting for survival. After the murder of the Roman official, Damon's presence in town was impossible as long as the garrison was quartered in the city. Some time later, the pro-Roman faction became weaker. It lacked any protection from the Romans, and inevitably faced the restless brigandage of Damon and his associates in the countryside. The elimination of the magistrates made a later agreement between the pro-Roman faction and the insurgents quite unlikely.

Rather than postulating a Machiavellian stratagem on the part of the Chaeronean magistrates, it is easier to make sense of the story by arguing that in fact Damon was not leading a criminal gang, but a group that opposed Roman presence in Boeotia, and targeted the part of the local elite that sought a *modus vivendi* with the invaders. Some hints in this direction can be detected in Plutarch's account too. We are

⁵⁷ Ma 1994, 68; McKay 2000b; Thornton 2001.

⁵⁸ Published and discussed by Holleaux 1919 (= Holleaux 1938, 143–159); cf. *FD*, III.3, 143, fn. 3. Thracian troops took part in the Mithridatic War, both on the side of the Romans and of Mithridates: see Salomone Gaggero 1978 (about Amatokos, see 304–305) and Danov 1979, 113–115. The inscription from Phanagorea in the Thracian Chersonesus edited in Vinogradov-Wörle 1992 (dating to 87 BC) may refer to a group of mercenaries that were about to join Mithridates's troops in northern Greece.

told that Damon's family enjoyed some prestige: in the second century AD, some of his descendants were known to live in the area of the Phokian city of Stiris. More importantly, Plutarch says that Damon descended directly from a soothsayer called Peripoltas, not otherwise known in the literary tradition, who led the mythical migration of the Boeotians from Thessaly. Peripoltas' descendants settled in Chaeronea after defeating the local inhabitants, whom Plutarch dismissively brands as "barbarians".⁵⁹ When Damon decided to lead a revolt against Rome, the weight of his family tradition must have been apparent to his fellow citizens. His was no mere act of brigandage, and more than an uprising against the conquerors. It was a military and political action directed by the descendant of a prominent family, whose history was deeply linked to the foundation myth of the city.⁶⁰

The aftermath of Damon's death too may be read as a symptom—perhaps the clearest one—of the political relevance of the incident. Soon after the end of the war, the city of Orchomenus paid a Roman informer (συκοφάντης) to accuse the Chaeroneans of the murder of the Roman officer and soldiers killed by Damon. The case was heard by the highest authority in mainland Greece, the governor of Macedonia, probably Cn. Cornelius Dolabella, who held the province from 80 to 78.⁶¹ Only a written statement by Lucullus, discharging the city from all responsibilities, could ensure acquittal to Chaeronea, avoiding a likely punishment, and perhaps even destruction. For this very reason, as he makes it clear, Plutarch decided to devote one of his *Lives* to the philhellenic commander, as a sign of lasting gratitude.⁶² The allegations brought by Orchomenus may be explained by the intention to harm a neighbouring city and by the hope of gaining some new territory.⁶³ On the other hand, the prospect of creating closer relations with the elite of the city may have been a further reason for Lucullus' support. Possibly,

⁵⁹ Plutarch is here using a local tradition, which is otherwise unknown: Ma 1994, 67–68.

⁶⁰ It is likely that local historiography was influenced by a tradition favourable to Damon, which still influenced Plutarch: cf. *Cim.* 1.2, for his remarks on Damon's beauty (σώματος κάλλος) and spiritual vigour (ψυχῆς φρόνημα).

⁶¹ It is worth noting that his *prouincia* still extended to Greece proper even after the Mithridatic War, pretty much as was the case when the *lex de prouinciis praetoriis* was voted. Kallet-Marx 1995, 280–282 views the Damon affair as evidence for the little ability of the governors of Macedonia to deal with Greek affairs, even after the First Mithridatic War.

⁶² Duff 1999, 59–60.

⁶³ Ma 1994, 64–66.

he also intended not to cause an irreversible crisis in a context already affected by a long war.

Boeotia's attitude towards Rome during the Mithridatic War was on the whole inconsistent; the erratic attitude of Chaeronea is a warning against generalisations. Plutarch provides a detailed narrative of the conflict, but in some respects he does not deserve unconditional trust. He systematically represents his hometown as loyal to Rome, and fails to refer to any differences of approach within the local elite. A similar attitude applies to the rest of the region. After the Chaeronea battle, Sulla decided to celebrate his victory at Thebes, with a lavish session of games. All Greek cities were represented, and appeared keen to offer their judges for the competition. Plutarch says that only Thebes was excluded, because of its inconsistent attitude during the conflict.⁶⁴ As recalled above, however, Appian says that Sulla decided to punish all Boeotian communities as a whole immediately after the second, decisive battle of Chaeronea, just before heading for Thessaly and preparing the army for the expedition to Asia Minor, "because it had lightly changed field".⁶⁵ Perhaps significantly, this phase of the conflict is completely ignored by Plutarch, who focuses on the talks between Sulla and Archelaus, just before the Dardanus agreement.⁶⁶

Pausanias recalls the resentment of Sulla towards Thebes, which he judged guilty of having followed Rome only after the invasion of Greece.⁶⁷ According to his version, Sulla was eager to punish Thebes from the outset of the conflict, and finally found a pretext in his need to provide compensation to the panhellenic sanctuaries, Olympia, Epidaurus, and Delphi, where he had gathered most of the resources for the first part of the campaign. Half of the territory of the city was given to the sanctuaries—unfortunately we are not told what proportions were used. A steady and irreversible decline started for the city, which Pausanias describes as reduced in size and poor still in his day. However, his odd statement about Athens going through an uninterrupted crisis from the age of Sulla to Hadrian should invite readers

⁶⁴ Plut. *Sull.* 19.11–12.

⁶⁵ App. *Mithr.* 51.203: συνεχῶς μετατιθεμένην. Also cf. *ibid.*, 29.113 and 30.117.

⁶⁶ Plut. *Sull.* 23.9–10. Also cf. App. *Mithr.* 54.215–216; Licin. 35.71–77 Memn. *FrGrHist* 434 §24. Cf. however Plut. *Sull.* 26.7, recording the destruction of three Boeotian cities, Anthedon, Larymna and Halae, after the battle of Orchomenus. Possibly he wanted to prevent Archelaus from using their harbours, but it is likely that it was also a retaliation for having supported Mithridates.

⁶⁷ Paus. 9.7.4–6.

to be cautious about his accuracy on matters of economic history.⁶⁸ Pausanias claims that, at some point, Rome decided to give the lost territories back to the city. Improved relations with the members of the Roman elite may explain this choice, although this piece of information is made less useful than it could be by the absence of any chronological reference.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Paus. 1.20.7: Ἀθῆναι μὲν οὕτως ὑπὸ τοῦ πολέμου κακωθεῖσαι τοῦ Ῥωμαίων αὐθις Ἀδριανοῦ βασιλεύοντος ἤνθησαν (“Athens was badly affected by the war with the Romans, but she flourished again under the reign of Hadrian”). See already Day 1942, 120–126, 169–174.

⁶⁹ There is no evidence supporting the claim made by Kahrstedt 1954, 93 that the land was soon given back to Thebes.

CHAPTER THREE

FACING THE CONSEQUENCES: THE ELITES OF ASIA MINOR

It is significant that the richest documentary evidence for the Asian elites and their political choices in this period comes from cities that kept supporting Rome even in her most difficult hour. In fact, the highest output of sources is from Caria, the region whose loyalty to Rome was the staunchest in the whole of Asia Minor. As I shall try to show in more detail in the third part, religion played a very important part in the interaction between Sulla and elites in the Greek East. This becomes apparent in the relations between Sulla and Boeotia, which also involved the Panhellenic sanctuary of Delphi, and it is perhaps even clearer in his dealings with some cities of Caria, a region that kept a consistent loyalty towards Rome during the war and that was duly rewarded for it. That special relationship dated back to the Hellenistic age, and was mainly determined by the protection from the influence of Rhodes, which Rome had guaranteed to Caria from 167 BC.¹

Aphrodisias enjoyed an especially privileged status, powerfully demonstrated by the episode of the Delphic response received by Sulla at the end of the war, and of course by the magnificent epigraphic dossier published by J.M. Reynolds.² It was in the Augustan age, with the decisive intervention of the local notable Zoilus, that Aphrodisias' impressive urban development took place. However, in the early 80s the city could already afford to send envoys to Sulla and/or to Delphi so that the oracle implicitly referred to its shrine of Aphrodite.³ The inscriptional evidence shows that Aphrodisias was a city in its own right throughout the first century BC, playing a consistently important function in the regional context of Caria. In fact, it is a distinct possibility

¹ Errington 1987, 103–114.

² App. *b. c.* 1.97.453; Reynolds 1982.

³ On the development of Aphrodisias at the end of the first century BC, see Ratté 2002, 7–14. It may be significant that Strab. 12.8.13 = C 576 still calls it a *polisma*—not quite a *polis*?—several decades after the Sullan age; however, the text has a lacuna.

that the *sympoliteia* of Aphrodisias and Plarasa attested epigraphically dates back to the first half of the second century BC, following the liberation of the region from the influence of Rhodes.⁴

The position of Aphrodisias, albeit very significant, was not isolated. There is at least one similar situation, whereby the allegiance to Rome involved both a city and a neighbouring sanctuary. The loyalty to Rome of Stratonicea in Caria was rewarded with an impressive series of privileges, acknowledged first by Sulla himself in 85/84 BC, before leaving Asia for Italy, and then ratified by a *senatusconsultum* in 81 BC.⁵ This document is made of several parts, going backwards in time. It is opened by a letter of Sulla to the city, restating the merits of the communities in the fight against Mithridates and the gratitude of the Romans, and followed by the text of the *senatusconsultum*, listing all the eleven clauses of privileges that Rome acknowledged to Stratonicea. Among them, there was the confirmation of the *asylia* of the temple of Hekate at Lagina. The declaration occupies just one line (l. 113), but the citizens of Stratonicea must have viewed it as a very important aspect of their new status.

Indeed, the sanctuary was becoming a central aspect of the city's identity, as much as was the case with Aphrodisias. The awareness of its importance has perhaps prompted unilateral and somehow schematic interpretations of the evidence. The northern frieze of the temple, for instance, has long been viewed as a powerful symbol of the renewed alliance between Stratonicea and Rome following the Mithridatic War.⁶ Its central scene, portraying a warrior and an Amazon shaking hands, has been seen as the most explicit symbol of the new strategic situation as the Stratoniceans saw it. In a recent paper, still unpublished, R. van Bremen has suggested a persuasive re-interpretation of the frieze, mainly based on a comparative discussion of its iconography with contemporary evidence from Asia Minor.⁷ According to her reconstruction, the frieze appears to be dated not earlier than the last quarter of the second century BC, and it must be explained by a development

⁴ Reynolds 1982, no. 1: see Errington 1987, revising Reynolds' conclusions about the chronology, and Savalli-Lestrade 2005, 16–17.

⁵ The reference edition is *RDGE* 18; cf. *IvStrat* 505. A new fragment, providing the text of the middle section of l. 15–27, is published in Şahin 2002, 3.

⁶ See Schober 1933, 31–41 and Junghölder 1989, 12–120 for a discussion of the whole frieze. About the possible interpretation of the monument, cf. Schober 1933, 72–76; Tuchelt 1979, 39–44; Junghölder 1989, 138–157.

⁷ Van Bremen forthcoming.

of closer relations among the Carian communities than by the aftermath of the Mithridatic War.

In fact, there is no need to endorse the traditional interpretation of the frieze to recognise the importance of the link between the Sullan declaration of *asylia* and the importance of the sanctuary of Hekate Lagina. The special status of the temple was certainly viewed by the local inhabitants as the clearest symptom of the city's persistent importance and of the friendship between Rome and Stratonicea. Sulla's decision must be interpreted against this background. It is significant that the text of the *senatusconsultum* was for everyone to look at on the wall of the temple's *naos*.

The history of Stratonicea's excellent relations with Rome is closely linked to the development of the religious life of the city. The cult of Hekate was not the only one in the Stratonicean territory. From the early third century BC a significant function was played by the sanctuary of Zeus Karios at Panamara, one of the most important among the hilltop sanctuaries that were such a conspicuous feature of the Carian landscape in antiquity.⁸ The dossier about the Stratonicean sanctuaries provides the background for attempting to answer some more general questions. Stratonicea enjoyed impressive development and wealth after the coming of Rome, supported by her excellent relationship with a number of magistrates and emperors, and not interrupted even after the devastating earthquake of AD 139.⁹ Connections with Rome were indeed a peculiar aspect of the life of the city. A citizen of Stratonicea, Hermias, was with Sulla during the Greek campaign, and he persuaded him not to sack Daulis, a city in Phocaea. An honorific inscription put up for him in Delphi duly records his patronage of the city. From it we learn that he was also given *proxenia*, honorary citizenship, fiscal immunity and *asylia*.¹⁰ The loyalty of Stratonicea must have been very strong indeed, and its relationship with Rome quite exceptional, if the advice of one of its citizens could be received so well by Sulla.

⁸ Van Bremen 2004, 215–222. Cf. the classic discussions by Laumonier 1958, 344–425 and T. Kraus 1960, 41–54. For the cult of Rome at Stratonicea, see Mellor 1975, 49, 177 and Fayer 1976, 74–75.

⁹ The Aristonicus war was perhaps an exception, as some evidence suggests that the would-be King chose Stratonicea as his capital in the year preceding his defeat: see Coarelli 2005a, 226–229, with earlier bibliography. Little archaeological work has been done on the site of Stratonicea: Mitchell 1998/1999, 157–158; Debord 2002, 158–162.

¹⁰ *SEG* 1.175, esp. l. 9–12. See Daux 1936, 402–405; Campanile 1996, 154–155.

The impact of the conflict on civic finances was nevertheless considerable, as is shown by Appian (*Mithr.* 21.82) and, indirectly, by two clauses of the *senatusconsultum*, which order Roman magistrates to support the city in recovering the goods which had been lost during the conflict (l. 60–63, 114–118) and in supervising the release and the return of the prisoners of war (l. 63–64, 118–122). Such a disposition was part of the range of privileges and rewards that Rome granted to the free cities at the end of a conflict in which they had proved their loyalty.¹¹ In this respect, a contemporary inscription from Asia Minor, the *senatusconsultum de Tabenis* shows the spirit of the times quite clearly.¹² The town of Tabae, after supporting Rome and sustaining Mithridates' retaliation, was awarded freedom by Sulla and later by the Senate, according to the same procedure followed for Stratonicea. This document is unfortunately the only surviving evidence for its political history.¹³

The record of another Carian city, Laodicea on the Lycus, was less consistent. When Mithridates first invaded the area, the city resisted briefly, as it was controlled by Q. Oppius, then in charge of Cilicia, but ended up delivering the Roman magistrate to Mithridates. Its status after the Sullan settlement is unknown, and it is quite likely that Rome decided to punish the defection by putting it under direct rule. A bilingual inscription found on the Quirinal, in which the people of Laodicea express their gratitude to Rome, was dated by Mommsen and Chapot to 83 BC. However, it is perhaps preferable to accept Mellor's hypothesis, viewing it as a re-inscription of a text, originally written in the late second century BC after the acquisition of Attalus' legacy and later restored by Sulla, after the Capitol burnt in 83 BC.¹⁴

Unlike Laodicea, Aphrodisias kept excellent relations with Oppius. An inscription contains a letter sent by Oppius from Cos after the end of the war, in which the Roman magistrate expressed his gratitude to the cities of Aphrodisias and Plarasa, then merged into a single political

¹¹ For a survey of modern scholarship on civic freedom in the Greek East, see Boffo 2003.

¹² *OGIS* 442 = *RDGE* 17; the best text is in Crawford-Reynolds 1974.

¹³ See Magie 1950, 1112–1113, fn. 9. For an overview of the region and of the history of the city in antiquity, J. and L. Robert 1954, 17–53, 72–95 is still invaluable.

¹⁴ See respectively Mommsen 1887b, 213–214 (= Mommsen 1906, 75); Chapot 1904, 37–38; Mellor 1975, 203–206; Mellor 1978, 323–324. The low date has been proposed, with new though unpersuasive arguments, by Ameling 1988, 20–21, also suggesting that Laodicea was already the capital of a *conuentus* in Aquillius' organisation (18–19); accepted by Corsten 1997, 2. For a discussion of the archaeological context of the inscription, see Mellor 1978 (with full bibliography at 319–321); Behr 1993, 125–126.

community, for their military support during the siege of Laodicea. Oppius also agreed to become their patron, after the explicit request of the two cities' ambassadors.¹⁵ With such a distinct record of loyalty, and with the prominent role it played in the making of the *Epaphroditos*-motif (which I will deal with in the third part), Aphrodisias surely had no difficulty in obtaining a declaration of freedom from Sulla at the end of the war.¹⁶ The status appears to have been revoked some time in the late Republic, but Augustus ultimately confirmed it in 39 BC.¹⁷ On the other hand, it seems quite hard to believe that Laodicea managed to be granted freedom in 84 BC. It must have taken a significant time for the city to regain the favour of Rome, which certainly played an important part in helping the city to become one of the most prosperous centres of Asia Minor.

A similar image of wealth and indeed of luxury is conveyed by Strabo's brief account of life in Alabanda, the third important centre of Caria he deals with, after Mylasa, whose history in this period is almost unknown, and Stratonicea.¹⁸ Carian epigraphy is relatively abundant for the Sullan period, and there is important evidence from this city too. It is the honorific decree for an important citizen, Pyrrha[kos], who distinguished himself in several delicate diplomatic missions: two were addressed to Rome, the third one to an unmentioned king (l. 32), probably Mithridates Eupator.¹⁹ During the latter mission, the notable died, and his fellow citizens duly commemorated his achievements.²⁰

¹⁵ This detail is conveniently stressed by Canali De Rossi 2001, 53 and Eilers 2002, 24–25. From the Augustan age onwards, the Roman documents systematically refer only to Aphrodisias: about the history of the joint community, see Reynolds 1985 and Reynolds 1987, 107–108.

¹⁶ Cf. Chaniotis 2003, 74–75.

¹⁷ Reynolds 1982, 4–5.

¹⁸ Strab. 14.26 = C 660–661. Cf. however Cic. *fam.* 13.56.1 and 3.1, mentioning the debts contracted by Alabanda and Mylasa to the Roman *negotiator* Cluvius. *IVMylasa* 109 records the contacts between the city and the governor of Asia M. Iunius Silanus, called στρατηγὸν, πάτρωνα τῆς πόλεως (l. 15). The inscription is usually dated to ca. 76 BC: Eilers 2002, 247–248; Dmitriev 2005a, 8; Dmitriev 2005b, 104. An earlier chronology for Iunius Silanus' governorship (about 100 BC) cannot however be excluded: Ferrary 2000a, 172–173, 192. The history of Mylasa between 50 BC and the age of Augustus is better known, and symptoms of economic decline have been noticed: Delrieux-Ferrière 2004.

¹⁹ Text in *ISE* 3.169. See Canali De Rossi 1997, 219–221 and Gauthier 2005, 85–89. The supplement of the name is suggested in Holleaux 1898, 260. Cf. Canali De Rossi 1992/1993, arguing that the king mentioned here was Eumenes II.

²⁰ Pyrrha[kos]' death was probably due to natural causes: Habicht 2001, 12. *Contra*, Canali De Rossi 1992/1993, 39–40.

Pyrroha[kos] managed to negotiate the autonomy of the city by renewing friendship with Rome, and in a second mission to the Roman Senate he also obtained fiscal immunity by effectively recalling the merits of Alabanda towards Rome (l. 28–32). There has been some disagreement about the dating of the text. The first editors thought it referred to the early relations of Alabanda with Rome in the first half of the second century BC; Willrich later suggested that the historical development outlined in the inscription was compatible with a dating to the aftermath of the First Mithridatic War, and this interpretation seems preferable to me.²¹

Pyrroha[kos] was a prominent member of the Carian elite who displayed remarkable diplomatic skills and became a friend of Rome. He was not alone in that mission; other notables got ready for the coming of Sulla. Chaeremon of Nysa even organised military support for Rome, drawing upon himself Mithridates' hatred. The King wrote twice to Leonippos, the satrap he had put in charge of Caria, explicitly ordering his capture for having collaborated with the "common enemy".²² The letters also provide some information about Chaeremon's moves: he helped some Romans to flee to Rhodes, and he apparently was very careful about the safety of his sons, whom he twice sheltered in secret refuges. He probably lost his life in the upheaval that took place in Nysa during Mithridates' breakthrough. When his sons returned to their home town, at the end of the conflict, they recovered a prominent role, and chose to celebrate the deeds of their father by displaying the letters of Mithridates along with an honorific dedication and a letter of C. Cassius, proconsul in Asia in 89/88, acknowledging Chaeremon's generosity towards the Roman army.²³

²¹ See Willrich 1899; Marek 1988, 294–302. Canali De Rossi 1992/93 and Canali de Rossi 2002 (= *ISE* 3), no. 169, 109–113 identify the king with Eumenes II, and dates the inscription to 164 BC.

²² *RC*, nos. 73/74. Leonippos has the title of "satrap" (no. 73, l. 1), by which Mithridates referred to the officials in charge of the territories he conquered at the beginning of the first war: cf. App. *Mithr.* 21.81. On Mithridates' use of the expression 'common enemies' (no. 74, l. 6–7), see Robert 1969, 59 and Erskine 1994, 81–82; on the expression 'common benefactors' referred to the Romans, see Wehrli 1978.

²³ See *MRR* 2.34; Ferrary 2000a, 193. On Chaeremon's family, see *RC*, 297; Campanile 1996, 172–173. Rigsby 1988, 149–153; Rigsby 1996, 399–404, no. 185 attributes to Mithridates Eupator the letter acknowledging the *asylia* of the local temple of Pluto and Kore, which in 1 BC the governor of Asia Cn. Lentulus Augur allowed to be displayed on the wall of the shrine along with an analogous message from Seleucus I. However, the argument that the declaration was exposed to imply that 'even Mithridates' had

Had he survived, Chaeremon might have been granted privileges similar to those awarded to Asclepiades from Clazomenae, Polystratos from Karystos and Meniskos from Miletus by the famous *s.c. de Asclepiade sociisque*, passed in 78 BC. The case of these three men is quite exceptional, although there surely were precedents to it.²⁴ They had supported the Roman navy in the Social War, and they were rewarded with the grant of the rank of ‘friends of the Roman people’ and complete fiscal immunity, both from ordinary and extraordinary taxation.²⁵ Asclepiades and his friends were not granted Roman citizenship, unlike Aristion from Massilia, or the mysterious *Gaditani* who were included in the citizen body for military merits by Sulla himself.²⁶ The position of the three notables from Asia Minor is more similar to that of the *techmitai* of Dionysus resident in Cos, who were collectively granted fiscal immunity by the dictator, and defended it from the attempts of the polis to undo it. Apparently, in the aftermath of the Mithridatic War, it was unthinkable to extend Roman citizenship even to the most loyal individuals from Asia Minor.²⁷

This remained the case even with exceptional situations like Caria, where there is little evidence for tensions within the local elites about the decision to support Rome. As noted above, the region’s impressive record of loyalty to Rome throughout the Mithridatic crisis was no doubt rooted in its Hellenistic background. Not even the creation of the province of Asia had put its autonomy into question. After 133 BC

respected the inviolability of the temple is far-fetched, and it is safer to attribute the letter to a Hellenistic king, e. g. Antiochus III.

²⁴ Cf. the references to “those judged individually to be in a state of friendship with the Romans” (οἱ κατ’ ἀνδρα κερταίμενοι ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους φιλίᾳ) in *OGIS* 438 and 439, with Ferrary 2005, 53–54.

²⁵ The standard edition of the *senatusconsultum* is *RDGE* 22; see also A.J. Marshall 1968b and Raggi 2001. On the fiscal aspects of this document, see Raggi 2001, 89–92.

²⁶ Cic. *Balb.* 50. The text is quite tormented: *quid? Cn. Pompeius pater rebus Italico bello maximis gestis P. Caesium, equitem Romanum, uirum bonum, qui uiuit, Rauennatem foederato ex populo none ciuitate donauit?... quid? Massiliensem Aristionem L. Sulla? quid? quoniam de Gaditanis agimus, idem + erosnouem Gaditanos?* (“what shall we say? Did not Cn. Pompeius the father give the citizenship to P. Caesium, a Roman knight, a good man, who is still alive, from the allied people of Ravenna, because of his great deeds in the Italian war?... And what shall we say? Did not Sulla [enfranchise] Aristion from Massilia? And what shall we say? Since we are talking about men from Gades, [did not] the same man [*scil.* Sulla], indeed, [enfranchise] ... from Gades?”). Various readings have been suggested: *seruos nouem Gaditanos* (Reid), *homines nouem Gaditanos* (Wrampelmeyer); *Hannonem Gaditanum* (Garatoni).

²⁷ Sherwin-White 1973, 306–311.

as well as in the Sullan age, Rome showed no interest in controlling Caria directly, and relying on the loyalty of some free cities and on the power to police the area was enough for her purposes.²⁸ The problem of the grant of freedom to individual cities has often been treated along with that of the extension of the boundaries of the province. In fact, the evidence for this problem is rather unsatisfactory.

Local autonomy remained an important issue even after the Mithridatic War. When he summoned the representatives of the Asiatic cities to Ephesus, after the end of the war, Sulla granted freedom to a small number of communities. For most of them this decision was a reward for their loyalty during the war, which was the outcome of a specific background, in which the central role was played by the previous relations with Rome and the development of the city's identity in the Roman context.²⁹ The most reliable picture of what civic freedom implied in this period is the *lex Antonia de Termessibus*, a statute passed in 68 BC, which deals with the status of a city formerly included into the province of Cilicia, and declared free after the Third Mithridatic War.³⁰ There is no reason to believe that the terms of civic freedom had changed substantially from the end of the first conflict. A free city was recognised friend and ally of the Roman people, and its citizens were allowed to live according to the laws of their community. Roman garrisons and soldiers may not be quartered in its territory. The local authorities were entitled to dispose freely of the properties of the city, and to levy taxes and customs at their own discretion—although at Termessus Roman publicani were exempted from any sort of taxation (l. 34–35).

Free cities, however, were the exception in the Roman province of Asia, especially after Sulla. It is time to consider the position of the so-called subject cities. The clearest sign of their lower condition was not political, but economic: namely, the different fiscal treatment to which

²⁸ Marek 1988; cf. Baronowski 1996 (earlier bibliography at 241–242); Dmitriev 2005a, 8, 249–250.

²⁹ Of course, civic freedom had fiscal implications; however, Kienast 1968, 360–364 and Bernhardt 1980, 196–207 have rightly warned against considering the notion of civic freedom as a synonym of complete fiscal immunity. The oscillations in the use of expressions like *φιλικάι λειτουργίαι*, usually viewed as occasional “contributions” of an allied city to Rome, show that their meaning often shifted to that of *φόροι*, “taxes”; see also Ferrary 2001a, 103–104.

³⁰ Edition and commentary by J.-L. Ferrary in *RS*, 331–340, no. 19. Ferrary 1985 remains invaluable for the history of the text and the discussion of various matters of content and chronology.

they were subjected. The implications of the subject status could vary even to a considerable extent from city to city. The great majority of the communities lost their freedom in the Sullan reorganisation. Moreover, even for those who managed to keep it, it was a gracious and always revocable concession on the part of Rome, which had to be supported by good relations with members of the senatorial elite.³¹ Even so, from the First Mithridatic War to the end of the Civil War, most urban communities of Asia Minor went through very hard times.³²

Even a ‘friend and ally’ of Rome like Ilium was no exception. The city had already paid a heavy price in the war against Aristonicus (133–129 BC): some recently excavated buildings in the southern edge of the Lower City show signs of destruction by fire dating back to that period, and the area was not reoccupied until the Augustan age.³³ At the end of the 80s, the city was compelled to borrow money from the sanctuary of Athena Ilias to organise the common festival in honour of the goddess. Its finances were in a serious emergency, while the sanctuary appeared to have kept a relative stability deriving from its privileged relationship with the Attalids. The poor state of the city budget cannot be ascribed to the burden of taxation imposed by Sulla, as Ilium was declared free; the destruction perpetrated by Fimbria is probably to blame.³⁴ At any rate, all the communities of the Troad did not recover quickly after Sulla’s freedom grant.³⁵ In 77 BC, they were compelled to ask for a reduction of their debt. The matter was negotiated in the presence of a Roman magistrate, and the final solution was the cancellation of all the arrears and a substantial reduction of the interest rate imposed by the sanctuary.³⁶ Such negotiations involved the sanctuary, the representatives of the federated cities (at least seven: besides Ilium, Dardanus, Scepsis, Assus, Alexandria, Abydus, Lamp-sacus) and the quaestor Lucius Julius Caesar, whose family had close

³¹ The best discussion of Roman patronage of Greek communities is now Eilers 2002; also cf. Canali De Rossi 2001. Braund 1989 and especially Ferrary 1997b are still excellent introductions.

³² Kallet-Marx 1995, 275–276.

³³ See Aylward 1999, esp. 161, 176; Mitchell 2003, 27. On the role of the cities of Asia Minor in the war of Aristonicus, see the dossier collected by Brun 2004.

³⁴ See Mitchell 1998/1999, 138; Hertel 2003, 263–266.

³⁵ Magie 1950, 239, 1119–1120; *contra*, Preuner 1926, 117. The sanctuary was entirely renovated only in the early imperial age: see the recent discussion by Rose 2002, esp. 40–41.

³⁶ *Ivllion*, no. 10, esp. ll. 1–19 (block A). See Bellinger 1961, 10; Tenger 1999, 162.

connections in the Troad even before the Sullan period.³⁷ Of course, the *gens Iulia* claimed descent from Venus and Aeneas, but its members could do good services to Athena as well. In 89, during his censorship, the homonymous father of the quaestor of 77 acted in Rome to obtain a declaration of immunity for the sanctuary's land from the activity of the publicani.³⁸ The benefits obtained from the censor were so remarkable that a statue was dedicated to his daughter Julia too.³⁹ The financial stability of the sanctuary ultimately derived from L. Caesar's decision. *IvIlion* 10 makes it clear that the common festival was to go on through the years without any variation (bl. B, l. 21–23).

In this respect, the case of Ilium reflects a more general pattern. Asian sanctuaries went through their most difficult phase during the war between Octavian, Antony and the Caesaricides, rather than in the Sullan period. Despite Plutarch's allegations of impiety, essentially based on the expropriations of the land of the panhellenic sanctuaries in mainland Greece, for which he later offered compensation, Sulla appears to have usually respected the inviolability of temples and sacred lands.⁴⁰ That the last years of the Republic were a hard time for sanctuaries is implicitly confirmed by the declarations of *asylia* that can be attributed to Augustus.⁴¹

In the Sullan period, the major threat to the region seems to have been piracy. The honorific inscription for Nikandros from Poemanium, of 80 BC, shows that the pirates were then seriously threatening the

³⁷ Cf. the elegant, if schematic 'triangular model' outlined in Dignas 2002, esp. 271–278.

³⁸ *IvIlion*, no. 71: "having restored the sacred territory to Athena Ilias and removed it from the revenue contract with the publicani" (l. 5–9: ἀποκαταστή- | σαντα τὴν ἱερὰν | χώραν τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ | τῇ Ἰλιάδι καὶ ἐξελόμενον | αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς δημοσιωνίας). See Ehrhardt 2002, 141–142, no. 4. A very fragmentary inscription (*RDGE* 53) contains the letter of a Roman magistrate to the city, referring to her freedom. It probably dates back to the first century BC: see Sherk 278–279 and Debord 1982, 448, fn. 113.

³⁹ *IvIlion*, no. 72, with Nicolet 1980, 122.

⁴⁰ Dignas 2002, 117–119; Dignas 2005, 208–209.

⁴¹ See Rigsby 1996, 177–178 (the sanctuary of Apollo at Miletus); 391–393, no. 183 (the Artemision at Ephesus); 426–427, no. 211, with Tac. *ann.* 3.62.2 (the sanctuary of Zeus at Panamara, near Stratonicea); 429–430, no. 212 (Aphrodisias); 447–448 (Aezani). See also *RDGE* 61, from Cyme, providing a practical demonstration of Augustus' concerns about the respect of sacred ownership. Cf. *res gestae* 24.1: *in templis omnium civitatum prou[inci]ae Asiae uictor ornamenta reposui, quae spoliatis tem[plis] is], cum quo bellum gesseram, priuatim possederat* ("after my victory I replaced in the temples of all the cities of the province of Asia the ornaments that the man with whom I fought the war had taken into his private possession after despoiling the temples"). A good discussion in Dignas 2002, 119–128.

city, and also were a great cause of concern for Rome, as the proconsul C. Claudius Nero's direct interest in the solution of the crisis shows.⁴² The recently published inscription of the monument put up in 62 BC at Ilium in honour of Pompey, celebrating his victory over Mithridates and the pirates is further indirect evidence for the difficult situation that Asiatic communities experienced after the coming of Sulla.⁴³

The documentation is scarce, of course, but it shows important economic processes at work, and it reveals the talent of the city elite in building profitable relations with the Roman representatives. The immediate aftermath of the First Mithridatic War shows that very clearly. It is usually assumed that Ilium kept its loyalty to Rome during the war, and that freedom was a consequence of this attitude. Yet, a coin issue struck by the moneyer Menephron son of Menephron bore the symbol of the drinking Pegasus, certainly related to Mithridates Eupator.⁴⁴ The local elite must have made some efforts to come to terms with the King during his successful attack. However, even if the city had not been adamantly loyal during the war, a freedom grant may have appeared an almost inevitable decision for Sulla, who claimed descent from Venus and Aeneas so forcefully in his relations with the Greek world. With such a favourable attitude on the part of the Romans, the civic elite surely found it easy to reassert its loyalty to them.

Caria and Ilium, however, remain exceptional cases.⁴⁵ It is a safe guess that regaining a positive relationship with Rome was much more difficult for the Asiatic cities than the Greek ones. A traumatic event like the Asiatic Vespers had created too great a divide between Romans and Greeks not to claim its toll in the aftermath of the war. Rebuilding a constructive dialogue with Rome required the initiatives of a number of distinguished and exceptionally skilled characters. The inscriptional evidence offers several significant examples.

Pergamum certainly lost its freedom in 85, when Sulla chose to punish the openly pro-Mithridatic stance it had taken at the beginning of the war.⁴⁶ The well-known dossier about Diodoros Paspasos, persua-

⁴² *IvIlium*, no. 73, l. 174–176.

⁴³ *SEG* 46.1565; for a full discussion, see E. Winter 1996b. Cf. *SEG* 49.1509 from Claros, on which more *infra*.

⁴⁴ The evidence is gathered and discussed in Bellinger 1961, 33–34; see Kinns 1987, 110. The objections of de Callatay 1997, 291 are not convincing.

⁴⁵ On the role of kinship in this special relationship, see Gruen 1992, 47–50; C.P. Jones 1999, 94–105; C.P. Jones 2001b.

⁴⁶ This can be inferred from *OGIS* 433, recording that the city recovered freedom

sively dated to the aftermath of the Sullan settlement by C.P. Jones, records a series of initiatives taken by a local notable, which closely recall those of the ambassadors of the Ilian *koinon*, and also fit the economic context outlined by the Aphrodisian text discussed above.⁴⁷

In an embassy to Rome, Diodoros denounced the intolerably high interest rates which made it impossible for the cities to pay back the debts they had contracted with the moneylenders in order to meet the requirements of Roman taxation.⁴⁸ Moreover, he complained about the abuses perpetrated by the Roman army in the Pergamene territory. His mission was certainly successful, although the extent of Roman concessions is unknown. The impressive honours he received are, of course, strong elements pointing to the importance of his diplomatic achievements.

Along with his political skills, Diodoros offered a part of his considerable wealth to the community by sponsoring the restoration of the local gymnasium, which had been seriously damaged during the First Mithridatic War and still had not returned to use at the beginning of the Third War.⁴⁹ Soon after 69 BC, the gymnasium was reopened, and the twenty-ninth celebration of the local feast of the *Nikephoria* could finally take place there. For this great achievement, Diodoros' reward for this great achievement was a new honorific decree, in which his whole career found a proper celebration and which is the ultimate, if controversial, source for any chronological reconstruction of his initiatives.

With good reason, such a belated refurbishment of an important public building is often cited as clear evidence for the serious financial crisis that affected the Asiatic cities after the conflict and the Sullan

and immunity from Caesar: see C.P. Jones 1974, 203, fn. 130, with earlier bibliography.

⁴⁷ The inscriptions referring to Diodoros Paspasos are usefully listed by Kienast 1970, 224–225. For the chronology, C.P. Jones 1974. The recent contestations by Musti 1998, 10–27 (= Musti 2005, 52–63), and Musti 1999 are unpersuasive: C.P. Jones 2000; Müller 2003, 433–445 (providing a full summary of the debate on the Pergamene *Nikephoria* before Jones' ground-breaking study at 433–437). Also cf. the further interventions of the Italian scholar, Musti 2000 (= Musti 2005, 93–147) and Musti 2002 (= Musti 2005, 149–172). The most recent general discussion of the historical context of Diodoros' action is now Virgilio 1993, 77–94; C.P. Jones 1974, 193–198, however, remains invaluable. S. Price 1984, 48 is an excellent account of the religious dimension of the problem.

⁴⁸ *IGR* 4.292, l. 3–6: the terms used here are ἐλαφροτομία (“low interest rate”), l. 4, and μεγάλους τόκους (“high interests”), l. 6.

⁴⁹ *IGR* 4.293, col. 1, l. 13–23. See Radt 1988, 143–144.

resettlement. The accomplishment of this public work, however, was a major step in the reconstruction of civic religious identity after the traumatic experience of the war, as the gymnasium was the natural scene of the *Nikephoria*, the city festival created by Attalus I in the late 220s. It soon became much more than a celebration of the monarchy, and it acquired a prominent function in the city's identity, which would survive for a long time after the creation of the Roman province.⁵⁰ It is not surprising, therefore, that the refurbishment of the gymnasium offered Diodoros the opportunity to receive an exceptional honour. His fellow citizens dedicated a cult statue to him and put it in the new gymnasium itself.⁵¹

The set of awards and public celebrations offered to this benefactor on his return from the embassy to Rome (*IGR* 4.292) are indeed very close to those which an inscription from Pergamum records for Attalus III, after his return from a war whose context and chronology are unfortunately unclear (*OGIS* 332): a golden crown, two cult statues, the perpetual celebration of the day of his return to the city.⁵² Besides this parallel between Attalus III and Diodoros, the deep link of Pergamum with the memory of the monarchy must be stressed. The cult of the Attalid monarchs remained an established practice at Pergamum even after the Mithridatic Wars and the definitive consolidation of Roman rule: its revival is duly recorded among Diodoros' merits. There is no evidence for Mithridates' attitude towards it; on the other hand, Rome's toleration before and after the war is well-known.

However, questions arise about the way in which Pergamene religious identity reshaped itself in Diodoros' day. After the Sullan reorganisation of the province, the city lost its free status, and the severe punishment and later crisis it went through make it hard to believe that there was no resentment against Rome. Of course, the clear pro-Roman stance taken by the cities of Asia Minor in the Third Mithridatic War shows that, after Rome's effective reaction to Mithridates' first attack, they were not deluding themselves any longer about their

⁵⁰ Müller 2003, 441–445.

⁵¹ *IGR* 4.293, l. 41–45. Two other statues of Diodoros are known: Radt 1986, 117. About the discovery of the complex where the cult of Diodoros Paspáros may have taken place, see Radt 1976, 314–316 and Radt 1980, 414–416.

⁵² For a detailed discussion of this inscription, see Robert 1984, 472–489 (= Robert 1987, 460–477); on the honours received by Attalus III, see Robert 1985, 468–481 (= Robert 1987, 522–535).

chances to regain complete autonomy.⁵³ Pergamum was no exception in this respect. The cult of M^p. Aquillius was revived; the magistrate who had first organised the Roman province of Asia was honoured along with Diodoros Paspáros, who did so much to limit the impact of Roman rule.⁵⁴ Moreover, no critical remark on the Romans or on Roman rule can be detected in the documents referring to Diodoros' *res gestae*. At the same time, however, these texts are far from expressing satisfaction with the consolidation of Roman rule. In a way, their existence itself is a symptom of difficulty. They were put up to express gratitude to a local notable who contributed to make the burden of the war and the reorganisation of the province less intolerable for the city. At the same time, the strong emphasis put on the local cults and on the cult of the dynasty which had made Pergamum its capital suggests that the identity of the city was still something deeply un-Roman, and a sphere Romans were not supposed to interfere with.

A similar link between the defence of a city's prerogatives and the identity of a community emerges from another epigraphic dossier, that from the sanctuary of Claros, near Colophon, which range from the immediate aftermath of the creation of the province down to the rise to power of Augustus.⁵⁵ The decrees in honour of two local notables, Polemaios and Menippos, are perhaps the most explicit example of the efforts which even free communities had to make in order to keep their status.⁵⁶ The two characters, already active in the last phase of the Attalid period, are praised for having persuaded some influential members of the Roman elite to become patrons of Colophon. Menippos also

⁵³ None of the communities that supported Mithridates in Asia Minor was Greek: see the list in App. *Mithr.* 69.291–294 (including Chalybes, Armenians, Scythians, Taurians, Achaeans, Heniochi, Leucosyrrians, and those who lived near the river Thermodon, in the region also known as the “land of the Amazons”).

⁵⁴ Virgilio 1993, 70.

⁵⁵ Published in J. and L. Robert 1989, with a detailed commentary. The best available discussion of the dossier is Ferrary 1991. New editions of both texts, with commentary, in Lehmann 1998 and Canali De Rossi 2002, 138–149, no. 178 (Menippos) and 150–161, no. 179 (Polemaios). New texts from Claros have been recently published in Ferrary 2000b. For a survey of the archaeological context of the sanctuary, see de la Genière 1993; de la Genière 1998; Ferrary-Verger 1999.

⁵⁶ See Ferrary 1991, esp. 573–577; cf. Ferrary 1999. While it is certain that Colophon enjoyed freedom before the First Mithridatic War, there is no evidence for its status in the later period: Ferrary 1991, 558. Ma 1999, 150–178 provides a useful background by discussing the equally complex relationship between a Hellenistic ruler and the cities of Western Asia Minor.

hosted the governor Q. Mucius Scaevola and his staff during his stay in the area.⁵⁷

This familiarity was just an aspect of a more important and complex strategy. Their diplomatic activity led them to visit the Roman Senate with impressive frequency: Menippos at least five times, Polemaios at least twice. The best-known embassies were carried out by Menippos. On one occasion, he asked the Senate to solve a controversy with the city of Metropolis, which was part of the province of Asia. The Roman governor must have taken a stance in the dispute, as the Senate, after hearing Menippos' plea, restated that governors had no right to interfere with the organisation of free cities.⁵⁸ On different occasions, Menippos and Polemaios successfully defended the jurisdictional autonomy of the city.⁵⁹

The chronology of the texts cannot be fully established, and the decree for Polemaios is especially elusive in this respect. It is even uncertain whether the careers of the two characters ever overlapped.⁶⁰ At any rate, they shared the same civic background and a very similar education, which the dedications duly emphasise. The overtone of the decrees makes it clear that, besides their political achievements, the fellow citizens of Menippos and Polemaios aimed at celebrating the model they embodied as spokesmen of the city towards Rome. Their typically Hellenistic *paideia*, rooted in the context of civic gymnasia and in the study of rhetoric, had given them the opportunity to influence the Roman Senate and to gain Roman patrons to Colophon. The most important moments of their education are therefore recalled in the honorific decrees, as the necessary background of their achievements, and a central aspect of the identity of the whole community.⁶¹

⁵⁷ The identification of this Quintus Mucius Scaevola is uncertain: he may be Q. Mucius Scaevola the Augur, who was governor of Asia in 120/119 BC, or Q. Mucius Scaevola the Pontifex, who was in the region during the early 90s. A full discussion in Eilers 2002, 127–132, who thinks that there is no decisive element to solve the problem.

⁵⁸ I, l. 50–54; II, l. 1–7. See Ferrary 1991, 562–563; Eilers 2002, 131. On the controversy between Colophon and Metropolis, see Heller 2006, 57–65, with earlier bibliography.

⁵⁹ Menippos, col. 1, l. 27–31, 40–49; Polemaios, col. 2, l. 51–57. Menippos obtained a ruling of the Senate decreeing that a citizen of Colophon could not be judged at Rome for a capital offence: Mitchell 2005a, 199–202, with a summary of earlier bibliography.

⁶⁰ A hypothesis which was taken for granted by J. and L. Robert 1989, 104, and has recently been questioned by Eilers 2002, 133–137.

⁶¹ See, for Polemaios, I, l. 1–46 (education in the local gymnasium, journeys to Rhodes and Smyrna); for Menippos, I, l. 1–10 (journey to Athens). See J. and L. Robert 1989, 39–40; Gauthier 1993, 225–228. On the increasing importance of gymnasia for

Later epigraphic material from Colophon includes a series of dedications to the Roman patrons of the city, which are even more interesting for our purposes. An equestrian statue was dedicated to the proconsul Gaius Valerius Flaccus in 95 BC at the latest, while another one was dedicated to his brother Lucius a few years later.⁶² In the late 60s, the Valerii Flacci still had important connections in town. The dedication of a statue in honour of L. Valerius Flaccus, praetor in 63 and governor of Asia in 62/61, stresses his action of inherited (διὰ προγόνων) patronage.⁶³ It is worth noting how the wording of these texts often reflects some substantial change. After the Sullan settlement, the emphasis is on the role of the patrons in making the burden of taxation less heavy. Lucullus, who enforced the Sullan settlement in a way that was quite favourable to the Asian cities, is called “benefactor and saviour of the city”.⁶⁴ Some time later, it shifts to the defence of the city from external threats: Pompey is called “guardian of the land and the sea, benefactor and patron of the Ionians”.⁶⁵ The emphasis on the *beneficia*, which strongly affected the economic life of the city, resurfaces some years later, in an honorific inscription for Q. Tullius Cicero, proconsul of Asia between 61 and 59 BC, “benefactor of the Greeks and patron of the people”.⁶⁶

The Claros dossier is probably the most illuminating evidence for the spread of Roman patronage of Greek communities after the Mithridatic War. This practice is another strong symptom of the difficult phase the Asiatic cities went through at the beginning of the first century BC. It may be argued that it was an attempt to find a solution to the same state of tension and discontent that had persuaded many Asiatic cities to support the King.⁶⁷ The success of this model of political relationship

the construction of civic identity in late Hellenism, see Gauthier 1995, which includes a summary of earlier bibliography.

⁶² Respectively *SEG* 49.1506 and 1507 = Ferrary 2000b, 334–338, nos. 1–2.

⁶³ *SEG* 49.1510 = Ferrary 2000b, no. 5, l. 4: according to Eilers 2002, 79, the clearest case of inherited patronage of a community. See also Coarelli 1982a, 437–440.

⁶⁴ *SEG* 49.1508 = Ferrary 2000b, 339–340, no. 3, l. 3–4: εὐεργέτην καὶ σωτήρα | τῆς πόλεως (“benefactor and saviour of the city”).

⁶⁵ *SEG* 49.1509 = Ferrary 2000b, 341–345, no. 4, l. 4–7: γῆς τε καὶ θαλάσσης | ἐπόπτην, τὸν εὐεργέ- | την καὶ πάτρωνα τῶν | Ἰόνων (“guardian of the earth and of the sea, benefactor and patron of the Ionians”).

⁶⁶ *SEG* 49.1511 = Ferrary 2000b, 351–353, no. 6, l. 5–8: εὐεργέτην ὄντα | τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ | πάτρωνα τοῦ δή- | μου (“who is a benefactor of the Greeks and a patron of the people”).

⁶⁷ Eilers 2002, 143. In this phase of economic crisis, patronage was often related to the construction of new public buildings: E. Winter 1996a, 19.

in the first century BC is probably the clearest trace of the central role which urban communities still played in Roman Asia Minor after Sulla's reorganisation. It is certainly true that the resettlement of the province was based on the inclusion of many previously autonomous cities under Roman rule. However, this is only one side of the coin. The administrative reorganisation carried out by Sulla was still founded on the cities. The decisions taken in favour of the cities at the end of the 70s by Sulla's closest associate, Lucullus, show that their crucial role did not escape the Roman elite.⁶⁸ Weak cities and weak urban elites would have deprived the empire itself of the strength and cohesion it needed.

⁶⁸ Plut. *Luc.* 20. See Broughton 1938, 537–538, 561–562. On the relationship between Sulla and Lucullus, see Keaveney 1992, 15–31.

CHAPTER FOUR

WARFARE AND POLITICS: SULLA IN ITALY

In Italy, as well as in Asia Minor, local elites were a crucial aspect of the balance of the empire. The nearly fifteen years between the outbreak of the Social War and the death of Sulla presented them with numerous problems and difficult choices. As pointed out above, in Italy Rome was facing a similar problem to that it had to confront in the East. The vast majority of the local elites had decided to manifest hostility to Rome, and had managed to create a serious danger to her hegemony. The motives of the Italian allies, however, are not as straightforward to account for as those of the communities of the Greek East. It may be argued that the ultimate project of some of the Italian communities was to put an end to Roman rule. This is probably true of a part of the Samnite elites, for instance. Others, however, intended to be allowed to share the profits of the empire, and wanted to obtain Roman citizenship—which Rome ultimately did grant at the end of the conflict. At any rate, the position of the Italian elites is by no means comparable to that of the Greek ones. The Roman presence and influence were much more usual for them than was the case with the Greeks. Their familiarity with Rome was incomparably greater, in all respects.

The inclusion of the Italians in Roman political life was a complex process, which took several decades from the enfranchisement to be accomplished. It was not started by Sulla, but by his enemies, and namely by Cinna, who had a crucial role in the enfranchisement of the Allies. It was not accomplished in his day either, since the inclusion of all the potential new citizens into the citizen body required a censorial *lustrum*. Sulla's contribution was incomplete in this respect, mainly because of his decision not to perform the *census* in 81 BC.¹

¹ Coşkun 2004 provides a full account of the problem. Until the census took place, the new citizens could vote in the *comitia tributa*, but not in the centuriate assembly: Wiseman 1969, 61–62, 65–66. See also Gabba 1956, 135–138 (= Gabba 1973, 421–424); Harris 1971, 236; Crawford 1994, 415, 417.

This, however, does not mean that Sulla had no interest in profitable relations with the Italian elites. Several aspects of his policies deserve attention: the ways he dealt with the communities that supported him and those that opposed him, the criteria he used to appoint new senators, and the way in which the proscriptions were carried out. Sulla's efforts towards the reorganisation of Italy were deployed after the two major traumas of the Social War and the Civil War. I intend to show that Sulla's skilful management of his relations with the Italian elites played an important role in ensuring him the final victory in the conflict for supremacy in Rome. As was the case in the East, the close link between military and political activity contributed towards his final success. His moves in the Social War are quite instructive.

In the late 90s, some time after his return from Cilicia, after escaping prosecution from his political foe C. Marcius Censorinus, Sulla was included among the Roman commanders in the Social War.² Appian lists him among the generals who were entrusted with the command of a part of the army: the consuls for 90 BC, L. Julius Caesar and P. Rutilius Lupus, supervised the operations all over Italy and coordinated the actions of a number of senior generals, acting in local contexts and entrusted with the rank of *legatus*, probably *pro praetore*.³ There is evidence for Sulla's initiatives in an area corresponding to the territory of the Marsi and, later, to inland Campania. Again, we are told that he operated in close contact with C. Marius, possibly even under his authority. Appian mentions the important support given by Sulla to Marius in a crucial fight against the Marsi, although its location is not specified by the numerous sources that report the episode.⁴

What we know of Sulla's command in Campania, where he led operations in 89 BC, is more interesting.⁵ The focus of his activity appears to have been Pompeii, where his opponent was the Campanian commander Lucius Cluentius. Sulla also relied on the support of Italian forces led by Minatius Magius, a notable from Aeclanum who was to be rewarded for his loyalty to Rome with an individual citizenship grant.⁶

² About Censorinus, see David 1992, 112, 768–769; Reams 1993.

³ App. *b.c.* 1.40.178–179. See Brennan 1992, 157.

⁴ App. *b. c.* 1.46.201–202, with the provisos of Gabba 1958, 141–142. Cf. Plut. *Mar.* 33.3; Liv. *Per.* 73.6; Oros. 5.18.15; Eutr. 5.3.2. Sulla in action near Aesernia, the Latin colony which the Allies had started to besiege from the beginning of the conflict: Frontin. *Strat.* 1.5.17.

⁵ See, in general, Liv. *Per.* 75.2 and 7.

⁶ Vell. 2.16.1–3: *quippe multum Minatii Magii, atavi mei, Aeclanensis, tribuendum est memo-*

We know from Pliny the Elder that Sulla conquered and destroyed Stabiae on 30 April. The sack was so devastating that Stabiae could not be defined as an *oppidum* any longer after the Roman reconquest, but had become something like a rural centre.⁷ Along with Norba, which was conquered in the Civil War, Stabiae is the only Italian city we know to have been destroyed by Sulla. Unfortunately, there is no further evidence for these events.

We are, of course, considerably better informed about Pompeii. The siege of this city must have either preceded or, more probably, followed the conquest of Stabiae. The development of the campaign, however, suggests that Sulla's forces could not have been exiguous, as during the siege of Pompeii they had to face a sudden extension of the conflict. Sulla camped in the area, and soon afterwards Cluentius decided to camp at a very short distance from him.⁸ This prompted a Roman reaction and the beginning of hostilities. Cluentius' troops were defeated and ran away from Pompeii, heading for the neighbouring city of Nola, which was ready to shelter them. Sulla chased the enemies and killed most of them, including Cluentius. It was a crucial moment of the Social War. One of the strongest Italian contingents was severely defeated, and had to concentrate its forces in the safe stronghold of Nola.⁹

We lack explicit evidence for the chronology of the seizure of Pompeii, which must be dated at some point in the spring of 89, after the

riae, qui nepos Decii Magii, Campanorum principis, celeberrimi et fidelissimi uiri, tantam hoc bello Romanis fidem praestitit, ut cum legione, quam ipse in Hirpinis conscripserat, Herculaneum simul cum T. Didio caperet, Pompeios cum L. Sulla oppugnaret Compsamque occuparet... illi pietati plenam populus Romanus gratiam rettulit ipsum uirum ciuitate donando ("for much credit must go to the memory of Minatius Magius, the father of my great-great-grandfather, from Aeclanum, grandson of Decius Magius, leader of the Campanians, a man of great fame and integrity, who showed so much loyalty to the Romans in that war that, with a legion that he had recruited himself among the Hirpini, he took Herculaneum together with Titus Didius, besieged Pompeii with L. Sulla, and occupied Compsa... the Roman people fully rewarded that commitment by a personal citizenship grant"). See, on this passage, the valuable remarks in Sumner 1970, 258–261: *nepos* is probably to be corrected with *pronepos*.

⁷ Plin. 3.5.70: *nunc in uillam abiit* ("now it has been reduced to a farmhouse"). A new smaller settlement was built on the site of the city (modern Poggio di Varano: Miniero 1988, 233), but the whole *ager Stabianus* appears to have been put under the jurisdiction of Nuceria (Miniero 1988, 261).

⁸ App. *b. c.* 1.50.217–221.

⁹ It is probably at this stage of the war that Sulla received the *corona graminea*: Plin. 22.12 (= *HRR*² 10 = Chassignet 10).

victory over Cluentius. Of course, the siege went on even when Sulla was leading the attack near Nola. A passage of Orosius suggests that the *legatus* Postumius Albinus, *uir consularis*, was in charge of it during Sulla's absence. However, his *superbia* soon alienated the sympathy and support of the soldiers, who ended up starting a revolt and stoning him. According to this version, which certainly derives from Livy, Sulla cleverly exploited the incident to encourage them to expiate their guilt by defeating the enemies, and his appeal was successful: in the subsequent battle, 18,000 Samnites were reportedly killed.¹⁰ Sallust's remark about the talent Sulla displayed in dealing with his troops finds further confirmation here. Whatever one decides to make of Orosius' account, the development of the operations shows that the army led by Sulla was quite skilled and able to sustain a complex military effort on at least two fronts.¹¹

The most significant aspects of the conquest of the city, however, remain mysterious. We do not know how traumatic it was, whether the choice of the city to oppose Rome was unanimous or not, and how many people lost their lives in the attack.¹² Ignorance on these matters prevents us from establishing what factors linked the Sullan conquest to the decision Sulla took in 80 BC, when he founded a colony in the territory of the city. The parallel example of the complete destruction faced by neighbouring Stabiae suggests that Pompeii may have had a more pragmatic attitude towards the Roman army, as the city was conquered, but not destroyed. No widespread bloodshed is known to have taken place either.

¹⁰ Oros. 5.18.22–23; cf. Liv. *Per.* 75.1; Plut. *Sull.* 6.9; Polyae. 8.9.1. Orosius' narrative is clearly flawed at least in two respects: the siege is dated to *anno ab Urbe condita DCLXI* (93 BC), and Sulla is called *consul*. Amidani 1994 speculates that Sulla was so mild towards the soldiers because he already knew that their support would be essential for him to obtain the Mithridatic command.

¹¹ Gabba 1958, 151 speculates that the legate Aulus Postumius Albinus, who was supporting Sulla with a fleet, may have been responsible for it.

¹² There is some archaeological evidence for the Sullan siege of Pompeii. The northern side of the walls had to be refurbished thoroughly: Van Buren 1925; Van Buren 1932; Coarelli 2002a, 52. The so-called *eitums*-inscriptions (Ve 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 = *ST* Po 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39), no doubt the best known feature of Oscan epigraphy in Pompeii, certainly deal with the organisation of the resistance against Sulla, but their interpretation remains obscure on a number of matters: see Poccetti 1988, esp. 320–327; Coarelli 2002a, 53. Several Latin graffiti bear the name of Sulla: they are on the wall of the tower no. 3 (*CIL* 4.5385 = *ILLRP* 346: *L. Sulla*), on that of the tower no. 10 (*CIL* 1².2709 = *ILLRP* 347), and on the grave of the aedilis C. Vestorius Priscus

Pompeii benefited from the extension of Roman citizenship and, for nearly a decade, was a *municipium*.¹³ It was only in 80 BC that a colony was created and a new institutional system imposed upon the city.¹⁴ There is no evidence to believe that Pompeii's conduct in the Social War was the factor that caused the foundation of a Sullan colony in 80 BC. The colonisation of Pompeii must have had different reasons, and to have been unrelated to the conquest of the city in 89 BC.¹⁵ It is surely significant, however, that Sulla had direct familiarity with the area, which may have played a part in deciding and organising the colonial settlement.

A similar link between the Social War and the aftermath of Sulla's victory in the Civil War may be found at Aeclanum, an important centre of Samnium. After defeating Cluentius, Sulla moved towards the territory of the Hirpini and besieged the city, then in the hands of the insurgents.¹⁶ Aeclanum refused to surrender, and was punished with the destruction of the walls, which were still made of wood, and a sack. Again, as Appian makes it clear, this case was exceptional. All other cities of Hirpinia decided to surrender, and escaped the sack. Sulla's attitude during the Social War appears to have been consistent in this respect, and it probably was an unavoidable strategy, in a war where time and speed were crucial factors.

In the aftermath of the war, however, Sulla apparently created some useful connections at Aeclanum.¹⁷ M. Magius Surus gained the supreme magistracy of the city. He was son of that Minatius Magius who had played such an important part in supporting the Romans before

(CIL 6.9161 = *ILLRP* 348: *L. Sulla Cornelius*). The archaeological context of the latter suggests that a dating to the age of Claudius: see Weber 1966.

¹³ Castrén 1975, 51 argued, on epigraphical grounds, that some *interreges* may have ruled the city in the early phase of the *municipium*: the argument is convincingly refuted in Crawford 1998, 45–46.

¹⁴ On the chronology, see Weber 1975, 182–187. There is no evidence that the colony and the old *municipium* coexisted for a short period, as claimed by Onorato 1951: cf. Mouritsen 1988, 71–75, 86–88.

¹⁵ *Contra*, Salmon 1958, 168–169.

¹⁶ App. *b.c.* 1.51.222: see Gabba 1958, 152. An episode of the campaign against the Hirpini is perhaps mentioned in Gell. 20.6.3: see Keaveney 1981b, 294–296.

¹⁷ It cannot be ruled that there was a pro-Roman faction at Aeclanum even during the Social War. Salmon 1989, 232–233 attributes to the presence of a pro-Roman element in town the inclusion of the community into the tribe Cornelia, instead of the Galeria, where all other Hirpinian cities belonged. It has been argued that Abellinum is a Sullan colony, but the evidence is inconclusive: Colucci Pescatori 1991, 119 (earlier bibliography: *ibid.*, 111, fn. 122).

the conquest of Pompeii.¹⁸ An inscription found near the eastern gate of the walls of Aeclanum sheds light on the aftermath of the war in the town, soon after the creation of the *municipium*, and strikingly links Sulla's involvement in the Social War to his later *dominatio*. Two of the *quattuorviri*—Magius Surus and an otherwise unknown Patlacius—and the *patronus municipi* Quinctius Valgus built “gates, towers, walls and towers as tall as the wall”.¹⁹ The walls burnt by Sulla were replaced by an imposing stone structure, which is still the most prominent feature of the site of Aeclanum in contrada Grotte, near modern Mirabella Eclano.²⁰ The devastations of the war were therefore followed by a reasonably prompt reconstruction, jointly funded by the *municipium* and by a *priuatus*, who was not a local magistrate, and not even a citizen of Aeclanum. Quinctius Valgus was one of the richest landowners of post-Sullan Italy, who owed his wealth to the confiscations that followed the Civil War. Significantly, Cicero mentions his properties *in agro Hirpino*.²¹ As we shall see in due course, Aeclanum was only one of the fronts for the activities of this impressive figure. Although we do not know how he reached this position, it is no doubt significant that Valgus became patron of a city that had fallen into Sulla's range of action

¹⁸ Again, we are well-informed about his family thanks to his descendant Velleius Paterculus (2.16.3): *cuius* [scil. of Minatius Magius] *illi pietati plenam populus Romanus gratiam rettulit ipsum uirum ciuitate donando, duos filios eius creando praetores, cum seni adhuc crearentur* (“the Roman people fully rewarded that commitment by a personal citizenship grant, and by making his sons praetors at a time when the number of the praetors elected each year was [still] six”). This passage implies that his sons held the praetorship some time between 88 and 82, before the Sullan reform of the magistracy. It is therefore quite likely that they were followers of Marius: Gabba 1954a, 101 (= Gabba 1973, 268). Taylor 1960, 310 and Harvey 1973, 90, fn. 28 are surely wrong in suggesting that the *quattuoruir* C. Marius C. f. mentioned in *CIL* 1².1721 = *CIL* 9.1138 = *ILLRP* 522 is Marius the Younger, cos. 82. There is a stemma of the Velleii in Cébeillac-Gervasoni 1982, 84.

¹⁹ *CIL* 1.1230 = *CIL* 9.1140: *C(aius) Quinctius C(ai) f(ilius) Valg(us) patron(us) munic(ipi) / M(arcus) Magi(us) Min(ati) f(ilius) Surus A(ulus) Patlacius Q(uinti) f(ilius) / IIIHuir(i) d(e) s(ena-tus) s(ententia) portas turreis moiros / turreisque aequas qum moiro / faciundum coirauerunt* (“Gaius Quinctius Valgus son Gaius, patron of the municipium, and Marcus Magius son of Minatus and Surus Aulus Patlacius son of Quintus, *quattuorviri*, supervised the construction of gates, towers, walls and towers as tall as the wall, according to a decree of the senate”).

²⁰ On this site, see Colucci Pescatori 1991, 98–106. On the walls of Aeclanum, see Sgobbo 1931; Kirsten 1975, 627–628.

²¹ Cic. *leg. agr.* 3.2.8. The identification between this C. Quinctius Valgus and the Valgus mentioned in Cic. *leg. agr.* 3.1.3, the father-in-law of the tribune Rullus, is convincingly suggested in Dessau 1883 and in Harvey 1973; cf. *leg. agr.* 3.2.8, 3.3–4.13–14, with Drummond 2000, 138–139, 144–145. See also Scuderi 1989, 124–127.

already during the Social War. His cooperation with Magius Surus, son of an Italian notable who supported Sulla in a crucial moment of the war, must be no coincidence either.

Already in the Social War Sulla was prepared to interact with, and even to reward the Italian elites that did not oppose his plans. During the Civil War, Sulla was keen to build good relations with the communities and the members of the local elites that were prepared to accept his supremacy and not to interfere with his rise to power in Rome. His first act after his return to Italy is very instructive in this respect. In the summer of 83, he sailed into the port of the former Latin colony, by then *municipium*, of Brundisium. Appian says that he was welcomed in town with no opposition.²² The port was granted some form of fiscal immunity, which Appian calls ἀτέλεια, stating that it still existed in his own day. Since Brundisium was a community of Roman citizens, where the *tributum* was not levied, and the most important harbour of the Italian Adriatic coast, it is safe to assume that the immunity was granted from the *portorium*.²³

Sulla's decision was a sign of benevolence and goodwill towards Italy as a whole.²⁴ The 83 BC exemption generated clear advantages to the trade to and from Italy, and specifically to Brundisium. Moreover, it is likely that Sulla himself or his associates enjoyed their own share in the economic bonanza that followed this decision. Already before Sulla, Brundisium was an important centre for the production of the so-called 'Apulian' amphorae, actually produced on the whole Adriatic coast, which had a wide circulation in the East.²⁵ At least two sites in the territory of Brundisium, contrada Apani and contrada Giancola, are known to have been important centres for the production of amphorae in this period.²⁶ Amphorae stamps found in both areas have revealed

²² App. *b.c.* 1.79.364.

²³ Brundisium was included in the tribe *Maecia*: on the municipalisation of Apulia, see Pani 1988, 21–30, esp. 26–27. The archaeological evidence for the development of the city in the Republican period is summarised in Uggeri 1988, 55–59 and Carito 1988. *Portoria* are known to have been abolished all over Italy in 60 BC by the *lex Caecilia de uectigalibus* (see Rotondi 1912, 386); cf. however Suet. *rhet.* 1.

²⁴ On Sulla's agenda after the return to Italy, see the magisterial discussion in Frier 1971, 595–604.

²⁵ In fact, they must be called 'Lamboglia 2': Volpe 1988, 81–87; for an attempt to define the 'Brundisian' amphora type, see Desy 1989, 12–13.

²⁶ On their different characteristics and functions, see Manacorda 1994, 9–10. On the Apani site, see Desy 1989, 14–15 (14: "sans doute le plus riche de tout le bassin méditerranéen en timbres amphoriques"). For a survey of the amphorae types found

the direct involvement in the production of amphorae of Tarula, one of Sulla's closest associates. A freedman of Sulla himself, probably of Thracian origin, he was among those who profited most from the Sullan confiscations. He is mentioned in a famous passage of Sallust's *Historiae*, the *Oratio Lepidi*, where he is numbered among the most detestable figures of the Sullan regime:

nam praeter satellites conmaculatos quis eadem uolt, aut quis non omnia mutata praeter uictoriam? scilicet milites quorum sanguine Tarulae Scirtoque, pessumis servorum, diuitiae partae sunt?

for apart from his blood-stained henchmen, who does support his [Sulla's] cause and who does not want to change everything but the victory? Surely not the soldiers, with whose blood the riches of Tarula and Scirtus, the worst of the slaves, were generated?²⁷

A stamp found at Apani reads *TARVLAE SVLLAE L*, whereas another one from Giancola reads *TARVLA L SVL*.²⁸ They are explicit evidence that Tarula invested some of his patrimony in workshops in the territory of Brundisium.

It is unlikely that Tarula was still a slave when he owned amphorae workshops. Surely he had been enfranchised by then, and the stamps are to be supplemented with *L(ibertus)*, rather than with *L(uci)*.²⁹ The chronology of the amphorae is to be placed, on archaeological grounds, somewhere between the end of the 80s and the early 70s—therefore, in all likelihood, after the proscriptions.

Among the stamps produced in the territory of Brundisium, there are several bearing the name *EPICADVS* too.³⁰ The name is probably Illyrian, and another freedman of Sulla comes to mind: Cornelius Epicadus, who was very close to his patron and to his son Faustus Sulla, and was entrusted to complete the memoirs that death had

at Apani, see Palazzo 1988 and Palazzo 1989. About Giancola, see Desy 1989, 16 and Manacorda 2004. Nonnis 2003, 248–260 usefully discusses this material from the *ager Brundisinus* along with similar evidence from other areas.

²⁷ Sall. *Hist.* 1.55.21.

²⁸ Cf. *CIL* 9.6079.9. Overall, there are seven exemplars of stamps bearing Tarula's name, six from Apani and one from Giancola: Desy 1989, 95, nos. 654–656; 105, no. 751. They are present mainly in the *ager Brundisinus*: see Palazzo 1996, 50, with earlier bibliography.

²⁹ Marangio 1978; Palazzo 1996, 49–50; Nonnis 2003, 252, fn. 11; *contra*, arguing that Tarula was a *servus cum peculio*, Manacorda 1985, 146; Santoro 1993, 512–513; Aubert 1994, 252–253; Manacorda 1994, 15–16 (more cautious); Manacorda 2004, 186.

³⁰ Cf. *CIL* 6079.24. Desy 1989, 76–77, nos. 482–486 (from Apani); 109, no. 793 (from Santa Rosa); 115, no. 842 (unknown, though certainly Brundisian workshop).

prevented the great man from completing.³¹ However, the idea of a direct involvement of this Epicadus in the workshops near Brundisium is probably far-fetched. It should be explained, first of all, why Epicadus would not state his relationship with Sulla, as Tarula does.

However, Tarula was not the only ‘outsider’ who was involved in financial enterprises in the *ager Brundisinus* in the first century BC. Another amphora stamp shows the name of an *ORESTE(S) LENTULO(RUM)*. This Orestes is surely a freedman, or a slave supplied with *peculium*, of some members of the Lentuli family. His patrons must have been L. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, consul in 57 BC (*RE* 238) and L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus, consul in 49 BC (*RE* 218).³² Their political position was all but consistent, as they cautiously kept close both to Pompey and to Caesar, and it sheds little light on the reasons of their presence at Brundisium.³³ Not even their relationship with the *gens Cornelia* should be viewed as an immediate reason for their involvement in Brundisian pottery workshops. Their presence in the area is the symptom of a wider phenomenon. The exemption from the *portorium* decided by Sulla determined an economic expansion for the territory of Brundisium, and some members of the Roman elite took advantage of this favourable situation, replacing the local producers who had been operating there until the beginning of the first century BC.³⁴

As he moved towards Rome along the Appian Way, Sulla found no significant hostility from the local communities. Velleius Paterculus stresses how exceptionally peaceful the passage of Sulla through Calabria and Apulia was:

putares Sullam uenisse in Italiam non belli uindicem, sed pacis autorem: tanta cum quiete exercitum per Calabriam Apuliamque cum singulari cura frugum, agrorum, hominum, urbium perduxit in Campaniam.

one would think that Sulla had come to Italy not as the champion of war but as the maker of peace; so quietly did he lead the army to Campania through Calabria and Apulia, with a remarkable care not to harm crops, fields, men, cities.³⁵

³¹ On the diffusion of the name, see Santoro 1993, 513. On Epicadus’ relationship with Faustus Sulla, see Suet. *gramm.* 12.

³² Manacorda 1994, 15; Silvestrini 1996a, 34. Cf. the general discussion on the interests of the Italian elites in manufactories and trade during the Republic in Nonnis 2003, 267–274.

³³ Syme 1939a, 44–45.

³⁴ Cipriano-Carre 1989, 73.

³⁵ Vell. 2.25.1. On Velleius’ typical interest in Italian matters see Mazzarino 1966, 433–438; Dench 2005, 119.

Velleius should be taken seriously here, rather than simply dismissed as an uncritical follower of a pro-Sullan tradition.³⁶ Sulla's most dangerous enemies were elsewhere: near Capua, in Latium, and in Etruria, where the decisive phase of the conflict would take place.³⁷ Moreover, it is safe to assume that he had already gathered the resources he needed for his campaign from the extraordinary levy he had imposed on the cities of Asia Minor, and could exploit the political advantages that would derive from a mild treatment of the Italian population. Finally, it is not unlikely that the senators who had left Rome and joined Sulla during his Eastern campaign, forming that “semblance of a Senate” (σχῆμα βουλῆς) mentioned by Plutarch, exploited their connections in Southern Italy for the sake of their friend and patron, the winner of the Mithridatic War.³⁸

Sulla was prepared to make some substantial political concessions on various fronts. Between Cales and Teanum, after the victory in the battle near the Tifata Mount, he held talks with the consul L. Scipio Asiagenus, in which he proved himself prepared not to affect the rights of the Italian communities, while Scipio gave reassurances about his intention to respect the prerogatives of the Senate.³⁹ Some time later, as he was getting closer to Rome and to the final clash with Marius, he negotiated directly with the Italians, and struck a deal with them, reported by the *Epitome* of Livy:

Sulla cum Italicis populis, ne timeretur ab his uelut erupturus ciuitatem et suffragii ius nuper datum, foedus percussit.

³⁶ Sulla's hostility to the Samnites should not be exaggerated, and there is no good reason to believe that the Samnites were excluded from the enfranchisement; *contra*, Salmon 1964, 75–79.

³⁷ Salmon 1967, 382.

³⁸ See Plut. *Sull.* 22.1, with Angeli Bertinelli 1996, 16. For some guesswork on the senators who may have joined Sulla in the East, see Keaveney 1984, 126–131; see also Kelly 2006, 99–100.

³⁹ Cic. *Phil.* 12.11.27: *Sulla cum Scipione inter Cales et Teanum, cum alter nobilitatis florem, alter belli socios adhibuisset, de auctoritate senatus, de suffragiis populi, de iure ciuitatis agentes inter se condiciones contulerunt. non tenuit omnino colloquium illud fidem, a ui tamen periculoque afuit. non tenuit omnino colloquium illud fidem, a ui tamen periculoque afuit* (“Sulla and Scipio, the one accompanied by the flower of the nobility, the other by his allies in the war, laid down their respective conditions on the authority of the Senate, the suffrages of the people and the right of citizenship in a conference between Cales and Teanum. That meeting was not entirely marked by good faith, but it was devoid of violence and danger”); cf. Cic. *Phil.* 13.1.2, and Brunt 1988, 125–126. On the talks between Sulla and Scipio and the position of Sertorius, see Strisino 2002. Some envoys of the Senate had approached Sulla immediately after the defeat of Mithridates: Liv. *Per.* 83.4 and 84.1–3.

Sulla struck a deal with the peoples of Italy, so that they did not fear that he would withdraw their citizenship and the right to vote that had recently been given to them.⁴⁰

By that time, it was clear to many that Sulla's rule was bound to replace that of his enemies. Livy reports that he was visited by litigators who presented their *vadimonia* to him. He answered them to present their claims at Rome, where he would deal with them in due course. He clearly felt that the final victory was very close. The local Italian elites must have realised it too.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Liv. *Per.* 86.3.

⁴¹ The best discussion of this phase is Frier 1971, 601–602. On Sulla's decision to confirm the enfranchisement of the Allies, Gabba 1954a, 102–104 (= Gabba 1973, 270–272) remains invaluable. Dahlheim 1993, 111–112 hastily dismisses Sulla's pledge as a merely tactical measure; Keaveney 1987, 187, 205–206 emphatically celebrates it as the turning-point in the making of Roman Italy.

CHAPTER FIVE

RETALIATION AND POLITICS: THE PROSCRIPTIONS

In all the narratives of the Civil War the portrait of a peaceful Sulla, who gets back to Italy and reassures the Italians about his intentions, is closely followed by the proscriptions and the dictatorship. There is no intrinsic contradiction between these two moments, which are in fact different aspects of the same strategy.

After his arrival in Italy, Sulla showed his talent for building fruitful relations with the communities that were prepared to second his interests. The booty he had obtained in the East allowed him to restrain his greed, at least for the first part of the campaign. Overall, he kept quite consistent with this policy, as far as his relations with the communities were concerned.¹ Retaliation affected only the staunchest enemies. Praeneste and Norba, which had become the core of the anti-Sullan resistance and sheltered the most prominent Marians, were sacked.² Norba was even abandoned, and the area was reoccupied only in the Middle Ages, when the city of Norma was founded on a neighbouring site.³ The destruction of Sulmo, the capital of the Paeligni, was probably only announced by Sulla, but never carried out.⁴ Other cities, as I will show in greater detail in the next part, were punished with the settlement of veterans, and an unclear number of communities, which certainly included Arretium and Volaterrae, were deprived of Roman citizenship. Other Etruscan cities, like Telamon, Vetulonia and

¹ Brunt 1971, 286–287 is probably too pessimistic.

² Pompey conquered and sacked Sena Gallica in Picenum: App. *b. c.* 1.88.401.

³ See Coarelli 1982b, 265–271. The archaeological evidence shows that the city went through a prosperous phase between the Second Punic War and the war between Sulla and the Marians: Quilici Gigli 2003. On Norbanus' possible connection with Norba, see Linden 1896, 56, fn. 20; Münzer 1936, 926–927.

⁴ See Flor. 2.9.28: *nam Sulmonem, uetus oppidum socium atque amicum—facinus indignum—non expugnat aut obsidet iure belli; sed quo modo morte damnati duci iubentur, sic damnatam ciuitatem iussit deleri* (“indeed he does not storm into Sulmo, which has long been a friendly ally, nor besieges it, but—what a shameful act—he condemns the city and orders its destruction, in the same way as those who are condemned to death are ordered to be led to execution”). Possibly, the destruction was limited to the fortifications of the city. See Gabba 1970/1971, 462–463 (= Gabba 1973, 363–367); Wiseman 1971, 26.

Saturnia, suffered heavy destructions, which may be due to a Sullan attack. It is however with the punishment of hundreds of individuals that Sulla earned himself the reputation of a blood-thirsty tyrant, which lingered on in the ancient tradition. Indeed, the proscriptions were his most obvious contribution to the making of the Italian elite. They also were the final act of the Civil War, and the most extraordinary one—especially because they were unprecedented.

As soon as Sulla returned to Rome, he started to settle the political affairs in the city. Appian reports a speech which he gave to an “assembly”, surely a *contio*, where he outlined his intentions for the immediate future.⁵ He anticipated an ambitious plan of constitutional and political reforms, and requested complete obedience. Moreover, he announced that all the magistrates who had opposed him after his return from the East and his negotiations with Scipio would be severely punished. After this speech, the proscriptions started.⁶ The *contio* mentioned by Appian was probably held the day after a Senate assembly that took place in the temple of Bellona on 2 November 82 BC, in which Sulla outlined the project of the proscriptions.⁷ According to Plutarch, this meeting of the Senate coincided with the actual beginning of the massacres and the confiscations.

The speech reported by Appian is the most thorough and diffused justification of the mass slaughter that is widely known as the Sullan *proscriptiones*. The elimination of the leading exponents of the *factio Mariana* was, of course, an essential aspect of the proscriptions, but it would be wrong to view it as the only, or perhaps even the main, one. The history of the word *proscriptio* reveals the complexity of such a process, and its political importance. The term had long belonged in the technical vocabulary of Roman law and it was commonly used to designate a procedure whereby a document was put up in a public place (*pro-scribere*), and presented to the whole community. A list of candidates or people deemed suitable for a magistracy could be the object of a *proscriptio*, but the word is most frequently associated with a public sale. An auction of the goods belonging to an individual,

⁵ App. *b. c.* 1.95.441–444. Appian uses the word ἐκκλησία.

⁶ The best modern discussion on the Sullan proscriptions is Hinard 1985a, 18–223, followed by a catalogue of the victims at 329–411. My debt to this contribution will often be apparent. For a survey of the modern debate on the proscriptions, see Calore 1995, 34–40.

⁷ Plut. *Sull.* 30.3; Dio 33–35, fr. 109.5. The chronology is convincingly outlined by Hinard 1985a, 108–110.

for example, was usually called *proscriptio*. The word had an explicitly negative connotation, as the sale affected the household of someone in a state of insolvency, and the publicity it was given was at the same time a denunciation of that person's conduct, and a sanction of *infamia*.⁸ To a large extent, the proscriptions decided and enacted by Sulla were a complete novelty, although his decision to declare *hostes publici* twelve leading associates of Marius, in 88 BC, is, to an extent, a precedent.⁹ At the same time, they must be understood in light of this legal and ideological background.¹⁰

Technically, the *proscriptio* was the inclusion of a person on a list of the addressees of a range of provisions, adopted unilaterally by Sulla. We are told by the literary sources that the list was displayed in the Roman Forum, and periodically updated by the insertion of new names.¹¹ A reference made by Cicero in his speech in defence of Roscius from Ameria makes it clear that the final deadline for the inclusion of new names was fixed as 1 June 81, about seven months after Sulla's speeches to the people and the Senate.¹²

It has often been argued that the list of proscriptions was set up to restrain the massacres and limit the number of victims.¹³ The evidence we have for many arbitrary and politically unjustified crimes perpetrated in the age of the proscriptions is a warning against accepting these arguments. The set of legal consequences for those included on the list, however, points to a quite different conclusion. Strictly speaking, a proscription was not a death sentence.¹⁴ Most of the people on the list were killed, of course, although some managed to flee Rome and Italy, and either spent the rest of their lives in exile, or joined the forces

⁸ The best discussion of the legal background of the proscriptions is Hinard 1985a, 17–29. About *proscriptio* as an aspect of civil law, see Kaser 1996, 388–401. On the *proscriptio* (public sale) of a debtor's goods in the age of Sulla, see Cic. *Quinct.* 6.25. Also cf. *ibid.* 24.76. On the political implications of the speech, see Heinze 1960, 93–98; Desrosiers 1969, 15–26; Hinard 1975.

⁹ App. *b. c.* 1.60.271–272; Plut. *Sull.* 10.1; Cic. *Brut.* 168; Liv. *Per.* 77; Val. Max. 3.8.5; Flor. 2.9.8. See Pais 1916; Bauman 1973; Katz 1975, 105–115; Hinard 1985a, 108–109 (Sulla presented his aims to the Senate and to a *contio*, like he did before the proscriptions); Kelly 2006, 93–98.

¹⁰ J. Henderson 1998, 15–18 is an excellent, if brief discussion in this respect.

¹¹ App. *b. c.* 1.95.443. See Cicero's definition of the proscription in *dom.* 17.43 (*poenam in ciues Romanos nominatim sine iudicio constitutam*, “a penalty decided against expressly named Roman citizens without a trial”).

¹² Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 44.128.

¹³ Cf. Plut. *Sull.* 31.2–4; Flor. 2.9.25; Oros. 5.21.2–3.

¹⁴ See Hinard 1985a, 35–36.

of Sertorius in Spain. The murder of the proscribed was of course the most frequent outcome, since immunity was granted to the executioner and those who helped the proscribed were liable to be killed, although not proscribed.¹⁵ However, this was not the central aspect of the proscriptions.¹⁶

The immediate effects of a proscription were political and financial. The proscribed was the victim of an *interdictio*, a legal provision that excluded the victim from citizenship, and therefore deprived him of any right, including that to personal safety, and meant that his patrimony was entirely confiscated by the State. Soon afterwards, all his properties were sold in a public auction, usually at a considerably lower price than the real value of the goods. The *interdictio* was extended to the children of the proscribed, mainly to make any legal challenge to the confiscation impossible.¹⁷ The punishment inflicted by Sulla on a part of the Roman and Italian notables that had opposed him was not meant to be exhausted over the course of one generation. Moreover, the effects of the proscriptions had to be shielded from the likely legal challenges, or open revenge, of the descendants of the victims.¹⁸

Even this cursory glance at the provisions relating to the proscriptions shows that the intention to limit the number of the victims was hardly the reason which led Sulla to reinvent the *proscriptio* and transform it into a political matter. Some more convincing motives can be suggested. Firstly, a massive process of expropriation and reallocation of resources needed some form of legal recognition, which the creation of public lists of victims made possible. Secondly, Sulla needed to convey the weight of the *infamia* that he inflicted on his enemies by adopting a completely new form, which was nevertheless immediately understandable to the Roman public. It had to be the political death of the sectors

¹⁵ Plut. *Sull.* 31.7. Hinard 1985a, 35–40.

¹⁶ Even some enemies of Sulla who had died during the Civil War were proscribed: Hinard 1985a, 84–85. It is the clause of the law on the proscriptions quoted by Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 43.126: *ut aut eorum bona ueneant qui proscripti sunt... aut eorum qui in aduersariorum praesidiis occisi sunt* (“that the properties, either of those who have been proscribed... or of those who have been killed on the enemies’ lines should be sold”). Strictly speaking, having died fighting with the Mariani was enough to receive a posthumous punishment. This is the only surviving citation of the text of the statute: see *RS*, no. 49, 747.

¹⁷ Sall. *Cat.* 37.9; Liv. *Per.* 89.4; Vell. 2.28.4; Plin. 7.117; Sen. *ira* 2.34.2. See Vedaldi Iasbez 1981 (with a tentative list at 184–207); Hinard 1985a, 87–100. Velleius’ statement that *senatorum filii et onera ordinis sustinerent et iura perderent* is probably an anachronism: see Hinard 1985a, 99–100; contra, Vedaldi Iasbez 1981, 170–176.

¹⁸ Epstein 1987, 44–45, 109 at fn. 109.

of the Roman and Italian elites that had opposed him. Re-using an aspect of private law in the political domain was, in some respects, a stroke of genius. Its close link with the concept of *infamia* and the effectiveness of the provisions no doubt played a major part in bringing about the climate of terror conveyed by some ancient accounts of the aftermath of Sulla's victory.¹⁹

The proscription of an individual was, first of all, a legal decision, although there was an obvious political dimension to it. The standard procedure was set out in an edict and was later ratified by a law. As is the case with other aspects of this problem, our information depends on the correct interpretation of a passage of Cicero's speech *pro Roscio Amerino*.²⁰ In 80BC Cicero defended Sextus Roscius Amerinus, the son of a partisan of Sulla, who was unduly included in the proscription list and killed by two fellow citizens. Chrysogonus, an influential freedman of Sulla, eventually bought Roscius *senior's* properties at a very low price. A global interpretation of this speech is made quite difficult by the constraints that Cicero had to face when he gave it: the case was heard when Sulla was still in Rome, holding the consulship. However, the *pro Roscio Amerino* teaches us a lot about the legal aspects of the proscriptions and the way in which they were enforced.

It seems therefore quite surprising that, at some point, Cicero refers to a passage of the law showing some uncertainty about its name:

how, according to the very law on the proscription, the Valerian or the Cornelian—for I do not know it and I do not know which one it is—how by virtue of that law could they sell the properties of Sextus Roscius?²¹

Surely, there should be no room for uncertainty on such a matter, especially in a plea made by a lawyer in such an important trial, and later revised for publication.²² The doubt that Cicero expresses here is probably explainable as a reference to the legal procedure which led

¹⁹ Hinard 1985a, 135–143; cf. J. Henderson 1998, 32 (“Sullan *proscription* always bleeds into the bloodstream of ‘*putting on public record*’—‘noticing the terms of political existence’”). Cf. the dreadful treatment inflicted upon the corpses of the victims: Hinard 1984b.

²⁰ There are useful discussions of this speech in Desrosiers 1969, 26–53; Stroth 1975, 55–79; Kinsey 1980; Kinsey 1981; Diehl 1988, 43–117; Dyck 2003; Hinard 2006.

²¹ Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 43.125: *qui potuerunt ista ipsa lege quae de proscriptione est, siue Valeria siue Cornelia—non enim noui nec scio—uerum ista ipsa lege bona Sex. Rosci uenire qui potuerunt?*

²² Diehl 1988, 46 suggests that the written version of the speech followed closely the plea given at the trial; an opposite view, which I find preferable, in Berry 2004.

to Sulla's dictatorship.²³ A law presented by L. Valerius Flaccus, who acted as an *interrex* in the months immediately following the end of the Civil War, provided the legal background to Sulla's accession to the dictatorship.²⁴ With this law, all Sulla's *acta* between 88 and 82 were ratified, and the way was paved for the dictatorship.²⁵ The proscriptions were then dealt with in detail in a *lex Cornelia*. The existence of this law is confirmed by a passage of the *Verrines*, which refers to a specific clause, which forbade the assistance of the proscribed.²⁶ In the *pro Roscio Amerino*, Cicero's aim is to de-politicise the trial by downplaying the role of Sulla in the rise of Chrysogonus. By implying that the proscriptions were not just a result of Sulla's policy, but had ultimately been made possible by a law presented by a former opponent of the dictator, like Flaccus, Cicero did a good service to the agenda of his harangue, if not to the cause of historical accuracy.²⁷

It is therefore likely that the definitive legal framework of the proscriptions was provided by a *lex Cornelia*, voted by the *comitia* during the dictatorship. Although the full name of the law is not stated, it was probably a *lex Cornelia de proscriptione*, or *de proscriptis*, which determined

²³ Cf. Diehl 1988, 92–95, viewing it as an indirect reference to the unlawfulness of Roscius's murder and of the ensuing confiscation.

²⁴ App. *b. c.* 1.98–99.459–461; cf. Plut. *Sull.* 33.1; Vell. 2.28.2. On Appian's account and Valerius Flaccus' role in the Civil War, see Gabba 1958, 267–271; Bellen 1975; Keaveney 1984, 131–138.

²⁵ On the ratification of Sulla's *acta*, see Cic. *leg. agr.* 3.2.5: *omnium legum iniquissimam dissimillimamque legis esse arbitror eam quam L. Flaccus interrex de Sulla tulit, ut omnia quaecumque ille fecisset essent rata* ("of all the laws I think that the most iniquitous and the one that least resembles a law is that presented by the interrex L. Flaccus on Sulla, decreeing that all his acts, irrespective of what they were, should be ratified"). About the background and scope the *lex Valeria*, see Vervaet 2004; on its legitimacy, see Castello 1956. Also cf. Gabba 1958, 255; Wosnik 1963, 93; Hurlet 1993, 30–50; Sandberg 2002, 80. On Cicero's reference to 'tyranny', see Lanciotti 1977, 130–131.

²⁶ Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.47.123: *quae proscriptum iuuari uetaret*. On this clause, see Calore 1989.

²⁷ The view of Hinard 1979 and Hinard 2006, LIII–LVII, that Cicero deliberately politicised the case of Roscius by overstating Chrysogonus' power, is unsupported by the evidence. Flaccus, cos. 100 was appointed *princeps senatus* in 86 BC: Liv. *Per.* 83.4. Cf. however Buchheit 1975a, arguing that Cicero's negative views about Sulla are already apparent in the *pro Roscio Amerino*, albeit skillfully concealed by a clever use of irony; on a similar line Diehl 1988, 85–117, esp. 86–88. On the portrait of Chrysogonus as a tyrant, see Buchheit 1975b; Hinard 2006, XLIV–XLVI wrongly minimises the political influence of the freedman. The speech is probably to be dated to the beginning of 80 BC: see Kinsey 1967. It is unlikely that Cicero left Rome for Athens because he feared Sulla's anger (Plut. *Cic.* 3.6). It is more likely that he left because of poor health, as Cicero himself says in *Brut.* 314 (see Kinsey 1967, 67).

the *interdictio* of a number of enemies of Sulla.²⁸ It set the rules for the confiscation and the sale of the household of the proscribed, withdrew the political rights of the children of the proscribed, granted immunity to the murderers of those who had not died in the Civil War, and fixed the temporal limit for the inclusion of new names on the proscription list to 1 June 81 BC. It probably contained the first list of the victims of the proscriptions, which was created after the Colline Gate Battle and included the most prominent opponents of Sulla.²⁹ However, such a list was certainly not exhaustive, as murders and expropriations were still possible after June 81, as is shown by the case of Roscius Amerinus, who was killed three months after the deadline set in the law on the proscriptions.

It seems clear that Sulla himself compiled the list, and that he had a direct role in organising the confiscations and the new allocations of properties. As he made clear in the speech reported by Appian, the first targets were the magistrates that had led, or followed, the Marians during the last phase of the Civil War. Some of them, like Marius the Younger and the praetor Damasippus, had already died during the conflict, while other leaders of the faction, captured after the battle at the Colline Gate, were executed soon afterwards. Their suffering was dreadful: they were beheaded, and their heads were taken to Praeneste and exposed in front of the walls of the besieged town. The grisly spectacle was meant to persuade the citizens of Praeneste to surrender.³⁰

The punishment of Praeneste is an episode of the proscriptions too, and it shows an important aspect of the political plan which prompted Sulla's vengeance.³¹ To his eyes, not only did the members of the Roman political elite deserve to be punished for their infidelity, but so did also the Italian notables that had supported the Marians. The male population of the *municipium* of Praeneste was decimated. It is likely that a part of the local elite was put on the proscription list. The

²⁸ Hinard 1985a, 74–77 envisages a *lex Cornelia de hostibus rei publicae*.

²⁹ Hinard 1985a, 84–85; Kinsey 1988.

³⁰ App. *b. c.* 1.93.433. See Hinard 1985a, 127, 134; on the executions, 107–108. Mazzarino 1966, 318–320 offers some interesting speculation on the prominence of the massacre of the Praenestines in the tradition on Sulla's *crudelitas*, in which he claims, largely on the shaky ground provided by Val. Max. 9.2.1, that Livy played a very significant role.

³¹ See Gabba 1987, 117–119: the punishment of entire communities decided by Sulla show that the political importance of the Italian cities had increased remarkably.

subsequent foundation of a colony was probably preceded by a series of individual confiscations, rather than by the confiscation of the whole territory of the *municipium*. Praeneste was no exception in this respect. As Appian says, the partisans of Sulla brought about specific and detailed investigations all over Italy, in most local contexts, constantly adding names to the first list that Sulla had produced in Rome.³² Sanctions could be decided, without trial, if one was believed guilty of one of the charges listed by Appian: for having held a command or having served in the armies of the Marians, or even for having financed Sulla's opponents.³³

Another speech of Cicero, the *pro Cluentio*, shows the authors of the proscriptions at work in a *municipium* of Central Italy, Larinum, soon after the end of the war. The client of Cicero was accused by his mother Sassia of having poisoned his stepfather Oppianicus, whom his advocate had every reason to depict as a dangerous thug and a profiteer of the Sullan regime. Many other people, according to the reconstruction Cicero provided in his plea, may have had an interest in killing him.³⁴ Oppianicus' active role in the proscriptions is a central feature of his memorably hostile portrait. Some time after the end

³² App. *b.c.* 1.96.446.

³³ Cf. Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 44.127. Gabba 1958, 258 suggests that Appian closely followed the text of Sulla's disposition. Hinard 1983, 327 argues that copies of the proscription list may have been displayed in the *municipia* too.

³⁴ Cic. *Cluent.* 8.25: *post illam autem fugam, sceleris et conscientiae testem, numquam se iudiciis, numquam legibus, numquam inermum inimicis committere ausus est, sed per illam L. Sullae uim atque uictoriam Larinum in summo timore omnium cum armatis aduolauit: quattuoruiros, quos municipes fecerant, sustulit: se a Sulla et tres praeterea factos esse dixit, et ab eodem sibi esse imperatum ut A. Aurium, illum qui sibi delationem nominis et Capitis periculum ostentarat, et alterum A. Aurium et eius L. filium et Sex. Uibium, quo sequestre in illo indice corrumpendo dicebatur esse usus, proscribendos interficiendosque curaret. itaque illis crudelissime interfectis non mediocri ab eo ceteri proscriptionis et mortis metu tenebantur* ("after that escape, which was testimony to his guilt and his bad conscience, he never dared to expose himself to the judgement of a court, to the laws, or to the enemies, unless he was in arms; but thanks to the violence and the victory of Lucius Sulla he Stormed into Larinum with a group of armed men, filling everyone with the greatest fear; he unseated the *quattuoruiroi* that had been elected by the citizens of the *municipium*; he said that he and three others had been appointed by Sulla, and that he had been ordered by the same Sulla to make sure that Aulus Aurius, who had threatened to denounce him on a capital charge, another Aulus Aurius, his son Lucius and Sextus Vibius, whom he was said to have used as an intermediary in bribing the informant, were proscribed and killed. Thus, after those men were killed in the cruellest way, the citizens were kept in constant and real fear of being proscribed and put to death"). The speech is an invaluable source for the family alliances and rivalries within the elite of Larinum: Moreau 1983; Silvestrini 1996b, 269–272. On the economic aspects of the speech, see Moreau 1986.

of the Civil War, he suddenly arrived in Larinum, with a group of armed thugs, entrusted by Sulla with a specific mission. His tasks were clear: unseating the *quattuorviri* of the *municipium*, no doubt followers of Marius; becoming a member of the new *collegium* of city magistrates; “proscribing and killing” four local notables (*proscribendos interficiendosque curaret*).³⁵ It is apparent that the proscriptions and the murders were two different steps of the same process, although not immediately related to each other. The physical elimination of the enemy may have followed his ‘legal death’, the *infamia* and the confiscations, but it was not a necessary consequence of the proscription. Oppianicus claimed that he was acting on behalf of Sulla, from whom he had received explicit instructions: the subsequent lines make it apparent that the executions had taken place, and that the threat of more was still impending. After Oppianicus had proved so ruthless and so effective, the people at Larinum feared that the proscription list could be extended, should Oppianicus be attracted by the wealth of some other citizens.

It is hard to believe that the deeds of Oppianicus were not paralleled elsewhere. Unfortunately, there are no other examples on the record, but this passage probably unveils an important aspect of the proscriptions. It is significant that Oppianicus, after performing the task he had been entrusted with by Sulla, was entitled to proscribe other individuals.³⁶ As his case suggests, the atrocity of the proscriptions must not overshadow an important point: the proscriptions were a political process, whose explicit aim was to destroy a part of Italian elite and replace it with new elements that had proved their loyalty to Sulla. The first list set up by Sulla included only the most prominent supporters of Marius and Cinna, those holding senior positions in Roman and Italian politics. Yet, it remained open to the inclusion of people whose prominence did not go beyond their local community, signalled by the Sullan envoys that had been sent to other cities. For the misdeeds of Oppianicus and

³⁵ M.R. Torelli 1973, 341–343 conveniently links Oppianicus’ misdeeds to an inscription from Larinum that mentions *Sulla Felix dictator* as *patronus* of the city (*AE* 1975, 219); cf. Moreau 1997, 137–139 and Fezzi 2003, 31–33. Crawford 1998, 33 argues that Oppianicus supervised a new *constitutio* of the *municipium*, undoing the provisions taken after the enfranchisement of the city. Two tribes are attested at Larinum, the Voltinia and the Clustumina; Folcando 1997, 54–55 speculates that Sulla assigned the inhabitants were assigned to two different tribes, as he wanted to punish the part of the elite that had supported Marius.

³⁶ He may have also freed the slaves of his victims, like Sulla did at Rome: see the mysterious case of the *Martiales*, a group of (former?) slaves Oppianicus wanted to grant freedom to (Cic. *Cluent.* 15.43–44, with Moreau 1997).

his likes to be perpetrated without being punished, there was time at least until 1 June 81, as the *pro Roscio Amerino* makes clear.

In Appian's account, the punishment of the individuals—the proscriptions—chronologically precede the retaliation that Sulla decided against some communities which had supported the Marians. This is true of the colonies that were founded in Italy by Sulla himself, but not necessarily of the Italian *municipia*. In Larinum, for instance, the elected magistrates were proscribed by the envoys of Sulla. The status of the community did not change, but a strong interference in its political life took place. Indeed, the proscriptions and the political normalisation of local contexts were two facets of the same dossier, and they took place in a close sequence, soon after the victory in the Civil War.

CHAPTER SIX

SULLA'S INFAMOUS ASSOCIATES

Numerous victims of the Sullan proscriptions are known, although they number considerably less than the tally of victims of the triumviral proscriptions.¹ We are not equally well informed about those who claimed and got hold of their properties. On the other hand, it is well established that the land confiscations related to the proscriptions affected the most diverse areas of Italy, from Beneventum to Casinum, from the Campanian coast to Alba Fucens.²

Beside the short, if colourful, accounts provided by Appian and Plutarch, it is Cicero that provides the most detailed narratives of how a proscription was decided and enforced. One concerns the misdeeds of Oppianicus, as we have seen, while the other is contained in the first chapters of the *pro Roscio Amerino*. In fact, according to Cicero's forceful reconstruction, Roscius' *proscriptio* was illegal. The father of Cicero's client, a keen partisan of Sulla and a client of several prominent aristocratic families, was murdered in Rome. Cicero insinuates that two of the victim's fellow citizens, T. Roscius Capito and T. Roscius Magnus, were involved in the murder. They then told Chrysogonus, an influential freedman of Sulla, of the value of Roscius' patrimony, and suddenly the name of the victim appeared on the proscription list: "the name of Sextus Roscius, a most zealous supporter of the nobility, is put on the proscription lists".³ According to Cicero, the operation obeyed no political rationale; its only purpose was to favour a bunch of profiteers by damaging an honest and unsophisticated farmer from an Umbrian

¹ See the catalogue in Hinard 1985a, 327–411.

² On Beneventum, see Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.15.38. On Casinum, see Cic. *leg. agr.* 3.4.14. On Marius' Campanian villa, bought for a ridiculous price by Sulla's daughter Cornelia, see references and discussion in Badian 1973, esp. 121–125, 130–132. On Alba Fucens, see Plut. *Sull.* 31.11–12. *ILLRP* 146 might be evidence for land assignments to the veterans of Metellus Pius in its territory after the Civil War: Gabba 1979. It is possible that the city took part in Lepidus' revolt, and that this was a reaction to the Sullan confiscations: see Oros. 5.22.16–17, with Coarelli 1998 and Liberatore 2004, 16. Plut. *Crass.* 6.6 is no evidence for land confiscations at Tuder, *pace* Gabba 1986, 98 (= Gabba 1994a, 205).

³ Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 8.21: *nomen refertur in tabulas Sex. Rosci, hominis studiosissimi nobilitatis.*

municipium.⁴ Moreover, it was unacceptable from a legal point of view. Roscius had no relationship whatsoever with the Marians, and he was included on the proscription list *aliquot post menses* since the final date set for the proscriptions and for the sale of the confiscated properties was 1 June 81 BC. Unfortunately, the only internal evidence we have for a precise dating of the presumably illegitimate confiscation has no parallel elsewhere. When the enemies of Roscius told Chrysogonus about the potential operation, he was at Volaterrae, then besieged by Sulla.⁵ The date of the conquest of this last Marian stronghold is uncertain; it is beyond doubt, however, that it fell during Sulla's dictatorship.⁶

According to Cicero, Sulla could not have known about the fraudulent behaviour of his protégé because of his many duties. The role of Chrysogonus, however, remains a problem, as much as his relationship with Sulla, and one cannot be satisfied with the clever rhetorical move of Cicero, who needed to de-politicize the case, if he wanted to stand any chance to win it. If Cicero's speech downplays the connection between the dictator and his freedman, a passage of Pliny the Elder's *Naturalis Historia* is much more explicit on Chrysogonus' actual role and influence.⁷ He opens a list of freedmen who managed to enrich themselves thanks to the favour of their patrons, whom Pliny mentions in

⁴ On this case, see David 1992, 233–234, 253–255; Fezzi 2003, 36–38. On the characterisation of the young Roscius as a *rusticus bonus*, as opposed to his fraudulent city-based enemies, see Vasaly 1993, 157–172. On the ethical—and moralistic—aspects of the speech, see May 1988, 21–31.

⁵ Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 7.20: *res ad Chrysogonum in castra L. Sullae Volaterras defertur* (“the matter is reported to Chrysogonus in Sulla's camp at Volaterrae”).

⁶ Cf. *Rosc. Amer.* 8.22: *neque enim mirum, cum eodem tempore et ea quae praeterita sunt reparaet et ea quae videntur instare praeparet, cum et pacis constituendae rationem et belli gerendi potestatem solus habeat...* (“it is not surprising [that he is not aware of Chrysogonus' plan], since at the same time of the events he is mending the past and preparing the things that appear to be in store for the future, and he alone possesses the power to establish peace and to wage war”). On Sulla's presence at Volaterrae, see Krawczuk 1960, 14–21 and Harris 1971, 257–258.

⁷ Plin. 35.58.200: *sed quid hos referat aliquis, litterarum honore commendatos? talem in catasta uidere Chrysogonum Sullae, Amphionem Q. Catuli, Hectorem L. Luculli, Demetrium Pompei, Augenque Demetri, quamquam et ipsa Pompei credita est, Hipparchum M. Antoni, Menam et Menecraten Sexti Pompei aliosque deinceps, quos enumerare iam non est, sanguine Quiritum et proscriptionum licentia ditatos* (“But why mention these men, made so distinguished by their literary merits? We have seen on the stand in the slave market Chrysogonus, freedmen of Sulla, Amphio freedman of Quintus Catulus, Hector freedman of Lucius Lucullus, Demetrius freedman of Pompey, and Auge freedwoman of Demetrius, although she was believed to have belonged to Pompey, Hipparchus freedman of Mark Antony, Menas and Menecrates freedmen of Sextus Pompeius, and others there is no need to list now, made rich by the blood of the Quirites and the licence of the proscriptions”).

contrast with other freedmen who distinguished themselves in the literary field. The allegation of having made illicit gains from the proscriptions applies to most of the freedmen mentioned by Pliny. Catulus, Lucullus and Pompey were all close associates of Sulla, and it is likely that they profited, personally and through their freedmen, from the sales that followed the first proscription.

It is to Pliny, therefore, that we owe explicit evidence for the connection between Chrysogonus and Sulla. By referring to Chrysogonus as a *seruus*, Cicero makes it clear that he was a freedman, but fails to uncover the real nature of his connection with the dictator.⁸ What Cicero portrays most effectively is the privileged status that Chrysogonus achieved after Sulla's victory. Despite his relatively young age, he allegedly became one of the most influential figures in Rome.⁹ Over a short time he gathered an impressive wealth, which Cicero forcefully portrays before starting his final peroration (46.133–135). He lived on the Palatine, the most exclusive area of the Urbs, showing off his wealth unashamedly. His house was full of precious objects and it was not even his only property, as he owned a country-house near Rome and a number of farms. When he walked into the Forum, a crowd of clients followed him; his house was often visited by artists and musicians, an unwelcome presence for the neighbours. After such an unsympathetic portrait, Cicero restates his support for Sulla and his reforms, but lets slip a bitter remark: the rise of people like Chrysogonus casts some doubts about the true extent of the victory of the *nobilitas* that Sulla claimed to have ensured.¹⁰

For most of his speech, however, Cicero does not push his political critique of Sulla too far. His purpose was just to make the case for his client, using legal arguments and depicting him as a peaceful and honest farmer. He was confident that his still unprominent position

⁸ The name Chrysogonus is widely attested among freedmen and slaves: Solin 2003, 178–179. Pliny the Elder appears to be quite familiar with the history of the Sullan age: Cotta Ramosino 2004, 83–88, 303–310.

⁹ Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 2.6: *adulescens uel potentissimus hoc tempore nostrae ciuitatis* (“a young fellow, or the most powerful man in this time of the history of our city”).

¹⁰ Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 49.141: *idcircone expectata nobilitas armis atque ferro rem publicam reciperauit, ut ad libidinem suam liberti seruolique nobulium bona, fortunas uestras atque nostras uexare possent?* (“did the nobility, after such long expectation, regain the state with the arms and the sword, so that freedmen and petty slaves could attack your properties and ours for the sake of their own satisfaction?”).

would enable him to escape direct involvement in any serious political controversy.¹¹ He remained consistent with this strategy down to the end of the speech, with the exception of the last paragraph, which deals with the rights of the children of the proscribed and was perhaps added just before the publication of the speech.¹²

With such a detailed reconstruction of his client's case, Cicero provides a crucial insight into the way proscriptions worked. Although the proscription of Roscius' properties was apparently illegal, the picture described can be seen as quite a typical one. Chrysogonus claimed he had bought the properties of Roscius from Sulla himself: "he claims to have bought it for 2,000 sesterces from that most brave and illustrious man, Lucius Sulla, whom I mention here for the sake of his glory".¹³ When the case was heard, the confiscation had already taken place, and Cicero repeatedly claims that his purpose is just to save Roscius from a conviction for murder, not to contest Chrysogonus' right to hold his properties. According to his reconstruction (6.21), Chrysogonus obtained the property as soon as Roscius' name appeared in the list. After acquiring the properties, Chrysogonus sent T. Roscius Magnus as a personal envoy to his new *fundi*, while Roscius Capito, who had played an important part in identifying Roscius as a possible target, was rewarded with three *praedia*. Cicero claims that Sulla was not aware of such an operation, but Chrysogonus argued the contrary. It is surely significant that Cicero brings no evidence to support his assumption. The speech itself tells us that Chrysogonus fostered the inclusion of Roscius in the list while he was taking part in the siege of Volaterrae, and that he could do that *because* he was a member of Sulla's entourage. It is unlikely that he and his associates could have put their hands on a substantial patrimony like that of Roscius without the connivance of Sulla.

As Cicero's account forcefully shows, taking possession of a property after the proscription of the owner was not a simple operation. One had to be prepared to use violence, and eventually to face opposition and even resistance. Acting quickly and ruthlessly was therefore essential. Soon after buying Roscius' properties for a shamefully low price—an aspect I will soon come back to—Chrysogonus sent his asso-

¹¹ Vasaly 1993, 170.

¹² Gabba 1964, 10–11 (= Gabba 1973, 399–400); Berry 2004, 84–85.

¹³ Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 2.6: *de uiro fortissimo et clarissimo L. Sulla, quem honoris causa nomino, duobus milibus nummum sese dicit emisse.*

ciate Magnus to Ameria, with the precise task of claiming the properties: Cicero calls him Chrysogonus' *procurator* (8.23), and his arrival in Umbria an *impetus* (8.21). Surely Chrysogonus knew that he would find some resistance on the part of the city of Ameria. Indeed, a delegation of the *decuriones* was soon sent to Volaterrae, and tried without success to obtain a hearing with Sulla. Imposing the rule of the new master in the *fundi* of Roscius, however, must not have been too difficult. Later in the speech, Cicero refers to the popularity that Chrysogonus had earned among the slaves formerly owned by Roscius. Some of them even joined his entourage and had a close relationship with their new master.¹⁴ Surely, Cicero is insinuating that Chrysogonus' origins made it easy for him to mingle with slaves.

The mission of the *decuriones* shows that the citizens of Ameria viewed the confiscation of Roscius' properties very unfavourably, to say the least. They must have felt just as the citizens of Larinum did after the coming of Oppianicus, fearing that their names would appear in the proscription list any day soon. We do not know the stance taken by Ameria during the Civil War. The composition of the council of the *decuriones*, however, shows that some followers of Sulla were sitting in it.¹⁵ Roscius Capito was among the *decuriones* sent to Volaterrae. His involvement in the confiscation, and probably in the assassination of Roscius, was already clear, as he had been the first to announce the murder to his fellow citizens, and his presence in the delegation shows that there was no unanimity within the elite of Ameria about opposing the confiscation. In order to carry out the confiscation, Chrysogonus needed the support of some insiders to identify the property, and to make sure that the local community would not react too unfavourably. Capito played exactly this role, by misleading the fellow-members of the council about Chrysogonus' real intentions, and he was rewarded with three *praedia*.

I have already pointed out that proscriptions were important political operations, which required a high level of sophistication and complexity to be implemented. Cicero's account of the proscription of Roscius confirms this impression. The proscriptions were decided at a central level, in Rome, where a list of the victims was displayed, and the rel-

¹⁴ Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 28.77: *apud eum sunt in honore et in pretio* ("he honours them and rates them highly").

¹⁵ The evidence for land confiscations in Umbria is very episodic: G. Bradley 2000, 236.

evant law was certainly voted. However, they needed local knowledge and local support. In some cases caution was required too, and this is the best explanation for the death of many victims of the proscriptions, whom their depredators thought it sensible to eliminate so that they would not create problems in the future. Cicero's *pro Roscio Amerino* is an invaluable source for the actual dynamics of the proscriptions, as it provides useful insight into a specific case, whilst giving some general views on this chain of events. Cicero's arguments are made slightly less credible by the assumption that Sulla could not be aware of the abuses of his associates. That something went wrong in the process, he concedes, "one may not like, but it is inevitable".¹⁶ The political importance of the proscriptions and the accounts of some literary sources show that Sulla himself encouraged his associates to be ruthless and greedy.¹⁷ He even exempted some of the profiteers from paying the price that had been agreed upon at the public auctions for the properties of the proscribed. Only in 72 BC was a statute passed, preceded by a *senatusconsultum*, which compelled them to pay at least the ridiculous sums of money they owed to the *aerarium*.¹⁸

However, rather than insisting on the alternative between Sulla's alleged *crudelitas* and the greed of his associates, more relevant for our purposes is the wider problem of identifying the beneficiaries of the proscriptions. Some close associates of Sulla built huge fortunes out of the proscriptions, which in some cases would enable them to pursue a successful political career.¹⁹ M. Licinius Crassus was so eager to accumulate the goods of the proscribed in Bruttium that he irritated even Sulla, who isolated him from the political scene.²⁰ The list of the known profiteers is not very long—a couple of dozen people in total—and it includes characters as diverse as L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Catiline and C. Verres.²¹ Local associates of Sulla, like Oppianicus

¹⁶ Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 45.131: *non placet, sed necesse est*. Cicero states that Sulla was unaware of Chrysogonus' dealings on several occasions: see 2.6; 8.21; 9.26; 38.110, 45.130.

¹⁷ Cf. e.g. Sall. *Cat.* 11.5–7; Plut. *Sull.* 12.9–14.; *Luc.* 7.3.

¹⁸ See Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.35.81; Sall. *Hist.* 4.1 (= Gell. 18.4.4.). Hinard 1985a, 187–188 rightly notes that the statute was the final legitimisation of the profiteers' rights on the *bona proscriptorum*.

¹⁹ Jaczynowska 1962, 487–489; Hinard 1985a, 200–203.

²⁰ Plut. *Crass.* 6.7–8.

²¹ On Domitius, see Dio 41.11.1, with Hinard 1985a, 201, fn. 200; on Catiline, see Sall. *Cat.* 5.2; Q. Cic. *Comm. Pet.* 9–10; Ascon. *in tog. cand.* p. 84, 91; Plut. *Sull.* 32.3; Plut. *Cic.* 10.3. Verres' properties were concentrated in the territory of Beneventum: Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.15.38.

at Larinum or Capito at Ameria, who had an important function in carrying out some confiscations, had their share of the booty too.

Chrysogonus' case shows that personal affiliation with the dictator could play a decisive role. He was not the only freedman who enjoyed the dictator's confidence. The completion of his memoirs was entrusted to Epicadus, an educated *libertus*, who provided the narrative of the last days of Sulla's life. Nothing is known about him, or about the Vettius Picens who is mentioned after him in the same passage, and for whom one can just guess an Italian origin. We have better luck with Tarula: the name of this wealthy freedman, mentioned by Sallust some lines below (21), appears on some amphorae from Brundisium, which I have discussed in 1.4. Sallust's reference to his exceptional wealth makes all the more sense, considering that his activities were diversified, and that some landed property coexisted with an entrepreneur-like activity. Perhaps a similar explanation applies to the case of the last freedman mentioned in Lepidus' speech, Scirtus; but nothing else is known about him.

What is striking about these characters is not just their special relationship with their patron, or its political significance. It is the trust and responsibilities that Sulla gave them, enabling them to take part in a crucial political process like the proscriptions. This would become a frequent state of affairs in the late Republic, with all the leading political personalities giving important tasks to their freedmen, from Pompey to Cicero. Sulla, however, was the first to use freedmen in such a way, and he appears to have had a strategy in this respect.²² A hint at the role of freedmen in the devastation of the Sullan period is noticeable in a passionate passage of Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum*:

qui expulsionem uicinorum qui latrocinia in agris, qui cum seruis cum libertis cum clientibus societates, qui possessiones uacuas qui proscriptiones locupletium qui caedes municipiorum qui illam Sullani temporis messem recordetur, qui testamenta subiecta, tot qui sublato homines...

those who remember the displacements of neighbours, the thefts in the fields, the partnerships with slaves and freedmen, the empty properties, the proscriptions of rich men, the massacres of the towns, that famous harvest reaped in the times of Sulla, the numerous forged wills, the many people who were eliminated.²³

Of course, this is a rhetorical overstatement, but the *societates* that included slaves, freedmen and clients were certainly an important ele-

²² *Contra*, Treggiari 1969, 181.

²³ Cic. *Parad. St.* 6.2.46.

ment of the Sullan coalition at work after the victory. After all, the three characters that expropriated and proscribed Roscius were a *societas* created by a freedman of Sulla and two obscure Umbrian followers. Such a pragmatic *modus operandi* could prompt, of course, the dramatic rise of some otherwise unremarkable figures, apart from the former slaves. This is the case, for instance, with the *primipilaris* (and later praetor) L. Fufidius, who is defined *ancilla turpis* in the *Oratio Lepidi*, and who suggested, according to some literary sources, that the proscriptions were the best strategy to eliminate the enemy.²⁴

An important passage of Appian shows that the social promotion of people like Chrysogonus or Tarula was not an isolated choice involving just a handful of individuals.²⁵ Being in charge of the whole proscription process, Sulla took possession of the slaves who formerly belonged to the proscribed. With thousands of slaves under his control, Sulla exploited this enormous potential for his own sake, and decided to enfranchise “the youngest and fittest” ones, including them into the citizen body and adding a powerful contingent of new clients to the already impressive number of his associates.²⁶ According to Appian, more than 10,000 slaves were enfranchised. Sulla was not interested in more electoral support, of course, but rather in having a group of loyal people ready to support and defend him, should the need arise.²⁷ Appian rightly saw the political importance of this decision, and discussed it along with the enlargement of the Senate and the foundation of new colonies.

We do not know with certainty of any individual *liberti Cornelii* enfranchised after the proscriptions. It is likely that the freedmen mentioned by the literary tradition among the profiteers of the *Sullanum tempus* were enfranchised before the end of the Civil War, and were already with Sulla during the conflict with Mithridates. The freedmen mentioned by Appian are a group that emerged later, with a clear political agenda. When Sulla retired to Campania, his position was made

²⁴ About Fufidius, see Sall. *Hist.* 1.55.22; Plut. *Sull.* 31.4; Flor. 2.9.25; Oros. 5.21.3 (who calls him *Fursidius*); cf. Wiseman 1971, 232, no. 184. It is possible that he had a role in planning the proscriptions, although it is unlikely that he actually expressed his views in the Senate.

²⁵ App. *b. c.* 1.101.469; 104.489.

²⁶ See Češka 1955; Treggiari 1969, 181–184.

²⁷ Cf. Liv. *Per.* 77.1, 8, with Treggiari 1969, 50–51: in 88 Sulla scrapped Sulpicius' law distributing freedmen throughout all the thirty-five tribes. There is no evidence that they were given a land allotment too, *pace* Gerlach 1856, 46 and Jonkers 1963, 51. Thein 2006, 245 makes too much of the “guilty conscience” of Sulla's freedmen.

safe by the presence of the Cornelii in Rome, who ensured that no subversive initiative would take place.²⁸

Doubts about the accuracy of Appian's account are, however, prompted by an inscription found near the site of ancient Minturnae, in southern Latium, bearing a dedication to Sulla put up by a group of freedmen: *L. Cornelio L. f. / Sullae Feleici / dictatori / leiberteini*. ("the freedmen to Lucius Cornelius Sulla, son of Lucius, Felix dictator").²⁹ The absence of any specific identification of the freedmen led scholars to view it as an honorific inscription offered by a *collegium* of former slaves of the proscribed.³⁰ The hypothesis is supported by two elements. Firstly, the inscription was found at Minturnae, where Marius had strong *clientelae* and found shelter in the most critical phase of his political career. Marius' slaves must have been included in the enfranchisement, and their presence at Minturnae may be explainable through the connection of their former patron with the city.³¹ The existence of a *collegium*, a formal organisation of the *liberti Cornelii*, is probably attested by a fragment of Cicero preserved by the commentator Asconius in his commentary on the *pro Cornelio*. Making the case for his client, Cicero claims that he was not the owner of the slave Phileros: Cornelius is a very common name, as Phileros is among slaves. The reference to a *collegium* of Cornelii comes in this context, as part of a rhetorical question:

quid ego nunc tibi argumentis respondeam posse fieri ut alius aliquis Cornelius sit qui habeat Philerotem seruum; uolgare nomen esse Philerotis, Cornelios vero ita multos ut iam etiam collegium constitutum sit?

why should I now need argumentation to give you an answer—that it could be that there is some other Cornelius who happens to own a slave called Phileros; that the name Phileros is common, and as for Cornelii there are so many that a *collegium* of them has even been created?³²

²⁸ App. *b. c.* 1.104.489: κατὰ τὸ ἄστυ ("in the city"). After the Sullan reform, the urban plebs could not count on the *frumentationes* any more, or any public subsidy in food supply: this may have been seen as a potential danger. On the abolition of the corn distributions by Sulla, see Rickman 1980, 165 and Vanderbroeck 1987, 121–123. They were reintroduced in 73 BC by the *lex Terentia Cassia*: sources in Rotondi 1912, 366.

²⁹ *CIL* 10.6028 = *ILS* 871 = *ILLRP* 353.

³⁰ Gabba 1958, 275–276; Treggiari 1969, 170–171.

³¹ The slave of a C. Marius mentioned in an inscription from the so-called temple A at Minturnae is not relevant for the present discussion, as there is no evidence compelling to consider him a slave of the enemy of Sulla. The text is edited in Johnson 1933, 46–47, no. 27; a sound discussion in Badian 1973, 121–124. There is no evidence for Sullan land assignments at Minturnae, *pace* Chouquer 1987, 174–175.

³² Ascon. in *Cornelian*. p. 75.

If we did not have Asconius' commentary, this could seem an ironic reference, a hyperbole used by Cicero to undermine the argument of his counterpart. Yet, the commentator takes the reference seriously, and specifies that there were many *collegia* in Republican Rome, which sometimes fuelled political violence. At some point, several laws and *senatusconsulta* outlawed most of them, allowing only those with a recognisable public function, such as professional association like those of carpenters and potters.³³ This reconstruction usefully integrates what we know about Sulla's aims when he chose to enfranchise the slaves. The *collegium* of the Cornelii was then a tool available to the enemies of the Mariani, which could still play a role in Roman politics more than ten years after the death of the dictator.

The Sullan regime has evocatively been branded as “a reactionary regime based on mass consensus”, adapting the interpretative category that P. Togliatti used to make sense of Fascism. On this view, the exploitation of the freedmen is most revealing.³⁴ However, the evidence is too scarce to enable us to make good use of this interpretative suggestion. The reference made by Cicero in the *Corneliana* is interesting, but it is too fragmentary to allow any conclusion. Moreover, the value of the inscription from Minturnae is undermined by the absence of any clear archaeological context, and its historical interpretation remains problematic. Mommsen suggested, without offering any supporting argument, that the *leibertini* mentioned here are the *liberti Cornelii*, and that the stone had been carried from Rome to the Campanian shore in the Middle Ages.³⁵ The latter is hard to believe, and my guess is that the freedmen of the proscribed, enfranchised by Sulla himself, would have probably recorded their gratitude to the dictator more explicitly. Appian refers to them twice, and both times they are called Κορνήλιοι, which suggests that they were collectively referred to in that way.³⁶ This is hard to prove anyway, as we lack further and more detailed evi-

³³ See *ibid.*: *frequenter tum etiam coetus factiosorum hominum sine publica autoritate malo publico fiebant: propter quod postea collegia et S.C. et pluribus legibus sunt sublata praeter pauca atque certa quae utilitas ciuitatis desiderasset, sicut fabrorum fictorumque* (“very often at that time there became gatherings of seditious men without any public control, and to the public detriment. For this reason later on the *collegia* were suppressed, both by a decree of the senate and by several laws, with the exception of a few whose lawfulness was well established and which public interest required, such as those of the carpenters and statue-makers”).

³⁴ Canfora 1980, 428.

³⁵ See the commentary on *CIL* 6.1298.

³⁶ App. *b. c.* 1.100.469; 1.104.489.

dence. However, an alternative suggestion could be made. If we accept the possibility that the freedmen of the Minturnae inscription actually owed their status to Sulla, it may be argued that not all the Corneli were based in Rome, and that Appian's κατὰ τὸ ἄστυ is a reference to the *ager Romanus*, or even to Latium. Minturnae had been a steadfast supporter of Marius, and keeping some loyal supporters in the area could be a sensible operation.

The evidence shows that the social promotion of some freedmen was part of a complex political operation carried out by Sulla after his victory. The Civil War had to be followed by a process of political 'normalisation' throughout Italy. Sulla needed to prevent the possibility of the emergence of a new opposition for many years to come. The proscriptions ensured this aim by affecting the legal status of a number of members of the Roman elite, and by transferring their property under the direct control of Sulla and his associates. This operation was not limited to the traditional Rome-based elite. Italy was heavily involved, as much as it had played an important part in the development of the Civil War. Moreover, as the case of Roscius shows, a *proscriptio*, especially when it took place out of Rome, needed some people supervising it and carrying it out. For this purpose, Sulla had some agents who could do the job on his behalf, were rewarded for that, and were allowed to enjoy part of the profits deriving from the confiscation. Hostile tradition focuses on several freedmen, but other free people with an apparently unprominent background, like Fufidius, L. Luscius, and the *centurio Sullanus*, grandfather of the jurist Ateius Capito, apparently had similar roles.³⁷

Indeed, the victory of Sulla was the chance for a major redistribution of wealth in Roman Italy, and it also led to a redistribution of political influence, and prestige. It did not just offer, to many members of the

³⁷ Luscius' story is summarised in Asconius' commentary on Cicero's lost speech *in toga candida*, p. 90: *notus centurio Syllanus diuesque ex uictoria factus (nam amplius centies possederat), damnatus erat non multo ante quam Cicero dixit. obiectae sunt ei tres caedes proscriptorum* ("a well-known centurion of Sulla who became rich thanks to his victory—for he had property worth more than HS 100,000—had been convicted not long before Cicero's speech. He was charged with the murder of three of the proscribed"). The grandfather of Capito surely gathered a remarkable wealth, as his son managed to reach the praetorship: see Tac. *ann.* 3.75.1 (*Capito Ateius, de quo memorauimus, principem in ciuitate locum studiis ciuilibus adsecutus, sed auo centurione Sullano, patre praetorio*, "Capito Ateius, whom I have already mentioned, reached a position of prominence in the state because of his legal expertise, but his grandfather was a centurion of Sulla, and his father reached [only] the praetorian rank").

nobility, the chance of becoming even richer than they already were. It also rewarded a group of new men, who fought in the Sullan camp and had their share of power in the aftermath of the Civil War. Some of them, like Oppianicus, gained prominence at a municipal level. Others, like the rich freedmen of Sulla, unexpectedly achieved wealth and influence.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE NECESSITY OF THE ELITES: INTERIM CONCLUSIONS

I do not intend to discuss in detail the evidence for Sulla's intervention on the Senate and its membership, since I will do it in a forthcoming paper; I will only summarise the main conclusions of this study.¹ There is no evidence that Sulla extended the Senate to 600 members, as is often claimed. The main source on this topic (App. *b.c.* 1.101.468) says that in 81 Sulla appointed about 300 new senators, who joined an assembly that was probably down to about 150 senators after the Mithridatic and the Civil War. Immediately after this extraordinary *lectio*, the Senate must have counted about 450 members. The Sullan reforms of the praetorship and of the quaestorship ensured a constant growth, which must have quickly led the total of the senators to exceed 500.² The interest of the Sullan reform of the Senate would be obvious for a study of Sulla's relationship with the elites; unfortunately, the evidence for its social implications is inconclusive. There is no way of determining whether the three-hundred equites appointed to the Senate by Sulla were young members of families of senatorial ranks, members of the *ordo equester*, or both. The identities of most of the new senators are equally obscure. The geographical origin of the few known individuals is usually to be inferred on onomastic grounds, and no serious historical conclusions may be reached from the available evidence.

¹ Santangelo forthcoming.

² About the increase of the number of praetors—probably from six to eight—see Dio 42.51 and Pompon. *Dig.* 1.2.2, with the general discussion in Brennan 2000, 389–392 and the sobering remarks in Cloud 1988. About the Sullan reform of the quaestorship, see Tac. *ann.* 11.22.6; also cf. the fragment of the *lex Cornelia de XX quaestoribus* in *RS*, no. 14, 293–300 (edited by E. Gabba and M.H. Crawford), with Gabba 1983, 488–489 and Purcell 2001, 650–654. Against this background, it is significant that a reorganisation of the treasury appears to have taken place in the Sullan period: see Plut. *Cat. Min.* 18.8, with Crawford 1985, 187. It is conceivable that the number of the quaestors had already been increased before 81 BC to meet the needs of provincial administration (Harris 1976; Gabba 1983, 487, with earlier bibliography), but the evidence is not conclusive: Badian 1983, 167–169.

It seems clear, however, that there never was such thing as a ‘Sullan Senate’—at least not after Sulla’s retirement. Sulla opened the assembly to new members and made it a more accurate representation of the Roman elite, where even some reliable Italian *domi nobiles* were allowed. The three-hundred (or so) members he personally appointed were certainly loyal to him, although they need not all have fought in his army. During Sulla’s dictatorship, the Senate did not stand in the way of the strongman. After his death, however, the political allegiances of its members, both old and new ones, had to be quickly renegotiated.

The Sullan enlargement of the Senate may be better understood within the broader framework outlined so far. This part of my study is founded on two basic assumptions: that the role of the local elites was crucial in the age of Sulla, and that an important aspect of Sulla’s imperial policy was rebuilding constructive relations with the local elites that were interested in resuming cooperation with Rome. Of course, in Sulla’s case the need to serve the interest of the empire was combined with the necessity of gathering support for the Civil War, and of providing rewards to his associates after the final victory. The interference and the confusion between general and personal interests are apparent especially in Italy, and they are probably most striking in the direct link that existed between the proscriptions and the enlargement of the Senate.

I have set out to show how complex the attitude of Sulla to the local elites was, and how central to his policies it consistently was. The Greek East and Italy could not have been more different worlds, and the strategies chosen by Sulla had to change accordingly. However, a similar concern can be detected throughout his political activities: ensuring to Rome the loyalty of as large a part of the local elites as possible, and concentrating repression on a limited number of enemies. This is what he did both in the East, by sparing most of the Greek cities from destruction, and in Italy, where he confirmed the enfranchisement of the Allies. At the same time, of course, he decreed several exemplary sanctions. In Asia he reorganised the fiscal administration of the Roman province bringing about a draconian system that pushed most cities on the verge of economic collapse, while in Italy he confiscated the land of hostile communities and individuals, and used it to found new veteran colonies. At the same time, he did not fail to reward his most loyal supporters, even ruthlessly, and regardless of their social standing, as the cases of the freedmen Chrysogonus and Tarula show.

More than anything else, the Sullan proscriptions were a massive redistribution of wealth in the aftermath of a civil war.

We know little about Sulla's political conceptions, and it is uncertain what place he expected the Roman nobility to have in the organisation of the State. His hostility to the tribunate of the plebs does not necessarily imply that he imagined a central role for the Senate. At any rate, it is apparent that he viewed the primacy of the elites as a central feature of the empire, at all levels. In this respect he was by no means revolutionising the practices of Roman imperialism. However, he did pursue this aim in a much more consistent and effective fashion than had been the case in the previous decades. In the next part I will show that a similar rationale is apparent from his contribution to provincial administration and to the organisation of Italy after the Civil War. Sulla's interest in promoting the loyalty of the local elites to Rome is the most powerful factor linking the initiatives he took in the Greek East to those he took in Italy. More generally speaking, it is a crucial aspect of the history of the late Republic.

PART II

BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE.
SULLA AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE

INTRODUCTION

The aim of the first part was to stress the importance of the local elites in the age of Sulla, and to show in what respects Rome had to come to terms with them after going through a critical phase of her imperial project. The topic of this part is in many ways close to that of the previous one. The discussion will be devoted to the provisions of Sulla for the political and administrative reorganisation of Italy and the Greek East, and the role of the elites, of course, will sometimes reappear quite prominently. So far I have tried to show that Sulla put in place a system of rewards and punishments for the communities and the local notables he dealt with, which enabled him to serve his own purposes and to contribute to the consolidation of the empire. In this part, I will try to show that Sulla aimed to place his decisions within a more stable institutional framework. The case of the settlement of Asia Minor shows this aspect of Sulla's policies most clearly. This is, after all, his most important contribution to the administration of the empire, since Sulla did not reorganise the Roman presence in Greece, and it is indeed from this problem that my discussion will start.¹

¹ Sulla took decisions on the status of several communities and sanctuaries: see the case of the Amphiaracum (*RDGE* 23) and that of the island of Thasus, which had been besieged by Mithridates' troops, but not conquered. The bravery of its inhabitants was rewarded by a *senatusconsultum* voted in 80 BC, in which a range of privileges were granted: see *RDGE* 20 and *RDGE* 21, with O. Picard 1989. Maronea too supported the Romans, and was apparently destroyed by Mithridates' army: see Clinton 2003, esp. 385–389. I do not think, however, that *SEG* 35.823 dates to the Sullan age, *pace* Canali de Rossi 1999 and Wörrle 2005, 148. The presence of the publicani is attested in the province of Macedonia after the Mithridatic War, and they seem to have been in charge of the collection of the *portorium*: Cic. *Pis.* 87, with Accame 1946, 102–104 and Kallet-Marx 1995, 279. *Syll.* 748, from Gytheum, shows that the free cities of mainland Greece were not immune from extraordinary εἰσφοραί: Migeotte 1984, 90–96.

CHAPTER ONE

RESETTLING THE PROVINCE OF ASIA

In the winter of 85/84 BC Sulla made important decisions about the organisation of the province, which he announced to the representatives of the cities whom he had summoned to Ephesus. It is often assumed that Ephesus was the capital of the province from 129 BC. Generally speaking, there would be no contradiction between such a status and the award of freedom to the city included in Attalus' testament.¹ Several milestones, found in different areas of the province, mention M'. Aquillius and show that Ephesus was their *caput viae*. Hence they have been interpreted as evidence that Ephesus was the administrative centre of the province at that time.² The mileage of other milestones, however, has shown that Pergamum was in fact the starting point of the road to Side, and that the road system of the province had two *capita uiarum*.³ At a close scrutiny, the evidence available for this period gives no reason to believe that Ephesus was the capital of the province in its early history. Until the Mithridatic War there are no grounds to say that the centre of the Roman administration was moved from Pergamum, the former capital of the Attalids. It is quite likely that it was Sulla himself who decided the move of the capital to Ephesus.⁴

The Ephesians, however, had followed Mithridates quite promptly, as it is apparent from their prominent role in the massacre of the Italians, and the King put a satrap called *episkopos Ephesion* in charge of the city.⁵

¹ On Ephesus' freedom in the earliest phase of the province, see Rigsby 1979; Ferrary 1988, 184, n. 207, 216.

² See French 1980, 707, 714. The case for Ephesus enjoying the status of capital from the creation of the province is made by Rigsby 1988, 137–141, oddly overlooking the evidence of the milestones.

³ The milestones of Aquillius are listed and discussed in Mitchell 1999, 19–20; see also Thonemann 2004, 81, fn. 11. About the road from Pergamum to Side, see French 1988, nos. 266, 279, 294 and 295. A portion of the road built by Aquillius to link Pamphylia with Pisidia has been located and surveyed in the Döşeme Boğazi: Mitchell 1998/1999, 173. Thonemann 2004, 81–82 argues that the construction of a road system was the first initiative taken by Aquillius in Asia Minor.

⁴ As shown in C.P. Jones 2000, 12–14.

⁵ App. *Mithr.* 48.187–189.

Eventually, they made a desperate attempt to regain the favour of the Romans when the defeat appeared inevitable, as is shown by a famous civic decree calling the Ephesians to war against the King (*IvEph* 8). Their effort was unsuccessful, and Ephesus was severely punished at the end of the conflict with the loss of freedom and the imposition of a fine, like most Asiatic cities.⁶ However, it was with Sulla that Ephesus gained a central role in the administration of the province, when the victorious general summoned the representatives of the Asiatic cities there.

The meeting was the crucial moment of the Sullan resettlement of the Greek East, whose importance goes beyond the boundaries of the *provincia Asia*. Immediately after defeating Fimbria, Sulla united his troops with those who had revolted against his defeated enemy, restored Nicomedes on the throne of Bithynia and Ariobarzanes in Cappadocia, and sent an embassy to the Senate. He then started to deal with the organisation of Asia.⁷ After listing the communities to whom freedom was awarded or confirmed (Rhodes, Chius, the Iliadic, Lycian and Carian cities, Magnesia on the Sipylus, and some other unspecified, presumably minor, centres) as a reward to their loyalty to Rome and to Sulla himself, Appian explicitly stresses the dominant feature of the Sullan reorganisation: “to the other cities he sent the army, without exceptions” (ἐς δὲ λοιπὰ πάντα στρατιὰν περιέπεμπε). The presence of Roman troops was perhaps the clearest sign of the loss of freedom and of the inclusion of a community under the direct rule of Rome.

Sulla’s provisions, of course, were a contribution to an administrative system that had been in place for the last five decades. A senatorial commission of five members, led by P. Scipio Nasica, was sent to Pergamum probably as early as in late 133, soon after the murder of Tiberius Gracchus, in order to ensure the creation of the province.⁸ A

⁶ See App. *Mithr.* 61.252. It seems hard to maintain that Ephesus was a *ciuitas libera* after the Sullan reorganisation, or that its freedom was more than formal: see Guerber 1995, esp. 390–391, 407–409.

⁷ App. *Mithr.* 61.250. He also appears to have put on trial and executed some of the keenest supporters of Mithridates. See Licin. 35.82: *Ephesi causis cognitis principes belli secure necat; ciuitates pecunia multat, oppida in pacata redigit in suam potestatem* (“after presiding over the cases in Ephesus, he sentences to death the leaders of the war; he imposes a pecuniary fine on the cities, and reduces into his power the cities that are not pacified”), with Hinard 1985a, 44.

⁸ *Contra*, cf. Coarelli 2005a, 215, dating the arrival of the Roman envoys to Pergamum to mid-132. The commission appears to have had both civilian and military functions: C.P. Jones 2004, 481–485. The debate on the exact date of the creation of the province is summarised in Dmitriev 2005a, 7.

recently published inscription from Pergamum, certainly dating from after 125 BC and celebrating the merits of the local notable Menodoros, refers to the mission of the Roman delegation by mentioning its negotiations with the *bouleuterion* of Pergamum, which had Menodoros among its members.⁹ The inscription significantly calls the mission of the five ambassadors a Ῥωμαικὴ νομοθεσία, which may be roughly translated as “Roman legislation”. The phrase indicates that the task of the senatorial committee was to create the first institutional structures of the province, and that it required some kind of negotiation with the communities of the former Attalid kingdom.¹⁰ In 132, a *senatusconsultum* (*RDGE* 11), the so-called *s. c. Popillianum*—from the name of the consul Publius Popillius Laenas, who chaired that session of the Senate—ratified the decision of the committee and confirmed that all the dispositions of the Attalids were to remain valid under Roman rule.¹¹ Pergamum was the former capital of the kingdom, and indeed it kept a prominent role in the later history of the Roman province. In such a context, it is not surprising that Mithridates chose Pergamum as his residence during the short period which followed his conquest of Asia Minor.

It is likely that the system of the *conuentus-dioikeseis*, the assize districts, was put in place with the creation of the province. They were the main units for the administration of justice, and an extremely important feature in the administration of the *prouincia Asia* throughout the late Republic and the Imperial age.¹² The evidence for the district system in the early history of the province is fragmentary and quite elusive.

⁹ *SEG* 50.1211; the *editio princeps* is Wörrle 2000, followed by an invaluable historical commentary.

¹⁰ The inscription speaks of Menodoros ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν Ῥωμαικὴν νομοθεσίαν βουλευ - | περίωι γινόμενος (l. 13–14): Wörrle 2000, 569 is probably right in giving a temporal meaning to κατὰ (cf. Wörrle 1988, 96, fn. 95). Ferrary 1987/1989, 212; Crawford 1990, 112–113; Dmitriev 2005a, 302–303 and Dreyer 2005, 67–71 view this passage of the inscription as evidence for a *lex prouinciae* setting rules for the composition of city councils, therefore suggesting to translate the two lines as “having been in the council created according to the Roman dispositions”. This is a perfectly acceptable translation: unfortunately, a solution to this problem can hardly be determined until new parallel evidence becomes available.

¹¹ The text is known in three copies: see *OGIS* 435 and 436, and *SEG* 28.1208. The chronology of this document has been much debated: bibliography in Kallet-Marx 1995, 353–355. See now the persuasive conclusions of Mattingly 1985, 118–119 and Wörrle 2000, 567–568. The dating is confirmed by the context of the important inscription from Metropolis published in Dreyer-Engelmann 2003: see C.P. Jones 2004, 485.

¹² The best discussion is Mitchell 1999, 22–29. On the terminology, see Burton 1975, 92, 94–97. The word *iurisdictio* may be used instead of *conuentus*: Habicht 1975, 67–68.

It has been suggested that there was strong continuity between the Attalid and the Roman administration, at least in the early phase of the history of the province. Several scholars have also related the subdivision into *conuentus-dioikeseis* to the very organisation of the Attalid kingdom; the hypothesis, originally put forward by Wilamowitz, has been revived from time to time with different arguments.¹³ Most recently, C. Mileta has argued that the *conuentus* as a direct evolution of the *topoi*, the units of the Attalid administration, small districts built around an important city, most often a centre of a mint where cistophoric coinage was struck.¹⁴ In fact, there is no solid evidence for the transition between the two regimes and the date of the creation of the *conuentus* system remains uncertain.

Some explicit details about the creation of the Asiatic *conuentus* in the late Republic are, however, provided in a passage of Strabo, dealing with the vexing problem of the boundaries between the regions of Asia Minor.¹⁵ According to the geographer, who was from Asia Minor and had a wide (though not impeccable) historical knowledge, the Romans were responsible for the organisation of the new system, which probably fitted their need for a rational organisation of the territory, but ignored the ethnic and cultural boundaries of the region.¹⁶ The point is made very clearly, and continuity between Attalid and Roman organisation seems quite hard to maintain in light of this passage.

Strabo is quite explicit about the functions of the capitals of the *conuentus*: they were the places where local assemblies gathered, justice

¹³ Wilamowitz thought that the semantic equivalence of διοικήσεις and *conuentus* mirrored an historical continuity. Apparently, he made this suggestion to his pupil A. Schulten, who accepted it, perhaps with some reluctance, in his dissertation: Schulten 1892, 12, fn. 2; 129. For further bibliography, see Merola 2001a, 172, fn. 116.

¹⁴ Mileta 1990; Dreyer-Engelmann 2003, 24–25 (with further bibliography at fn. 56). *Contra*, see Magie 1950, 1059, fn. 41; Campanile 2003, 278–282.

¹⁵ Strab. 13.14.12 = C 628: ὥστε καὶ τὰ Φρύγια καὶ τὰ Καρυκὰ καὶ τὰ Λύδια καὶ ἔτι τὰ τῶν Μυσῶν δυσδιάκριτα εἶναι, παραπίπτοντα εἰς ἄλληλα· εἰς τὴν σύγχυσιν ταύτην οὐ μικρὰ συλλαμβάνει τὸ τοῦς Ῥωμαίους μὴ κατὰ φύλα διελεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλὰ ἕτερον τρόπον διατάξαι τὰς διοικήσεις, ἐν αἷς τὰς ἀγοραίους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς δικαιοδοσίας (“the Phrygian and the Carian and the Lydian territories, like those of the Mysians, since they merge into one another, are hard to distinguish. The fact that the Romans did not divide them according to tribes, but they used a different method to organise their judiciary districts, in which they hold the popular assemblies and the courts, has contributed much to this confusion”). This passage is the starting point of the invaluable discussion of the Asiatic *conuentus* system in Magie 1950, 171–173, 1059–1063. Also cf. Strab. 14.1.38 = C 646.

¹⁶ The *conuentus* system tended to dismantle the unity of the ancient *ethne*, and to give the Hellenised poleis a more prominent role: see Salmeri 2004, 204.

was dispensed, Roman magistrates performed their duties and, at the same time, the local elites still had a share of responsibilities in the management of the region.¹⁷ It is not by chance, then, that the earliest attestations of the *conuentus* system in Asia Minor are related to the provincial *koinon*, the plenary assembly of the communities included in the province. I will soon come back to the function of this assembly in the first half of the first century BC.

We have no evidence to establish whether Sulla brought any changes to the list of the *conuentus* or not.¹⁸ We are however quite well informed about the financial consequences of his decisions, which deserve special attention, as the provisions taken in Ephesus had a huge impact on the fiscal organisation of the province and on its economic history in the following decades. Plutarch mentions a collective fine of 20.000 talents imposed by Sulla on the Asiatic cities.¹⁹ Its devastating effect was increased by the serious losses inflicted to private households, and by the request made to rich families to host a Roman soldier indefinitely. The fine imposed on the cities deserves to be considered carefully, as it may reveal some interesting aspects of the political and military agenda of Sulla, as well as of the fiscal reorganisation he carried out.

Appian reports the angry and resentful speech that Sulla delivered to the city representatives, blaming the Asiatic communities for the stance they took in the war. At the end of his harangue, he declared that the just punishment for their disloyalty could be exactly quantified: “I will only impose on you the taxes of five years (to be paid at once), the war expenses that I had to meet, and whatever else I may spend settling the affairs of the province.”²⁰ Therefore, the sanction imposed on the cities consisted of a fine, or rather an extraordinary contribution that the Roman general claimed as a compensation for their treacherous conduct. It was also meant to be a rich booty for the victorious army and—quite explicitly indeed—an indispensable support for Sulla’s return to Italy and imminent fight for supremacy in

¹⁷ See, in general, A.J. Marshall 1966 and Burton 1975, esp. 102–105; on the status of the *conuentus* capital cities, see Heller 2006, 125–162. Governors administered justice in free cities too: Ferrary 2002a, 142.

¹⁸ Cf. Ramsay 1895, 265, arguing that the *conuentus* system was created by Sulla; Nicolet 1994, 159 (= Nicolet 2000, 254) states that it did not exist yet in the age of Sulla. Full bibliography in Merola 2001a, 143, fn. 1.

¹⁹ Plut. *Sull.* 25.4.

²⁰ App. *Mithr.* 62.259: μόνους ὑμῖν ἐπιγράψω πέντε ἐτῶν φόρους ἔσσενεγκεῖν αὐτίκα καὶ τὴν τοῦ πολέμου δαπάνην, ὅση τε γέγονέ μοι καὶ ἔσται καθισταμένη τὰ ὑπόλοιπα.

Rome. Apart from this extraordinary contribution, however, the cities had to pay to the Roman treasury the taxes they had been exempted from over the last five years, on account of their support of Mithridates' cause in 89 BC.

This aspect of Sulla's decisions stresses two relevant issues. First, such a systematic and well targeted reaction can be better explained if one bears in mind that the fiscal exploitation of the area was already well established before the war, and that resuming it was among the priorities of Sulla's mission—as well as Fimbria's and Flaccus'.²¹ At the same time, the ferocity of some communities against the Italians in the early phase of the Mithridatic War must be explained by the hardships that the Asiatic communities had suffered at the hands of the Roman publicani. The Sullan fiscal reorganisation was not a Copernican revolution, but a reform that stabilized an already existing system.

Moreover, Sulla cleverly identified his personal interest—gathering resources in view of the final phase of the Civil War—with the public interest of Rome. The collection of the fine and that of the arrears were two distinct, yet closely related, aspects of the same agenda. For this to be achieved, a reorganisation of the province had to be carried out. The final passages of the speech reported by Appian make this point quite clear: “I will divide these charges among each of you according to the cities, and will fix a time for the payments.”²² The collection of such a huge sum was therefore undertaken following a subdivision of the province into fiscal districts that was based on the territories of the cities.

As Appian points out, Sulla “divided the fine among the representatives and sent envoys to collect the money”.²³ The cities themselves were put in charge of the collection of the fine. The enforcement of Sulla's

²¹ However, Attalus' testament declared the cities of the kingdom free and immune from taxation. The publicani operated only in the χώρα βασιλική until 122 BC, when the *lex Sempronia de vectigalibus Asiae* was passed. This is confirmed by App. *b. c.* 5.4.17 (Antony addressing the representatives of the cities): ὑμᾶς ἡμῖν, ὧς ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, Ἀττάλος ὁ βασιλεὺς ὑμῶν ἐν διαθήκαις ἀπέλιπε, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀμείνονες ὑμῖν ἢ μὲν Ἀττάλου· οὗς γὰρ ἐτελείτε φόρους Ἀττάλῳ, μεθήκαμεν ὑμῖν, μέχρι δημοκόπων ἀνδρῶν καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν γενομένων ἐδέησε φόρων (“your King Attalus, o Greeks, left you to us in his will, and we immediately proved better to you than Attalus had been: we released you from the taxes that you had been paying to him, until the action of demagogues among us too made taxes necessary”). See Gabba 1970, 14–15.

²² App. *Mithr.* 62.260: Διαιρήσω δὲ ταῦθ' ἐκάστοις ἐγὼ καὶ κατὰ πόλεις καὶ τάξω προσθεσμίαν ταῖς ἐσφοραῖς.

²³ App. *Mithr.* 61.250: ἐπιδιήρει τοῖς πρέσβεσι τὴν ζημίαν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ χρήματα ἔπεμπεν.

orders would, however, be ensured by the garrisons of Roman soldiers deployed in the province, which had been explicitly ordered by Sulla to punish the cities that would not comply with the requirements.²⁴ According to Plutarch, Sulla imposed the burden of the maintenance of his troops on the communities.²⁵ Each family was obliged to offer a daily meal to a Roman soldier and to any guest he might invite, to pay for his clothes and to offer him four tetradrachms a day for his private necessities. Plutarch notoriously likes to focus on these picturesque details, and his statement that this decision was devastating for private households (Sulla allegedly “ruined” them, τοὺς οἴκους ἐξέτρωπεν) may well be exaggerated. We do not know how long this imposition was kept up, nor if it was systematically applied in the whole province, and it seems unlikely that it was part of an official provision. However, serious consequences on private households, along with the extraordinary financial burdens on communities, are hardly surprising in the aftermath of a war and of the Sullan resettlement.

In this early phase of the reorganisation of the province the publicani certainly played no part in the collection of taxes. The reason for their temporary absence, as argued by P.A. Brunt, was surely the unprecedented lack of human and financial resources that their *societates* suffered after the outbreak of the Mithridatic War.²⁶ For several years, until the publicani were ready to return to Asia, possibly not until the end of the Civil War, the Roman army provided the backbone of an embryonic form of fiscal administration, charged with the collection of the fine. Licinius Lucullus, the proquaestor whose remarkable skills had proved decisive in the early phases of the conflict, was entrusted with the task of coordinating it, while Licinius Murena was assigned some military tasks, such as the mission against Moagetes, the ‘tyrant’ of Cibyra.²⁷ Lucullus, himself a loyal partisan of Sulla, played no direct

²⁴ App. *Mithr.* 62.260: καὶ τοῖς οὐ φυλάξασιν ἐπιθήσω δίκην ὡς πολεμίους (“and I will punish those who will not obey as if they were enemies”).

²⁵ Plut. *Sull.* 25.4–5.

²⁶ Brunt 1956 (= Brunt 1990, 1–8, 481); see already Ivanov 1910, 101–102. Delplace 1977, 246–247 argues that the publicani did not cease their activities in Asia Minor between 84 and 80, but this hypothesis overlooks the impact of the massacre of the Italians. There is no evidence supporting the claim of Seletsky 1982 that Sulla promised the cities ‘of Greece and Asia Minor’ to abolish the tax-farming system in exchange for their financial support in the Mithridatic War, and that he changed his mind at a later stage.

²⁷ Strab. 13.4.17 = C 631. Murena also gathered a fleet to fight piracy, sensibly financing it with the revenues of ordinary taxation (Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.35.89: *decem enim nauis*

part in the Civil War, as the delicate task he was in charge of compelled him to stay in Asia. Yet it can safely be argued that his efficiency in ensuring the revenue flow from Asia to the Sullan treasury (the *aerarium* was then in control of the enemies of Sulla) played a crucial role in the development of the conflict.²⁸

Plutarch records the exact amount of the taxation imposed by Sulla: 20.000 talents, which he seems to consider a part of the fine only.²⁹ It is more likely, however, as mentioned above, that such a sum included the arrears too. Broughton, by working on the figures suggested by Böttcher, calculated that the annual revenues from Asia were approximately 2.400 talents, and that the arrears could be quantified in the sum of 12.000 talents.³⁰ If this reconstruction is correct, the fine was therefore of 8.000 talents, more than three times the annual fiscal burdens usually imposed on the cities, and four times more than the fine imposed on Mithridates after the agreements of Dardanus.³¹ Such severity is to be explained by the intention to punish in an exemplary way the communities that had revolted against Roman rule, whose disloyalty was even less acceptable than the aggressive policy of a foreign king.³² The figures themselves make it clear how heavy, and virtually impossible to comply with, the demands imposed by Sulla were.

We owe the little we know about the actual organisation of the new system to a later author, usually not very familiar to the students of

iussu L. Murenæ populus Milesius ex pecunia uectigali populo Romano fecerat, sicut pro sua quaque parte Asiae ceterae ciuitates—“by order of Lucius Murena the people of Miletus built ten ships for the Roman people as part of their tribute, and the other cities of Asia did the same, each one according to its share”). His deeds earned him the gratitude of Caunus (Tuchelt 1979, 153); possibly, the citizens of Messene called him ‘benefactor’ for the same reason (*IG* 5.1.1454, with Accame 1946, 139). See de Callataÿ 1997, 331–335; Mastrocinque 1999a, 94–99.

²⁸ Lucullus was also ordered to strike coinage (Plut. *Luc.* 4.2) and he appears to have produced a large amount of cistophori: de Callataÿ 1997, 356–359.

²⁹ Plut. *Sull.* 25.4: τὴν Ἀσίαν δισημυρίοις τάλαντοισι ἐξημίωσε (“he imposed a fine on Asia of twenty thousand talents”).

³⁰ Böttcher 1915, 56–62; Broughton 1938, 562; Momigliano 1938, 280 (= Momigliano 1975, 641).

³¹ 2.000 talents according to Plut. *Sull.* 23.9; 3.000, according to Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 25.2. Although Badian 1968a, 33 and Cimma 1976, 202, fn. 38 call it a ‘treaty’, the so-called Peace of Dardanus was never ratified by the Roman Senate; on the diplomatic consequences of this choice, see Glew 1981.

³² That Mithridates asked the Chians for 2.000 talents is not an objection (App. *Mithr.* 48.184–186): it was actually meant to bring the city to ruin, it required people to take the friezes of the temples, and it was the immediate background for the mass deportation of the citizens.

the late Republic. A laconic passage in Cassiodorus' *Chronica* records that in 84 BC "Sulla divided Asia into forty-four districts".³³ This piece of information is almost certainly derived from Livy, who is the main source for the 'Republican' section of this work. Cassiodorus' decision to refer to the reorganisation of Asia as the major event of 84 BC suggests that his source portrayed it as a very significant event. The other events Cassiodorus briefly refers to, interrupting his list of *fasti*, are all crucial moments, even authentic watersheds of Republican history, like the death of Hannibal, the conquest of Numantia, and the Gracchan reform of the criminal courts. Quite understandably, the function of the forty-four *regiones* has been much debated.³⁴

Although they have repeatedly been linked to the assize districts, the so-called *conuentus* or *dioikeseis*, there is no good reason to do so, and there are no grounds to revive Gray's clever, if speculative, hypothesis that the Sullan forty-four *regiones* were the outcome of the division into four sub-units of the eleven *conuentus* that existed at the time.³⁵ It is true that the inscription from Ephesus published by C. Habicht in 1975 shows beyond doubt that, by the Flavian age at the very latest, the *conuentus* were used for fiscal purposes too; but there is no evidence whatsoever that this was the case in the late Republic.³⁶ The province of Asia was an intensely urbanised area, and the forty-four Sullan *regiones* may thus have been quite large fiscal districts, each organised around an important city, providing the necessary framework for a well ordered collection of revenues.

It has often been stated that the forty-four *regiones* were the outcome of a decision made with a view to ensuring a quick and efficient levy

³³ Cassiod. *Chron.* p. 130 Mommsen: *Asiam in XLIII regiones Sylla distribuit*. There is no reason to question this figure, *pace* Rostovzeff 1932, 260, fn. 1.

³⁴ See Merola 2001a, 108–109, 177–179, with full bibliography.

³⁵ Gray 1978, 971–973; cf. Magie 1950, 1116–1117; Mitchell 1999, 29–30. In Gray's reconstruction, the *conuentus* capitals were Pergamum, Adramyttium, Smyrna, Ephesus, Miletus, Sardis, Tralles, Mylasa, Alabanda, Apamea and Synnada; the inference is however based on later evidence (see Mitchell 1999, 23). Sources on the gradual development of the system: *RDGE* 52, l. 43–47; Plin. 5.95, 105, 106, 109, 111, 120, 122, 123; *SEG* 39.1179, l. 88–92 (*lex portorii prouinciae Asiae*, from Ephesus); *IoDidyma* 148, l. 12–21, with Robert 1949. Useful summaries in Campanile 2004 and Heller 2006, 379–380.

³⁶ *IvEph* 13. First published in Habicht 1975; see especially the commentary at 67–71 on the likely development of the assize system in Asia and the conclusions at 90–91. The inscription contains a list of communities who were expected to pay some kind of tax, whose nature and destination remain unclear. As a matter of fact, however, the list was created by grouping the communities according to the *conuentus* where they belonged.

of the tribute.³⁷ Since the classic treatment of the question by F. Fröhlich, the assumption underlying some discussions is that the new system was just meant to provide a solution to an emergency, just before Sulla's departure from Asia to Italy, where the final clash for power was about to take place.³⁸ In fact, there are reasons to question that. There is no evidence for the phase in which the Sullan system was replaced by a new fiscal subdivision of the province. At the end of his mission to Asia Minor Pompey was mainly busy creating the province of Pontus-Bithynia, and no substantial change in the fiscal administration of the province of Asia can be dated to the period of his Eastern command.

Cicero says that in 62/61 BC the propraetor Lucius Valerius Flaccus, then in charge of Asia, raised a fleet to fight the pirates, and ordered the cities to contribute to the expense according to the subdivision decided by Sulla, which Pompey had slightly revised: "he... divided the cost according to the allocation made by Pompey, which was based on Lucius Sulla's assessment". The scheme was not just useful for the purposes of ordinary taxation, but it could also be used to raise exceptional tributes. Flaccus' policy, too, was consistent with the settlement of 85/84 BC: "he had divided the amount proportionally among all the cities of Asia and both Pompey and Flaccus followed his method of levying the cost".³⁹ Cicero's testimony makes it clear that the Sullan reform went far beyond the scope of an emergency arrangement, and was based on an extensive knowledge of the territory, and on a preliminary assessment of the fiscal capacities of the communities. Its sophistication might also presuppose a familiarity with the administration of the province, which decades of Roman presence had made possible.⁴⁰ If

³⁷ Cic. *Quint. fr.* 1.1.33 suggests that each *regio* had to contribute the same amount of money, in the same proportion: (*scil.*: the Greeks of Asia Minor) *nomen autem publicani aspernari non possunt, qui pendere ipsi uestigal sine publicano non potuerint quod iis aequaliter Sulla discripserat* ("they [the Greeks of Asia Minor] should not contempt the word 'tax-collector', since without the intervention of the tax-collector they were unable to pay the taxes that Sulla had equally distributed among them"); see Bertrand 1978, 803.

³⁸ Fröhlich 1900, col. 1543–1544; Magie 1950, 1116–1118, fn. 17; Merola 2001a, 53–54, 179. For a different approach, cf. Reinach 1890, 209–210; Broughton 1938, 518.

³⁹ Cic. *Flacc.* 14.32: *discripsit... pecuniam ad Pompei rationem, quae fuit accomodata L. Sullae discriptioni; qui cum in omnis Asiae ciuitates pro portione pecuniam discripsisset [scil.: Sulla], illam rationem in imperando sumptu et Pompeius et Flaccus secutus est.*

⁴⁰ Bertrand 1978, 803–804 argues that this may explain why the subdivision was carried out so quickly. Crawford 1985, 160 speculates that after the creation of the province the Romans just used the fiscal system of the Attalids.

not a fair solution for the cities, it certainly was an efficient tool for the needs of Roman administration.

The model chosen by Sulla provided a blueprint for later administrative developments. The radical reform carried out by Caesar, who entrusted the collection of direct taxes to the cities and deprived the publicani of their role in the fiscal administration of the province, was based on the same principle as the Sullan resettlement. The territory was divided into a number of districts, each one referring to a major urban centre and being assigned a fixed sum of money to be paid to the Roman administration.⁴¹ Sulla certainly ended the war without attempting a final and definitive victory over Mithridates, as events imposed a different agenda. However, the survival of his organisation of the province in the following decades does not allow us to consider it as a mere post-war *Blitz*. Sulla intended to bring about a more rational system for the exploitation of Asia Minor, and he managed to do so.

Curiously enough, modern scholars have rarely asked themselves in what kind of legal framework the deliberations taken by Sulla on the provincial organisation of Asia were formulated. Several *senatusconsulta* declaring the free status of some loyal communities have long been known and studied, but the position of the punished communities has hardly been considered as it deserves. At least since Mommsen's day, it has been repeatedly argued (or rather postulated) that Sulla's main contribution to provincial administration was a *lex Cornelia de provinciis ordinandis*, issued in the years of his dictatorship, as part of a broader constitutional reform.⁴² The key aspects of this law, in Mommsen's reconstruction, were the total bar on consuls and praetors from holding any military command during their mandate, and the abolition of any distinction between consular and praetorian provinces.⁴³ After the decisive refutation proposed in the early 1980s by A. Giovannini, who persuasively listed and discussed an impressive series of exceptions to

⁴¹ On Caesar's reform, cf. App. *b. c.* 2.92.385 and 5.4.19; Dio 42.6.3; Plut. *Caes.* 48.1. See Merola 2001a, 72–84 and Merola 2001b.

⁴² On the emergence of this theory see Giovannini 1983, 97–101.

⁴³ Mommsen 1857, 29–36 (= Mommsen 1906, 118–124); Mommsen 1887a, 94–97, 214–219; cf. Marquardt 1884, 523–525. However, Mommsen developed and codified an interpretation that was already well established in his day; cf. e. g. Vockestaert 1816, 179–182 and Zachariä 1834, 114–116. There are lengthy discussions of this law and of Sulla's contribution to provincial administration in Betti 1982, 251–267; Cobban 1935, 72–76; Valgiglio 1956, 124–144; Hantos 1986, 89–120.

Mommsen's supposed rule, there is no need to reconsider this matter in any detail.⁴⁴ No *lex Cornelia de provinciis* was ever issued, and the problems posed by the references made in ancient sources to a *lex Cornelia* dealing with the administration of Asia Minor can be more satisfactorily discussed without viewing them as evidence for a piece of general legislation.⁴⁵ Some may refer to the *lex Cornelia de maiestate*;⁴⁶ others to the decisions that Sulla took at Ephesus. It is worth reconsidering them briefly.

One of the epigraphic documents recording the introduction of the new calendar in the province of Asia, in 9BC, from Priene, fixing the beginning of the year to 23 September, the date of the birth of Augustus, refers to a Κορνήλιος νόμος. The dispositions for the elections of the civic magistrates formulated in that Sullan law were not to be modified with the advent of the new system.⁴⁷ This *lex Cornelia* may well be a text dealing specifically with Asia. The reference to a provincial law is somewhat clearer in a fragmentary text from Thyatira, which mentions a διάταξις “written according to the *lex Cornelia*”.⁴⁸ The meaning of διάταξις in this context is unclear: it could be “financial regulation”, or even “testament”. In the first case, the reference to a *lex provinciae* would be unproblematic. If the second hypothesis is to be preferred, it is not unlikely that such matters were dealt with in a provincial law, reflecting the concerns that provided the background to

⁴⁴ See Giovannini 1983, 75–101, also providing full references to all relevant passages of Mommsen's *Staatsrecht*. The existence of a Sullan law *de provinciis ordinandis* had already been questioned by several scholars: see Zumpt 1868, 385, 440; Balsdon 1939, 58–65; Evola Marino 1974, 115–123; cf. Pelham 1895, 216, fn. 2; Pelham 1911, 67, fn. 4; Arnold 1914, 51, fn. 1; Badian 1986, 81–84. Giovannini's theory has been widely accepted: see Girardet 1987, 292–293 (= Girardet 2007, 160–161); Nicolet 1992; Ferrary 2001b, 28–29.

⁴⁵ My debt to the discussions of Crawford 1990, 113–114 and Ferrary 2001b, 28–29 will be apparent. To my knowledge, a Sullan *lex provinciae* for Asia was first suggested in Zumpt 1868, 362–363.

⁴⁶ Cic. *fam.* 1.9.25; 3.6.3, 6.

⁴⁷ RDGE 65.D = *IoPriene* 105, l. 82–84: γείνεσθαι τὰ κατὰ τὰ | ἀρχαιεσία μηνὶ δεκάτῳ, ὥς καὶ ἐν τῷ Κορνελίῳ νόμῳ γέγραπται, ἐντὸς | δεκάτης ἰσταμένου (l. 82–84: “the procedures connected with the election of magistrates shall take place in the tenth month, as has been laid down in the Cornelian law; within the first ten days [of the month]”). Rhodes-Lewis 1997, 546 rightly speak of “a *lex Cornelia* of Sulla for the province of Asia”.

⁴⁸ IGR 4.1188 = TAM 5.2, 856, l. 5: ...οι γράψασα κατὰ τὸν Κορνήλιον νόμον διάταξιν.

the *lex Cornelia de falsis* issued by Sulla during his dictatorship.⁴⁹ The general meaning of the text is, however, uncertain.⁵⁰

A third source may be used as evidence for the existence of a Sullan provincial law on Asia. In a letter written from Laodicea in April 50 BC to Appius Claudius Pulcher, his predecessor as governor of Cilicia, who was then facing charges *de maiestate*, Cicero deals with the problem of limiting the expenses of the embassies sent to Rome by the cities.⁵¹ In an earlier letter, Appius voiced the suspicion that Cicero was preventing the delegates of some Cilician cities from going to Rome to witness in his favour, on the grounds that their mission would have required excessive expenses. Cicero replies by recalling a conversation he had with a delegation from an unspecified city of Phrygia Epictetus, or Phrygia Minor: “I remember that some people approached me (they were from Epictetus, if I am not mistaken), and claimed that excessive sums were being voted for the deputations. I did not so much order as advise them to determine those sums as far as possible according to the Cornelian law.”⁵² The *lex Cornelia* Cicero refers to here was long thought to be the law on provincial administration.⁵³ A clause of the Flavian *lex Irnitana*, however, shows that the amount of money paid to the embassies could be decided on a local level: “a *duovir* is to give to each ambassador under the heading of daily expenses as much as the *decuriones* or *conscripti* decided was to be given”.⁵⁴ It is not unlikely, therefore, that a provincial law set a limit on the expenses to be met by civic delegations. In this case, Cicero probably decided to use in

⁴⁹ *Contra*, Wörrle 1988, 92–93, fn. 77, arguing that the inscription refers to the *lex Cornelia de provinciis*.

⁵⁰ Cf. the commentary of P. Herrmann in *TAM* 5: “fortasse decretum est quo pecuniarum civitati (ab Avercio?) datarum vel legatarum usus et procuratio statuuntur. Liberae rei publicae exeunti tribuerim”.

⁵¹ *Cic. fam.* 3.10. It was a difficult moment in the relationship between Cicero and Appius, whose prosecutor was Cicero’s future son-in-law P. Cornelius Dolabella: see Constans 1921, 93–102 and Campanile 2001, 252–259.

⁵² *Cic. fam.* 3.10.6: *ad me adire quosdam memini, nimirum ex Epicteto, qui dicerent nimis magnos sumptus legatis decerni. quibus ergo non tam imperavi quam censui sumptus legati quam maxime ad legem Cornelianam decernendos.*

⁵³ See Liebenam 1900, 84; *contra*, Crawford 1990, 114. Campanile 2001, 254–255 argues that it may be a clause of the *lex Cornelia de maiestate*; cf. Ridley 1975, 100, suggesting the *lex Cornelia de repetundis* and Keaveney 1983c, 199–202, suggesting the *lex Cornelia de provinciis*.

⁵⁴ *Lex Irnitana*, ch. H: *legatis singulis diarium nomine Iiur tantum dato, quantum / dandum esse decurion[es] conscripti[s]ue censuerint* (translation by M.H. Crawford). See the brief commentary on this clause in González 1986, 212.

his own province, Cilicia, a regulation that Sulla had set for Asia. In his capacity of provincial governor, he chose to refer to the guidelines provided by the law of a neighbouring territory, which probably had already proved its effectiveness in the previous decades.⁵⁵

Cicero's letter interestingly shows how financial provision for local delegations was viewed by Rome as a relevant problem in the organisation of provincial life. As I have argued in the first part, a shrewd use of diplomacy on the part of the cities could be a fundamental strategy for the improvement of the status of the communities.⁵⁶ As Cicero's suggestion makes clear, the contents of this *lex Cornelia* were not to be interpreted restrictively. A flexible interpretation could be of some use and convenience for both interested parties.

It seems therefore quite safe to conclude that Sulla reorganised the province of Asia by issuing a law, surely a *lex data*, which covered the major aspects of its political and institutional life. It was probably included in the *lex Valeria* of 82 BC, which legalised all the initiatives taken by Sulla during his Eastern command.⁵⁷ It probably contained the guidelines of the new fiscal system and it provided a set of rules on the election of city magistrates, although apparently not on the membership of the city assemblies. There is no evidence that it went into minute details about the organisation of civic life, like the law issued by Pompey for Bithynia two decades later. The former Attalid kingdom, after all, had a much stronger tradition of urbanism and local autonomy than its neighbour.⁵⁸ The law certainly did not deal with

⁵⁵ Excellent discussion in Zumpt 1868, 362–363.

⁵⁶ If the reference is to the Sullan law, the clause can be explained by the Romans' interest to compel the cities to concentrate their resources on the fulfillment of their fiscal duties: Ferrary 2001b, 29, fn. 57. At any rate, setting a limit to the resources available to foreign envoys was an issue already before the Sullan settlement: cf. the *senatusconsultum* voted in 94 BC, prohibiting loans to the representatives of the provincial communities to Rome (Ascon. in *Cornelian*. p. 57).

⁵⁷ See Cic. *leg. agr.* 3.2.5, with *MRR* 2.66. On the ratification of *leges datae*, see Frederiksen 1965, 189; Hoyos 1973, 50–53 (focusing on provincial laws); Sandberg 2002, 102–103. See however the stimulating discussion on the Sullan resettlement of the province and its ratification in Schleussner 1978, 78–81.

⁵⁸ Hamon 2005, 132–135. The fullest discussion of the *lex Pompeia de provincia Bithynia* is now Fernoux 2004, 129–146; Sherwin-White 1966, 525–555 (esp. 525–529, on the financial administration of the cities) and Marek 1993, 26–46 remain very useful. It is unnecessary to suggest, as Fernoux does (129–130), that the *lex Pompeia* mentioned by Pliny the Younger was not a proper law, but just a series of *decreta*. On the rules set by Pompey about city magistracies, see A.J. Marshall 1968a; Ameling 1984; Mitchell 1984, 121–125.

the introduction of the Sullan era, which many cities adopted without following any input on the part of the Romans, at different moments and mostly independently from each other.⁵⁹

As all provincial laws, this *lex Cornelia* must have been accompanied and complemented by the *formula prouvinciae*, the list of the communities included into the province and to which the law was actually applicable.⁶⁰ When Sulla delivered his speech to the representatives of the cities, announcing what he had decided about the status of the communities, he must have presented something resembling a *formula prouvinciae*. The position of cities to which he confirmed or awarded freedom would be dealt with in a series of *senatusconsulta* after his return to Rome. The vast majority of the communities were punished by the deprivation of freedom and the downgrading to the status of subject cities, put under the direct control of the provincial governor.⁶¹ The fact that Sulla still had to gain political supremacy in Rome, and then to obtain the full legal confirmation of his acts is no obstacle to this reconstruction of the events.

The available evidence and the large number of cities included in the territory of the province of Asia make a reconstruction of the *formula* set up in the Sullan law impossible. The institutional history of a city is known in some detail only in a few cases, like that of Aphrodisias. However, as far as our sources tell us, the status subdivision of the Asian communities decided by Sulla was as follows:

⁵⁹ Leschhorn 1993, 216–221; 420–423. The dossier of the cities using the Sullan era must now include Aizanoi too, as proved by Wörrle 1995, correcting Leschhorn 1993, 234–244. Pace Sartre 1995, 120, there was never such a thing as the era of the *prouvincia Asia*: see Rigsby 1979.

⁶⁰ Marquardt 1884, 500–502; Crawford 1990, 115. *Contra*, Lintott 1981, 58–61.

⁶¹ A.H.M. Jones 1971, 62–64 is still a good discussion; also cf. Bernhardt 1985, 49–65. Bernhardt 1971, 115, 120–132 fails to see the significance of Sulla's intervention in the history of Roman Asia Minor; Kallet-Marx 1995, 289–290 wrongly views the Sullan reorganisation as the moment in which many Asiatic communities were first included under direct Roman rule, and underrates the impact of Roman domination on Asia Minor in the early history of the province. A similar approach in Dmitriev 2005b, 75–80; a sound critique in Ferrary 2002a, 133–134.

<i>Free cities</i>	<i>Subject cities already before the war</i>	<i>Subject cities, under Sulla's decisions</i>
Rhodes	Clazomenae	Ephesus
the Lycian <i>koinon</i> ⁶²	Phocea	Pergamum
Chius ⁶³	Synnada	Miletus ⁶⁴
Ilium	Thyatira	Mytilene ⁶⁵
Cyzicus ⁶⁶	Tralles ⁶⁷	Samus ⁶⁸
Lampsacus ⁶⁹		Termessus
Magnesia on the Sipylus ⁷⁰		

⁶² Cf. the very fragmentary *s.c.* from Cormus, in eastern Lycia (*RDGE* 19), where the name of Sulla is legible. Friendship between the Lycian commune and Rome was confirmed by the treaty of 46 BC recently published in Mitchell 2005a. The relations with Rome were already very good since 167 BC, as is shown by the dedications of the Lycian *koinon* to Jupiter Capitolinus and the Roman people found on the Capitol (*ILLRP* 174 and 175): Mitchell 2005a, 231–232. Kolb 2002, 209, fn. 17 announces the discovery of another inscription containing a treaty between Rome and the Lycian *koinon*, from Tyberissus, which will soon be published.

⁶³ On Chius' loyalty to Rome, see App. *Mithr.* 46–47.180–186. This text and *RDGE* 70 show that some Roman citizens owned land in its territory. A number of Roman citizens started acquiring substantial portions of land soon after the creation of the province of Asia: see Broughton 1934, 209–212; Bussi-Foraboschi 2001, 450–451. The Sullan *s.c.* stressed that Roman citizens resident in Chius were subject to local laws (cf. l. 17–18): A.J. Marshall 1969 convincingly suggests that the clause refers only to civil cases, especially those concerning property law.

⁶⁴ On Miletus, see Haussoulier 1921, 58; Robert 1937, 427–428, arguing that the city did not start its recovery until the late 60s.

⁶⁵ The Mytilenians had surrendered the legate M'. Aquillius to Mithridates in 88: on the traditions about Aquillius' death, see Amioti 1979. Lucullus carried out the siege and the reconquest of Mytilene (Plut. *Luc.* 4.2–3; see also Suet. *Div. Jul.* 2). He tried not to destroy the city, but was compelled to besiege and punish it because its inhabitants “were prey to a bad demon” (κακοδαίμονοῦντας). Cichorius 1888, 5–6 is still fundamental.

⁶⁶ Strabo 12.8.11 = C 576, with Heller 2006, 71–76.

⁶⁷ Tralles took part in the massacre of the Italians: App. *Mithr.* 23.90; Dio 35.101.

⁶⁸ In 86 BC, Lucullus organised an expedition against Samus, with the support of Chius and Cnidus: see Plut. *Luc.* 3.3, with Transier 1985, 37–38.

⁶⁹ Lampsacus was certainly free in 80, when Verres operated in Asia Minor (Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.32.81: *circumsessus es. a quibus? a Lampsacenis. barbaris hominibus, credo, aut iis qui populi Romani nomen contemnerent. immo uero ab hominibus et natura et consuetudine et disciplina lenissimis, porro autem populi Romani condicione sociis, fortuna seruis, uoluntate supplicibus*, “you [Verres] were surrounded. By whom? By the Lampsacenes. Barbarians, one may think, men who would have no respect for the name of the Roman people? In fact, people who by nature, habits and culture are most civilised, and indeed are allies of the Roman people because of their status, slaves because of their condition, suppliants because of their will”).

⁷⁰ Liv. *Per.* 81.2: *Magnesia, quae sola in Asia ciuitas in fide manserat, summa uirtute aduersus Mithridaten defensa est* (“Magnesia, which had been the only city in Asia to remain

<i>Free cities</i>	<i>Subject cities already before the war</i>	<i>Subject cities, under Sulla's decisions</i>
Stratonicea		Caunus (assigned to Rhodes) ⁷¹
Tabae		
Alabanda		
Aphrodisias		
Astypalaea		
<i>Doubtful:</i>	<i>Doubtful:</i>	<i>Doubtful:</i>
Byzantium ⁷²	Colophon	Laodicea on the Lycus
Sardis ⁷³	Nysa	
Halicarnassus ⁷⁴		
Apollonis ⁷⁵		
Smyrna ⁷⁶		

loyal, was defended with outstanding courage against Mithridates"). Cf. Strab. 13.3.5 = C 621, with Mastrocinque 1999c, 189, fn. 151 and Goukowsky 2001, 149–150, fn. 199. Magnesia on the Maeander certainly sided with Mithridates: Kinns 2006 and Santangelo 2006.

⁷¹ See Cic. *Quint. fr.* 1.1.33: *non esse autem leniores in exigendis uectigalibus Graecos quam nostros publicanos hinc intellegi potest quod Caunii nuper omnesque ex insulis quae erant a Sulla Rhodiis attributae confugerunt ad senatum, nobis ut potius uectigal quam Rhodiis penderent* ("that the Greeks are not more indulgent than our publicani when it comes to collecting taxes it can be easily understood from the fact that the Caunii and all the islands assigned to Rhodes by Sulla requested the Senate to let them pay their taxes to us rather than to Rhodes"). On this *adtributio*, see Bertrand 1992, 155; Heller 2006, 68–71. Kallet-Marx 1995, 276 uses this passage and the *s.c. de Stratonicensibus* to argue that "as a rule" all the free cities were given new territories, but the evidence is too sparse to allow safe conclusions.

⁷² Byzantium was an ally of Rome and certainly fought against Mithridates, as attested by the Byzantine ambassadors who visited the Senate in AD 53 (Tac. *ann.* 12.62: *et piratico bello adiutum Antonium memorabant, quaeque Sullae aut Lucullo aut Pompeio obtulissent* ... "they mentioned the help they gave to Antony in the war against the pirates, and what they offered to Sulla, Lucullus or Pompey").

⁷³ Some recent funerary inscriptions from Sardis (*SEG* 41.1027, 1029, 1030) attest the existence of a Συλληίς tribe: such an attestation may be related to an award of freedom. The existence of a homonymous *phyle* has been tentatively proposed for Saittai too: see *SEG* 41.1019.

⁷⁴ The honours for Sulla στρατηγὸς ἀνθύπατος recorded in *ILS* 8771 may be explained in light of a freedom grant following the Mithridatic War (cf. the reference to a "benefaction", εὐεργ[ε]σία, l. 7).

⁷⁵ Cic. *Flacc.* 29.71: *cur ergo unus tu Apollonidensis amantissimos populi Romani, fidelissimos socios, miseriore habes, quam aut Mithridates aut etiam pater tuus habuit umquam?* ("why are you the only man to make the Apollonidenses, who are very attached to the Roman people and most loyal allies, more miserable than Mithridates or even your father ever did?"). This passage shows that the city was attacked by Mithridates, and it is likely that Sulla rewarded its loyalty with a freedom grant.

⁷⁶ Smyrna supported Mithridates, as its coinage shows: Kinns 1987, 109–110. How-

After summarising the political aspects of Sulla's decisions, it is worth coming back to the economic consequences of the Sullan reorganisation, on which we are better informed. Some well-known passages of Appian and Plutarch show how burdensome the demands of Sullan taxation were for the cities. As argued above, Sulla did not aim to exclude the publicani from the collection of taxes. In fact, his policy was quite favourable to that sector of the equestrian order, since it offered the Italian moneylenders the chance for an even more prominent role in the economic life of the province by increasing the number of the subject cities. Moreover, as Appian makes clear, the cities were in desperate need for financial resources, and they would soon start borrowing resources from the Roman moneylenders.⁷⁷

Plutarch's narrative, although not devoid of a similar rhetorical undertone, provides some factual detail. Lucullus, serving as a proquaestor in Asia in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, tried not to exact from the cities more than they could actually afford.⁷⁸ However, the Asiatic cities soon contracted enormous obligations with the moneylenders, which interest rates soon made unsustainable. From the 20.000 talents of the original fine, the overall debt of the cities had grown to 120.000 talents in fifteen years' time.⁷⁹ When governor of Asia, in 70 BC, Lucullus took the sensible decision to cut interest rates, limit the income of the moneylenders to a quarter of the overall capital, and forbid them to compound the interest on the capital. Such measures represented

ever, Sulla is known to have acknowledged the support of the city to the Romans in the war against Aristonicus: see Tac. *ann.* 4.56.2 and Aristid. 41.766 (Ἐπιστολή περὶ Σμύρνης), with Lewis 1991; cf. Cadoux 1938, 157 and Lintott 1976, 490–491, dating the episode to the winter of 85/84. This led to believe that he granted freedom to the city. Mastrocinque 1999b, 89–93 speculates that Smyrna was one of the cities that bribed Sulla in order to obtain the grant (Cic. *off.* 3.87 and Plut. *Compar. Lys. Sull.* 3.4), despite its disloyalty during the war.

⁷⁷ App. *Mithr.* 63.261: ἀποροῦσαι τε καὶ δανειζόμεναι μεγάλων τόκων, αἱ μὲν τὰ θέατρα τοῖς δανείζουσιν, αἱ δὲ τὰ γυμνάσια ἢ τεῖχος ἢ λιμένας ἢ εἴ τι δημόσιον ἄλλο, σὺν ὕβρει στρατιωτῶν ἐπειγόντων ὑπετίθεντο (“the cities, oppressed by poverty, borrowed it at high rates of interest: some mortgaged their theaters, others their gymnasiums, their walls, their harbors, and every other scrap of public property; they were insolently urged on by the soldiers”).

⁷⁸ Plut. *Luc.* 4.1: οὐ μόνον καθαρὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρᾶον (“not just honest and just, but gentle too”).

⁷⁹ See Migeotte 1984, 339–341; Kallet-Marx 1995, 276–278. See Plut. *Luc.* 20.2, mentioning the indebted inhabitants of the province compelled to serve their creditors as slaves. Cf. Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.29.74 (*accusator enim apponitur cuius Romanus de creditoribus Lampsacenum*, “a Roman citizen is chosen as prosecutor, one of the money-lenders of Lampsacum”).

a fatal blow to Lucullus' political future, but were to provide decisive relief for the cities, which extinguished their debts within four years, after paying 40.000 talents—double the original fine, but considerably less than the debt which they had contracted.⁸⁰

A watershed in the economic and fiscal history of the province of Asia can therefore be located between 66 and 65 BC. Although there is evidence that some communities started contracting debts soon afterwards, the cities never went through another crisis comparable to that following the Sullan settlement.⁸¹ The impact of the fine imposed on them in 84 BC took two decades to overcome. In the meantime, from the creation of the province of Asia, both free and subject cities had experienced four wars, the uninterrupted threat represented by piracy, a dramatic economic crisis, and the greed of the publicani. It is no wonder, therefore, that Lucullus was honoured in various and different contexts for his achievements and, more importantly, for his moderation. According to Plutarch, the Asiatic *koinon* honoured him with great manifestations of gratitude on his arrival in Ephesus. The *Loukoulleia*, a new panasiatic celebration that closely recalled the *Moukieia*, were established in his honour.⁸² A similar decision was taken some time earlier, at the beginning of the Third Mithridatic War, by the citizens of Cyzicus, who instituted the *Loukoulleia* in gratitude for having been freed from the siege of Mithridates: apparently, the festival was still celebrated in Appian's day.⁸³ Some epigraphic evidence also survives for this period of Lucullus' administrative activity in Asia Minor. He was called εὐεργέτης and σωτήρ in an inscription from Claros, and πάτρων and εὐεργέτης in a text from Andros. He became the patron

⁸⁰ Plut. *Luc.* 20.3–6; see Cimma 1981, 40, fn. 147; Keaveney 1992, 95–98; de Callatay 1997, 356–359.

⁸¹ See Cic. *Quint. Fr.* 1.1.25, written in 59 BC (*nullam aes alienum nouum contrahi civitatibus, vetere autem magno et gravi multas abs te esse liberatas*; “the cities are not contracting any new debts, and indeed many have been relieved by you of a huge and burdensome load of old obligations”), with Migeotte 1984, 342–343. Piracy, as well as the ruthlessness of the governor L. Valerius Flaccus, had surely played a significant part. Cf. the situation Cicero found in Cilicia in 50 BC: Cic. *Att.* 6.2.4–5 (*his ego duobus generibus facultatem ad se aere alieno liberandas aut levandas dedi, uno quod omnino nullus in imperio meo sumptus factus est...accessit altera: mira erant in ciuitatibus ipsorum furta Graecorum quae magistratus sui fecerant*, “I gave them the opportunity to free themselves entirely or partially in two ways; first, no expense has been incurred under my watch...moreover, there was an astonishing number of peculations in their cities, committed by their own magistrates”).

⁸² Plut. *Luc.* 23.1.

⁸³ App. *Mithr.* 76.331. See Magie 1950, 327–330; 1111, fn. 4; Bernhardt 1971, 134.

of important centres like Ephesus and Synnada.⁸⁴ As W. Ameling has persuasively suggested, a dedication in his honour was probably put up in the free city of Chius too, and a relationship of patronage may be suggested in this case.⁸⁵

Lucullus is the most representative exponent of a part of the Roman elite that understood the importance of a rational and sensible exploitation of Asia. One may wonder whether there is an open contradiction between the vision of Sulla and that of Lucullus. No doubt, Sulla bore serious responsibilities for the bad state of civic finances, which his friend and associate had to deal with when he assumed the governorship of the province. However, the decisions taken by Sulla must be explained in light of his military needs, and can hardly be considered as the symptom of broader conceptions on the function of Roman rule. Indeed, Sulla made a serious effort towards a stable fiscal organisation, and he did not increase the yearly burden of taxation. What was exceptional, and actually impossible to implement, about his decisions was the collection of the arrears and the parallel imposition of a fine. There is little doubt that Sulla was uninterested in the consequences that a deep economic crisis could have on the cities. Such an attitude may be explained by a deep distrust towards most of the Asiatic communities after their warm support for Mithridates' cause. Such a feeling must have been quite widespread among the Romans, and quite persistent too, as Cicero heavily relied on it still in 59 BC, when he delivered the *pro Flacco*.⁸⁶ Sulla's priority was to show the impor-

⁸⁴ See respectively *IvEph* 2941 (= Eiler 2002, C89) and *MAMA* 4.52 (= Eilers 2002, C134).

⁸⁵ *SEG* 35.929, with Ameling 1989. Theoretically, the dedicatee could also be Murena, who is not known to have been the patron of any community. For a full survey of Lucullus' relations in the Greek East, see Tröster 2005.

⁸⁶ Cf. e. g. Cic. *Flacc.* 11.24 (*ne hominibus leuitate Graecis, crudelitate barbaris ciuem ac supplicem uestrum dederetis*, "not to surrender a fellow-citizen and a suppliant to men who from their levity are Greeks, but who, as far as cruelty goes, are barbarians"); 16.37 (*testis ipse... leuitatem totius Asiae protulit, de qua nos et libenter et facile concedimus*, "the witness himself...cited the unreliability of the whole of Asia, which he can happily and easily admit"); and especially 25.60–61 (*quae quidem a me si, ut dicenda sint, dicerentur, grauius agerem, iudices, quam adhuc egi, quantam Asiaticis testibus fidem habere uos conueniret; reuocarem animos uestros ad Mithridatici belli memoriam...if I said what the facts require me to say, I would be dealing with the credibility of the Asian witnesses with more harshness than I have done so far; I would bring back your memories of the Mithridatic wars back to your minds*) and 27.64–65 (*quaeso a uobis, Asiatici testes, ut... uosmet ipsi describatis Asiam nec quid alienigenae de uobis soleant, sed quid uosmet ipsi de genere uestro statuatis, memineritis*, "I ask you, Asian witnesses, that...you remember not what foreigners usually say, but what you yourselves think of your own race"). See Vasaly 1993, 198–205.

tance of being loyal to the empire, the advantages that such loyalty could bring, and Rome's determination to punish all rebels. Lucullus had a different agenda, not least because, at the time of his second mandate in Asia Minor, the cities had already shown their lack of interest in Mithridates' new attempt.⁸⁷ His decisions must then be viewed as an attempt to bring life in the province back to a normal state, by ending a transition that had proved too long, and ultimately exhausting.

It should be borne in mind, however, that after the extinction of the debts the framework of the renewed, gradually pacified life of the province was still provided by the *lex Cornelia* issued at Ephesus in 85/84. Moreover, everything we know about Sulla's contribution to the redefining of Roman rule in Asia reveals a strong interest in placing—or rather keeping—the cities at the centre of the administrative life of the province. There is no conclusive evidence that the Sullan law dealt with the *koinon* of the cities of the *prouincia Asia* and set rules for its membership. It is beyond doubt, however, that Sulla informed the representatives of the cities of his decisions in a meeting which must have had similar composition and functions to those of the *koinon*. Although there was a heavy intervention of the army to ensure its enforcement, his fiscal reform was based on a network of cities, and it required their cooperation.

Many factors suggest that Sulla still viewed communities as the backbone of the Roman province. Indeed, the decision to reward some cities for their loyalty to Rome and to punish others for having joined Mithridates was based on the assumption that the Roman presence itself was unconceivable without a preliminary assessment of the cities' behaviour towards Rome and of the needs of the Roman administration. The core of the Sullan reorganisation of Asia Minor was neither a more direct intervention in the internal business of the cities nor a centralisation of the provincial administration. Sulla did not undertake anything comparable to Pompey's organisation of Bithynia in 66 BC. With its solid background of urbanism and sophisticated political and constitutional organisation, the province of Asia just did not require that approach. On the contrary, the solution to the crisis was provided by two crucial choices: a stable military presence of Rome in the region, made possible by the presence of three legions formerly led by Fimbria and later

⁸⁷ On Mithridates' forces at the beginning of the war, see App. *Mithr.* 69.292–293.

surrendered to Sulla, and a strategy that compelled the local elites to embark on closer relations with Rome.⁸⁸

Sulla's harsh measures did not just prove to the Greek world the scale of its defeat. They also compelled it to react by negotiating a new position towards Rome, and by accepting an active role in an empire that was changing its shape. The fine decided by Sulla was a potentially deadly punishment for the cities of Asia Minor. It had been imposed in a phase of serious economic crisis, after a war, with piracy still in control of the Ionian Sea. Most of the bronze coinage struck in the province immediately after the war, including that produced by Lucullus, bears traces of overstriking and countermarking. This led to a devaluation that was a form of supplementary taxation itself.⁸⁹ Moreover, the involvement of the Roman moneylenders made the prospect of emancipation from debts even less realistic.

In such a situation, the local elites had one choice left: to seek the support of the members of the Roman elite who were prepared to defend the interests. The rise of foreign *clientelae*, of course, dates back to much earlier than the Sullan period, and cases of relations between some Asiatic cities and members of the Roman elite are recorded already before the Mithridatic age. However, the available evidence suggests that the tendency became more widespread only after the Sullan resettlement. It was Sulla himself who offered a blueprint for this change, by displaying his closeness to some cities that had demonstrated their unstinting loyalty to Rome, such as Aphrodisias, Stratonicea, Delos, and perhaps Ilium. Moreover, he created close ties with other cities whose position in the Mithridatic War was not entirely straightforward, but which somehow managed to build good relations with the winner, such as Smyrna and Halicarnassus.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ The decision to deploy legions in Asia Minor was unprecedented: Mitchell 1993, 29.

⁸⁹ Crawford 1985, 196; Kinns 1987, 110; de Callatay 1997, 329–330.

⁹⁰ Coşkun 2005 convincingly argues that a link between military success and patronage can still be noticed in the late Republic, but does not mention any example from the Sullan period (in fact, there is no evidence that Sulla formally became 'patron' of a community). Some cities are said to have bribed Sulla in order to be granted freedom, and his decision about their status was reversed in 77 BC by the initiative of the *princeps senatus* L. Marcius Philippus (cos. 91, cens. 86; see Paterson 1985, 24, 40, fn. 11). See Cic. *off.* 3.87: *non igitur utilis illa L. Philippi Q.f. sententia, quas ciuitates L. Sulla pecunia accepta ex senatus consulto liberauisset, ut eae rursus uectigales essent, neque iis pecuniam, quam pro libertate dederant, redderemus. ei senatus est assensus* ("therefore, that well-known measure of Lucius Philippus, son of Quintus, was not useful. The cities that Lucius Sulla had declared free

The measures decided by Lucullus did not solve the crisis the province of Asia had been fighting for several decades with. The slow recovery of the region was favoured by the defeat of Mithridates and of the pirates, finally brought about by Pompey in the 60s, and by the political stabilisation ensured by the creation of the provinces of Cilicia and Bithynia as permanent commands. Most importantly perhaps, things started to change when the Asiatic cities realised how to deal with Rome and her elite. For the heirs of characters like Chaeremon of Nysa and Pyrrh[akos], who had kept their loyalty during the Mithridatic War, garnering favour at Rome was no hard task. However, the greatest part of the Greek world had a different record and was compelled to follow a different strategy. Murena, Lucullus and Pompey would eventually play an even more active part in this context than Sulla did.

The list of Roman patrons of Greek cities provided by C. Eilers shows a pattern that cannot be explained as mere chance. Before the Mithridatic War, only a handful of cities honoured, and created ties with Roman magistrates operating in Asia Minor. Most of them have already been mentioned here: Aphrodisias of course, Synnada, Ephesus, Ilium. Cities like Colophon and Alabanda had already started to send envoys to the Roman Senate to discuss issues related to their status before the conflict. Samus, which later followed Mithridates, had gained the patronage of Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (*cos.* 96 BC) and C. Iulius Caesar (*praet.* 92 BC).⁹¹ In Greece, Delos, before gaining Sulla's favour, had established ties with M. Antonius, proconsul in Cilicia in 102, and again with C. Julius Caesar, governor of Asia in the 90s.⁹² Other monuments were probably destroyed during the war, when the enemies of Rome prevailed throughout the Greek East.

From the end of the 80s, however, the Roman patronage of Greek communities came into play again, and became even more widespread. The list provided by Eilers contains fifty-three patrons (out of 141 whose chronology is known) that can safely be dated between the aftermath of the First Mithridatic War and the battle of Actium.⁹³ With the

with the ratification of a senatorial decree were brought back to the status of tributary communities, and the money that they had paid in exchange for their freedom was not returned to them. The senate approved his proposal"). Also cf. Plut. *Compar. Lys. Sull.* 3-4.

⁹¹ See respectively *IGR* 4.968 (= Eilers 2002, C51) and *IGR* 4.970 (= Eilers 2002, C53); cf. Transier 1985, 36-37 and Ferrary 1997a, 209, with further bibliography.

⁹² *ID* 1700 (M. Antonius) and 1701 (Julius Caesar): see Baslez 1982, 55-57.

⁹³ Evidence in Eilers 2002, 269-276.

beginning of the principate, the patronage of communities started to go through a gradual and irreversible decline, which was accomplished by the age of Claudius.⁹⁴

Patronage, however, was mainly a prerogative of the free cities, which had stronger relations with Rome, and a slightly better financial situation than the subject cities. For these communities a very significant function was played by the *koinon* of the province of Asia, the assembly where the cities met regularly and discussed current affairs. The inscriptional evidence suggests that the role of the *koinon* became more significant in the years that followed the Sullan reorganisation. The assembly of the cities had the function of organising the panhellenic festivals already from the 90s.⁹⁵ After the First Mithridatic War it apparently became more involved in the administration of the province, and provided a context in which formal consultations between the cities and the Roman governor could take place.

The *koinon* also offered the members of the Greek elites excellent chances to build networks of cooperation and alliance with their peers. An important inscription from Aphrodisias, probably dating from the 70s, shows that a free city could exploit the credit it had earned with Rome on behalf of the whole province. The text shows the representatives of the Asiatic cities complaining about the difficult state of their finances, which was due to the action of the publicani and to other unfavourable, and unspecified, circumstances—perhaps, the unaffordable interest rates imposed by the moneylenders, who came into action when Asiatic cities had to gather the resources to pay the fine imposed by Sulla.⁹⁶ The assembly decided to send two envoys to the Roman Senate, formally charged to ask for a remedy against the abuses of the publicani. Interestingly, the designated ambassadors, Dionysius and Hierocles, were citizens of Aphrodisias, a city that was not under direct Roman rule in this period. Aphrodisias was not a part of the province in this period, and the text makes it clear that the two brothers also held the citizenship of Tralles. They may have been chosen for their diplomatic skills, or more probably because of the excellent relations between their hometown and Rome.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Eilers 2002, 145–146.

⁹⁵ See Erkelenz 1999, 50 and Ferrary 2001b, 26–27. About the later developments in the tasks of the *koinon*, see Campanile 1994, 13–17.

⁹⁶ See Drew-Bear 1972, 443–471; Reynolds 1982, 26–32, no. 5.

⁹⁷ Reynolds 1982, 30. Tralles had followed Mithridates: App. *Mithr.* 23; Varro, in Apul. *mag.* 42.

The tasks of the *koinon* in this period are not entirely clear, as there is little available evidence.⁹⁸ Nothing, however, compels us to believe that it was directly related to the organisation of the province brought about in 129. It was surely set up later, perhaps under the governorship of Mucius Scaevola, and it was probably reorganised after the Sullan settlement.⁹⁹ Some documents attest a role of the *koinon* in the organisation of games, or in the collection of money for ceremonies in honour of Roman magistrates.¹⁰⁰ Its first attestation is indeed a letter of Q. Mucius Scaevola to the cities of the province, dealing with the organisation of games in his honour.¹⁰¹ In 62/61, the League unsuccessfully tried to gather money to organise games in honour of the former provincial governor L. Valerius Flaccus, whose son also happened to be the governor in that very moment.¹⁰² The Roman elite had ties not only with the notables of the free cities, and the situation of the provincialised cities was not completely static, without any chance of success in influencing Roman attitudes.

There were therefore two different processes at work in the relations between Rome and the elites of the province of Asia, involving both free and subject cities, for which a common background may be suggested. It was the Sullan settlement which compelled the cities of the province to embark on closer relations with the Romans. Some cities sought the patronage of Roman notables, others voiced their concerns and needs in the provincial *koinon*. Sulla's demands were just not affordable, as we have seen. The efforts that the cities made to start paying the fine had put them in an even worse position, as they were compelled to borrow money from the Roman moneylenders. Disaster may be avoided only by obtaining the support of members of the Roman elite who were prepared to defend their interests, formally or infor-

⁹⁸ Listed by Drew-Bear 1972, 460–463 and Dmitriev 2005b, 105–115, 129.

⁹⁹ Ferrary 2001b, 29 suggests that the *koinon* was first organised by Lucullus, between 85 and 80, after he was left in charge of the organisation of the province by Sulla.

¹⁰⁰ On the historical explanation for the panhellenic overtone of some texts, see Ferrary 2001b, 29–35.

¹⁰¹ *OGIS* 437 = *RDGE* 47. On the Σωτήρια καὶ Μουζαῖα and the role of the cities in their organisation, see also *OGIS* 438 (from Poemanum) and 439 (from Olympia). Rigsby 1988, 141–149 argues that the festival in honour of Mucius later developed into the *Euergesia*, but the evidence is inconclusive: Ferrary 2001b, 26, fn. 43. On the significance of 'provincial memory' in the history of Roman Asia Minor, see C.P. Jones 2001a.

¹⁰² *Cic. Flacc.* 22–25.52–59, with Erkelenz 1999. The money was gathered at Tralles, and Flaccus was a patron of the city (*Cic. Flacc.* 22.52).

mally, avoiding further punishment, extending deadlines for payments, or even making the case for a radical change in the requirements set by Rome, as Lucullus did.

The consequences of such a process were not just political or economic. The main effect of the spread of patronage was to bring the Roman and the Greek elites closer. Their interaction became progressively more frequent and more intense, and mutual understanding surely improved. The language of the inscriptions recording relations of patronage is very interesting in this respect, with all its emphasis on concepts like 'benefaction', 'protection', 'loyalty', or 'gratitude', which conveys the impression of an increasingly sophisticated strategy of 'role assignment' between the Roman and the local elites.¹⁰³ The network of personal and political relationships between members of these two elites, which G.W. Bowersock masterfully portrayed in *Augustus and the Greek World*, took shape in these decades.¹⁰⁴ A traumatic event like the decisions taken by Sulla at the end of the First Mithridatic War decisively influenced its emergence.

It may be objected that Sulla could not foresee such a development, and that the scope of his plans for the province of Asia should not be overrated. To an extent this is correct: the first aim of the Sullan resettlement was to ensure that the resources necessary for the Civil War were gathered quickly and effectively. There were, however, two aspects of more general importance to it. First, it was a substantial contribution to the organisation of the province, which would be used for several generations to come. Secondly, it generated a decisive acceleration in a political and social process that would be of crucial importance for the life of the empire for three centuries to come. Of course Sulla was not in a position to predict in detail the lasting political consequences of his measures. However, he certainly knew that the harsh punishment he had decided to enact against the cities of Asia Minor would have compelled their elites to rethink their attitude to Rome. It is safe to argue that he expected them to start building their future knowing that Rome was there to stay, and to get involved in a closer confrontation and cooperation with the representatives of the Roman power. It is possible

¹⁰³ This use of the concept of the 'role assignment' strategy is owed to Ma 1999, 211–214, who usefully insists on its importance in the study of the relationship between an Hellenistic ruler like Antiochus III and the cities of Asia Minor.

¹⁰⁴ Bowersock 1965, 6–13. Cf. Quaß 1993, 138–149. A seminal discussion of the interaction between Greek and Roman elites, both on the political and the cultural levels, in Woolf 1994.

that he did not do much to organise such collaboration, although perhaps he intervened on the organisation of the provincial *koinon*. However, it is hard to deny that he did not know that his measures would inevitably bring about a new political climate, and the empire may have benefited from it.

In the following section I will seek to show that some of the initiatives that Sulla took in Italy—in many respects a completely different world to Asia Minor and the Greek East—may be explained under a similar light.

CHAPTER TWO

STATESMANSHIP AND RETALIATION: BETWEEN CAPUA AND PRAENESTE

Italy, of course, could not be treated as a Roman province: it was the centre of the empire. It is true that a considerable part of it had revolted against Rome and her hegemony, but after the enfranchisement of the Allies it had become clear that Italy would share the profits of the Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean, and that the Italian elites would play a more significant role in Roman politics. In this section I will try to show how Sulla contributed to make the political role of the Italian elites more significant, ultimately by compelling them to build closer relations with the Roman elite, as was the case in the Greek East. This process would be accomplished only with Augustus, but it started in the age of Sulla. The punitive measures he took against his opponents played a decisive role.

The end of the Civil War prompted the redefinition of the status of several communities, and the foundation of a number of colonies of veterans is Sulla's main contribution to the administrative history of Roman Italy. Rewarding the soldiers with land was an inevitable consequence of the proletarianisation of the army that had become an established reality since the end of the second century BC. Apparently, Sulla planned to found twelve colonies in 87, before leaving for the East.¹ Surely this was a clever move towards ensuring the loyalty of his soldiers. It was not, however, a new idea. Marius rewarded his soldiers with virgane assignments in Italy and in Africa, although he undertook the foundation of only one colony proper, the Colonia Mariana in Corsica.² Widespread opposition prevented him from embarking on a series of colonial foundations, although his alliance with Saturninus and Glaucia strongly suggests that he had that aim. His followers tried to imitate him by planning a new settlement on the border of the *ager*

¹ Liv. *Per.* 77.7: *L. Sylla civitatis statum ordinavit, exinde colonias deduxit* ("L. Sulla settled the situation of the city, and then he founded colonies").

² Plin. 3.80. Like Gaius Gracchus, Marius founded his colony overseas—unless it was actually founded by his followers after his death and named after him.

Campanus, at Capua, whose abortive development was closely related to the history of the Civil War.

The colony was probably founded between the end of 84 BC and the beginning of 83 BC by the tribune M. Brutus, a Marian, and was governed by two magistrates, called *praetores*; Cicero visited the settlement soon after its creation.³ At least one of the two *praetores* mentioned by Cicero, L. Consius, certainly had Campanian origins.⁴ The function of a colonial settlement in that area is quite clear: that part of the *ager Campanus* was both fertile and strategically crucial. The revenue flow from the Greek East to Italy, interrupted by the Mithridatic War and by the victory of Sulla, had to be offset by intensifying the exploitation of that part of Campania.⁵

Brutus, however, did not have much time to develop the settlement. He may have assigned some land allotments, but it is unlikely that he managed to go any further. After the battle on the Mount Tifata, Sulla's control of the area was unrivalled. The colony was certainly dismantled. Some of the land of Capua was later assigned to the Sullan veterans, without a new colony being founded on the site.⁶ Another part of the land that had been assigned (or was meant to be assigned) to the settlers was given to the Diana sanctuary of the Mount Tifata. This was a reward to the temple, after the victory Sulla had obtained in its vicinity: assigning new territory to a community, and especially to a sanctuary, was a sign of extraordinary favour.⁷ This decision had a great political relevance, comparable to a declaration of *asylia* in the Greek East, and its solemnity was confirmed by the means that Sulla chose to represent it. According to Velleius, Sulla put up two inscriptions: a dedication to the goddess (*gratae religionis memoriam*—"a record of a grateful act of piety"), and a bronze table, displayed

³ Cic. *leg. agr.* 2.34.92–93. See also *ibid.*, 33.89. On the reasons why *Consio* must be preferred to *Considio* or *Consilio*, see Harvey 1981, 299–301.

⁴ Harvey 1981, 302–331. On the history of the *ager Campanus*, see Beloch 1879, 360–374.

⁵ Harvey 1982, 156–167 is fundamental on these points; cf. Minieri 2002, 252–256.

⁶ *Lib. col.* 232.1. The position of the neighbouring colony of Urbana is uncertain, but I tend to believe that it was not founded in the *ager Campanus* (see *infra*).

⁷ See Frederiksen 1984, 265; the temple had already been in control of some territory for a long time. Scheid 2006, 78–79 stresses how important it was for Sulla that the sanctuary was autonomous, or “autrement dit dépendant de Rome seule”. The inscription on the pavement of the Basilica of S. Angelo (*CIL* 10.3935 = *AE* 1996, 429 = *AE* 1997, 316) is not relevant to our discussion: the best text is in Pobjoy 1997, with a full survey of earlier bibliography; also cf. Batino 1996.

inside the temple, which probably contained a list of the territories put under the control of the sanctuary.⁸ Augustus later carried out a proper reassessment of the jurisdiction of the sanctuary, and he is said to have given it a proper cadastral structure (*forma*), confirmed by Vespasian.⁹ The modern centre of Sant'Angelo in Formis, whose Basilica has annexed the foundations of the temple, may owe its name to this ancient administrative decision.¹⁰

Such a decision was intended to reassure all Campanian communities about Sulla's intentions, and to show the rewards that loyalty to him could bring: a practical example of the self-penned sentence which, according to Plutarch, he wanted to be written on his tombstone, and whose accuracy he had so often proved in the Greek East.¹¹ The sanctuary was pleased to show its gratitude adding to the list of prodigies in honour of Sulla. The restless fight of two goats on the Tifata, which had occurred some time before Sulla's departure from Greece, was promptly interpreted, presumably *post euentum*, as a premonition of the battle he fought against Norbanus.¹²

Sulla's dismantling of the Marian colony at Capua represented a novel way to demonstrate his interest in, and to gain control over, a strategic area. Supporting a sanctuary whose identity was inextricably linked to the city was no doubt a sign of benevolence. Assigning it territory which the Marians had allotted to Roman colonists was a sign of Sulla's utmost respect for its autonomy and special status.

⁸ Vell. 2.25.4. I do not think that the land assignments to the sanctuary contradict Cicero's statement that *nec L. Sulla... agrum Campanum attingere ausus est* (*leg. agr.* 2.29.81: "L. Sulla did not dare to touch the *ager Campanus*"), as claimed in Laffi 1966, 100: Cicero refers to virgane assignments, or to the foundation of colonies of veterans.

⁹ The continuity between the three moments is made very explicitly by *CIL* 10.3828 (= *ILS* 251): *Imp. Caesar Uespasianus Aug. cos. VII fines agrorum dicatorum Dianae Tifat. a Cornelio Sulla ex forma diui Aug. restituit. P(raedia) D(ianae) T(ifatinae)* ("the emperor Caesar Vespasianus Augustus, consul for the seventh time, restored the boundaries of the land dedicated to Diana Tifatina by Cornelius Sulla according to the allocation carried out by the divus Augustus. Territories of Diana Tifatina"). See also *AE* 1971, 80.

¹⁰ See De Franciscis 1956, 307–308 revives the argument of the eighteenth-century antiquarian F.M. Pratilli that the toponym may derive from the coincidence of two meanings of the Latin word *forma*: 'cadastral asset' and 'aqueduct'. About the remains of the sanctuary and the Basilica, see De Franciscis 1959, 314–343, 352–353; Kirsten 1975, 574–583.

¹¹ Plut. *Sull.* 38.6: τὸ δ' ἐπίγραμμα φασιν αὐτὸν ὑπογραψάμενον καταλιπεῖν, οὗ κερφαίων ἐστιν ὡς οὔτε τῶν φίλων τις αὐτὸν εὖ ποιῶν οὔτε τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακῶς ὑπερεβόλετο ("they say that he wrote the inscription himself, and the substance of it is that no friend ever surpassed him in doing good, and no enemy in doing evil").


¹² Plut. *Sull.* 27.8.

This is perhaps the most important example of that ‘political warfare’ which appears to have been the distinctive trademark of his conduct in Italy after the Social War. Sulla’s strategy required a widespread use of violence, but always with a clear political agenda, whereby war was exploited as a chance to reshape the status of a territory and the balance of power within it.

Of course, the attitude shown by Sulla against the communities that had opposed him or sheltered his enemies was completely different. I have already touched upon the clearest case, that of Praeneste, whose conquest was to some extent the prologue to the proscriptions and to the political (and often physical) annihilation of the defeated. Sulla’s wrath did not just target the individuals, but also led to an exemplary punishment for the whole community. After the victory obtained by Sulla at the Colline Gate, the destiny of Praeneste was marked. The city surrendered, and, after a failed attempt to flee it, Marius the Younger, who had escaped there, took his own life. Sulla himself returned to Praeneste and supervised the slaughter of those who had taken part in the resistance. However, the city was not destroyed, nor was its famous sanctuary of Fortuna Primigenia, one of the most important religious centres of ancient Italy. Some time later, a colony was founded in the city, as part of the broader plan of the Sullan veteran settlements. Two crucial consequences of Sulla’s victory in Italy, the physical elimination of the adversaries and the reorganisation of hostile territories by the foundation of colonies, feature very prominently in the context of Praeneste.

The history of the city is inextricably linked to that of the great shrine of Fortuna Primigenia, and the Sullan age is no exception. The systematic excavations of the sanctuary started in 1944, and the discoverers of the site distinguished two of its main elements: an ‘upper sanctuary’ and a ‘lower sanctuary’, divided by a series of terraces. In their view, the upper sanctuary dated back to ca. 150 BC, and the lower one bore the traces of a Sullan intervention, which must have been part of a restoration of the whole sanctuary.¹³ Such a chronology was a salutary reaction to the widespread opinion, established long before the beginning of any serious archaeological research on the site, which dated the whole sanctuary to the age of Sulla.

¹³ Fasolo-Gullini 1955, 301–323; Kähler 1958; Gullini 1991, 497–498, 511–513. For a critique of this approach, see Coarelli 1987, 62–63. About the negative influence of the ‘myth of Sulla’ on archaeologists, see Coarelli 1977, 9.



Map 4. Map of Praeneste in the late Republic, from L. Quilici, *MDAIR* 87 (1980)

This *idée reçue* was based on a passage of Pliny the Elder's *Naturalis Historia*, which mentions an intervention of Sulla on the architecture of the sanctuary. Referring to the different kinds of floor decorations, Pliny states: "mosaics came into use already under Sulla; indeed, the one that he placed in the temple of Fortuna at Praeneste, made of small cubes, still survives today".¹⁴ F. Zevi showed persuasively how the antiquarian tradition took this passage as solid evidence for a major Sullan renovation of the sanctuary, and how deeply this ill-founded conviction has influenced scholarly discussions of this complex site.¹⁵ In fact, Pliny just referred to the restoration of the floor in the temple of Fortuna, and especially to the presence of mosaic for decoration purposes, apparently unprecedented in the Republican period.¹⁶

The interpretation of the archaeological evidence from the site opened further problems. A closer study of the two 'sanctuaries' revealed a set of significant differences between them, which suggests that the structures are actually independent from each other. The so-called 'lower sanctuary' is in fact not a religious building, reproducing the functions of the upper temple, but rather a public structure. This interpretation, put forward forcefully by Coarelli and Zevi, is now widely accepted, and it has two main advantages.¹⁷ First, its interpretation of the sanctuary of Praeneste is consistent with what we know about the other main sanctuaries of Latium: the duplication of a religious building within the same sanctuary is unparalleled. Moreover, it leads to a much more convincing reconstruction of the urban development of Praeneste. Since Praeneste is, along with Pompeii, the only Sullan colony for which there is some significant archaeological evidence contemporary to the foundation, it is worth devoting some attention to it.

The so-called 'upper sanctuary' must be regarded as the actual sanctuary of Fortuna Primigenia, built in the second century BC, taking up the legacy of a cult that existed already in the third century BC. An obvious source of funding for its construction were the resources

¹⁴ Plin. 36.64.189: *lithostrota coeptauere iam sub Sulla; paruolis certe crustis exstat hodieque quod in Fortunae delubro Praeneste fecit.*

¹⁵ Zevi 1979; Zevi 1989, 34–41.

¹⁶ The scholarly debate on this passage is summarised in Lavagne 1988, 238–255, also speculating that Sulla may have introduced the cult of Isis to Praeneste.

¹⁷ See Zevi 1979 (with an invaluable survey of modern scholarship on Praeneste, at 2–8); Coarelli 1987, 35–61, 72–74; Coarelli 1989, 115–132; Zevi 1989, 33–41; S. Gatti-Agnoli 2001, 7. *Contra*, cf. Champeaux 1982, 4–24; Champeaux 1987, 225–228; Lavagne 1988, 227–256.

gathered by the affluent *negotiatores* from Praeneste, whose presence is well attested in the Greek East, and who kept a significant role in their native community.¹⁸ Below the 'upper sanctuary', clearly separated by a series of three terraces, there was a public space, occupied by an 'aula absidata' that had long been thought to be the *delubrum Fortunae* whose pavement was refurbished by Sulla.¹⁹ The complex must be seen as a whole structure, closely integrated with the area now occupied by Piazza Regina Margherita and the Church of S. Agapito. In this site F. Zevi recognised the traces of an archaic temple, unrelated to the sanctuary, which must be identified with the centre of the civic cult of Jupiter.²⁰

Before the siege and the bloody sack that changed its history, Praeneste was therefore organised around two independent poles, the sanctuary and the forum. The development of the city proceeded by a gradual diffusion from the hilltop. Republican Praeneste, however, was almost entirely enclosed within the city walls, and there is evidence only for a very limited development of the settlement in the flat land at the foot of the hill. A drastic change occurred after the Sullan conquest and with the later foundation of the colony. It is in this area, rather than in the sanctuary, that the traces of Sulla's presence must be looked for.²¹

L. Quilici provided a convincing picture of the urban development of Praeneste. In his reconstruction, the lower city is a later development of an earlier settlement, built around the civic temple whose site is now

¹⁸ Wilson 1966, 110 (Delos), 134 (Miletus), 142 (Clazomenae); Coarelli 1976, 338; Bodei Giglioni 1977, 73–76.

¹⁹ Sulla's direct interventions on the sanctuary were in fact very limited: Coarelli 1976, 339; Coarelli 1987, 66.

²⁰ Zevi 1989, 41–46. Cf. the dedication to Jupiter Optimus Maximus by M. Aeficius and A. Saufeius (*AE* 1989, 133): the dating and the archaeological context are unknown, but it is not unlikely that it is later than the foundation of the Sullan colony (Granino Cecere 1989, 150–151). There are important discussions on the differences and the relations between the 'world of Fortuna' and the 'world of Jupiter' in Brelich 1976, 17–55 and Champeaux 1982, 97–101, 437–446. On the analogies between the religious identities of Rome and Praeneste, see M. Torelli 1989.

²¹ For the lower city, see in general Quilici 1980, dealing with topographical problems, and Quilici 1989, focusing on the architectural features of the buildings of the colony; a survey of recent excavations in S. Gatti 2003. Cf. Quilici 1982 on the discovery of a mosaic with the judgment of Paris in the area of the Sullan settlement. The study of the archaeology of Praeneste is made considerably harder by the recent history of modern settlement in modern Palestrina and by the uncontrolled building activity that the town has experienced after the Second World War: Quilici 1979.

occupied by S. Agapito, of course related to the Sanctuary of Fortuna, situated on the upper part of the hill. The lower city is an expansion of this earlier settlement, whose boundaries actually go beyond the area of the Quadrilatero usually identified as the site of the Sullan ‘military colony’. Archaeological evidence has now confirmed beyond any doubt that this settlement was not an outcome of Sullan colonisation. The first bulk of the lower city was built in the second half of the second century, the most likely period of the construction, or rather monumentalisation, of the sanctuary. In this period, Praeneste was at the peak of its wealth, and it is not surprising that a reorganisation of the lower city was carried out some time before the coming of Sulla. The grid of the Sullan city clearly overlaps with that of an earlier settlement, partly adapting itself to its structure, and partly introducing a different orientation.²²

Although the model of a strong caesura between a pre-Sullan and a post-Sullan Praeneste is no longer tenable as far as the urban structure is concerned, some particular features of the Sullan settlement are however recognisable. The houses of the new settlers show some innovative features. A new material, the semi-reticulated limestone, a technique typically used in the post-Sullan period, is clearly recognisable in many buildings. However, it was not used everywhere, and the houses of the families which survived the Sullan sack are distinguishable because they do not feature it. Moreover, traces of an ancient subdivision of the land, following a grid pattern, have recently been detected in the southwestern area of the *ager*.²³

Many details of the structure of the Sullan colony, however, are unknown. It appears that the old city forum, located in the area of the Cathedral, ceased to be in use after the foundation of the colony. A later forum has tentatively been located in the area of the church of the Madonna dell’Aquila, but its exact location has not been determined yet. Other public buildings have been excavated, but a full report is still pending.

Other kinds of evidence, both literary and documentary, do not reveal much about the structure of the Sullan colony either. Land assignments are mentioned in a controversial passage of Florus, along with other cities that probably were not colonies at the time, and in a tangential reference in Strabo.²⁴ Moreover, Cicero explicitly calls

²² Quilici 1980, 209–213; Quilici 1988, 60–66.

²³ Muzzioli 1993.

²⁴ Flor. 2.9.27: *municipia Italiae splendidissima sub hasta uenierunt, Spoletium Interamnium,*

Praeneste a *colonia*.²⁵ Two inscriptions, almost identical in content, refer to a washing fountain (*lauatio*), offered “to the colonists, the residents and the visitors” (*colonis incol[is] hospitibus*) through the generosity of a local magistrate (*CIL* 14.2978 and 2979). An inscription records the refurbishment of a public bath by the *duoviri* of the colony Q. Vibuleius and L. Staius. The stone appears to have been found in the same area of the lower city where the public baths, dating to the Imperial age, have been located (*CIL* 14.3013). Although it does not have a clear archaeological context, there is reason to believe that the text does not date from much later than the foundation of the colony.²⁶

If his veterans were to settle there, it was certainly in Sulla’s interest to contribute to the recovery of a community that his conquest had so deeply affected. A number of inscriptions show that other interventions were carried out in the sanctuary soon after the foundation of the colony. Two fragments of travertine discovered on the site bear traces of the word *reficiendum* and, even more significantly, a third one shows the name of *Var]ro Lucul[us]*.²⁷ It has been argued that it is a fragment of a column of a porticus built in the sanctuary by Marcus Terentius Varro Lucullus (cos. 73), brother of L. Licinius Lucullus and quaestor in Greece during the Mithridatic campaign.²⁸ He was a prominent figure of the Sullan camp: he was entrusted with the task of striking the so-called Lucullan coins, he loyally supported Sulla during the Civil War, and he probably was one of the *deductores* of the colony of Praeneste.²⁹

It is conceivable that other restorations took place after the sack of the city, and they were probably due to the initiatives of the new settlers, and of their political patrons. However, not much is known of the history of Praeneste until the war between Octavian and Antony,

Praeneste, Florentia (“very distinguished cities of Italy suffered land confiscations, Spolegium, Interamnium, Praeneste, Florentia”); Strab. 5.3.11 = C 239.

²⁵ Cic. *Cat.* 1.3.8. Praeneste reobtained the municipal status under Tiberius; Gell. 16.13.5. On Florus’ passage, see Gabba 1970/1971 (= Gabba 1973, 361–367), and *infra*.

²⁶ See Dessau’s commentary in *CIL* 10.

²⁷ Respectively, *Ephemeris Epigraphica* 9.779 and 9.783; *CIL* 1².742.

²⁸ Degraffi 1969, 119 (= Degraffi 1971, 11).

²⁹ In 83 BC Varro Lucullus was apparently quaestor: see Plut. *Luc.* 37.1, with Angeli Bertinelli 1997, 380. About his support to Sulla in the Civil War, see Plut. *Sull.* 27.14–17. Thompson 1961, 437–438 argues that it was he, not L. Licinius Lucullus, who struck the so-called Lucullan coins that widely circulated in Greece; cf. Alföldi 1976, 146–148. In general on the Lucullan coins, see Daux 1935; Thompson 1961, 431–439; Wosnik 1963, 42–60; M. Price 1987, 96; Kröll 1997, 140. On Rome’s choice to strike Greek coins in mainland Greece during this period, see Giovannini 1978, 34–35.

or of its economic and social history in the last decades of the Republic. Moreover, we have a poor knowledge of local magistracies in the decades following the birth of the colony. This is an aspect of a more general problem. Little is known about the composition of the population of the colony, and consequently about the distribution of political power, property and wealth within the new community.

According to Appian, Sulla decided to spare the lives of the Marians besieged in Praeneste, whom Appian loosely calls *Ῥωμαῖοι*.³⁰ As mentioned above, all the male citizens of the *municipium*, on the contrary, were exterminated, along with the Samnites who had come to support the resistance against Sulla.³¹ Only women and children were spared. Strabo often exaggerates his statements about the impact of wars on a community or a people. However, his account cannot be entirely dismissed, and there is no reason to rule out that Sulla actually decided an exemplary punishment on a city that had strongly supported his enemies. Even if we assume that some local families escaped the slaughter thanks to their connections at Rome, the impact of Sulla's decision on the demography of Praeneste is still hard to deny. The colonists arrived in a city that was depopulated, and this probably concurs to explain why we do not have any evidence for tensions between 'old' and 'new' citizens as, for instance, in Pompeii.

Confirmation of the picture given by Appian has been sought in the inscriptional evidence from the only necropolis of Republican Praeneste known so far, that of La Colombella. A. Degrassi calculated that, out of the 138 *gentes* attested in the Republican age by the inscriptions from the Colombella necropolis, only twenty are still attested after 82 BC.³² This led him to argue for a steady decrease in the presence

³⁰ App. *b. c.* 1.94.436–438. Of course, Marius the Younger was on the proscription list from the start: Hinard 1985a, 60, 375–377.

³¹ Sulla certainly punished a part of the Samnite elites, but there is no evidence that he ever envisaged, or carried out any retaliation on the Samnites as an ethnic group. His impact on Samnium has been overrated (e. g. Syme 1939a, 87: “desolation for ever”) and still is (Galsterer 2006, 307), usually on the basis of Strab. 5.4.11 = C 250, which is not entirely reliable evidence. Strabo says that cities like Aesernia, Bovianum and Telesia went through a steady decline after Sulla's victory. Cf. Strabo's passage with Vell. 2.27.2. If any, the crisis certainly did not affect Telesia, where several public works, such as the city walls, date back to Sullan age: Quilici 1966, 85–97. There are symptoms of a contraction of urban life in Samnium between Sulla and the age of Caesar, but there was a similar situation in Lucania too: Crawford 1987, 415. For a judicious account of the history of Samnium under the Principate, see Patterson 2004.

³² Degrassi 1969, 114–116 (= Degrassi 1971, 5–7), developing a point made by H. Dessau in *CIL* XIV, p. 289. According to this widely accepted reconstruction, the figure

of the names of the old *gentes* in the local magistracies, and to draw an analogy with another Sullan colony, that of Pompeii, where local families appear to have recovered political influence only in the Augustan age. The argument, however, is not convincing. The context of Praeneste is altogether different in an important respect, since the exclusion of the traditional families from political life argued by Degrassi would be an effect of the elimination of most of their members, which does not appear to have taken place in Pompeii. However, there is an even stronger objection to this reconstruction. As M. Clauss has pointed out, the evidence studied by Degrassi comes from just one necropolis, which was used only in the third and in the second century BC. The necropolis (or necropoleis) in use immediately before and during the Sullan period has (or have) never been unearthed.³³ In this context, there is no room for a serious statistical survey.

The epigraphic evidence being so unhelpful, one is compelled to make sense of the literary evidence, however elusive that may be. Even if one views Appian's claim that "all the male citizens" of Praeneste were killed as excessive, it remains beyond dispute that Praeneste is the only Sullan colony where a slaughter of the inhabitants is known to have taken place before the coming of the settlers. On the other hand, it must be considered that Sulla's revenge may well not have affected all the members of prominent families. More importantly, the survival of the children allowed for continuity, and several *nomina* of the old Praenestine aristocracy re-emerged some decades after the foundation of the Sullan colony.³⁴ The size of the new civic elite represented by the colonists is hard to establish too. We are slightly better informed, however, about the impact of the colony on the economic and social structures of Praeneste.

Making the case for the repeal of the agrarian reform presented by the tribune Rullus, in 63 BC, Cicero warned the Roman people

could be even lower, as some names may be those of new families which came to Praeneste after the foundation of the colony and happened to be homonymous to older ones. Harvey 1975, 50–52 argues that several Praenestine families appear to have held magistracies soon after the Sullan conquest and in the Augustan age, but underrates the risk of homonymity (of which he is however aware: *ibid.*, 51, fn. 49).

³³ Clauss 1977, 132–133; cf. the vehement and unpersuasive critique of Coarelli 1987, 63–65, who claims that the local elite of the early first century BC stopped using the necropolis and started to use monumental graves. Coarelli 1992, 259 appears to consider the disappearance of onomastic evidence from private inscriptions as a symptom of the rise of evergetism and the higher number of public inscriptions.

³⁴ Harvey 1975, 48–49: the Dindii and the Magulnii certainly did.

against the risk posed by that bill. He claimed that the aim of a fairer distribution of the land was not to be achieved by that kind of law, which only favoured a privileged number of profiteers, usually involved in the crucial process of assigning the land allotments. That this would be the outcome of Rullus' law was confirmed by some recent examples, among which Cicero chose Praeneste.³⁵ According to his account, property concentration was made possible in the Sullan colonies by the unfair choices of the *deductores*, who assigned land to people who would entrust the allotments to other people to administer on their behalf, although the *lex Cornelia* that dealt with the foundation of new colonies explicitly forbade the settlers to sell the lots they had been assigned. Praeneste was the first example at hand, for Cicero was speaking to a Roman audience about a bill that would affect Campania. His words, however, make it clear that it definitely was not an exception.

Two decades after the Sullan foundation, Cicero stated that the territory of Praeneste was controlled by a small group of families, who surely had both wealth and political influence. Of course it may be argued that Cicero deformed reality, possibly for rhetorical reasons, or just because of ignorance. It is significant that, in this part of the speech, he did not attack Sulla or his projects. This should encourage us to see this piece of information as reasonably accurate. However, the actual composition of this group of *pauci* remains unclear. P. Harvey is probably right in arguing that they included both successful colonists who had coped well with the demands of their new life and members of some Praenestan families that Sulla had spared from the massacre, such as the Saufeii or the Samiarii, who are known from late Republican inscriptions; but it is impossible to go further.³⁶

³⁵ Cic. *leg. agr.* 2.28.78: *nam agrum quidem Campanum quem uobis ostentant ipsi concupierunt; deducunt suos, quorum nomine ipsi teneant et fruuntur; coement praeterea; ista dena iugera continuabunt. nam si dicent per legem id non licere, ne per Corneliam quidem licet; at uidemus, ut longinqua mittamus, agrum Praenestinum a paucis possideri* ("for they have long coveted the *ager Campanus* which they promise to you; they will settle their own men there, so that they may take possession of it and enjoy it themselves in their name. Moreover, they will buy allotments from the needy; they will cumulate *iugera* by tens. If they say this is forbidden by the law, it certainly is by the Cornelian law; and yet, not to mention distant examples, we see that the whole territory of Praeneste is owned by a few individuals").

³⁶ Harvey 1975, esp. 49–56. On the Saufeii, see Zevi 1996b, 242–243, stressing their connections with the Marians. On the Samiarii, see Harvey 1975, 50, fn. 48; S. Gatti-Onorati 1992, 218.

The history of post-Sullan Praeneste sums up various aspects of Sulla's policies in Italy, and is strongly related to the two most important initiatives that Sulla took there: the proscriptions and the colonisation. The conquest of Praeneste was the moment that triggered these two parallel processes, and that shows best how deeply linked they were. In the next section I will try to present this relationship in more detail.

CHAPTER THREE

SULLAN COLONISATION IN ITALY: BACK TO THE BASICS

Cicero's passage prompts more general questions about the economic and social consequences of Sullan colonisation. To discuss them in further detail, it is now worth dealing with the evidence we have for the colonial foundations decided by Sulla after the Civil War. Unfortunately, it is incomparably less rich and less detailed than that for the triumviral or Augustan colonial programme.¹

Appian says that Sulla settled 120.000 veterans throughout Italy.² The reliability of this figure has been questioned; Kromayer has reckoned that 100.000 veterans were settled, Brunt has argued that they were 80.000.³ At any rate, it seems certain that the settlers belonged to twenty-three legions, as Appian records, and they were assigned a large amount of land in the territories of the cities, some of it being still undivided, and some of it being withdrawn from the cities in punishment.⁴

¹ Keppie 1983, 49–86.

² App. *b. c.* 1.104.489: ἀμφὶ δὲ τὴν Ἰταλίαν δωδέκα μυριάδες ἀνδρῶν ἦσαν (“there were 120.000 men throughout Italy”).

³ Kromayer 1914, 160; Brunt 1971, 305. On the reliability of the figure, see also Krawczuk 1960, 53–56 and Keppie 1983, 39; the scepticism of Hirschfeld 1913 is probably excessive (Krawczuk 1960, 54, fn. 14). Chouquer 1987, 382 suggests that the Sullan land division covered between 100.000 and 300.000 *iugera*, but see Gabba 1989 (= Gabba 1994a, 197–201) on the unreliability of this kind of estimates.

⁴ App. *b. c.* 1.100.470: τέλεσι τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ στρατευσαμένοις τριοὶ καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐπένευμεν, ὥς μοι προείρηται, πολλὴν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γῆν, τὴν μὲν ἔτι οὖσαν ἀνέμητον, τὴν δὲ τὰς πόλεις ἀφαιρούμενος (“he distributed a great deal of land in the various cities to the twenty-three legions that had served under him, as I have already related; some of the land was still undivided, and some was confiscated from the cities”). Appian consistently uses the verb ἐπινέμειν to refer to land assignments to veterans (as opposed to διανέμειν and διαρθεῖν, which he uses in other contexts): Senatore 2004, 92–96. The figure of twenty-three legions is certainly more reliable than that of forty-seven given in Liv. *Per.* 89.12: *XLVII legiones in agros captos deduxit et eos his diuisit* (“he settled forty-seven legions in the conquered territories and he apportioned the land among them”). This *XLVII* may well be a corruption of *XXIII*: Krawczuk 1960, 54–55; Harmand 1967, 445, fn. 43; 471–472, fn. 243. It is interesting however, that Livy's emphasis is on the land assignments, rather than on the foundation of colonies. Brunt 1971, 305 speculates that each legion was settled in a different colony, and that the Sullan colonies may actually be twenty-three in total.

The sources of the land used for these assignments are clearly identified by Appian: the *ager publicus* and some of the *ager* of the cities that Sulla punished for their stance during the Civil War.⁵ As Brunt has noted, there is no evidence that the estates confiscated in the proscriptions were assigned to the veterans.⁶

It is significant that Appian does not explicitly mention the foundation of colonies, but speaks of land assignments. Since we know that Sulla created at least a dozen colonies, this passage could seem odd, or inaccurate; after all, the *Epitome* of Livy clearly states that Sulla *colonias deduxit*.⁷ In fact, Appian provides an interpretation which regards the foundation of the colonies as part of a wider process, whereby Sulla assigned land to his soldiers in many areas of Italy, not necessarily accompanying the assignment with the foundation of a colony. Moreover, all the known Sullan colonies, except Urbana in Campania and Aleria in Corsica, were founded on the territories of already existing communities. It is surely significant that Cicero once referred to the Sullan colonies with the verb *constituere*, normally used for *municipia*, instead of *deducere*.⁸

For the sake of clarity, I will organise the list of the communities affected by Sulla's colonial programme into four categories.

A. Here follows a list of the certain Sullan colonies, in alphabetical order.⁹

Aleria. "Corsica... is sixty-two miles from Vada Volaterrana, has thirty-two communities, and the colonies of Mariana, founded by Gaius Marius, and Aleria, founded by the dictator Sulla."¹⁰ Nothing else is known about this community, certainly founded as a response to the Colonia Mariana, which, however, appears not to have been dismantled after the defeat of the Mariani.

⁵ The exploitation of the *ager publicus* is denied in Rudolph 1935, 161, fn. 1, but no evidence supports this argument: Krawczuk 1960, 56, fn. 26. App. *b. c.* 2.94-395, where Caesar blames Sulla for having supported his settlement programme only with confiscations of land belonging to hostile communities, is surely inaccurate.

⁶ Brunt 1971, 301-305.

⁷ Liv. *Per.* 77.7: *colonias deduxit*.

⁸ Cic. *Cat.* 2.9.20: *hi sunt homines ex eis coloniis quas Sulla constituit* ("these are men from the colonies that Sulla founded").

⁹ Cf. the lists in Mommsen 1883, 164-175 (= Mommsen 1908, 205-214); Gabba 1951, 270-272 (= Gabba 1973, 172-174); Badian 1957, 346 (= Badian 1964, 62); Krawczuk 1960, 57-62; Hinrichs 1974, 67-68.

¹⁰ Plin. 3.6.80: *Corsica...abest a Vadis Volaterranis LXII, civitates habet XXXII et colonias Marianam, a C. Mario deductam, Aleriam, a dictatore Sulla*. Cf. Sen. *Helv.* 7.9.

Arretium. Settlers of the colonies of Arretium and Faesulae feature in one of Cicero's memorable portraits of the followers of Catiline:

uidebant... Catilinam interea alacrem atque laetum, stipatum choro iuventutis, uallatum indicibus atque sicariis, inflatum cum spe militum <tum> conlegae mei, quem ad modum dicebat ipse, promissis, circumfluentem colonorum Arretinorum et Faesulanorum exercitu; quam turbam dissimillimo ex genere distinguebant homines perculsi Sullani temporis calamitate.

in the meantime they watched... Catiline, busy and pleased, accompanied by a troop of youth, entrenched behind informers and assassins, proud and excited by the hope of the soldiers and the promises that he claimed he had received from my colleagues, rich with an army of colonists from Arretium and Faesulae; and that bunch also counted men of a very different kind, hit by the disaster of the age of Sulla.¹¹

Apparently, the community of the Sullan settlers had even a different name from that of the native, as Pliny distinguishes three groups of Arretines (3.5.52): *Arretini Ueteres*, *Arretini Fidentiores*, *Arretini Iulienses* (the “old Arretini”, the “More Loyal Arretini”, and the “Arretini of Julius”).¹² The *coloni Fidentiores* are also attested by *CIL* 11.6675.

Capitolium. “Founded under a Sullan law” (*lib. col.* 232.20: *lege Sullana est deductum*). The verb *deducere* points to a colonial foundation. Nothing else is known about the town in this period.

Faesulae. Along with *Cic. Mur.* 24.49, the presence of Sullan veterans is recorded by Licinianus with reference to the disturbances in 78 BC: “the Faesulans stormed into the fortresses [?] of the Sullan veterans” (36.36–37: *Faesulani irruerunt in castella ueteranorum Sullanorum*).

Pompeii. The foundation and the political life of the colony are dealt with in Cicero's *Pro Sulla* (21.60–62). The full name of the colony, *Colonia Veneria Cornelia Pompeianorum*, is still attested epigraphically for the age of Nero and must be explained by a Sullan foundation.¹³

Praeneste. As seen above, in 63 Cicero called it a colony (*Cat.* 1.3.8) and implicitly referred to the presence of Sullan settlers in its territory

¹¹ *Cic. Mur.* 24.49.

¹² It is unclear why Beloch 1880, 5, 8 used the same passage as evidence for a Sullan colony at Cortona. Pliny simply mentions the *Cortonenses* in a list of the Etruscan communities that is opened by Arretium.

¹³ Abellinum had the same epithet, but there is no evidence that it was a Sullan colony; Chouquer 1987, 168–169.

(*agr.* 2.28.78). See also *CIL* 14.2978 and 2979; cf. *Flor.* 2.9.27 and *Strabo* 5.3.11 = *C* 239.

Suessula. “A town encircled with a wall. It was founded under a Sullan law. Its territory was allocated to veteran soldiers in *iugera*, by means of Sullan *limites*” (*lib. col.* 237.5: *oppidum: lege Sullana est deducta: ager eius veteranis limitibus Sullanis in iugeribus est adsignatus*). The use of the verb *deducere* suggests that the city was a colony. The presence of the *duoviri* points in the same direction.¹⁴

Urbana. It was a settlement created near Capua, just beyond the border of the *ager Campanus*.¹⁵

Vibinum. A recently published inscription shows that the city had a colonial status between 195 and 197 AD, when it dedicated an inscription to Caracalla.¹⁶ It is significant that its official name contains no reference to Caesar or to Augustus.¹⁷ It is quite likely that the colony was Sullan, and that it was created to ensure a better control of an area traditionally controlled by the Samnites.¹⁸ Unfortunately, no systematic archaeological investigation of the territory has ever been undertaken.

It is worth discussing the evidence for two communities that generations of scholars have wrongly viewed as Sullan colonies: Clusium and Florentia.

Pliny the Elder mentions the existence of *Clusini novi* and *Clusini veteres* (3.52), and this coexistence of two separate communities has been compared to the situation at Arretium, where a Sullan settlement is certain. Moreover, the importance of the city in the Civil War and its ties with the Marians are well known.¹⁹ A dedication to *Sulla Felix*

¹⁴ See *CIL* 10.3764 and 3765.

¹⁵ Plin. 14.6.62: *Falernus ager a ponte Campano laeua petentibus Urbanam coloniam Sullanam nuper Capuae contributam* (“the Falernian territory begins at the Campanian bridge as you turn left to reach the Sullan colony of Urbana, recently attached to Capua”). The *contributio* probably dates to the age of Vespasian, a phase of apparent demographic contraction for Urbana: see Laffi 1966, 106–109, with earlier bibliography. Badian 1957, 346 (= Badian 1964, 62) unconvincingly argues that Urbana “seems to have been founded on part of the territory of Capua”.

¹⁶ *AE* 1991, 518, with the full discussion in Pani 1991.

¹⁷ Pani 1991, 128.

¹⁸ Pani 1988, 28, 44; Volpe 1990, 45; Pani 1991; Gabba 1996.

¹⁹ On the importance of Clusium in the war, see App. *b. c.* 1.89.408 and 412; 1.92.425–426.

dictator has been seen as further evidence for the existence of a colony.²⁰ However, a new survey of the epigraphy from Clusium has shown that all the inscriptions mentioning the *quattuorviri* appear to date back to the first century BC, whereas the *duoviri* are safely attested only in post-Augustan texts.²¹ It is much safer, therefore, to rule out a Sullan foundation, as well as the coexistence of a *Doppelgemeinde* of *municipes* and Sullan colonists, with two different magistracy systems. The *Clusini noui* mentioned by Pliny are probably Augustan veterans. During the war between Sulla and the Marians, Clusium was an important front for the military operations. After the conflict, the local aristocracy managed to build some connections with Sulla and to avoid a heavy punishment.

Florentia is one of the communities that, according to Florus (2.9.27), were affected by the Sullan settlements or land assignments. We lack any positive information about the history of this community until the Civil War between Caesar and Pompey. The foundation of Faesulae makes it less likely that a colony was founded at such a close distance, especially if the colonies are to be seen as settlements with a strategic function. Florus' statement, however, is very explicit and cannot be lightly dismissed.²² The development and the misfortunes of the colony of Faesulae may also be related to the foundation of another colony, that of Florentia, in the immediate neighbourhood. Again, the evidence for this problem is quite elusive. The foundation of a Sullan colony has often been suggested, as a sort of anticipation of a triumviral, or Caesarian, settlement which, on the contrary, is safely attested.²³ The only support for this argument has been found in the archaeological evidence: the remains of some private houses show a different

²⁰ *CIL* 11.2102 = *ILLRP* 356. See Fell 1924, 165–166; Harris 1971, 263; *contra*, Piffig 1979, 146–147. Luchi 1981, 419 speculates that the depopulation of the *ager Clusinus* was a consequence of the colonisation.

²¹ Pack-Paolucci 1987, 164–173, with *AE* 1987, 364; Mansuelli 1993 restates that the *Clusini Noui* were Sullan colonists, completely overlooking the inscriptional evidence. The city walls were renovated in the first century BC, but there is no evidence that this was related to a Sullan colonisation: Borghi 2002, 87–88.

²² I am not convinced by Keppie 1983, 175–176, who argues that Florus' passage may contain an anachronism and refer to assignments of land that later became *ager Florentinus*.

²³ See Mommsen 1883, 176 (= Mommsen 1908, 218); accepted by Degraasi 1949, 293–294, esp. fn. 103 (= Degraasi 1962, 114); Gabba 1970/1971, 460–461 (= Gabba 1973, 362); Keaveney 1982b, 524–525. Beloch 1926, 511–512 argues that the veterans settled in the territory of Faesulae founded a colony on the site of Florentia. Excellent discussion in Harris 1971, 261, 342–343. Hardie 1965 makes the case for a Caesarian foundation; see also Piffig 1966, 72.

orientation from that of the later colony, and the aspect of the walls is compatible with a dating to the Sullan age, as well as the building technique used for the Capitolium.²⁴ None of these elements, however, is decisive. It must be stressed that Florus calls Florentia a *splendidissimum municipium* (2.9.27). Such a definition would be justified only if a pre-existing community had been enfranchised after the Social War and later colonised by Sulla, which seems quite unlikely. The strongest argument against Sullan colonisation, however, is that Florentia never appears in the ancient accounts of Catiline's conspiracy, unlike Faesulae and Arretium.²⁵ Although the earlier history of the city is unknown, it seems quite gratuitous to suggest the existence of a Sullan colony, and there are no grounds to say that any land assignment was carried out on its territory. Hence, until new epigraphic or archaeological evidence emerges, Florentia should not be included in a list of the Sullan colonies.

B. For other communities there is some evidence that they had a colonial status in the period between Sulla and Augustus, although there is no explicit record of a Sullan foundation.

Abella. In 73 BC, the troops of Spartacus launch an attack "against the colonist of Abella, who were defending their own land" (Sall. *Hist.* 3.97: *in colonos Abellanos praesidentes agros suos*).²⁶ Since we do not know of any earlier foundation, they are likely to have been Sullan settlers.²⁷ It cannot be ruled out that it was a foundation of the Marians, but, in that case, it remains obscure why Sulla did not remove it, as he did at Capua.²⁸

Abellinum. The city was definitely an Augustan colony, as suggested by its full name, *Colonia Veneria Livia Abellinatum*; the colonial status is confirmed by the presence of *praetores Iuiri*. The epithet *Veneria*—attested at Pompeii too—has led some scholars to date the founda-

²⁴ Degrassi 1949, 293–294 (= Degrassi 1962, 114). On the Capitolium, see Cagiano de Azevedo 1940, 28–30 (the dating of the Capitolium of Faesulae is more controversial: 30).

²⁵ Excellent discussion in Harris 1971, 261, 342–343.

²⁶ Cf. *CIL* 11.1210; *CIL* 10, p. 136.

²⁷ De Neeve 1984, 38, fn. 39, with earlier bibliography.

²⁸ Badian 1957, 346 (= Badian 1964, 62) argues that the new colony was founded to "on waste land" to accommodate the old inhabitants after the destruction of the city by the Samnites during the Social War.

tion to the Sullan period.²⁹ The evidence seems, however, very tenuous indeed.

Grumentum. The city was definitely a colony by the Augustan age, as confirmed by the presence of *praetores IIviri*.³⁰ It is arguable that the foundation may be Sullan, but the hypothesis rests on even less firm ground than it is the case with Abellinum.³¹

Interamna Praetutiorum. There is good epigraphical evidence for the presence of *duouiri* from the first century BC, and Florus ranks the city among the *florentissima municipia* punished by Sulla (2.9.27).³² The inscriptional references to *municipes et coloni* (*CIL* 1².1904; *CIL* 9.5074 and 5075) are no evidence for the existence of a *Doppelgemeinde* of natives and Sullan veterans. They just have an ‘antiquarian’ meaning, and convey the memory of the foundation of the colony following the creation of the *municipium*.³³

Nola. “An Augustan colony encircled with a wall. Vespasianus Augustus founded it. A right of way 120 feet wide is due to the people. Its land has been allocated to soldiers by means of Sullan limites, and afterwards it was allocated to colonists and members of his household by means of internal lines” (*lib. col. 236.4: muro ducta colonia Augusta. Vespasianus Aug. deduxit. iter populo debetur ped. CXX. ager eius limitibus Sullanis militi fuerat adsignatus, postea interscisiuis mensuris colonis et familiae est adiudicatus*).³⁴ The official name of the city under the Principate was *Felix Augusta Nola* (*CIL* 10.1244). Although it is unclear when the names were adopted, the stance taken by the city in the

²⁹ Letta 1979, 68, fn. 172, with earlier bibliography.

³⁰ *CIL* 10.221 = *ILLRP* 606.

³¹ Bibliography in Letta 1979, 68, fn. 172 and 175. Cf. Russi 1995, 55 and Gualtieri 2003, 100–101.

³² About the *duouiri*, see *CIL* 1². 1905 and 3296; *CIL* 9.5067, 5074 and 5075, with Buonocore 1998, 466–467.

³³ Buonocore 1998, 466; cf. Keppie 1983, 103, fn. 13, suggesting that there was “some uncertainty over nomenclature and terminology in the opening years of the new settlement”. *Contra*, Rudolph 1935, 92, fn. 2; Gehrke 1983, 482–485; Guidobaldi 2001a, 220. The colonisation appears to have led to the emergence of an affluent local elite: Guidobaldi 2001b, 89.

³⁴ See Beloch 1879, 391; Gabba 1951, 236 (= Gabba 1973, 127); Hinrichs 1974, 73; Letta 1979, 68, fn. 174; Keppie 1983, 152; Campbell 2000, 422–423, fn. 132. A similar titulature, [*Colonia Iul*]ia *Felix Aug[usta] Capua*], was used for *Capua*: *CIL* 10.3832. There is virtually no archaeological evidence for the period following the coming of the Sullan settlers to Nola: Kirsten 1975, 611.

Civil War makes the foundation of a Sullan colony more likely than a simple distribution of land.³⁵ The reference to the members of Sulla's *familia* is interesting: perhaps some of the *liberti Corneli* enfranchised after the proscriptions were settled at Nola?

Spoletium. Nothing certain is known about this community, which was however punished by Sulla, according to Florus: "very distinguished cities of Italy suffered land confiscations, Spoletium, Interamnium, Praeneste, Florentia".³⁶ However, the lack of epigraphic evidence makes it safer to argue that only land assignments took place.³⁷

Telesia. Like Abellinum, it is known to have been ruled by *praetores Ilviri*.³⁸ Its full name, *Colonia Herculanea Telesia*, has been viewed as evidence for a Sullan foundation, because of Sulla's notorious devotion for Hercules.³⁹ Somewhat safer ground may be provided by the important public works datable to the Sullan age, such as the city walls.⁴⁰ There is however no compelling argument to consider it a Sullan foundation.⁴¹

C. Other cities were affected by Sullan viritane land assignments, without a colony being founded on their territories. Livy and Appian stress the close relation between colonisation and viritane assignments, and it appears that both were dealt with by a general law.

Capua. "The colonia Iulia Felix, encircled with a wall. By order of *imperator* Caesar it was founded by a board of twenty men. A right of way 100 feet wide is due to the people. Its land had been allocated under a Sullan law. Afterwards, Caesar ordered it to be allocated in *iugera* to each soldier according to his deserts." (*lib. col.* 232.1: *muro ducto colonia Iulia Felix. iussu imperatoris Caesaris a uiginti uiris est deducta. iter populo debetur ped. C. ager eius lege Sullana fuerat adsignatus: postea Caesar*

³⁵ Cf. Chouquer 1987, 225–226, with earlier bibliography.

³⁶ Flor. 2.9.27: *municipia Italiae splendidissima sub hasta venierunt, Spoletium, Interamnium, Praeneste, Florentia*.

³⁷ See however *ILLRP* 668, listing the *ioudices* of the colony, and mentioning a *P. Claudius C. f. tr(ibunus)* who is explicitly said not to be a local. The same character was perhaps *Ilvir de senatus sententia* at Paestum (*CIL* 10.480), and he may have been sent to Spoletium to supervise the land assignments: Wiseman 1971, 46.

³⁸ *CIL* 10.2235 = *ILLRP* 675.

³⁹ Bibliography in Letta 1979, fn. 173.

⁴⁰ See Quilici 1966, 85–97.

⁴¹ Chouquer 1987, 153–155; Compatangelo 1991, 142.

in iugeribus militi pro merito diuidi iussit).⁴² The epithet *Julia Felix* was almost certainly given by Caesar, and it may be explained by the presence of Sullan land assignments, rather than by the foundation of a Sullan colony.⁴³

Forum Cornelii. In the *Passio Sancti Cassiani Forocorneliensis*, Prudentius says that the city was founded by Sulla: “Sulla founded a Forum, and so the Italians call the town, from the name of the founder.”⁴⁴ Although this piece of information is unparalleled, there is reason to accept it, if cautiously, as Prudentius may have used a local tradition. The foundation of the *forum* may have been accompanied by some land assignments.⁴⁵

Tusculum. “Tusculum, a town encircled with a wall. A right of way is not due to the people. Its land was allocated according to a Sullan survey” (*lib. col. 238.11: Tusculi oppidum muro ductum. iter populo non debetur. ager eius mensura Syllana est adsignatus*). The northern part of the wall dates back to the early first century BC, and may well be Sullan.⁴⁶ Cic. *agr.* 2.96 notes that Tusculum, like other cities of Latium, is not comparable to the main centres of Campania for size or prestige.

Venusia. Horace (*Sat.* 1.6.71–75) gave a famous portrait of the *magni pueri magnis e centurionibus orti* (“big boys, sprung from big centurions”) who used to attend the local school with him. E. Fraenkel revived Niebuhr’s fascinating theory that they were the children of Sullan veter-

⁴² Cf. *lib. col. 232.3: Calatia. oppidum. muro ducta. iter populo debetur ped. LX. coloniae Capuensi a Sulla Felice cum territorio suo adiudicatum olim ob hosticam pugnam* (“Calatia, a town surrounded by a wall. A right of way 60 feet wide is due to the people. It was once assigned to the colony of Capua along with its territory by Sulla Felix, after a battle against his enemies”). See Laffi 1966, 100–101; Campbell 2000, 416–417, n. 104–105; Renda 2004, 416–423.

⁴³ *Contra*, Chouquer 1987, 219–220, fn. 14.

⁴⁴ Prud. *Perist.* 9.1–2: *Sylla Forum statuit Cornelius; hoc Itali urbem / uocant ab ipso conditoris nomine*.

⁴⁵ The most reliable discussion is Geraci 2000, 58–65. Brunt 1971, 573 is quite cautious: the area was inhabited from the first half of the second century BC, although there are no traces of urbanisation before the late Republic. For further speculation about possible Sullan interventions between Faventia and Ravenna, see Susini 1957, 30–33. There is no way to prove that the toponym *Silla*, attested in the Comune of Gaggio Montano on the Bologna Apennine, has anything to do with a Sullan settlement, as once suggested by the local antiquarian D. Lorenzini, but I see no reason to rule it out as firmly as Zagnoni 2001, 15–17 does: the strategic significance of the site is obvious.

⁴⁶ Quilici-Quilici Gigli 1993, 258.

ans settled in the territory of the city.⁴⁷ Venusia had been controlled by the Marians, and was reconquered by Metellus.⁴⁸

Volaterrae. The city was the last stronghold of the Marians, and it was conquered only in 79 BC (Licin. 36.8). There is evidence that Sulla deprived its inhabitants of Roman citizenship and that he planned some land distributions in its territory, but that they were never carried out (Cic. *Att.* 1.19.4: more *infra*, in 2.5).

D. The correct interpretation of other passages of the *Liber coloniarum*, which Mommsen used as evidence for other possible Sullan colonies, is more doubtful. Seemingly, they all refer to the construction of walls around some small centres of Latium.

Aricia. “Aricia, a town; it was fortified under a Sullan law. A right of way is not due to the people. Its land was allocated in parcels” (*lib. col.* 230.1: *oppidum: lege Sullana est munita. iter populo non debetur. ager eius in praecisuris est adsignatus*). It was a *municipium* in the 40s: Cic. *Phil.* 3.6.15.

Bovillae. “A town. It was encircled with a wall under a Sullan law. A right of way is not due to the people. Veteran soldiers had its land in lots as a result of appropriating it” (*lib. col.* 231.11: *oppidum: lege Sullana est circum ducta. iter populo non debetur. agrum eius ex occupatione milites ueterani tenuerunt in sorte*). *Municipium* with quattuorvirate: see *CIL* 6.1851 and 14.2413.⁴⁹

Castrimoenium. “A town fortified under a Sullan law. A right of way is not due to the people. Its land was held as a result of appropriation. Later, Nero Caesar allocated it to tribunes and soldiers” (*lib. col.* 233.3: *oppidum: lege Sullana est munitum. iter populo non debetur. ager eius ex occupatione tenebatur: postea Nero Caesar tribunis et militibus eum adsignauit*). *Municipium* with quattuorvirate: *CIL* 14.2454.⁵⁰

Gabii. “A town fortified under a Sullan law. Its land was assessed for soldiers on the basis of what they had appropriated. A right of way

⁴⁷ Fraenkel 1957, 2–3, with earlier bibliography; Galsterer 2006, 308. *Contra*, Keaveney 1982b, 516; Volpe 1990, 45; Gualtieri 2003, 88.

⁴⁸ App. *b. c.* 1.52–53.229–231, with Gabba 1958, 157–158.

⁴⁹ Beloch 1926, 504.

⁵⁰ Beloch 1926, 504. Note the term *occupatio*, which is usually referred to a military conquest: Chouquer 1987, 94, fn. 10.

is not due to the people” (*lib. col.* 234.15: *oppidum lege Sullana munitum. ager eius militi ex occupatione censitus est. iter populo non debetur*). Definitely a *municipium*: *CIL* 14.2799; 2802; 2807.⁵¹ Hor. *Epist.* 1.11.7 suggests that it was quite depopulated in the Augustan period.

It is likely that the aim of the *lex Sullana* mentioned in these passages was not just to allow some towns to build new fortifications. Of course, the mention of walls is quite significant in itself, as the creation of proper defensive structures fits well in the phase of extraordinary building activities and urbanistic renewal that took place in Italy throughout the last century of the Republic, and which was one of the most significant processes of this period.⁵² In this specific case, the new walls may be viewed as evidence for the transformation of these communities into *municipia*, and as part of the reorganisation of the administrative structure of the *ager Romanus*, which Sulla may have started and which would not to be accomplished until the age of Augustus.⁵³ Suggesting viritane assignments, complemented by the construction of some fortifications, seems, however, a more economical hypothesis.⁵⁴ Moreover, recent archaeological research has unveiled the traces of a centuriation that may be dated to the age of Sulla.⁵⁵ At any rate, the evidence for the municipal status of some of these communities in the first century BC disqualifies these passages as further evidence for the foundation of new colonies.⁵⁶

The safely attested settlements, on the contrary, are mostly concentrated in Campania and in Etruria, and the impression that Sulla’s efforts were purposefully focused on these very areas is no doubt correct. The impact of Sullan colonisation on the two regions, however, was quite different.

⁵¹ Beloch 1926, 501.

⁵² On this process, see esp. Gabba 1972a, 84–106 (= Gabba 1994a, 74–96); Gabba 1976a (= Gabba 1994a, 105–117); Gros 1990, 831–843; Cornell 1995; Lomas 1997.

⁵³ See Laffi 1973, 43–44 (= Laffi 2001, 121–122); Sherwin-White 1973, 166; Dahlheim 1993, 114. There are no grounds to argue, with Hinrichs 1974, 68, 74–75, that the Sullan intervention in these communities was related to the proscriptions, and not to the colonisation.

⁵⁴ Keaveney 1982b, 527; Campbell 2000, 414, fn. 92, stressing the use of *deducere*.

⁵⁵ Chouquer 1987, 87, 92–94, 286.

⁵⁶ Cf. however Keppie 1983, 8–12, rightly stressing that the *liber* is often unreliable, as far as the status distinction between *municipium* and *colonia* is concerned.

CHAPTER FOUR

POMPEII AND *CAMPANIA FELIX*

The importance of Sulla's colonial programme can hardly be overestimated. It was, after all, the widest plan of large-scale colonial settlement to be carried out in Roman Italy to that day, and a crucial precedent for the subsequent initiatives of Caesar and the triumvirs.¹ On the whole, however, little is known about the internal life of the colonies founded by Sulla. The evidence is quite sparse and often unhelpful, and this inevitably hinders our understanding of the impact of the Sullan colonization. There is, however, the notable exception of Pompeii, which inevitably plays a central role in most discussions of Sullan colonisation. The present one can hardly be an exception.

As we have seen, Sulla conquered Pompeii during the Social War, and the role of this community in the Civil War is unclear. The foundation of a colony, however, suggests a Marian allegiance. Pompeii had a considerable Oscan cultural and linguistic background, and the extension of Roman citizenship cannot have revolutionised its identity in less than a decade's time. Still, not an Oscan public inscription is known for the period following the colonial foundation; it is likely that the presence of the veterans generated tensions with the native community. This safe guess has sometimes led to unilateral interpretations of the archaeological evidence.

It is now widely assumed that the veterans prevalently found their home in the *ager* of Pompeii, outside the walls, in the fertile land between the city and the Vesuvius.² In some cases, they settled in new farms, built after the foundation of the colony and the new subdivision of the territory. In some other cases, they occupied old Oscan properties, promoting drastic refurbishments that obliterated the traces of earlier architectural styles. The clearest remains of these settlements have been identified in the area near the Porta Ercolano and the Via

¹ See Patterson 2006, esp. 208. Colonization in the early and middle Republic was probably much less state-organised than it has usually been thought: Bispham 2006.

² Zevi 1996a, 126–136, mainly basing the argument on Mingazzini 1949; Zevi 1995, 21; Lo Cascio 1996, 120–121.

dei Sepolcri, and their most prominent example is the famous Villa dei Misteri.³

According to this model, therefore, the veterans settled in a remunerative part of the city territory, and hardly managed to make their way into the core of Pompeii, within the walls. Conversely, the native Pompeians settled within the city walls, and reasserted their identity by imposing some clearly Samnite features to their residences. Many Pompeian houses preserved Samnite features, both structural and decorative ones, long into the Roman period: the most prominent example of this is the so-called Casa del Fauno.⁴ These architectural choices have therefore been viewed as symptoms of a broader political and social process.

The case for this interpretation is not very strong. Overall, the evidence is quite fragmentary, and the scenario of a forced inurbation of the Pompeians does not seem realistic.⁵ It is inaccurate, at any rate, to argue that the colonisation had an impact only on the *ager*. Even if we accept that most of the veterans settled in the outskirts of Pompeii, it is undeniable that their arrival prompted some major interventions in the monumental landscape of the town.⁶ Some public buildings were renewed, of course in a recognisably Roman style. The temple in the Forum was redesigned and dedicated to Jupiter.⁷ The Apollo temple was partly refurbished too, as is demonstrated by an inscription recording the names of the *quattuorviri* who supervised the work, all definitely Roman.⁸ A new temple was dedicated to Venus, at some point after the

³ On the chronology of the Villa, see Maiuri 1967, 44–45 and Johannowsky 1976, 283; for an historical contextualisation, see Zevi 1996a, 134–135.

⁴ Zevi 1996a, 132–134. The Casa del Fauno is probably the most prominent example of the persistence of Samnite elements in the Pompeian architecture, which remained virtually intact down to the eruption of AD 79: see Zevi 1998, esp. 62–65 for its broader historical meaning (63: “der Wohnsitz eines großen Verlierers, das Symbol einer Niederlage”).

⁵ Good discussion in Savino 1998, 458–459. It is likely that some of the natives rented land allotments assigned to the veterans: *ibid.*, 454.

⁶ For an overview, see Gros 1978, 74–77; Zanker 1988, 18–25; Laurence 1994, 23–26.

⁷ Cagianò De Azevedo 1940, 19–21.

⁸ *CIL* 10.800: M. Porcius, L. Sextilius, Cn. Cornelius, A. Cornelius. The *quattuorviri* also feature in *CIL* 10.938: (...) Cuspius, M. Loreius, L. Septumius, D. Claudius. Pompeii was however ruled by the *duoviri*, supported by two *aediles*: Sartori 1953, 73. The hypothesis of two couples of *duoviri* collectively called *quattuorviri* dates back to Mommsen, *CIL* 10, p. 93; see Chiavria 2002, 101–102, summing up earlier bibliography. On the public works at Pompeii in this period, see Zevi 1996a, 126–128 (with further bibliography).

foundation of the colony, possibly on the very site of an earlier temple of the Oscan goddess Mefitis.⁹ The cult of the so-called Italic Venus, the *Venus Fisica*, was of course already established at Pompeii. The coming of the veterans may have encouraged it even more, especially since Sulla had made such a heavy use of his association with Venus in the Mithridatic campaign.¹⁰ In Italy he referred to Venus less extensively, although the goddess is portrayed on a coin issue (*RRC* 359) that was struck at the beginning of the Civil War and widely circulated in Southern Italy.

The monumental landscape of post-Sullan Pompeii inevitably raises the problem of the coexistence of two different communities in the aftermath of the foundation. The colonists asserted their presence by renewing old public spaces and by creating new ones, which were usually juxtaposed to the existing structures, and imposed themselves with their size. The duplication of several public spaces is a curious trademark of Pompeii during this period, and it is tempting to explain it by the presence of two *genera civium* (two “kinds of citizens”, as Cicero put it). The so-called Terme Stabiane were refurbished in the early 60s by magistrates whose names suggest a local origin, while new baths were built in the Forum soon after the foundation of the colony.¹¹ A new, smaller theatre (*theatrum tectum*) was built by the colonists next to the great theatre that already existed in the area near the Porta di Stabia.¹² The difference in size has been explained by postulating that the newcomers were less numerous than the natives. This is certainly true, but it reveals nothing about the actual function of the building.¹³

⁹ Coarelli 2002b, 86 suggests that the Venus cult replaced that of Apollo. The temple is currently being excavated by a mission of the Università della Lucania, directed by E. Curti.

¹⁰ In the inscriptions the goddess is often called *Venus Fisica*. The epithet may have an Oscan origin, and it is surely related to the Latin *fides*: Sogliano 1931/1932; Coarelli 2002b, 88–89.

¹¹ On the refurbishment of the Terme Stabiane by the *duoviri* C. Vulius and P. Aninius see *CIL* 10.829; on those of the Forum, see *CIL* 10.819.

¹² About the great theatre, see Tosi 2003, 164–166; about the new theatre, also known as *Odeion*, see Tosi 2003, 166–167.

¹³ The figure of 4,000/5,000 settlers suggested by Lepore 1950, 150–151 and accepted by Jongman 1988, 144 is highly conjectural: it derives from the assumption that the 47,000 veterans settled by Sulla in Campania were equally divided among ten colonies. The latter figure is suggested from a questionable interpretation of Liv. *Per.* 89.11–12: *Sulla Nolam in Samnio recepit. XLVII legiones in agros captos deduxit et eos his diuisit* (“Sulla recovered Nola, in Samnium. He settled forty-seven legions in the conquered territories and apportioned the land among them”), with *XLVII legiones* supposedly meaning

It is just conjectural to argue that it served as a gathering place in the early phase of the settlement. Moreover, the total number of the colonists remains unknown.¹⁴

We are on somewhat safer ground when we turn to the institutional and political life of the city. The foundation of the colony was carried out by a *collegium* of three *deductores*, among whom was P. Sulla, the nephew of the dictator, whose heavy involvement in Pompeian affairs down to the 60s neatly emerges from the speech that Cicero gave in his defence in 62 BC.¹⁵ Details on the institutional life of the city in the later period are known to us only from the epigraphic evidence. Information can be gleaned from the electoral *programmata* painted or scratched on the walls of the city, and the record of the interventions of city magistrates or patrons is even more interesting. The construction of the small theatre was directly supervised by two local magistrates with recognisably Latin names, Gaius Quinctius Valgus and Marcus Porcius.¹⁶ The value of this inscription goes beyond the record of Porcius and Valgus' magistracy. It also sheds light on the completion of an important public work like the theatre of the colony and on the construction of a new roof for it.¹⁷ Along with the amphitheatre of Telesia, the little theatre of Pompeii is the most important monument built in Campania during the Sullan age.¹⁸ Its typically Roman design and the emphasis placed by the dedicatory inscription on the function of the building make its political significance quite explicit.

Both magistrates that promoted its construction played a prominent role in the early history of the Sullan Pompeii. M. Porcius, a member of the quattuorviral *collegium* in charge of the refurbishment of the Apollo

"47,000 legionaries". Savino 1998, 440–453 argues, on more solid statistical grounds, that the colonists were 1,500–2,000, and that they were assigned about ten *iugera* of land each; Coarelli 2000, 109 suggests a slightly higher figure, 2,000–2,500.

¹⁴ On the *theatrum tectum*, see Zanker 1988, 19; Gros 1990, 837; Zevi 1995, 1–10; Zevi 1996a, 130–131; Tosi 2003, 169–171. Johannowsky 1976, 272 stresses its strong structural similarities with the Hellenistic *bouleuteria*.

¹⁵ On P. Sulla, see Münzer 1900: his exact kinship relationship with the dictator has been established by Reams 1986/1987 and Berry 1996, 320–321. On the case discussed by Cicero, see Berry 1996, 14–42.

¹⁶ *CIL* 10.844: *C(aius) Quinctius C(ai) f(ilius) Valg(us) / M(arcus) Porcius M(arci) f(ilius) / duouir(i) dec(urionum) decr(eto) / theatrum tectum / fac(iundum) locar(unt) eidemq(ue) prob(arunt)* ("Gaius Quintius Valgus son of Gaius and Marcus Porcius son of Marcus, *duouiri*, contracted the construction of the covered theatre and approved it, under a decree of the decurions").

¹⁷ Castrén 1975, 88–91.

¹⁸ On the amphitheatre of Telesia, see Quilici 1966, 99–100; Tosi 2003, 303.

temple (*CIL* 10.800, see above), is one of the *duoviri* mentioned in the inscription of the new theatre.¹⁹ His colleague is no obscure figure either: the well known C. Quinctius Valgus, the associate of Sulla who financed the reconstruction of the walls at Aeclanum and became a patron of the city.²⁰ The magistracy he held in Pompeii shows that he was, or possibly became, a citizen of the Sullan colony.²¹ Valgus probably served in the Sullan army during the Civil War, and possibly even in the East. When the war was over, he became directly involved in the political life of several Campanian communities, although there is no evidence that he was originally from this region.²²

Valgus and Porcius also carried out the construction of the amphitheatre in the southwestern part of the city, capable of hosting about 20,000 people.²³ It is the first public work that was realised for the sake of the whole body of citizens since the foundation of the colony—no ‘small amphitheatre’ was built. Again, an inscription acknowledges Valgus and Porcius’ role in the enterprise.²⁴ As F. Zevi argued, the mention of the *coloni* is not a reference to the Sullan veterans, but to the whole community, where any official distinction between old and new inhabitants is elided.²⁵ The full name of the colony, *Colonia Cornelia Veneria Pompeianorum*, known from later inscriptions, accurately

¹⁹ After the discovery of a series of amphorae with his name stamped on them, it was argued that Porcius built his wealth on the wine trade with Gallia Narbonensis: Castrén 1975, 89 (summing up earlier bibliography at fn. 2); however, the claim seems hard to prove. Porcius’ tomb has been located just outside Porta Ercolano: see Zevi 1995, 10, fn. 34.

²⁰ The evidence on this character is gathered and convincingly discussed in Harvey 1973, esp. 80–84.

²¹ Valgus is mentioned as *duovir quinquennalis* in an inscription from Frigento (*ILLRP* 598: it is unclear what community it refers to), again as the promoter of major public works. He probably renounced to the citizenship of his former community to join the new colony of Pompeii.

²² Harvey 1973, 90.

²³ See Tosi 2003, 162–164 and 171–173.

²⁴ *CIL* 10.852: *C. Quinctius C. f. Valgus / M. Porcius M. f. duovir(i) / quinq(uennales) coloniai honoris / caussa spectacula de sua / peq(unia) fac(iunda) coer(auerunt) et coloneis / locum in perpetuom deder(unt)* (‘Gaius Quinctius Valgus son of Gaius and Marcus Porcius son of Marcus, *duoviri quinquennales*, provided for the construction of the amphitheatre with their own money for the sake of the prestige of the colony and permanently assigned the place to the colonists’).

²⁵ Zevi 1996a, 131–132. They were the first *quinquennales* of the colony: Castrén 1975, 90. It is surely excessive to argue that the integration did not take place before the census of 70 BC, like Zevi 1996a, 132. On the possible effects of this *lectio* and its relationship with the emergence of the *quinquennales*, see Castrén 1975, 90–91; Castrén 1976, 359; Gehrke 1983, 488–489.

represents its composition.²⁶ *Cornelia* refers to Sulla and his *gens*; *Veneria* pays tribute to the cult and patronage of Venus, a goddess traditionally worshipped in the Italian world, supposed ancestor of the Romans, and a crucial presence in Sulla's Eastern campaigns, as we shall see in the next part; *Pompeianorum* does justice to the role of the indigenous Oscan community.

The situation, however, was not necessarily peaceful even after the inauguration of the new amphitheatre. Cicero's *pro Sulla* sheds some light on the problems posed by the coexistence of the former occupiers of the city and the new settlers into the same institutional framework. The speech was given in defence of Publius Sulla, the *deductor* of the colony who, after a fairly successful political career (he was elected to the consulship for 65 BC and barred from taking office because of a conviction for *ambitus*), was charged with having taken part in the conspiracy of Catiline. With his outstanding record in its repression, Cicero took Sulla's case and pleaded for his acquittal. P. Sulla had been one of *deductores* of the colony of Pompeii, and this enabled him to be among its patrons, to whom the resolution of disputes between the colonists and the earlier inhabitants was entrusted.²⁷ This was relevant to the trial, because P. Sulla was accused of having tried to summon the natives to revolt by enhancing the conflict with the colonists, and with the ultimate purpose of taking hold of the city and use it as a stronghold in the Civil War. In order to show that P. Sulla was still trusted by the whole citizen body, Cicero brought to court a delegation including both old and new inhabitants.²⁸

In Cicero's words, the conflict between the natives and the new settlers had become a chronic problem (*inueterasset*). The patrons were asked to intervene only "many years" after the dispute had started. An exact chronology is not possible, although it seems safe to date the intervention of the patrons to the period which immediately pre-

²⁶ *CIL* 4.CXLIH; cf. *CIL* 4.CXXXVIII, CXXXIX, CXLI, CXLII, CXLIII, CXLV, CXLII, CXLVIII, *CIL* 10.787 (all mentioning a *Colonia Veneria Cornelia*).

²⁷ *Cic. Sull.* 21.60–62.

²⁸ *Cic. Sull.* 21.61: *atque hoc, iudices, ex hac frequentia colonorum, honestissimorum hominum, intellegere potestis, qui adsunt, laborant, hunc patronum, defensorem, custodem illius coloniae si in omni fortuna atque omni honore incolumem habere non potuerunt, in hoc tamen casu in quo adflictus iacet per uos iuari conseruarique cupiunt* ("and you can infer this, judges, from this large crowd of colonists, men of the highest standard, who are here and make an effort to defend this patron, defender, and guardian of that colony; if they did not manage to preserve him in the possession of all his fortune and of every office, still on this occasion, which sees him a victim, they would like you to support and defend him").

ceded the conspiracy, 65/64 BC. If Cicero is accurate, the controversy at Pompeii may have started immediately after the foundation of the unified colony.²⁹ Cicero sums up the issues at stake with a formula that has long been discussed: *de ambulatione et de suffragiis*.³⁰ The reference to *suffragia* is quite straightforward. Dissent involved the voting procedures and, most probably, the electoral weight of the two *genera civium*. Even after ‘reconciliation’ with the natives, the colonists must have kept a dominant position thanks to a favourable organisation of the electoral districts. If it is true that their settlement was concentrated in the *ager*, this area may have had more weight than the area within the city walls, where the Pompeians are supposed to have kept their residence. However, until our knowledge of Pompeian topography improves substantially, all attempts to give a more precise account of this supremacy are bound to remain speculative.³¹

The meaning of *ambulatio* is unclear too. It cannot be ruled out that the text is corrupt, and that it should in fact be emended to *ambitio*, meaning ‘electoral campaign’.³² The Sullan veterans may have profited from an advantageous subdivision of the electoral constituencies, which gave more weight to the districts where they settled as opposed to those inhabited by the natives. Colonists, moreover, may have enjoyed more favourable rules on campaigning, such as better spaces to advertise their candidates, or more resources to invest in the competition.

²⁹ See Gehrke 1983, 485–487; Lo Cascio 1996, 117–121. However, Andreau 1973, 226–231 must be mentioned as a salutary reaction to the interpretations that denied the existence of political and social tensions in Pompeian society.

³⁰ Cic. *Sull.* 21.61: *adsunt pari studio Pompeiani, qui ab istis etiam in crimen uocantur; qui ita de ambulatione ac de suffragiis suis cum colonis dissenserunt ut idem de communi salute sentirent* (“the inhabitants of Pompeii, who have been included in the accusation by the prosecution, are attending with no less participation. Even if they quarrelled with the colonists about the *ambulatio* and the *suffragia*, they were of one mind about their common safety”). Bibliography in Berry 1996, 254–256 and Chiavria 2002, 105–106.

³¹ There is some guesswork on the boundaries of the electoral constituencies in Coarelli 2000, 97–110.

³² See Lo Cascio 1996, 117–118, with earlier bibliography; Savino 1998, 457–460. I am not convinced by Wiseman 1977 and Laurence 1994, 23 (cautiously accepted by Berry 1996, 255–256), who argue that the passage refers to some prohibition for the indigenous population to walk in certain designated areas, called *ambulationes*: if this is the case, why does Cicero mention it even before the *suffragia*? Coarelli 2000, 98–99 reads *de ambulatione et de suffragiis* as a hendiadys (“an *ambulatio* that determines the *suffragia*”) and relates it to the structure of the *saepta* discovered near the forum, but the evidence is inconclusive. For further bibliography, see Chiavria 2002, 105–112.

Cicero's testimony is probably unreliable in an important respect, namely the actual success of the intermediation of the patrons. Since Sulla is accused of having had a strong bias for the Pompeians, it is in Cicero's interest to depict his intervention as a fair one, having the only aim of reconciling the whole community. The presence of groups of Pompeians and Sullan veterans at the trial, supporting P. Sulla's case, can hardly be used as solid evidence. It is Cicero himself who refers to them, surely with some exaggeration.

The actual proportions of natives and colonists in the Pompeian Fasti might then be figured out from the epigraphic evidence, namely from the inscriptions mentioning city magistrates, and from the electoral inscriptions, the so-called *programmata*. The onomastic evidence for the city magistrates gathered by P. Castrén suggests that for at least three decades the Sullan veterans and their descendants had a clear supremacy. Even if one assumes that the intervention of the patrons in 65/64 BC had some actual impact on the political life of the city, it still does not appear to have brought about a fairer use of the *suffragia*. It seems also quite likely that the re-emergence of the natives as an influential part of the *populus Pompeianus*, capable of making its way into the *ordo*, did not start before 50–40 BC.³³

If this was actually the case—which is by no means certain—the increasing influence of the natives could best be explained by some improvement of their financial condition, which is, however, difficult to contextualise in the aftermath of the Sullan confiscations.³⁴ Even the extent of the confiscation of private properties is unknown, as well as the number of the Sullan colonists who moved to Pompeii.³⁵ It cannot be ruled out that some of the veterans settled on land allotments that belonged to the city, and not to private citizens. If this was the case, the impact of the confiscations on the local owners may have been less devastating than has been thought, and the subordination of the natives would be mainly a political, rather than an economic, problem. The

³³ Castrén 1975, 92–98. Cf. however the serious objections of Duncan-Jones 1977, 196, who stresses that we know too little about the *ordo decurionum* to reach any serious conclusions about which families were and were not admitted to it; Mouritsen 1988, 87–88 is on a similar line.

³⁴ Andreau 1980, 194–196, challenging the established opinion that Sullan colonisation had not any lasting effect on Pompeii's social and economic structures: see e.g. Gordon 1927; Day 1932, 187–199; Lepore 1950, 151–156.

³⁵ A survey of the necropoleis, for instance, has been inconclusive: see Kockel 1987, esp. 195.

possibility that the Pompeians could have profited from the possession of parts of the *ager publicus*, or from their involvement in the increasing fortunes of the port of Puteoli are not to be excluded either.

The organisation of the city territory might reveal something about the impact of the Sullan settlement on Pompeii. It seems likely that the town area was divided into four or five electoral districts, probably called *uici*.³⁶ In a context that is uncertain in so many respects, it seems at least sure that the *pagus Felix suburbanus*, known from the inscriptional evidence, was related to the Sullan settlement. It was governed by a *collegium* of *magistri*, had some financial autonomy, and also contributed to the refurbishment of the amphitheatre.³⁷ In the Augustan age it was renamed *pagus Augustus Felix suburbanus*; the change of its official denomination is probably to be explained by the coming of more veterans.³⁸

However, some decades after the colonisation a gradual integration between the community of the colonists and that of the natives took place. Local magistrates with Oscan names are on the record again, whilst descendants of the Sullan settlers are still in the *ordo decurionum* in the Augustan age.³⁹ A number of developments must have contributed to this process. The impact of intermarriage, for instance, cannot be overlooked. The creation of kinship relations between families of different origin and status may well have been accompanied by the transferral of properties from the new landowners to the old ones, and may have encouraged mobility too.

The wealth of Pompeii and the involvement of some of its citizens in overseas trade in the first half of the first century BC may perhaps be explained in light of the crisis which the port of Naples seems to have gone through, along with the rest of the city, after the conquest of Sulla.⁴⁰ In fact, however, little is known about Pompeii's strategic function in this part of Campania. It is also doubtful whether Pom-

³⁶ Cf. *CIL* 4.60. See Castrén 1975, 79–82; Jongman 1988, 308; Lo Cascio 1996, 120.

³⁷ *CIL* 10.814 and 853. There is no evidence that it had an electoral function: Coarelli 2000, 108.

³⁸ They certainly settled in Pompeii by 7 BC, when the *ministri pagi Augusti Felicis suburbanus* are attested (*CIL* 10.924): see Lo Cascio 1996, 120, fn. 39. The reconstruction proposed in Gatti 1974/1975, 174–178 is untenable.

³⁹ Castrén 1975, 97–98, 231, 235; Andreau 1980, 196.

⁴⁰ See App. *b. c.* 1.89.411; cf. Strab. 5.4.9 = C 249. Appian speaks of a massacre of the inhabitants, not of a sack, whereas Strabo records just the loss of Pithecussae. The discussion of the impact of Sulla's conquest on the economy of Naples in Lepore 1952, 317–319, 326 and Lepore n. d., 279–288 is therefore unsupported by the evidence. For

peii is a representative example of the Sullan colonies founded in the region. A clue may be obtained by devoting some attention to Sulla's choice to retire in Campania after resigning from dictatorship in 79 BC. He enjoyed spending time in the region, and a passage from Cicero perhaps portrays him walking in the streets of Naples dressed in Greek fashion.⁴¹ His decision, however, was not determined only by the charm of the Campanian coastal environment, already quite popular among earlier generations of Roman aristocrats. The presence in the area of a considerable number of Sullan colonies and of land allotments possessed by the Sullan veterans may suggest a different explanation.⁴²

It is significant that a string of Sullan settlements can be identified at Urbana, Pompeii, Nola, Abella and Suessula.⁴³ The evidence is quite unsatisfactory, but such a high concentration of settlements was almost certainly unparalleled in Italy.⁴⁴ When he chose the resort where he would spend his last years, Sulla surely took into account the presence of thousands of loyal soldiers. Although no one dared to ask him to justify his misdeeds after his resignation from dictatorship, the political situation in Rome was far from stable when Sulla left, as the attempted *putsch* of Lepidus made clear only one year later.⁴⁵ The winner of the

a more cautious approach, see Lomas 1993, 95 and Leiwo 1995, 25–27, 166–167: the demographic impact of the Sullan attack remains unclear.

⁴¹ Cic. *Rab. post.* 10.26: *deliciarum causa et uoluptatis non modo ciuis Romanos, sed et nobilis adulescentis, sed quosdam etiam senatores summo loco natos non in hortis aut suburbanis suis, sed Neapoli, in celeberrimo oppido + maeciapella saepe uideri + *** chlamydatum illum L. Sullam imperatorem* (“not only Roman citizens, but young men of high condition, and even some senators of eminent family, are often to be seen wearing *** for the sake of elegance and pleasure, not in their country estates or in their suburban villas, but in the populous town of Naples... [we have seen] the famous general Lucius Sulla wearing a Greek cloak”)—the text is that of the Belles Lettres edition, by A. Boulanger. On the function of the city as a sea resort and a cultural centre in the late Republic, see D’Arms 2003, 47–68 (also dealing with the immediate neighbourhood of the city); Leiwo 1995, 27–30, 33–41.

⁴² See D’Arms 2003, 44–47. It is inaccurate, however, to claim that “Sulla could scarcely have retired anywhere [in Central or Southern Italy] without having some of his former soldiers in settlements nearby” (*ibid.*, 45).

⁴³ On the strategic function of Urbana, see Laffi 1966, 101–102. I see no reason to claim that Surrentum was a Sullan colony, as argued in Beloch 1879, 254.

⁴⁴ Badian 1957, 346 (= Badian 1964, 62) unconvincingly downplay the importance of Sullan colonisation in Campania. The claim that “most of the settlements were in the north, especially in Etruria” (Badian 1958, 246) is even less acceptable. However, Badian is right in saying that Campania was not as consistently loyal to the Mariani as Etruria was. Duncan-Jones 1977, 197 shows, against Castrén 1975, 53, 122, that there is no reason to believe that the Sullan land assignments at Pompeii were left unfinished.

⁴⁵ On Sulla's resignation, see Plut. *Sull.* 34.6; App. *b. c.* 1.103.480–484; Oros. 5.22.1;

Civil War still needed protection and armed support, even some years after his victory.

The exact location of the *buen retiro* of the former dictator is not precisely known. Appian speaks of a move “to Cuma” (ἐς Κύμην), and an interesting passage of a letter of Cicero, sent from his estate called *Cumanum*, refers to his encounter with Faustus Sulla, the son of the dictator.⁴⁶ In 55 BC, the two Roman gentlemen, who happened to be neighbours, met on various occasions, and Cicero had the opportunity to browse through the magnificent collection of books of his friend, which no doubt owed something to Sulla’s depredations in the Greek East.⁴⁷ The villa of Cicero was in the eastern part of the territory of Cuma and at a short distance from the harbour of Puteoli, in the immediate vicinity of the boundary between the two cities. It is likely that Sulla’s villa was in a similar location.⁴⁸ An alternative, less convincing, hypothesis has been suggested, which views Puteoli as the place of Sulla’s exile and is supported by Valerius Maximus and the *de uiris illustribus liber*, ultimately deriving from Livy.⁴⁹

Confusion on this matter was surely generated by an incident that immediately preceded the death of the former dictator, and shows that his political influence was not over even in his last days.⁵⁰ The community of Puteoli was undergoing serious tensions: the *princeps coloniae*

vir. ill. 75.12. Lafon 2001, 133 rightly remarks that the relatively short distance between Campania and Rome must have influenced Sulla’s decisions. On Lepidus’ initiatives after Sulla’s death, see App. *b.c.* 1.107; Licin. 36.33–45; Flor. 2.11; Oros. 5.22.16–18.

⁴⁶ Cic. *Att.* 4.10.1 (*ego hic pascor bibliotheca Fausti*, “here I feast myself with Faustus’ library”).

⁴⁷ On Faustus Sulla’s wealth, see Shatzman 1975, 336–337, no. 133. On his political positions, see Desrosiers 1969, 247–253 and B.A. Marshall 1984. Besides being a good friend of Faustus Sulla, Cicero owned a villa that had belonged to the dictator himself, in the territory of Tusculum: Plin. 22.12 (= *HRR*² 10). On the descendants of Sulla in the early Principate, see Syme 1986, 261–269.

⁴⁸ The discussion in D’Arms 2003, 42–44 (with fn. 53) is entirely convincing, except for one detail: I see no reason to question the accuracy of Cicero’s terminology here, and to keep considering Puteoli an option. Also cf. Lafon 2001, 191–192, comparing Sulla’s *buen retiro* with that of Scipio Africanus at Liternum, and stressing that his choice was a model for future generations of the Roman nobility; a different view in D’Arms 2003, 44. Granius was surely related in some way to the two Granii declared *hostes publici* in 88 BC (App. *b.c.* 1.60.271); two Granii are known to have been Caesarian (Plut. *Caes.* 16.8; *Caes. b.c.* 3.71.1). However, Sulla would have hardly tolerated a “notoriously Marian” city magistrate at Puteoli, *pace* Syme 1939a, 90.

⁴⁹ Val. Max. 9.3.8; *vir. ill.* 75.12.

⁵⁰ Keaveney 1982a, 204–213.

Granius was having a dispute with the *ordo decurionum* and refused to pay the money that the council had already offered for the refurbishment of the Capitolium. According to Valerius Maximus, Sulla went to Puteoli and censored Granius' behaviour so furiously that anger caused him a fatal apoplectic stroke.⁵¹ The position of Granius is made even clearer by Plutarch, who states that the city magistrate did not intend to use the money already paid by his fellow citizens, as he knew that Sulla's death was imminent.⁵² According to this version, Granius was summoned to the residence of Sulla and strangled by the slaves of the former dictator, who then had a deadly crisis soon after the murder.

In Plutarch's account, the role of Sulla emerges as something much more conspicuous than that of the hysterical former-warlord who reacts to the challenge of a local notable. Ten days before his death, according to this version, Sulla put an end to the *stasis* which was tearing apart the Puteolan community by drafting a new constitution, and by promoting reconciliation among the citizens.⁵³ Plutarch's text should be taken literally: Sulla intervened to stop the civil strife in the city, possibly using the deterrent force of the veterans settled in the area.⁵⁴ Puteoli accepted Sulla's proposal, which may have contained some guidelines regarding the use of public finances and the relations between the magistrates and the *ordo decurionum*.⁵⁵ Then, new tensions arose when Granius refused to fulfil what he was required to do, and was put to death for this.

I have repeatedly stressed the relationship between Sulla's military achievements and his need to punish, or to reward, the Italian com-

⁵¹ Granius was related to the Granius mentioned in the *lex Puteolana*: Cébeillac-Gervasoni 1996, 13. He certainly was a *duovir*: Sartori 1953, 64; Cébeillac-Gervasoni 1996, 33–34.

⁵² Plut. *Sull.* 37.5–6.

⁵³ Rotondi 1912, 492; *lex Puteolanis data*. Sartori 1953, 61–62 speculates that the Sullan law may have merged the Roman colony of Puteoli and the *praefectura* mentioned by Fest. 262 L. Keaveney 1982b, 520–522 suggests, with no evidence, that Puteoli was a Sullan colony. Bispham 2000, 58–59 rightly links the Sullan provisions to the status of autonomy of the city referred to in Cic. *leg. agr.* 2.31.86: *Puteolanos uero qui nunc in sua potestate sunt, suo iure libertateque utuntur* (“the Puteolani, who are now governing themselves, they have their laws and their freedom”); cf. Steuernagel 2004, 41.

⁵⁴ There are no grounds to assume that Puteoli was affected by Sullan colonisation: Gabba 1954b, 286–287 (= Gabba 1973, 603–605).

⁵⁵ See Val. Max. 9.3.8: *quod Granius princeps eius coloniae pecuniam a decurionibus ad refectorem Capitolii promissam cunctantius daret...* (“because Granius, the leading man of that colony, was too slow in giving money that had been promised by the decurions to rebuild the Capitol...”); cf. Plut. *Sull.* 37.5. M.H. Crawford, however, argues that the money gathered by the *decuriones* was supposed to finance the reconstruction of the Capitolium at Rome, and not at Puteoli: see Bispham 2000, 59, fn. 91.

munities involved in the conflict. In this period there was a close relation between warfare and politics, between conflict and political settlement—and not just in Italy. War and peace appear to be parts of the same process, to some extent influencing each other. The initiatives of Sulla in Campania show this very effectively. Sulla fought a part of the Social War in this region, came back some years later at the beginning of the Civil War, founded some colonies, and even decided to spend the final years of his life there.

Arguments *e silentio* are always quite risky, but there are good reasons to view Sulla's choice to retire in Campania as a symptom of the success of his veteran settlements in the region. The emphasis that the hostile tradition puts on Sulla's dissolute lifestyle and questionable company during his last years must not overshadow the political importance of his actions in that period. In Campania he created a network of colonies and rural settlements, which made possible a control of the region from the centre, with Urbana, founded on the border of the *ager Campanus*, down to the coast, through the land assigned in the territory of Nola and the colony of Pompeii. Puteoli's harbour was bound to become even more important after the destruction that Sulla brought about at Naples, and direct control was kept on the political life of this community.

Leisure, of course, may have been among the reasons that prompted Sulla's interest in the area, but even that was, to some extent, a politically and socially determined choice. The popularity of Campania with the Roman elite had been consolidated since the second century BC, and it was inevitable that some of properties confiscated in the proscriptions were in that area. However, the case of the villa owned by C. Marius at Misenum, eventually bought for a ridiculous price by Cornelia, the daughter of Sulla, and later by Sulla's associates Scribonius Curio and Licinius Lucullus, is as well known as it is unparalleled in our scarce evidence.⁵⁶ Campania was, at any rate, the most important area of Roman Italy Sulla had to come to terms with in the aftermath of the conflict, both for strategic and economic reasons. In many ways, Campania was a special place for the Romans, and an important pole in the making of Roman Italy. This must be borne in mind when one sets out to study the impact of Sullan colonisation on Etruria, its second major front.

⁵⁶ Badian 1973, esp. 121–125, 130–132; D'Arms 1977, 349 (= D'Arms 2003, 333).

As I will try to show in the next section, the success of the Sullan settlement was less conspicuous in Etruria, where there is evidence for much stauncher opposition. Campania was a rich and attractive region, with strong ties with Rome. The anti-Sullan resistance was effectively defeated and dismantled there. The development of Sulla's campaign in 83 suggests that it had already been less strong and widespread than in Central Italy.

CHAPTER FIVE

ETRURIA: A CONTRASTING PICTURE

The success of Sulla's campaign, with major efforts being concentrated on two fronts—Campania and Praeneste—was made possible only by the contemporaneous parallel victories of the Sullan generals on other fronts. In northern Etruria and in Aemilia Metellus countered the attacks of Carbo, while Pompey and Crassus obtained crucial victories against Carbo himself and C. Carrinas. Sulla's direct involvement on this front appears to be limited to a single military confrontation with Carbo, near Clusium.¹

This city was certainly loyal to the Marians, who used it as a pivotal point for the movements of their troops. The allegiance of the Etruscan cities to the anti-Sullan coalition is widely accepted, and confirmed by the available evidence, which however fails to be satisfactory in many respects. It has been argued that Cinna managed to obtain the support of the elites, while the lower classes had wholeheartedly supported Marius, perhaps being attracted by the prospect of serving in his army.² The evidence, however, is almost non-existent, and we also lack any information about the dissensions that may have arisen within the Etruscan elites about their attitude towards Sulla. It is beyond dispute, nonetheless, that some groups of the aristocracy managed to reach an agreement with the winner as soon as the outcome of the war became clear.

What was left of the army of the Mariani after the Colline Gate battle was disbanded in Etruria. The war, however, continued on several fronts, as the literary sources on one hand, and the archaeological evidence from a number of sites on the other show. From the literary accounts of the war, it is apparent that Clusium and Arretium had an important role in the development of the operations. Populonia was besieged and sacked, almost certainly by Sulla. The Acropolis, which

¹ Liv. *Per.* 88.1; App. *b.c.* 1.89.412; cf. Vell. 2.28.1.

² Piotrowicz 1930; Gabba 1954a, 49–50 (= Gabba 1973, 204–205); Krawczuk 1960, 23–24. *Contra*, see Harris 1971, 218–224 and Brunt 1988, 106. A balanced discussion in Rawson 1978, 133–134 (= Rawson 1991, 291–293).

had gone through an impressive renovation in the last decades of the second century BC, was abandoned from then on.³ The site still looked almost depopulated in the early fifth century.⁴ Telamon, although not a *municipium*, was ravaged, and traces of a sack, followed by a prompt reconstruction, have been recently detected at Saturnia.⁵ The extent of violence and human losses finds further confirmation in the four coin hoards datable to the late 80s that have been discovered in Etruria.⁶

Volaterrae came into play at a late stage of the war, as the last stronghold of the diehard enemies of Sulla, both Etruscans and Roman victims of the proscriptions. It was, along with Nola, one of the last fronts Sulla had to deal with before concentrating all his energies on the institutional reforms. From a passage of the *pro Roscio Amerino* we know that he was still besieging the city in the first months of 81 BC, soon after the beginning of the proscriptions.⁷ A passage of Licinianus, whose importance was rightly stressed by A. Krawczuk, dates the final conquest to 79 BC, during the consulship of Appius Claudius Pulcher and Servilius Vatia.⁸ A number of proscribed were still in the city, and left just before the besiegers arrived. However, they were promptly caught and eliminated. The siege of Volaterrae is therefore a significant exception in Italy, which was mostly pacified after 82 BC. For three years, possibly until Sulla's abdication from dictatorship, an important Etruscan city was still held by a contingent of rebels; there is no reason to disbelieve Licinianus.⁹ That the situation at Volaterrae was unparalleled in Italy is apparent from several pieces of evidence. Nola, the other main anti-Sullan city, was conquered about two years before, in 81,

³ Strab. 5.2.6 = C 223: Ποπλώνιον... πολιορκίαν καὶ αὐτὸ δεδεγμένον ("Populonia... sustained a siege too", like Volaterrae), with Pasquinucci 1988, 49–54 and Giua 1996, 37–39. On recent excavations, see Mascione 2004, 36–44.

⁴ See Rut. Nam. 1.401–414, with Krawczuk 1960, 13–21; Doblhofer 1977, 189–190.

⁵ Rendini 1998, esp. 113–116; Rendini 2003, 333–339. There is no evidence, however, for a settlement of veterans, *pace* Rendini 2003, 337.

⁶ Such a concentration of hoards in a specific area is unparalleled in this period: see Crawford 1967 and Crawford 1969a, nos. 258 (Capalbio), 260 (Carrara), 262 (San Miniato al Tedesco), 266 (Montiano, near Telamon); see Harris 1971, 258. On the relation between coin hoards and violence in the late Republic, see Crawford 1969b.

⁷ Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 7.20.

⁸ Licin. 36.8; see Krawczuk 1960, 16–17. It is likely that the siege was not followed by a sack, as there are no archaeological traces of destruction on the Acropolis: Bonamici 2003, 83–84.

⁹ See Massa-Pairault 1985, 222–223 on speculation on some indirect (and indeed doubtful) references to the Sullan siege in the Volaterran art of the first century BC.

and its *ager* was promptly assigned to the Sullan veterans.¹⁰ On the contrary Volaterrae attracted all sorts of anti-Sullan partisans because of its strategically invaluable position, and it remained a critical front for a longer period.

What we know about the countermeasures taken by Sulla also shows that the situation was exceptional. While there is no direct evidence for a project to found a colony after the conquest of the city, we know that Sulla decided, or at least tried to enforce, an exemplary punishment: the withdrawal of Roman citizenship from the *municipium*. The information derives from a passage of Cicero's *de domo sua*, where Sulla is said to have deprived some communities—it is unclear how many—of citizenship, along with a part of their territories. This decision was included in a law passed by the *comitia centuriata*.¹¹ Cicero argues that the land confiscations were legitimate, since it was in the people's power to decide about that matter. Citizenship, however, could not be affected under any circumstances, and hence Sulla's measure was illegal. For this reason, according to Cicero, that part of Sulla's provisions was not enforced even when Sulla was alive, and the Volaterrans soon regained their rights.¹²

Cicero is rarely a neutral or innocent source; he certainly is not here.¹³ The main reason why he recalled this particular Sullan initiative on this occasion was to support his personal position in a difficult

¹⁰ On the conquest of Nola, see Liv. *Per.* 89.11–12 and Licin. 36.9 with Keaveney-Strachan 1981. There is no reason to argue that the resistance of the city was a response to Sulla's decision to found a colony: *contra*, Harris 1971, 258.

¹¹ There is no evidence to agree with Dahlheim 1993, 114 that the measure affected communities in "Samnium, Lucania or Etruria".

¹² Cic. *dom.* 30.79: *populus Romanus L. Sulla dictatore ferente comitiis centuriatis municipiis ciuitatem ademit; ademit eisdem agros; de agris ratum est; fuit enim populi potestas; de ciuitate ne tam diu quidem ualuit, quam diu illa Sullani temporis arma ualuerunt... Volaterranis, cum etiam tum essent in armis, L. Sulla uictor re publica recuperata comitiis centuriatis ciuitatem eripere non potuit, hodieque Volaterrani non modo ciues, sed etiam optimi ciues fruuntur nobiscum simul hac ciuitate* ("the Roman people deprived some communities of their citizenship, under a proposal presented by the dictator Sulla to the centuriate comices; it deprived the same communities of the land. The deprivation of the territories was ratified, and that fell within the jurisdiction of the people; the deprivation of citizenship, however, did not remain in force even as long as Sulla's regime did... Lucius Sulla, after winning the war and restoring the republic, could not withdraw with the support of the centuriate comices the citizenship of the Volaterrans, even if they were in arms at the time, and today the Volaterrans are not just citizens, but they share the citizenship with ourselves, as excellent citizens"). This passage cannot be read as evidence that Sulla's bill on citizenship was not ratified: *contra*, Thein 2006, 247.

¹³ Other sources on Volaterrae in this period: Liv. *Per.* 89.13 and Licin. 36.8.

moment of his political career. He gave this speech after the end of his exile, with the aim of reasserting his claim on his house confiscated by Clodius. His point was a general one, and it addressed the nature of Roman citizenship.¹⁴ There was, however, a specific reason why the position of Volaterrae was so familiar to him: he was a patron of that community.¹⁵ Soon after the death of Sulla, the Volaterrans challenged the legitimacy of the law, and Cicero played an important part in supporting them.

The most important source for these problems is the final section of Cicero's *pro Caecina*, which raises the issue of citizenship and that of the status of the Etruscan communities punished by Sulla. This case is the clearest proof that the issue of the rights of the communities punished by Sulla was definitely not solved soon after the former dictator's death. The client of Cicero, Aulus Caecina, from Volaterrae, was a member of one of the most distinguished Etruscan families.¹⁶ In 69 BC he was involved in a complex civil litigation over the ownership of a *fundus*.

¹⁴ Wirzubski 1950, 30. Cicero, however, knew well that citizenship had been withdrawn in the past: cf. the case of Hostilius Mancinus in 137, mentioned in Cic. *orat.* 1.40.181 (*P. Rutilius, M. filius, tribunus plebis, de senatu iussit educi, quod eum ciuem negaret esse; quia memoria sic esset proditum, quem pater suus, aut populus uendidisset, aut pater patratus dedidisset, ei nullum esse postliminium*, "Publius Rutilius, son of Marcus, tribune of the plebs, ordered him [Gaius Mancinus] to be expelled from the Senate, and stated that he was not a citizen, as it was a traditional rule that a man sold by his father or by the people, or delivered by the *pater patratus*, had no right to be restored to his former status").

¹⁵ Cf. Cic. *fam.* 13.4.1, written to Q. Valerius Orca between 46 and 45: *cum municipibus Volaterranis mihi summa necessitudo est. magno enim meo beneficio adfecti cumulatissime mihi gratiam rettulerunt; nam nec in honoribus meis nec laboribus unquam defuerunt* ("I have a very close bond with the people of Volaterrae. Since they have received an important favour from me, they paid it back most abundantly, since they never failed to support me either in my successes or in my difficulties"). Cf. *ibid.*: *summo studio p. R. a me in consulatu meo defensi sunt* ("they were defended by me during my consulship, with the outstanding support of the Roman people"). Also cf. Cic. *fam.* 13.5.2, written to the same addressee soon afterwards. See Deniaux 1991; Deniaux 1993, 340–343, 354–360, 374. Cic. *fam.* 11.20.3, written in June 43 by D. Iunius Brutus Albinus, cos. des. 42, suggests that even in the 40s there were plans to use the land which Sulla had not managed to assign: *quattuor legionibus iis, quibus agros dandos censuistis, uideo facultatem fore ex agris Sullanis et agro Campano* ("I understand that the four legions that the Senate has voted to grant land to may be provided for using the Sullan allotments and the *ager Campanus*"). The text, however, is not certain.

¹⁶ Hohti 1975; Frier 1985, 18–19; 35; Deniaux 1993, 471–473; Lomas 2004, 106–108. On Caecina's bilingualism and interest in Etruscan antiquities, see Hadas-Lebel 2004, 38; on the emergence of bilingualism in Etruria after Sulla, see Crawford 1987, 414–415. Several members of Caecina's *gens* eventually joined the Senate from very the end of the first century BC onwards: see M. Torelli 1969, 295–298 and M. Torelli 1982, 281–282, 290.

The key argument of his opponent was that the Volaterrans were not entitled to accept legacies from Roman citizens, as Caecina had done, because Sulla had deprived them of the rights connected with citizenship.¹⁷

Cicero challenged the argument on two grounds.¹⁸ First, citizenship could never be withdrawn, unless one renounced it by becoming citizen of a Latin colony. This was, according to Cicero's interpretation, an established principle, closely linked to the correlation between *ciuitas* and *libertas*.¹⁹ Secondly, there was already a precedent that made Sulla's measure legally unacceptable. Cicero claims to have taken a tough stance against these measures already in the early phases of his career, when he discussed a case in which the issue of citizenship played a decisive role. The case dealt with the *libertas* of a *mulier Arretina* who had been reduced into slavery (it is unclear how). It was heard *Sulla uiuo*, and Cicero's opponent, C. Cotta, supported the claim that Arretium had been deprived of the citizenship by Sulla, like Volaterrae, and that the woman, lacking *ciuitas*, was not entitled to the acknowledgement of her freedom.²⁰ Cicero overthrew the argument and, according to his own reconstruction, he persuaded the jury of the inalienability of citizenship.²¹

The case of the woman from Arretium is mentioned first on the list of the precedents, no doubt because of Cicero's interest in celebrating his own merits, and it is the only one derived from the discussion of a judicial case. Although it is presented as a very straightforward one, the issue was often discussed in the courts, as Cicero himself admits.²² Although no evidence remains for it, a debate certainly took place among Roman lawyers and politicians since the Sullan law on the withdrawal of the political rights was voted. As Cicero's digression proves, the controversy continued through the following years, when new attempts to enforce the law were carried out. We do not know whether the law on citizenship involved other communities. If this was

¹⁷ The background of the case is summarised in Frier 1985, 20–27. See also Gelzer 1962, 305–311; Stroh 1975, 80–103; Fotheringham 2004.

¹⁸ Cic. *Caec.* 33–35.95–102.

¹⁹ On the close link between *ciuitas* and *libertas*, see Dessertaux 1907; Wirszubski 1950, 3–4; Ste. Croix 1981, 366–368; Brunt 1988, 296–297, 518–519.

²⁰ Cic. *Caec.* 34.97. Excellent summary of the case in Frier 1985, 99–102. It is a safe guess that *Caec.* 95–102 presents the same arguments that Cicero had used in defence of the Arretine woman (Frier 1985, 100).

²¹ A false claim, according to Brunt 1988, 518–519, fn. 1.

²² Cic. *Caec.* 34.98: *quaeri hoc solere non praeterit*.

the case, however, it would not be surprising at all. Significantly, the case for Caecina's opponent, Sex. Aebutius, was made by a former associate of Sulla, C. Calpurnius Piso, who certainly supported the Sullan law from a political point of view too.²³

According to Cicero, the case against his client was obviously flawed, even if one left aside all doubts about the legitimacy of the law. Sulla, by changing the status of Volaterrae, did not affect all the rights of its citizens: *quod Sulla ipse ita tulit de ciuitate ut non sustulerit horum nexa atque hereditates*. The rights to sell goods and to inherit were still acknowledged, since Sulla decided to change the status of the punished communities from full citizenship (*ciuitas optimo iure*) into the so-called *ius XII coloniarum*, or *ius Ariminensium* (35.102):

iubet enim eodem iure esse quo fuerint Ariminenses; quos quis ignorat duodecim coloniarum et a ciuibus Romanis hereditates potuisse?

the law prescribes that they are to have the same status that the people of Ariminum used to have; and who does not know that the citizens of the twelve colonies had the right to inherit from Roman citizens?

The origin and implications of this juridical status are far from clear, but they do not concern us here.²⁴ Cicero does not spend many words on this matter because he is interested in stressing his decisive objection, which is focussed on the inalienability of citizenship. However, even if someone still wanted to second a restrictive interpretation of the law, and to consider the withdrawal of citizenship sufficient to prevent the Volaterrans from inheriting, and doing business with, Roman citizens, Caecina would still deserve special consideration, because he is a worthy and decent man, and a friend of Rome.²⁵ The tension and

²³ See Frier 1985, 102–103, with earlier bibliography.

²⁴ It is unclear whether the *ius XII coloniarum* was more or less advantageous than the status of the Latin colonies. A number of (mostly unsuccessful) attempts to reach safer conclusions have been made: see Bernardi 1948; Krawczuk 1960, 33–44; Salmon 1969, 92–94; Sherwin-White 1973, 102–104, 109–110; Harris 1971, 280–281; Galsterer 1977, 90–92; Pfiffig 1979, 148–151; Mouritsen 1998, 105–106; Bispham 2006, 89, 134, fn. 87.

²⁵ Cic. *Caec.* 35.102: *quod si adimi ciuitas A. Caecinae lege potuisset, magis illam rationem tamen omnes boni quaereremus, quem ad modum spectatissimum pudentissimumque hominem, summo consilio, summa uirtute, summa auctoritate domestica praeditum, leuatum iniuria ciuem retinere possemus* ("still all the good people would be even more determined to find a way to prevent this most respected and modest man from suffering such injustice and to count him a citizen, as in his hometown he was so outstanding in terms of his wisdom, decency and prestige"). The argument is put forward in other Ciceronian speeches too, such as the *pro Archia* and the *pro Balbo*; Steel 2001, 78.

the conflicting interpretations of a complex legal issue are recognisable behind this skillful discussion.²⁶

Cicero's own position in the affair deserves to be stressed again. The two cases he accepted to take, in which the issue of citizenship played such a prominent role, show that he had good connections in at least two strongly anti-Sullan cities of northern Etruria. It is very significant that the cities heavily punished by Sulla were interested in obtaining the support of members of the Roman elite and in trying to make their position more advantageous. The plea for Roscius Amerinus made Cicero a credible candidate for the defence of the individuals, and potentially of the communities, that had been affected by Sulla's retaliation.

The law on citizenship was just an aspect of what Sulla intended to achieve in Etruria. It was accompanied and complemented by a plan of land assignments that was carried out only in part. Significantly, it is again a passage of Cicero's correspondence which sheds light on what happened to the land of Volaterrae and Arretium. In a letter to Atticus written on 15 March 60 (1.19), Cicero summarises the main developments in current political life, and mentions his efforts towards the introduction of some changes to an agrarian bill presented by the tribune Flavius and supported by Pompey.²⁷ Cicero sought consensus to prevent the enforcement of the law on the *ager publicus*, to confirm the rights of the "Sullan men" (*Sullani homines*, the veterans) on the land allotments assigned to them, and to exempt Volaterrae and Arretium from the implementation of the law.²⁸ Sulla had singled out the territories of these communities as possible targets of new assignments.

²⁶ On Caecina's merits towards Rome, see Frier 1985, 18–19, esp. fn. 51; on the specific issue of Roman citizenship, see 97–104.

²⁷ See Gruen 1974, 396–397.

²⁸ Cic. Att. 1.19.4: *agraria lex a Flavio tribuno pl. uehementer agitabatur auctore Pompeio, quae nihil populare habebat praeter auctorem. ex hac ego lege secunda contionis uoluntate omnia illa tollebam quae ad priuatorum incommodum pertinebant; liberabam agrum eum qui P. Mucio L. Calpurnio consulibus publicus fuisset; Sullanorum hominum possessiones confirmabam; Volaterranos et Arretinos, quorum agrum Sulla publicarat neque diuiserat, in sua possessione retinebam* ("an agrarian law is being pushed vigorously by the tribune of the plebs Flavius, masterminded by Pompey. There is nothing *popular* about it except the promoter. With the consent of the assembly I removed from that bill all provisions that harmed private interest. I exempted the land that used to be public property under the consulship of P. Mucius and L. Calpurnius [133 BC]; I confirmed the possessions of the Sullan settlers; I made sure that the Volaterrans and the Arretines stayed in possession of the land that Sulla had confiscated and not apportioned"). It is apparent that Cicero did not intend to affect the interests of the Sullan veterans, and the attacks on the Sullan *possessores* in the third speech *de lege*

For some reason, however, after being planned, the latter did not take place, although the threat remained incumbent on the communities for some time.²⁹ The former owners kept occupying the formally confiscated land as *possessores*. Cicero, as a Roman patron of these Etruscan communities, made sure that they were not affected by any land distribution. The aim was achieved, rather than by Cicero through his talent for gathering the consensus of the *boni*, mainly because of the opposition of a large portion of the Senate, which feared the possible implications of an agrarian law whose enforcement was left in Pompey's hands. The rights of the *possessores* from Arretium and Volaterrae were later confirmed by the *lex Iulia agraria* of 59 BC too.³⁰

Cicero's reference to the *agri* of the Etruscan cities is, however, very interesting: it is evidence for an incomplete side of the Sullan colonial plan. An important project of the dictator, conceived in the aftermath of the Civil War and aimed against two strongholds of the resistance, could not be fully implemented. We do not know if it was the only one, as Cicero shows an exclusive interest in the cities which he protected.

Cicero's letter bears some traces of the tense political atmosphere of the decades that followed Sulla's hegemony, in which the agrarian problem resurfaced now and again, never to find a proper solution. Thanks to his speeches *de lege agraria*, we are much better informed about Rullus' bill than we are about Flavius', although the information Cicero gives is definitely misleading in various respects.³¹ The argument put forward by Cicero is identical in both cases. Although the sponsors of the bill claim that it was *popularis*, it did not serve the interests of the people. Leaving propaganda aside, however, an important difference

agraria are no evidence for a hostile attitude to them: see Drummond 2000, esp. 144–146.

²⁹ Zambianchi 1978, 124 argues that Sulla decided not to affect the interests of the Etruscan aristocracy and refused to carry out his earlier plan; in fact, there is no evidence explaining why the assignments were not brought about.

³⁰ Cic. *fam.* 13.4.2: *cum tribuni plebi legem iniquissimam de eorum agris promulgauissent, facile senatui populoque R. persuasi ut eos cuius quibus fortuna pepercisset saluos esse uellent. hanc actionem meam C. Caesar primo suo consulatu lege agraria comprobauit agrumque Volaterranum et oppidum omni periculo in perpetuum liberauit* ("when the tribunes of the plebs put forward a very iniquitous bill concerning their lands, I easily persuaded the senate and the Roman people to decree the preservation of the citizens that were spared by Fortune. Gaius Caesar approved my initiative during his first consulship in his agrarian bill, and freed the territory and the city of Volaterrae from any future threat"). See Drummond 2000, 151–152.

³¹ See Drummond 2000, especially with reference to the third speech *de lege agraria*.

can be noticed. Rullus planned some interventions in the *ager Campanus*, which allegedly no one had dared touch ever since—the accuracy of this statement is far from certain.³² The bill presented in 60 BC was more wide-ranging, and it probably concentrated the assignments in Central Italy, an area affected both by Sullan colonisation and by the recruitment carried out by Catiline.

There are grounds to believe that land assignments in Etruria were not always as unsuccessful as they appear to have been in the territories of Volaterrae and Arretium. Moreover, there probably was a significant difference of treatment between these two cities. We have no evidence that a colony was founded at Volaterrae, while Pliny's reference to the *Arretini Fidentiores* ("the more loyal ones") is safe evidence for a Sullan settlement.³³ No doubt, apart from being included in the community, these colonists were given some land. However, Cicero's mention of some land of Arretium and Volaterrae having been *divisa*, but not *publicata* implies that the project of settlement was not fully implemented.³⁴ The colony had definitely been founded, but probably too much land had been confiscated, and there were not enough settlers available to get hold of it. In the meantime, the earlier *possessores* kept occupying it.

³² Cic. *leg. agr.* 1.7.21: *qui ager ipse per sese et Sullanae dominationi et Gracchorum largitioni restitisset* ("a territory that has resisted by itself to the absolute power of Sulla and to the bribery of the Gracchi"); cf. *leg. agr.* 2.29.81. Jonkers 1963, 50–51 accepts Cicero's testimony. Chouquer 1987, 217, fn. 8 is more sceptical and refers to Licin. 28.35–37; in 165 BC (P. Lentulus) *agrum Campanum inter priuatos diuisum publicauit et eum indicto pretio locauit. multo plures agros... recognitioni praepositus reciperauit formamque agrorum in aes incisam ad Libertatis fixam reliquit, quam postea Sulla corrumpit* (Lentulus "confiscated the *ager Campanus*, which was divided among private holders, and rented it out after determining a price. Having been put in charge of a survey, he recovered even more land and, after engraving the map of the territory on a bronze tablet, he displayed it in the *atrium Libertatis*; later it was altered by Sulla"). See also Fezzi 2003, 33–36. Sulla, however, founded Urbana on the very border the *ager Campanus*: see Minieri 2002, 256 (earlier bibliography at fn. 22).

³³ Cf. Cic. *Mur.* 24.49: *Catilinam... circumfluentem colonorum Arretinorum et Faesulanorum exercitu* ("Catiline... rich with an army of colonists from Arretium and Faesulae"). About Arretium, see Pfiffig 1966, 66; Harris 1971, 261–263.

³⁴ Cic. *Att.* 1.19.4: *Volaterranos et Arretinos, quorum agrum Sulla publicarat neque diuiserat, in sua possessione retinebam* ("I made sure that the Volaterrans and of the Arretines stayed in possession of the land that Sulla had confiscated and not apportioned"). Novaro 1975 makes the case for the reading *Arteminos* (given by many manuscripts) instead of *Arretinos*. In her view, sporadic finds near modern Artimino points to the existence of an ancient community in the area. Moreover, Arretium had not quite the same position as Volaterrae, as it certainly was a colony. The reconstruction is ingenious, but it cannot be accepted unless solid evidence emerges from the would-be ancient site of Arteminum.

Eventually, they managed to find the support of some members of the Roman elite, who opposed the completion of the programme and the coming of more settlers.

The situation was quite different, although by no means less interesting, further north. The foundation of a Sullan colony at Faesulae is certain, as is the violent opposition to the new settlement. Licinianus records a revolt of the inhabitants of Faesulae against the colonists, which apparently took place in 78 BC and aimed to restore the situation that preceded the coming of Sulla: “the Faesulans stormed into the fortresses (?) of the Sullan veterans and, after killing many of them, they recovered their own land allotments. They justified themselves in front of the senate, claiming that rural people had been compelled to act in such a way after being displaced from their homes. It was decided that the consuls were to leave for Etruria and that an army was to be given to them...”³⁵ These few fragmentary lines contain several important pieces of information. First, they tell something about the form of the settlement, which apparently was organised around fortified sites.³⁶ The word *castellum* makes it unlikely that the veterans lived within the city walls. They settled in the *ager*, forming a separate community and following a pattern similar to that suggested by some archaeologists for Pompeii, with the natives living in the *oppidum* and the colonists controlling their land in the outskirts, protected by some kind of fortifications (the *castella*). After a few years, the local population managed to launch a successful attack on the newcomers, which led to a massacre, and to the (probably temporary) recovery of the confiscated properties.

Moreover, the Faesulans were bold enough to defend their actions in the Senate, and to make the case openly against the legitimacy of the Sullan assignments.³⁷ Licinianus does not say how the Senate dealt with the envoys of the city, but if they could afford to be so confrontational

³⁵ Licin. 36.36–37 *Faesulani irruerunt in castella ueteranorum Sullanorum et compluribus occisis agros suos receperunt. et in senatu defendebant, quod uulgius agreste domoque extorre eo coactum esset. et consules dato exercitu in Etruriam profecti sunt, ut scitum* {...}. The text is quite tortured: I accept the reading of the Bonn edition *receperunt*, instead of *reddiderunt*, which is given by the manuscript and accepted by Criniti. On this passage, see Scardigli 1983, 129–131.

³⁶ Cf. App. *b. c.* 1.96.448; see Brunt 1971, 308–309 and De Neeve 1984, 131. On the Sullan colonies as *propugnacula imperii*, see Broadhead 2007, 159–160.

³⁷ I do not agree with Scardigli 1983, 129, arguing that the veterans were compelled to explain their defeat to the Senate; Mazzarino 1957, 120 is certainly wrong in saying that they forgave the rebels and defended them in the Senate.

they probably had some support within that assembly. The subsequent turn of the events is quite revealing: both consuls were sent to put an end to the revolt, but one of them, M. Aemilius Lepidus, would soon join the insurgency himself.³⁸

³⁸ See Licin. 36.38 and Sall. *Hist.* 1.66 M, with Labruna 1975, 46–51, 156–158.

CHAPTER SIX

THE SULLAN VETERANS AND CATILINE'S CONSPIRACY

Unfortunately, there is no literary evidence for what happened in Etruria between the revolt of 78 and Catiline's conspiracy. It remains unclear, first of all, what happened at Faesulae after Lepidus and the rebels were defeated.¹ No doubt, a considerable group of Sullan settlers did not leave the area, as Cicero refers twice to the presence of colonists from Faesulae in Catiline's army.² It is likely that their position remained difficult, and was further complicated by the losses suffered in the attack. It would be useful to know what measures, if any, were taken by Rome to protect the colonists and avoid further attacks, or even to restore some of them on the allotments reoccupied by the Faesulans.

The incidents at Faesulae suggest that something about the Sullan settlement plans in Etruria was flawed. Soon after the arrival of the veterans, the local population managed to react successfully.³ This was, to our knowledge, unparalleled in the rest of Italy. It is impossible to establish what triggered the offensive, or rather what led the inhabitants to believe that an attack could be successful. The riots were possibly related to contemporary events in other areas of Etruria. As we have seen, the land assignments at Volaterrae and Arretium were stopped after the death of Sulla. However, the strongest element suggesting that Sullan colonisation in Etruria was not a success is the participation of a contingent of veterans in the conspiracy of Catiline. This may be explained both by local factors and by the impact of wider processes that involved Italy as a whole.

It is significant that the bulk of the Sullan colonists who followed Catiline was from Arretium and Faesulae, where the settlement programme knew some significant drawbacks. They had endured hostility,

¹ Harris 1971, 268 argues that the land given up by the veterans was a "temporary concession", and that it was recovered after Lepidus' revolt.

² See Cic. *Cat.* 3.6.14; *Mur.* 24.49.

³ Harris 1971, 267–271 is too optimistic about the success of the Sullan settlement in the area.

open attacks, and isolation. They were prevented from increasing the size of their properties by adding unoccupied land (like that which had been *publicata*, but not *diuisa*) to the allotments they already had. There is every reason to believe that these scattered groups of veterans, posted on a hostile territory, still communicated with each other. Figures like Gaius Manlius and Publius Furius, both mentioned in Cicero's Catilinarian speeches, promoted adhesion to the conspiracy.⁴ Cicero's rhetorical reference to a *colonorum Arretinorum et Faesulanorum exercitus* cannot be lightly dismissed.⁵ The typical accusation launched against the supporters of Catiline is that they tried to revive the *licentia* of the Sullan age after squandering the fortunes earned by the proscriptions and the mass murders.⁶ Indeed, this may be true of Catiline and of other leading figures of the conspiracy.

The main reason why Catiline was so successful among the Sullan veterans, however, is that many of them had become considerably poorer in less than two decades after the Sullan colonisation. A satisfactory explanation for this development is still to be provided, and it probably is not within reach. It would be far-fetched, for instance, to view it as a consequence of the scarce talent of the Sullan veterans for agriculture, as has often been claimed. There is no reason to believe that they were less skilled than most Italian peasants. Most of them certainly had a rural background before joining the army, and it is conceivable that they were prepared to return to their earlier condition after Sulla's victory.⁷ It is true that many Sullan veterans tried to sell their properties soon after the land was assigned, and not just in

⁴ Cic. *Cat.* 2.6.14 (*Manlius iste centurio, qui in agro Faesulano castra posuit, bellum populo Romano suo nomine indixit*—"this centurion Manlius, who set up a camp in the territory of Faesulae and declared war against the Roman people in his own name"); 2.9.20 (*quo ex genere iste est Manlius, cui nunc Catilina succedit. hi sunt homines ex eis coloniis quas Sulla constituit*—"Manlius, from whom Catiline has now taken up the command, belongs in this class. These are men from those colonies that were founded by Sulla"); 3.6.14 (*in P. Furium, qui est ex eis colonis quos Faesulas L. Sulla deduxit*—"against Publius Furius, who is one of the colonists that Lucius Sulla settled at Faesulae"). On Manlius, also cf. Dio 37.30.

⁵ Cic. *Mur.* 24.49.

⁶ Cf. Sall. *Cat.* 16.4 (*plerique Sullani milites, largius suo usi, rapinarum et uictoriae ueteris memores civile bellum exoptabant*—"most of the Sullan soldiers, who had spent more than they actually had, longed for a civil war, mindful of their old victory"); *Cat.* 28.4. On the role of the accumulation of debt in Sallust's general interpretation of the late Republic, see Shaw 1975.

⁷ Brunt 1971, 309–310.

Etruria, as Cicero says.⁸ However, this fact may be better explained by the general economic conditions of Italy at the end of the 80s than by their inability to cope with rural life.

It is hard to establish whether the difficulties met by the Sullan veterans in Etruria had more to do with local dynamics or with wider processes. From the outbreak of the Mithridatic War Italy went through a serious financial crisis, triggered by the interruption of the revenue flow from the province of Asia. The bankruptcy of the bank of Fulcinius, which took place at Volaterrae between the Mithridatic and the Civil Wars and is mentioned in Cicero's *pro Caecina*, fits well with this scenario, and was certainly not unparalleled.⁹ In 86 BC the consul Valerius Flaccus put forward a law reducing debts by three-fourths, which received significantly wide support.¹⁰ At the same time, circulation of false and debased coinage was a serious issue. The edict of the praetor Marius Gratidianus of 85 BC and the *lex Cornelia de falsis* of 81 BC show similar concerns on the part of the Roman government, regardless of factional politics.¹¹

Moreover, the losses in the Social and Civil Wars were very significant.¹² Evidence like the coin hoards from Etruria that were buried in the 80s and never recovered afterwards suggests that money supply diminished considerably in the aftermath of the Civil War. The outcome was even more widespread indebtedness.¹³ Huge military expenses had

⁸ Cic. *leg. agr.* 2.28.78.

⁹ Cic. *Caec.* 3.11, with Frier 1985, 9–11. Cf. Cic. *imp. Cn. Pomp.* 7.19: *haec fides atque haec ratio pecuniarum quae Romae, quae in foro versatur, implicata est cum illis pecuniis Asiaticis et cohaeret; ruere illa non possunt, ut haec non eodem labefacta motu coincidunt* ("this credit and this system of monetary resources that operate at Rome, in the forum, is deeply linked with, and depends on, those financial resources in Asia; the ones cannot be lost without undermining the others and cause its collapse").

¹⁰ See Sall. *Cat.* 33.2 (*ac nouissime memoria nostra propter magnitudinem aeris alieni uolentibus omnibus bonis, argentum aere solutum est*—"and most recently, within our memory, silver was paid in copper with the unanimous consent of the nobles because of the great amount of debt"); Vell. 2.23. 2 (*Valerius Flaccus, turpissimae legis auctor, qua creditoribus quadrantem solui iusserat*—"Valerius Flaccus, the author of that most shameful law, by which he had decreed that only a quarter of a debt should be paid back to the creditors"). See Bulst 1964, 330–337; Nicolet 1971, 1220–1221; Barlow 1980, 215–217. On credit and debt in the 80s, see Williams 1998.

¹¹ On Gratidianus' measures, see Cic. *off.* 3.80 and Plin. 33.132. Cf. Crawford 1968 (= Crawford 1985, 187–193); Lo Cascio 1979; Verboven 1994; Williams 1998, 180–181; Pedroni 2006, 75–81, 196–197; Hollander 2007, 28–29.

¹² Brunt 1971, 285–287.

¹³ Cf. Catilina's pledge for *tabulae nouae*: Sall. *Cat.* 21.2 (*tum Catilina polliceri tabulas nouas, proscriptionem locupletium, magistratus, sacerdotia, rapinas, alia omnia, quae bellum atque*

exhausted the Roman *aerarium*, and they were bound to grow in the future, as the enfranchisement of the Allies exempted them from any contribution to the financing of the army.¹⁴ Besides, despite Sulla's reorganisation of the province of Asia, the public budget was definitely not stabilised, and it would not be until Pompey's Eastern campaign in the 60s. In 82, the Senate was compelled to use resources taken from the temples to pay the troops; the reconstruction of the Capitol was accomplished only in 69 BC.¹⁵ Things were soon made more difficult by the war against Sertorius, which stopped the revenue flow from an important province like Spain for several years.

It is conceivable that these critical factors influenced the situation of the Sullan foundations in Etruria, but it is unclear to what extent. Colonisation in Campania appears to be an overall success: there is no evidence that the veterans became poorer, all the confiscated land appears to have been assigned, and the opposition to the new foundations is not known to have been violent. Such a contrast is a warning against attempting to identify the economic difficulties of Italy as the main explanation for the situation of Etruria. On balance, it is preferable to put more emphasis on local factors.

Colonisation in Etruria started later than in Campania. As we have seen, although a *lex Cornelia* on the colonial foundations may have covered all the new settlements at once, military activities were not over before 79 BC, with the conquest of Volaterrae. Sulla did not play an active role in the land assignments at Volaterrae and Arretium, and there are grounds to argue that the settlement of the veterans in this region was not accurately organised. Unfamiliarity with the territory, and perhaps haste, may have led some of the newcomers to settle in not very productive land. The hostility of the local population and the subsequent campaign of Lepidus made it even harder for them to cope

lubido uictorum fert— “then Catiline promised the abolition of debt, the proscription of the rich, magistracies, priesthoods, plunders, and all the other sorts of things that war and the greed of the victors bring”).

¹⁴ Nicolet 1978 (= Nicolet 2000, 93–103, 397–398); Barlow 1980, 203–212; Crawford 1985, 187.

¹⁵ Val. Max. 7.6.4: *C. autem Mario Cn. Carbone consulibus ciuili bello cum Sulla dissidentibus ... senatus consulto aurea atque argentea templorum ornamenta, ne militibus stipendia deessent, conflata sunt* (“when the consuls Gaius Marius and Cnaeus Carbo were fighting with Sulla in the civil war... gold and silver ornaments were melted down by decree of the senate to provide the pay for the troops”). See Frederiksen 1966, 133; Barlow 1980, 213–219; Burnett 1982, 135.

with their new situation. There is also evidence that the colonists spent huge resources in building activities, and that this further compromised their financial position.¹⁶ Some of the veterans became impoverished, and joined Catiline's attempt. It should be noted, however, that not all the Sullan settlers made that choice. The colonies of Faesulae and Arretium survived even after that crisis.

Although many crucial aspects remain unclear, the background of the Catilinarian crisis sheds light on some crucial aspects of the policies that Sulla adopted in Italy, and on the impact which they had on Italian economy and society. They need to be briefly summarised at the end of the present discussion on Sulla and Etruria. As seen above, the proscriptions and the foundation of veteran colonies were the main aspects of Sulla's impact on Italy. They were made possible by a fierce power struggle within the Roman elite, but they had wider consequences for the whole peninsula.

The proscriptions affected parts of the *ordo senatorius* and of the *ordo equester*, and they were a major chance for other sectors of the same *ordines* to increase their wealth. They generated new great estates, more absentee ownership, and more unoccupied or underexploited land. Concentration of properties must have been the rule, rather than the exception, if even Quinctius Valgus, who apparently was not a senator, got control of vast estates in the territory of Casinum and in Hirpinia.¹⁷ At the same time, however, Sulla settled his veterans in areas of Italy that were fertile and strategically significant. Colonisation responded to two basic needs: rewarding the soldiers that had won two wars, and

¹⁶ Cic. *Cat.* 2.9.20: *hi dum aedificant tamquam beati, dum praediis lectis, familiis magnis, conuiuiis apparatis delectantur, in tantum aes alienum inciderunt, ut, si salui esse uelint, Sulla sit iis ab inferis excitandus* ("while they were putting up new buildings as if they were rich, while they were enjoying their first-choice farms, their large households, their lavish banquets, they ran so deeply into debt that in order to save themselves they would have had to raise Sulla from the dead"). See Gabba 1976a, 323 (= Gabba 1994a, 114).

¹⁷ Cic. *leg. agr.* 3.4.14: *denique eos fundos quos in agro Casinati optimos fructuosissimosque continuauit, cum usque eo uicinos proscriberet quoad oculis conformando ex multis praediis unam fundi regionem normamque perfecterit, quos nunc cum aliquo metu tenet, sine ulla cura possidebit* ("lastly, he will be able to possess without any anxiety those excellent and very fertile estates that he bought in a sequence in the territory of Casinum, as far as the eye could see, thanks to the proscription of his neighbours. Eventually, by combining numerous estates, he managed to create the impression of a single great district, which he now holds with some apprehension"). On Valgus' estates in Hirpinia, see Cic. *leg. agr.* 3.2.8, and *supra*. He was therefore a great landowner whose properties were scattered in different regions: Gabba 1994b, 438–439 (= Gabba 1994a, 226–227).

punishing the communities that had opposed Sulla's rise to power.¹⁸ In Campania there is no evidence that the settlements of the Sullan veterans ever went through a critical phase, or that their survival was ever threatened. The situation in Etruria was not equally straightforward. In some communities, like Volaterrae, there were just land assignments to the Sullan veterans, without a colony being founded. At Faesulae, the local population attacked the veterans, and they managed to regain their land, although it is unclear to what extent and for how long. At Arretium, the Sullan *deductores* probably made serious mistakes: part of the land that had originally been destined to the assignments was never used for that purpose, because not enough settlers could be found.

The ancient accounts of the Catilinarian conspiracy are not devoid of propaganda and rhetorical bias, but they cannot be dismissed when they portray the Sullan veterans fighting next to the descendants of the victims of the proscription. These two groups may have fought each other in the past, but they apparently shared the same problem at the end of the 60s: they were impoverished and in search of new sources of wealth. The reason why the proscribed may have been in that position is apparent. Unfortunately, as I have tried to show above, the poverty of the veterans is harder to account for.

¹⁸ Chouquer 1987, 245–247 speculates that in some areas the *centuriatio* was first carried out in the Sullan age: the territory immediately south-east of Rome, around Castrimoenium, Bovillae and Gabii, a part of the *ager Campanus*, and the *ager Nolanus*.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE IMPORTANCE OF ETRURIA

The settlers of the Etruscan colonies were the weakest link in the large constituency of supporters of Sulla who were rewarded after his victory. The political importance of their presence in the region, however, must not be overlooked. Although their settlement may not have been organised very competently, it played a significant part in the history of Etruria during the late Republic. The coming of the veterans was not just a price that had to be paid to the victorious army; it was the clearest signal of an epoch-making defeat too—that of the cities which had followed the Marians. It followed a series of impressive destructions, and it was accompanied by a law that withdrew Roman citizenship to several anti-Sullan communities.

The response of some sectors of the Etruscan elite to this situation is extremely interesting: they started seeking the patronage of the part of the Roman elite that was prepared to support their agenda, and to defend the interests of their communities. As I have argued above, the Faesulans who went to the Senate to defend their attack on the veterans would not have spoken as boldly as reported by Licinianus if they had lacked any support in that assembly. The Arretines and the Volaterrans, downgraded to the mysterious *ius XII coloniarum*, would have hardly regained their rights if they had not found support among the Roman notables that were interested in exploiting their loyalty.

Finding informal ways to interact with the Roman elite was a problem that was common to all the Italian Allies in the period between the enfranchisement and the actual inclusion into the citizen body. For some Etruscan communities this may have been even harder, as they had been deprived of full citizenship. Fortunately, we are quite well informed about their position, because they chose such a vocal patron as Cicero. The status problem of the Volaterrans was probably solved not long after Caecina's case and Cicero's successful plea in his favour. It is arguable, in fact, that the census that started in 70 BC put this anomaly to an end and included all the communities punished by Sulla

back into the citizen body.¹ That was the success of Caecina and of the members of the Etruscan elite who, like him, had proved prepared to accept the victory of Rome without reservations, and to negotiate a new role for themselves.² About ten years before, that very elite had taken part in a war against Sulla and a large part of the Roman political establishment. Sulla's great victory was probably to have found the most direct way to compel the Etruscan to become, politically speaking, Roman. As soon as the well-to-do Volaterrans lost full citizenship, it became clear to them that they could no longer afford isolation, or sterile opposition anymore. They had to look for Roman patrons, and it is significant that they found one in a 'moderate conservative' like Cicero. Sulla's retaliation had compelled them to renegotiate their relations with the Roman elite.

The attempt to downgrade the status of Volaterrae and Arretium is of great significance for an assessment of Sulla's policies on the empire. It reflects more general patterns of his contribution to the making and the consolidation of the empire, and it suggests analogies with other events that I have discussed in this part of the book. The land confiscations and the withdrawal of Roman citizenship that Sulla inflicted on some hostile communities were an extraordinarily harsh punishment, which may be compared to the fine he imposed on the cities of the province of Asia at the end of the Mithridatic War. The effects of these two measures are remarkably similar to each other. In both cases, retaliation enabled Sulla to gather a significant amount of wealth, either in cash, as was the case in Asia Minor, or in land, as happened in Italy. This was of course crucial in the development of the Civil War, as it enabled Sulla to finance his Italian campaign and to reward some of his veterans after the victory. However, it also had a considerable effect in the longer term, as it significantly affected the administrative organisation of some crucial regions of the empire, and compelled the local elites to redefine their position towards Rome.

At the end of both wars he fought in the 80s, Sulla put in place a clear system of rewards and sanctions, whose scope went beyond his personal political agenda, and which reveals his interest in contribut-

¹ Harris 1971, 275–276. Cf. Bruun 1975, 466–468.

² The talent of the Volaterran elite for building profitable relations at Rome and the central role of the Caecinae are stressed by Terrenato 1998, 107–109 and Terrenato 2001, 61. Cf. however Berrendonner 2003, 59 remarking that the case of a prominent family like the Caecinae must not necessarily be considered the rule. The reference discussion of the Caecinae is Capdeville 1997.

ing to the organisation of the empire. As I have shown above, the fine decided by Sulla in Asia Minor was part of a wider programme, whereby the administration of the province was fully reorganised, probably by a *lex provinciae*. In Italy, Sulla had a similar approach. He confirmed the enfranchisement of most allied communities, and took revenge only on a handful of cities whose resistance had been particularly staunch during the Civil War. Some of them were punished with the substitution of the local magistrates with pro-Sullan ones, as happened at Larinum; others had part of their territory confiscated and assigned to the Sullan veterans, like Praeneste and Pompeii; others suffered the confiscations and the downgrading from full citizenship (*ciuitas optimo iure*) to the *ius XII coloniarum*.

The response of the local elites, too, was strikingly similar in the Greek East and in Italy. Some chose to join and support Sulla from the beginning, and had their loyalty rewarded. Those who did not, and were consequently punished, embarked on a process that gradually enabled them to find support, and sometimes patronage, among members of the Roman elite. For the cities of Asia Minor it was crucial to limit the impact of the financial impositions decided by Sulla, and to ensure that a limit was set to the greed of the Roman moneylenders. As I have shown above, two strategies were adopted: the search for Roman patrons, which was prevalently used by the free cities, and active participation in the assembly of the cities of the province of Asia, the *koinon*, which dealt with Roman governors on a regular basis. In both cases, the outcome was a progressively closer cooperation between Greek and Roman elites, whose importance for the development and the stabilisation of the empire in the longer term was crucial. In Italy, the local elites that managed to survive Sulla's revenge soon committed themselves to a similar process, and sought the support of members of the Roman elite. It is quite fortunate for the student of this period that Volaterrae and Arretium found such a vocal patron and supporter in Cicero, who was so keen to record his special relationship with the Etruscan cities. It is even more significant that the descendants of the Volaterran aristocrat Aulus Caecina, defended by Cicero, managed to enter the Senate in a couple of generations' time, providing us with an impressive example of the ultimate consequences of the strategy that Sulla's punishment had compelled their ancestors to adopt.

CHAPTER EIGHT

BEYOND THE EMERGENCY: INTERIM CONCLUSIONS

Sulla's initiatives often present the student of Republican history with tricky problems of general importance: what Sulla's ultimate aims were, and whether he predicted the consequences of his decisions, both in Italy and in the Greek East. There is clear evidence for a Sullan attempt to reorganise the province of Asia, which was not just expected to meet the demands of an emergency; provisions like the creation of the forty-four fiscal districts, or the clause of the *lex Cornelia* that set a limit to the expenses of the city embassies to Rome, are symptoms of an ambitious approach. The rules concerning the embassies, in particular, were a symptom of the growing importance of the relationship between Roman rulers and local elites, which the harshness of Sulla's impositions made all but more urgent. Of course, it would be unreasonable to claim that the Sullan reorganisation directly aimed at enhancing the function of patronage and *clientelae* in the life of the province. However, it was Sulla himself, with his decision to reward the cities that had been loyal to war during the Mithridatic war, who showed the provincials the importance of good relations with Rome and her representatives. Even if Sulla was not in a position to imagine in detail the methods and the forms that would bring about fuller cooperation between Romans and provincials, it is fair to say that he created the conditions that would bring about. He compelled the local elites to face harsh retaliation and to ask for a lenient treatment on Rome's part; he also compelled them to come to terms with the irreversibility of Roman rule. It is true that others, especially Lucullus and Pompey, would deal with this new situation, but Sulla undoubtedly prepared the ground for it.

Sulla followed a similar strategy in his dealings with the Italian communities that had resisted his rise to power. The problem of his actual aims and of his ability to foresee future developments is central in this respect too. An exceptional decision like punishing some Italian communities with the withdrawal of Roman citizenship had the ultimate effect of persuading even the most sceptical groups of the local aristocracy of the importance of Roman citizenship, and of strong ties with

the Roman ruling elite. The Sullan colonisation must have had similar effects too: the Volaterrans and the Arretines looked for patrons who helped them to limit its impact, and the Pompeians sought the support of the *deductores* of the colony in their controversy with the veterans.

In Italy, Sulla identified his cause with that of Rome. He had done it in Asia Minor too, of course, but under very different conditions: in Asia Minor, being loyal to Sulla meant being loyal to Rome (with the possible exception of the brief spell that preceded the mutiny of Fimbria's troops); in Italy, being loyal to Sulla meant being loyal to one of the *partes* at war. The effects of the measures taken by Sulla, especially of the sanctions he imposed on his enemies, were however quite similar in both contexts, and there are good reasons to believe that Sulla considered the consequences of his decisions carefully.

At the end of this analysis of Sulla's contribution to the administration of Asia Minor and Italy, his strong interest in the role of the elites, which emerged already in the first part, finds full confirmation. At the same time, the widely held stereotype that portrays Sulla as a bloodthirsty and greedy general, exclusively interested in eliminating his enemies and in building personal power, is decisively undermined. Of course he was driven to create a personal supremacy in Rome, but overemphasising this factor is a reductive way to consider his role in the history of the late Republic. The age of Sulla cannot be fully understood without considering his efforts towards the consolidation of the empire, and his considerable achievements in this respect.

In the following—and last—part I will try to discuss the ideological aspects of this operation by studying the use Sulla made of some religious motifs at various moments of his imperial strategy. Some similarities between the initiatives he took on the two sides of the empire are recognisable at this level too. Again, both in the East and in Italy, Sulla's emphasis on the ideology of the empire was part of a substantial effort to involve the local elites in the new phase. Although he used religion in a variety of contexts and for different audiences, his first interlocutors were the *domi nobiles*, the local elites. Sulla realised that his efforts to strengthen the empire, both in Italy and in the East, were likely to turn into failure without a complex ideological operation supporting them. It is now time to consider it in detail.

PART III

SULLA, RELIGION, AND THE EMPIRE

INTRODUCTION

In the previous parts the focus has been on the consequences that the initiatives of Sulla had on the administration of the empire, and on its economic and social history. There is a third level, however, that deserves to be taken into consideration, as it complements the other two: religion. Sulla did not just substantially contribute to the development of the empire in the Greek East and to the development of Roman Italy by winning wars and by compelling the local elites to redefine their attitude and position towards Rome. He also made a very significant contribution to the development of Roman imperial ideology: to the way in which the Romans made sense of their global power, and to the way in which the Greek world viewed the role of the Romans. Sulla's operation was rooted in the context of the Mithridatic War and in the developments in the Greek campaign and, as I shall show in more detail, it was based on restating the kinship and the special relationship between Venus and Rome. Sulla managed to exploit this old theme, which had been circulating in the East for several generations, for the sake of his own political agenda, and to transform it into a 'political theology of victory'.¹ Back in Italy, he aimed to represent himself as a new founder of Rome, who came to rescue the Republic from a deadly crisis. The theme of the mythical kinship between Rome and Venus had great importance for this strategy of self-representation, and created an ideal bridge between Sulla's agenda in the East and in the West. The aim of this part is therefore to explore the two sides of Sulla's approach to religion, and to show the importance that religion had in both contexts where he operated.

¹ The definition is derived from Gallini 1970, 127, whose discussion of Sulla's approach to religion (127, 140–141) is however misleading.

CHAPTER ONE

WHY 'SULLA *EPAPHRODITOS*'?

A good starting point for this discussion is provided by the events that took place in Boeotia during and immediately after the Mithridatic War. The literary sources indeed offer many interesting, if isolated, elements, which may be viewed as symptoms of more widespread patterns. What matters most to this discussion, however, is that the history of the region during this period is closely linked to the panhellenic sanctuaries, a front of the Sullan campaign in Greece, which turned out to be decisive in his relations with the Greek world as a whole.

Sulla's depredation of the Greek sanctuaries is reported by Plutarch, who links the siege of Athens directly to Sulla's need for fresh resources.¹ Interestingly, he stresses an aspect of Sulla's conduct before and after the conquest of Athens: his striking, even appalling indifference towards Greek religious institutions and sanctuaries. According to Plutarch, when Sulla sent Caphis of Titheora, a Greek member of his entourage, to collect the treasure of the Delphic Amphictyony, his envoy was extremely wary and ended by bursting into tears in front of the priests of Apollo, fearing the possible consequences of such an impious act. When he wrote to Sulla claiming that he had witnessed some unfortunate presages, he received a mocking reply and was ordered to withdraw the treasure at any rate.² Plutarch makes it clear that only political convenience—mainly determined by the need to keep the favour of his army—mattered to Sulla at that stage.³ Piety could happily be left aside and rediscovered after the victory. Allegations of impiety, however, could turn out to be a political problem in the meantime.

¹ Plut. *Sull.* 12.5.

² Plut. *Sull.* 12.6–8. The chronology of the episode cannot be determined: Daux 1936, 399. About Caphis, see Plut. *Sull.* 15.5, with Robert 1960, 82–84; C.P. Jones 1971, 41–42 argues that Plutarch was told about Caphis' deeds by his friend Socrarus, who was from Titheora himself.

³ Duff 1999, 165–168, 193–200 is an excellent discussion of Sulla's portrait in Plutarch.

The negotiations between Caphis and the Amphictyones show how important a factor religion could be in the relations between Sulla and the Greek world since the beginning of the Mithridatic War. The record of the Roman general was both inconsistent and controversial in this respect. No doubt, some episodes did not help him to earn a good reputation. In Athens he was blamed for hunting Aristion down to the temple of Athena, where the former tyrant had fled after the Romans had stormed in the city.⁴ According to Pausanias, who has a consistently negative bias against Sulla but whom there is no reason to disbelieve on this matter, he was also responsible for the sack of at least two Greek temples.⁵

At Orchomenus, he stole from the Myniae sanctuary a standing statue of Dionysus, made by Myron, which he later dedicated again on Helicon, where many other statues of the gods and the muses were on display. Pausanias bitterly remarks that Sulla's behaviour is the most vivid illustration of a Greek proverb, "to worship gods with other people's incense".⁶ Pausanias is the only source mentioning hostile actions of Sulla against Orchomenus. A destruction of the city can safely be ruled out, as the story of Damon shows the local elite actively plotting against Chaeronea in the immediate aftermath of the war. In fact, the eventual attempt of the Orchomenians to damage Chaeronea by questioning its loyalty to Rome is probably to be explained in light of a crisis they suffered at Sulla's hands. According to another passage of the *Periegesis*, Sulla's misdeeds caused a severe crisis for the city, comparable to that which other Greek associates of Mithridates suffered: "Sulla's treatment of the Athenians was fierce and alien to the character of the Romans, but it was consistent with his treatment of the Thebans and the Orchomenians."⁷

⁴ The crime committed by the victorious general was so awful that Pausanias viewed it (1.20.7) as the cause of his horrible death, caused by the same disease which had caused the death of the philosopher Pherecydes of Syrus. Different accounts of Aristion's death in App. *Mithr.* 39.151 and Plut. *Sull.* 14.11–12. A list of other famous characters allegedly killed by the same illness as Sulla is provided by Plutarch too (*Sull.* 36.5).

⁵ On the booty that Sulla gathered in the Greek East, see Pape 1975, 21–22; Waurick 1975, 44, 46. The shipwreck discovered near Mahdia, in modern Tunisia, has been viewed as a that of the ship carrying part of the booty that Sulla gathered at Athens (on which see Luc. *Zeux.* 3). There is, in fact, no way to prove that, and a dating to 100 BC ca. is most likely: Hellenkemper-Salies 1994.

⁶ Paus. 9.30.1: θυμάμασιν ἀλλοτρίοις τὸ θεῖον σέβεσθαι. Cf. Arafat 1996, 103–104; Schörner 2003, 85, fn. 611.

⁷ Paus. 9.33.6: Σύλλα δε ἔστι μὲν καὶ τὰ ἐς Ἀθηναίους ἀνήμερα καὶ ἥθους ἀλλότρια

In Pausanias’ view, however, these misdeeds were not Sulla’s greatest fault. The Boeotian village of Alalcomenae had in its territory an important sanctuary of Athena, which Sulla profaned by stealing the image of the goddess. The shrine was soon abandoned, because the goddess was widely believed “not to live there any more”.⁸ Sulla, however, was cursed by the gods, his fortune started to decline and he died of scabies—the just punishment for such a misdeed. With his explanation of Sulla’s death, Pausanias confirms that a strong tradition, overtly hostile to Sulla, had developed in the Greek world, which still found a place in the historical debate in the second century AD. There is some ground to believe, however, that Sulla tried to counter this vision and to give credit to a different representation of his conduct in the Greek world, especially when the defeat of Mithridates seemed at hand. I intend to suggest that this was a crucial point on his political agenda.

In fact, the portrait of an impious Sulla is challenged by several interesting episodes. Back in the 90s, during his *propraetorship* in Cilicia, he had confirmed the *asylia* of the sanctuary of Isis and Serapis at Mopsuestia, which had already been acknowledged by the Seleucid kings. The grant was renewed by Lucullus in the late 80s and endorsed by Sulla during his dictatorship, as is shown by the inscription that records it.⁹ As Sulla arrived in Greece, the oracle of Trophonius, near Lebadea, predicted that he would obtain great victories in Greece and in Asia Minor.¹⁰ In the tenth book of his *Memoirs*, he recalled that a Roman businessman based in Greece, Q. Titius, came to him immediately after the first victory of Chaeronea, announcing that the oracle

τοῦ Ῥωμαίων, ἐοικότα δὲ τοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐς Θηβαίους τε καὶ Ὀρχομενίους. As we have seen in 1.2, Sulla deprived Thebes of a considerable part of its territory, which he gave to the Panhellenic sanctuaries as compensation: Paus. 9.7.4–6.

⁸ However, the village was not destroyed: Strab. 9.2.36 = C 413.

⁹ SEG 44.1227. First published and discussed in Sayer-Siewert-Taeuber 1994; see also Rigsby 1996, 465–472, no. 217. Lucullus explicitly refers to the *asylia* decreed by other Roman magistrates before him (l. 15–16). The reference is to the magistrates who, since 102, had been in charge of the *provincia Cilicia*. The extant fragment of l. 2, where Sulla’s accompanying letter was, reads]σεως τῆς[, which the editors supplement as ἀνανεώ]σεως τῆς[: it is possible that Sulla was here referring to the renewal of a privilege awarded by himself (Rigsby 1996, 469). Buraselis 2003, 156–157 speculates that the grants of Sulla and Lucullus extended the *asylia* of the sanctuary to the city, implying that Rome would protect it from the pirates.

¹⁰ Plut. *Sull.* 17.1.

had predicted another one in the near future; subsequently a soldier called Salvienus reported another oracle foreseeing the victory in the Civil War.¹¹

At some point during the war, Sulla granted the sanctuary of Amphiaraus near Oropus, on the border between Boeotia and Attica, complete fiscal immunity, and even gave it new land—a remarkable sign of favour in itself. Later, in 80 BC, a *senatusconsultum* confirmed the decision. The circumstance is recorded by a controversy which arose some years later and required the arbitration of the Roman Senate. In 74/73 BC, Sulla's decision was challenged by the publicani, who tried to levy taxes from the sanctuary. Somewhat curiously, their argument was a religious one: Amphiaraus was a hero, not a god, and his sanctuary did not deserve immunity. A new *senatusconsultum*, however, was passed (*RDGE* 23) confirming the decisions of Sulla, and the *asylia* of the sanctuary was respected down to the age of Augustus, when the publicani left Greece.¹² In that very period, the Amphiaraeum returned under Athens' sphere of influence, where it used to belong before the intervention of Sulla. The intention to harm Athenian interests may have had a role in the decision to reassert the autonomy of the sanctuary. At any rate, the episode casts doubt on the stereotype of an impious Sulla, holding Greek religious tradition in low regard, and encourages us to adopt a more nuanced perspective.¹³ But there is much more. The strategy adopted by Sulla to present himself in the aftermath of his victory over Mithridates and Archelaus offers very interesting evidence to the discussion.

Plutarch provides important information about the way in which Sulla celebrated his crucial victory at Chaeronea.¹⁴ He erected two tro-

¹¹ Plut. *Sull.* 17.2–3. It is significant that both responses were reported to Sulla by Roman citizens. The Trophonius oracle already had a record of responses consistently favourable to the Romans: Radke 1939, 684. It is significant that the local festival of the *Basileia* was resumed straight after the Mithridatic War: Gossage 1975, 123–124. There is a useful list of the evidence for Greek religious festivals discontinued because of the First Mithridatic War in Habicht 2006, 160–161.

¹² On the immunity of the Amphiaraeum, cf. Cic. *nat. deor.* 3.49. On the economic history of the area, see Kahrstedt 1954, 59. The inscriptional evidence suggests that the local festival in honour of Amphiaraus, the *Amphiaraia*, kept flourishing after 80 BC: Gossage 1975, 117–121. See also Dignas 2002, 118–119.

¹³ The decision on the status of the Amphiaraeum is viewed in an anti-Athenian light by Cosmopoulos 2001, 79, who supports the argument by stressing the emergence of local pottery in the first century BC.

¹⁴ On the development of the battle, Hammond 1938, 188–201 is still fundamental; cf. Keaveney 1982a, 92–95; Brizzi 2002, 110–113, 125–128.

phies in the territory of the city, both bearing dedications “to Ares, Nike and Aphrodite”.¹⁵ Plutarch could certainly see them in his own day. At first sight, the choice of the three gods seems quite transparent, for once: Nike-Victoria is a goddess one would expect to see mentioned in such a context, Ares-Mars was the god to whom the patronage of Roman warfare was entrusted, and Aphrodite-Venus a goddess with whom both the Romans and Sulla as an individual claimed a special relationship. The language in which the dedications of the trophies were written raises a less straightforward problem. Plutarch remarks that the monument built on the top of a hill called Thurium bore the names of Omolochos and Anaxidamos, two Chaereonean notables who led the contingent of fellow citizens which took part in the battle, written “in Greek letters”.¹⁶ The accuracy of this description was confirmed by the lucky discovery, in the neighbourhood of Chaeronea, of an inscription bearing their names, which appears to be, in all likelihood, part of the trophy erected after the battle.¹⁷ Unfortunately, the archaeological context of the find does not enable us to determine how this Greek inscription related to the rest of the monument and to its overall structure. Plutarch’s specifying that the inscription was in Greek alphabet suggests that the first monument, and possibly a part of the second monument, were inscribed in Latin.¹⁸ At any rate, in another

¹⁵ Plut. *Sull.* 19.9; cf. Plut. *mor.* 318d; Paus. 9.40.7.

¹⁶ Plut. *Sull.* 19.10: γράμμασιν Ἑλληνικοῖς.

¹⁷ *SEG* 41.448, published and discussed in Camp 1992; cf. the sceptical, though unconvincing arguments of McKay 2000a. The international press has reported that the other trophy erected by Sulla, in the spot where Archelaus’ troops started withdrawing towards the Molum (Plut. *Sull.* 19.10), has recently been discovered near Orchomenus by a local peasant, and its full publication is currently being prepared by the Ephor of Classical Antiquities for Boeotia, Vassili Aravantinos; see Whitley 2004/2005, 44 and Whitley 2005/2006, 56.

¹⁸ No surviving document from Asia Minor shows us Sulla using Latin; all the messages addressed by him or by the Roman Senate are in Greek, though often translated from Latin original versions. There is a handful of Latin inscriptions of the Sullan period from Greece: two from Delos, *ID* 1850 (= *ILLRP* 349): *L. Cornelius L. f. Sulla pro co(n)s(ule)* and *ID* 1852 (= *ILLRP* 350): *L. Cornelius L. f. Sulla pro co(n)s(ule) / de pecunia quam conlegia / in commune conlatam*; see also *CIL* 1².2507; and, more interestingly, from the Peloponnesian city of Sicyon, where he dedicated a statue to Mars, on the southern side of the Artemis temple. The dedication, probably dating to the aftermath of the victory over Archelaus, reads *L(ucius) C(ornelius) L(ucii) f(ilius) Sulla imper(ator) Martei*: *AE* 1939, 43 = *ILLRP* 224; briefly discussed by Accame 1946, 158 and Griffin 1982, 89. Sicyon was definitely a free city in 60 BC: Cic. *Att.* 1.19.9, with Peppe 1988, 47–49, 55–56. Schörner 2003, 172 stresses that dedications to Ares are rarely attested in Greece in this period. On the connection between Mars and Venus Victrix, see Galinsky 1969, 233–234.

passage of the biography Plutarch says that Sulla's name also appeared in Greek, and that it was followed by a Greek name, Ἐπαφρόδιτος: "When he wrote to the Greeks or had political relations with them, he called himself *Epaphroditos*, and in our region one can read this on the trophies: 'Lucius Cornelius Sulla *Epaphroditos*'."¹⁹

It is beyond doubt that Plutarch is here referring to the Chaeronean trophies, but the importance of his remark goes way beyond the boundaries of Boeotia and concerns Sulla's relations with the Greek world as a whole. Very early on during his campaign, certainly soon after the first decisive victory over Archelaus (if not earlier, as we shall see), Sulla decided to deal with the Greek world using a name, *Epaphroditos*, that suggested a close relationship between him and Aphrodite, and soon became part of his name. The numismatic evidence confirms the importance of this process, and prompts further interest in the background to the name.

At the end of his campaign to the East, Sulla struck his own coinage, which he used to finance his army and which had a wide circulation in the Italian regions where his march was easiest, like Apulia, Campania and Southern Latium.²⁰ The mint travelled with him, and resources had been gathered on the way. In Greece, they derived from the conquest of Athens and, even more, from the depredation of the panhellenic sanctuaries. In 84/83 BC, at the end of the Mithridatic War, on his way back to Italy, Sulla struck a coin issue, produced both in aurei and denarii, that looks like a perfect epitome of the ideological agenda of his imperialistic effort. *RRC* 359 has, on the recto, a head of Venus and the name of Sulla and, on the verso, the legend *IMPER(ATOR) ITERV(M)* (literally: "twice victorious commander"), accompanied by a jug and a *lituus*, two symbols related to the augurate and to the concept of *imperium*, and surrounded by two trophies which have long been identified with those he erected at Chaeronea.²¹

¹⁹ Plut., *Sull.* 34.4: αὐτὸς δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλησι γράφων καὶ χρηματίζων, ἑαυτὸν Ἐπαφρόδιτον ἀνηγόρευε, καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς τροπαίοις οὕτως ἀναγέγραπται· Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Σύλλας Ἐπαφρόδιτος.

²⁰ The hoards containing Sullan coins from the years of the Civil War have been found in Southern Italy, where the penetration of the Sullan army found no opposition: see Crawford 1964, 150.

²¹ On the emphasis on the title of *imperator*, see Cesano 1945/1946, 188; Deininger 1972, 985–986. On the jug and the *lituus*, see *RRC*, 373–374 and Keaveney 1982c, 154–161, linking Sulla's "claim to *imperium*" to the *hostis*-declaration pronounced by his enemies while he was in the East. This coin issue has often been discussed in modern



Fig. 1. Aureus struck by Sulla *imperator iterum* in 84–83 BC (*RRC* 359; © copyright The Trustees of the British Museum, London)

Discussion has involved various aspects of this coin, such as the meaning of the symbols referring to the augurate and the mention of the double proclamation of the title of *imperator*, which almost certainly refers to the victories in Cilicia and at Chaeronea.²² It is indisputable

studies on the priestships that Sulla held, or may have held. On this, see the polemic between B. Frier, arguing that Sulla was an augur from 88 BC and claimed back the priesthood in 84/83 BC (Frier 1967, Frier 1969; cf. Cesano 1945/1946, 204; Luce 1968, 27), and E. Badian, claiming that he was a pontiff instead (Badian 1968b, Badian 1969); cf. Alföldi 1976, 156 and Martin 1989, 43. *RRC*, 374 argues that Sulla reached the augurate only in 82, replacing L. Scipio Asiagenus; same position in Rüpke 2005, 926–927. Fears 1977, 104–105, 109–110 speculatively argues that the *lituus* is a symptom of exceptional divine favour and personal charisma, both in the Sullan coinage and in late Republican issues as a whole; see also Fears 1981, 785 and Wistrand 1987, 29.

²² See the commentary in *RRC*, nos. 359–360, with earlier bibliography; also cf. *RRC*, 732. It is possible, however, that the first proclamation took place in 89 BC, after the victory over the Samnites near Nola, when Sulla received the *corona graminea*: Plin. 22.12 (= *HRR*² 10). Wosnik 1963, 14–31 and Martin 1989 argue that *RRC* 359 was actually struck at the end of the Civil War, and that Sulla was hailed as *imperator* for the second time after the victory of the Colline Gate: I find it unlikely, since that was the final act of the Civil War (cf. Val. Max. 2.8.7). It is needless to argue, with Gisborne 2005, 114, that the title must be explained with the fact that Sulla's triumph lasted two days rather than the usual one; and the use of *iterum* instead of *bis* is unproblematic.

that the two trophies are a reference to the victory over Mithridates. Their importance was so great that Sulla referred to them on the first coin issue he ever produced, on his way back from the Greek East. They were the visual celebration of his crucial victory in the campaign for the reconquest of Greece.

The stress on the battle at Chaeronea is hardly surprising, if one considers the actual development of the campaign. It was, in fact, the most important military confrontation that Sulla had with the army of Mithridates. When he won it, he probably knew already that he would seek an appeasement of Mithridates that would ensure the *status quo ante* and enable him to leave for Italy in the near future. The event had to be celebrated for what it actually was: the most important moment of the war, the victory that threw Mithridates' army out of Greece for good and prepared its final defeat. In this light, it is not surprising that the trophies also feature, in small size, on several coin issues struck in Athens after the reconquest.²³ The theme of the double victory may also occur in the so-called Bocchus monument, found at Rome near the church of Sant'Omobono, where two trophies feature, and the palm branch in the eagle's beak clearly has two wreaths.²⁴ It is possible that the monument was built in 91 BC, as a base for the statue portraying the capture of Jugurtha by Sulla, and demolished by Marius in 87 BC (see introduction). Sulla may have rebuilt it after he returned from the East, bringing about some significant iconographic changes.²⁵

At any rate, in Sulla's intentions Chaeronea was to be remembered as the beginning of the new phase of the history of Roman Greece, and as the moment when the threat posed by Mithridates came to an end. The powerful message of *RRC* 359 is complemented by the presence of Venus, next to Sulla's name.²⁶ The reference to the goddess is extremely significant, especially in the aftermath of the first victory over Mithridates. The importance of Sulla's allusion to his

²³ Thompson 1961, 430–431, nos. 1341–1345; Thompson 1965.

²⁴ See the bibliography listed in the introduction, fn. 7.

²⁵ The importance of Jugurtha's capture for Sulla's propaganda is confirmed by the coin issue struck by his son Faustus Sulla in 56 BC: see *RRC* no. 426.1 and Holscher 1994, 56–60, 227–229.

²⁶ On the portraits of Sulla known from coins and statues, see Strocka 2003 and Ganschow 2003; for a possible portrait on a gem, see Vollenweider 1974, 30–31.

special relationship with Venus in the definition of his imperial strategy has probably not been adequately stressed so far. Scholars have often tended to view it as a feature of his personal propaganda and as a claim to be used mainly in the Roman political arena. I believe, on the contrary, that the claim to Venus’ favour played a very prominent role in Sulla’s relations with the Greek world, whereas it was less intensively exploited on the Italian front. It is significant that the fourth name Sulla adopted in Italy was not *Epaphroditos*, but *Felix*, which has nothing to do with Venus.²⁷ The evidence of *RRC* 359, if very precious, is not conclusive. Luckily, it can be usefully supplemented by a literary source.

A passage from Appian’s *Civil Wars*, which conveniently, although not always clearly, deals with the meanings of Sulla’s ‘fourth names’, records the time when Venus appears to have become part of Sulla’s *Selbstdarstellung* in the Greek East. At some point during the Greek campaign, Sulla consulted an oracle, no doubt that of Delphi (1.97.453–455).²⁸ Despite the strong criticism he attracted in the Greek world for having deprived the panhellenic sanctuaries of their treasures, Sulla was very interested in acknowledging the function of religious institutions, partly because of his personal beliefs, and partly because he was aware of their political value. The oracle gave him a very interesting response, based on three points, which is worth quoting in full:

Πειθεό μοι, Ῥωμαῖε. κράτος μέγα Κύπρις ἔδωκεν
 Αἰνείου γενῇ μεμελημένα. ἀλλὰ σὺ πᾶσιν
 ἀθανάτοις ἐπέτεια τίθει. μὴ λήθῃς τῶνδε·
 Δελφοῖς δῶρα κόμίζε. Καὶ ἔστι τις ἀμβαίνουσι
 Ταύρου ὑπὸ νιφόεντος, ὅπου περιμήκετον ἄστῃ
 Καρῶν, οἱ ναίουσιν ἐπώνυμον ἐξ Ἀφροδίτης·
 ἧ πέλεκυν θέμενος λήψῃ κράτος ἀμφιλάφες σοι.

Believe me, Roman. Cypris gave great power
 to the offspring of Aeneas, which she protects. But offer
 yearly gifts to all the immortals. Do not forget that!
 Bring gifts to Delphi. And there is a god, for those who climb
 under the snowy Taurus, where there is a high city inhabited
 by the Carians, which they name after Aphrodite;
 dedicate an axe to her and you will obtain enormous power.

²⁷ Passerini 1935 very usefully stresses the differences between the two names; a similar approach in Castagnetti 1996.

²⁸ Gabba 1958, 265–267. See also Marinoni 1987, 193–209 (probably the best study of this topic).

The oracle acknowledged that, as a Roman, Sulla was a descendant and a protégé of Aphrodite: this was in itself a great strength, and implied precise religious duties. For this very reason, the oracle ordered him to send gifts to Delphi and to honour the shrine of Aphrodite in the Carian city of Aphrodisias by offering an axe. These pious actions would ensure him a great power. Sulla was happy to comply with the order and sent the axe and a golden crown to the sanctuary, accompanied by an epigram in which he remembered having dreamed of the goddess leading the Roman army with the signs of Mars.²⁹ There is no evidence to say whether Sulla himself went to Aphrodisias at some point during his stay in Asia Minor; however, this issue has a relative importance.

What matters to the present discussion is the apparent political agenda of the oracle's response. A descendant of Venus was asked to put a remedy to his guilt towards the most important Greek sanctuary, and to pay tribute to a sanctuary of Aphrodite situated in the region of Asia Minor that had been most loyal to Rome. No doubt that was the outcome of some discreet diplomacy involving at least three parties: Sulla, Delphi, and Aphrodisias—then the sanctuary of a not-so-prominent community in a region of Asia Minor that resisted Mithridates' attack most staunchly. Sulla's reference to his dreaming of Aphrodite suggests that the vision dated back to the night before a battle fought in the Greek campaign. It is striking, and no doubt significant, that Sulla's dream referred both to Aphrodite and to Ares, who are mentioned in the inscription of the Chaeronea trophy.

His visit to the Delphic oracle probably dates to the aftermath of the victory.³⁰ Surely, it was the most appropriate occasion to compensate the sanctuary for the expropriation of its treasury at the beginning of the campaign. The gift to the Aphrodisias sanctuary must date to the

²⁹ App. *b. c.* 1.98.455: τόνδε σοι αὐτοκράτωρ Σύλλας ἀνέθηκε, Ἀφροδίτη / ᾧ σ' εἶδον κατ' ὄνειρον ἀνὰ στρατὴν διέπουσαν / τεύχεσι τοῖς Ἄρεος μαρναμένην ἔνοπλον ("Sulla brought you this axe, Aphrodite, as in a dream he saw you leading the army, fighting fully clad with the arms of Ares").

³⁰ Appian is not explicit about the chronology of the episode. Although it cannot be ruled out that Sulla visited the oracle on his way back to Italy, the prominence of the *Epaphroditos* motif in his relationship with the East makes it quite unlikely. Scholars have tended to date the visit to 87 or 86 BC, and usually before the Chaeronea battle: a summary of the most significant positions in Marinoni 1987, 223–226. I am inclined to think that the oracle was consulted in 86 BC, after the victory at Chaeronea and soon before the move to Asia.

aftermath of the battle of Chaeronea at the very earliest, when Sulla had already reconquered mainland Greece and was preparing the final stage of the war in Asia Minor. The order to make gifts to Delphi would be quite easily explainable in this context. There had been a crisis in the relations between the Roman commander and the sanctuary, which needed to be solved by reasserting full respect on the part of the Romans. Therefore Sulla decided to offer the territorial compensation to Delphi, Epidaurus and Olympia. The second part of the response, suggesting Sulla to honour to the shrine of Aphrodisias, is certainly engrained in the context of his Eastern campaign. As Mithridates' success shows, Greece and Asia Minor had closer ties than is usually assumed. The descendants of Aphrodite were ordered to pay their respect to a temple of the goddess in the Greek East, which deserved gratitude and recognition for the firmly pro-Roman stance taken in the Mithridatic War, and shared by other Carian communities.³¹

As far as Sulla's special relationship with Aphrodite is concerned, the phrasing of the oracle shows that it was rooted in the way the Greek world was used to view and to represent the Romans. He was the military commander of a people whose mythical kinship with the goddess was universally acknowledged by the end of the first century BC (“the offspring of Aeneas”, Αἰνείου γένεῃ, as the oracle calls the Romans).³² This was not controversial for any of the parties involved: the Greeks were prepared to acknowledge it, and Sulla was ready to exploit its political significance.³³

³¹ See Marinoni 1987, 232–235. About the iconography of the Carian Aphrodite, which had some impact on Roman art, see Fredrich 1897 and Galinsky 1969, 217 (with further bibliography at fn. 90).

³² Breglia Pulci Doria 1983, 265–279 has suggested that the Trojan liberator, the Τρώς mentioned in the Sybilline oracle recorded by Phlegon of Tralles (*FGrHist* 257 F 36.X) is Sulla, and that this is a development of the theme of the kinship between Aphrodite and Rome that he reasserted during the Mithridatic War. It must be noted, however, that the Cornelii were not among the *familiae Troianae*, although they seem to have had a tradition of veneration for Venus (cf. *RRC* 205.2).

³³ Norden 1901, 255–258; Balsdon 1951, 8–10; Schilling 1954, 281–282; Weinstock 1955, 187–188; Galinsky 1969, 217–219; Erskine 2001, 237–245. Cf. Liv. 37.37.3, dealing with the visit of the Cornelii Scipiones to Ilium, in 190 BC. Fimbria was much less receptive: during his siege of Troy he justified his order to the Ilions to capitulate by evoking the kinship between the two cities in an ironic way. This no doubt played a part in Sulla's decision to grant freedom the city: App. *Mithr.* 53.211 (cf. Dio 35.104.7). In light of such background, it is unlikely that Sulla's main concern in stressing the link with Venus was to counter Mithridates' association with Dionysus, as argued in Hind 1994, 163 and Gisborne 2005, 115–116.

The actual genesis of *Epaphroditos*, however, is less straightforward. It certainly is a development of the kinship theme taken up by the oracle. It is hard to go beyond the conclusions reached, more than fifty years ago, by E. Fränkel and J.P.V.D. Balsdon, showing that it is etymologically connected with Aphrodite and it relates to her qualities, but it cannot be interpreted simply as the ‘favoured of Venus’, as has repeatedly been suggested.³⁴ *Epaphroditos* had been used, as an adjective, since Herodotus, and may be translated as ‘fascinating, charming’: a charm deriving, of course, from the most charming goddess, Aphrodite. Sulla, or even one of his associates, must have found the name (or rather the word) still in use in first century BC Greek, they were attracted by it, and decided to use it in order to stress the connection with the goddess. In his memoirs Sulla made it clear how much, since the beginning of his career, he liked to think of himself as a person with extraordinary, almost charismatic, qualities. The charm he emanated was the alleged source of his famous fortune, and it became widely known and highly rated in Rome at the end of his life.³⁵

It was only after contact with the Greek world, however, that Sulla found the way to develop this aspect and to exploit it within the framework and the needs of the Roman imperial project. It was only during the Mithridatic War that the theme of his special relationship with the gods could be best exploited if it was combined with the evocation of a kinship between Rome and an individual goddess, of course Venus. The official correspondence between *Epaphroditos* and *Felix* was ratified by a *senatusconsultum* voted in 82 BC, and *Felix* was added to Sulla’s *tria nomina*.³⁶ Appian (our only source for this decision) claims, perhaps stretch-

³⁴ Balsdon 1951, 8, esp. fn. 91; *contra* Ericsson 1943, 84; Keaveney 1983a, 64–65; Behr 1993, 160; Fadinger 2002 (a misleading discussion, trying to discuss Sulla’s use of religion in light of some Near Eastern parallels). Erckell 1952, 83 and Wistrand 1987, 27–28 go too far in arguing that Ἐπαφροδίτης corresponds exactly to *uenustus* (perhaps following Facciolati-Forcellini-Bailey 1828, 2.828, s. u.): see Weinstock 1955, 187 and *RRC*, 373. *Unereus*, suggested in Desrosiers 1969, 197, is definitely not an option.

³⁵ Cf. Plut. *Sull.* 35.5–11: a woman, passing by his seat while he was sitting in a theatre, touched his toga, justifying her deed with the intention to get some of Sulla’s fortune by that quick contact: on this episode, see Wagenvoort 1954, 321–322 (= Wagenvoort 1980, 81–83). Front. *Strat.* 1.11.11 remarked that claiming a special relationship with the gods could be very useful for a general: *L. Sulla, quo paratorem militem ad pugnandum haberet, praedici sibi a diis futura simulavit*.

³⁶ See Vell. 2.27.5 and *vir. ill.* 75.9, with Gabba 1958, 264, who views the decision as part of the senatorial ratification of the *acta Sullae*. Appian tries to convey the impression of the great power which Sulla enjoyed in Rome by mentioning a statue of his erected in the Forum, bearing a dedication which probably read, in Latin, as *Cornelio Sullae*

ing the imagination, that the name was used by the many adulators of the new strong man and later on passed into official use. He goes on to say that in Rome Sulla was also called *Faustus* and “the name can be very similar to *aisios* or to *epaphroditos*”.³⁷ Appian is making at least one mistake: Sulla never adopted the cognomen *Faustus*, but rather introduced it among Roman *praenomina* by giving it to his children.³⁸ The confusion may derive from a linguistic matter: in Appian’s day, *Epaphroditos* apparently meant ‘propitious’ too, as he somewhat misleadingly related it to the Latin name *Faustus*. Moreover, there is no etymological connection between *Faustus*, or *Felix*, and *Epaphroditos*, which is of course explicitly linked to Aphrodite. They may well have been used by, and referred to, the same person, but their origin was clearly different.

If one looks at the meanings of the two adjectives, their analogy is not ill-founded: they both refer to a range of meanings involving personal fascination, good luck, divine favour, and exceptional ability to influence people and situations. As Plutarch says, Sulla used to acknowledge a fundamental role to *Tyche*—‘fate’, ‘destiny’, ‘fortune’.³⁹ He saw it as a prominent force—although not as a goddess—integrating and completing his virtues. To his mind, none of his victories would have been possible without his exceptional value, and without the support and the protection afforded by fate.⁴⁰ Any direct relationship between the cult of Fortuna and that of Aphrodite must, however, be ruled out. In fact Sulla never aimed to depict himself as a protégé of Fortuna.⁴¹ The origins of *Felix* and *Epaphroditos* are independent from each other, and must be explained by different contexts and political agendas. However striking the similarities between the outcomes of the two processes may be, they should not conceal the profound differences.

Felici imperatori (1.97.451). On this statue, see also Cic. *Phil.* 9.13; Vell. 2.61.3; Suet. *Div. Jul.* 75.4; Dio 42.18; cf. *RRR* 381. See Sehlmeier 1999, 204–209, 231–232.

³⁷ App. *b. c.* 1.97.452: δύναται δὲ τοῦ αἰσίου καὶ ἐπαφροδίτου ἀγχοτάτω μάλιστα εἶναι τὸ ὄνομα.

³⁸ Plutarch loosely states that both his children were given the names of *Faustus* and *Fausta*, as a further honour of the leading force of the goddess Fortuna (*Sull.* 34.5). The twins were probably born in 87–86; see Angeli Bertinelli 1997, 403–404.

³⁹ Plut. *mor.* 318c–d.

⁴⁰ Weinstock 1971, 231 on the relationship between Fortuna and Virtus in Sulla’s approach; the comparison between Sulla’s Fortuna and Marius’ Virtus in Wistrand 1987, 27–34 is interesting, though somewhat schematic.

⁴¹ Plut. *mor.* 318c–d must be interpreted in this light. See Marx 1890, 121–122; Marx 1899, 543–545; Ericsson 1943, 77–82; Erckell 1952, 72–79; Weinstock 1961, 208–209 (criticising Latte 1960, 279–280); Champeaux 1987, 216–236.

Epaphroditos is used in several official acts that Sulla produced in the Greek East, both in Greece and in Asia Minor.⁴² The *senatusconsultum* about the Amphiaraeum at Oropus, for instance, refers to Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Ἐπαφρόδιτος (l. 52). This document, however, does not contain a message issued by Sulla himself, as it is a confirmation of decisions taken by him when he was in Greece: Ἐπαφρόδιτος is used only once, while Sulla is mentioned five more times. The *senatusconsultum* confirming freedom for the city of Tabae, in Caria, calls Sulla Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Σύλλας αὐτοκράτωρ (l. 9–10: “Lucius Cornelius Sulla *imperator*”), while the *s.c. de Stratonicensibus* speaks of [Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Λ]ευκίου [υἱός] Σύλλας Ἐπαφρόδιτος | δικτάτωρ (l. 1–2: “Lucius Cornelius Sulla, son of Lucius Epaphroditos dictator”). The difference must be explained by the different contexts in which Sulla is mentioned. In the text addressed to Tabae, the Senate confirms the privileges granted by Sulla in his capacity of victorious commander, at the end of the conflict, when *Epaphroditos* was not part of his full name. In the one for Stratonicea, the dictator Sulla *Epaphroditos* is addressing a letter to the assembly and the people of the Carian city introducing them to the context and the negotiations which led to the approval of the *s. c.*, whose text follows immediately afterwards. However, only the first lines of the *s. c. de Tabenis*, which are unfortunately lost, would enable us to reach safer conclusions.

The background and the use of the name chosen by Sulla for his relations with the Greek world are not mere technicalities. On the contrary, they can help us to understand some aspects of Sulla’s self-representation as an epoch-making leading figure in Roman history, who even found it acceptable to expand his name by using a completely new rationale: Scipio or Metellus had become Africanus or Numidicus because of something they had achieved; Sulla claimed to **be** *Epaphroditos* (or *Felix*, for that matter).⁴³ Most importantly for our purposes, this discussion can help us to realise how communicating with the Greek world in a personal and innovative way was important to Sulla’s wider strategy, and how interested he was in exploiting the opportunities offered by the religious dimension of Greek culture.⁴⁴

⁴² *RDGE* 18, l. 74, 103, 125 (*s. c. de Stratonicensibus*); *RDGE* 20, col. II d, l. 7 and II e, l. 4–5 (*s. c. de Thasius*); *RDGE* 23, l. 52 (*s. c. de Oropius*); *RDGE* 49, l. 2–3 (the letter to the artists of Dionysus).

⁴³ See Ericsson 1943, 78; Balsdon 1951, 1: “a far advance from such specific cognomina as ‘Numidicus’ or ‘Africanus’”.

⁴⁴ Galinsky 1969, 187–188, helpfully remarks that the legend of the Trojan ancestry

Sulla's main aim in the Greek East was to resume its exploitation, at the same time compelling the local elites to get closer to Rome and to resume full cooperation with her. To do so, he did not limit himself to confronting them with excessive demands, which left the Asian cities with no choice but to look for Roman patrons. He also tried to persuade the Greeks that, to an extent, they shared the same legacy with the Romans. The Romans descended from the daughter of Zeus, the goddess who presided over love and social coexistence. At the same time, they were the descendants of the Trojans, who fought against the Greeks, but had long been widely regarded as very similar to them.⁴⁵ The potential of such an ambiguous identity was obvious. Rome was somehow part of the Greek world, and still irremediably different from it. She had a right to interfere in Greek affairs, and at the same time could present herself as an independent power and an external force.⁴⁶ These themes had been lingering in the Roman religious discourse for nearly two centuries, but it is with Sulla that they were first used for an explicit political purpose, on the wider scene of the empire.

of Rome was used by the Roman elite, and that it never became a “living popular tradition”. The foundation of Rome, and Aeneas’ role in it, started to intrigue Greek scholars by the end of the fourth century: see Cornell 1975, 23–27, with earlier bibliography; Gruen 1992, 8–21, 26–27, 37–38.

⁴⁵ On the ‘Grecisation’ of the Trojans from the fourth century BC, see Galinsky 1969, 161–162; Gruen 1992, 16–21.

⁴⁶ Galinsky 1969, 187–190; Gabba 1976b, 94–101; Gruen 1992, 29–31. Cf. the curious theory of the first century BC antiquarian Aristodemus of Nysa, who claimed that Homer was in fact Roman: Heath 1998.

CHAPTER TWO

A NEW FOUNDER FOR ROME

By exploiting the theme of kinship between Rome and Venus in the aftermath of the Mithridatic War, Sulla also managed to make it part of his own political discourse, which was a global one, and went beyond the boundaries of the Greek East. There is not much direct evidence for Sulla's use of religion after his return to Italy. It seems quite clear, however, that he gave to several of his actions the trademark of those of the 'new founder' of Rome after more than decade of turmoil and civil war. The theme was of course related to the kinship with Venus, although it had a largely independent development.

That the theme of the 'refoundation' of Rome was so prominent in Sulla's agenda must have been known to some quarters of the Greek world too, as the behaviour of the Athenian elite seems to suggest. Sulla came back to Athens on his way back to Italy, in 84BC. He took several important initiatives during his stay in the city, and he received considerable honours too. Athens had betrayed Rome, of course, and Sulla showed his generosity by sparing it from destruction. His attitude towards the city could not be as positive as the attitude he adopted towards the cities that he had declared free. However, he showed he was prepared to deal with the pro-Roman elites in a relatively amicable way. That is what he did in Athens, by spending some time in the city and accepting pledges of loyalty from the local elite. Of course, he could afford to behave as if he was in perfect control of the situation, with a victorious army protecting him during his stay and with plenty of time to rest from the hardship of war. No doubt Sulla found some time to enjoy himself during his second stay in Athens—but he acted with a political agenda too. Even after the Mithridatic War and the complete submission of the Greek world to Rome, Athens was not, and could not be, a city like all the others.

First and foremost, Athens was still a major cultural centre. Even Sulla was keen to exploit the opportunities it offered. According to Plutarch, during his stay in town he laid his hands on the library of Apellicon of Teos, a former supporter of Athenion, who owned many

works of Aristotle and Theophrastus.¹ Moreover, in Plutarch's words, he was "initiated" (μυηθείς). Although K. Clinton has rightly noticed that Plutarch is not explicit here about the initiation received by Sulla, it is likely that he actually refers to the most prominent Athenian mysteries, those of Eleusis.² Sulla's interest in, or respect for, Athenian culture, however, still went hand in hand with more ruthless attitudes. Pliny the Elder records that he used some columns from the temple of Olympian Zeus in the reconstruction on the Capitol.³ It is unlikely that the columns of the Olympieion that were already in place were dismantled. Moreover, the temple had been left unfinished after Antiochus IV's death in 164 BC, and it was accomplished only under Hadrian. Pliny probably means that Sulla took to Rome some columns that were designed to be used in the construction of the temple.⁴

Some inscriptional evidence shows that the Athenians paid tribute to Sulla with a statue (*IG* 2².4103 = *SEG* 24.214) and, more importantly, by creating new civic games in his honour, called *Sylleia*. The chronology of these games is far from certain. It is safe to assume that they were discontinued some time after Sulla's death. However, they were almost certainly still held in 79/78 BC, under the archonship of Apollodorus, who is mentioned in an inscription praising the ephebes who served in the games, and they can hardly have been abolished before the prominent Sullan C. Scribonius Curio, who played such an important part of the reconquest of Athens, was proconsul of Macedonia between 75 and 72.⁵ A. Raubitschek has demonstrated that the holding of the

¹ Plut. *Sull.* 26.1–2. About Apellicon, see Goulet 1989; about the role of his library in the spread of Aristotelism at Rome, cf. Barnes 1997, esp. 8–17, and Sedley 1997, 112.

² Clinton 1989, 1503; moreover, I see no serious reason to suggest that the text is corrupt.

³ Plin. 36.5.45: *columnis demum utebantur in templis, nec lautitiae causa—nondum enim ista intellegebantur—sed quia firmiores aliter statui non poterant. sic est inchoatum Athenis templum Iouis Olympii, ex quo Sulla Capitolinis aedibus aduexerat columnas* ("[marble] columns were used in temples, surely not as ornaments, since ornaments were not appreciated, but because people were not able to build stronger columns. Thus they feature in the unfinished temple of Jupiter Olympius at Athens, from which Sulla brought columns to be used for the temple on the Capitol").

⁴ Cf. Boëthius 1962, 31; Gjerstad 1962, 39–40; Abramson 1974a, 8–23; Abramson 1974b. I find no reason to doubt that the columns were used in Rome: *contra*, Heilmeyer 1970, 34 and Gros 1990, 844. On the history of the Olympieion, see Travlos 1971, 402–403. Cf. Wycherley 1964, 170–171 (with earlier bibliography), speculating that Sulla did not carry columns, but smaller decorative elements, such as capitals.

⁵ Kallet-Marx 1995, 214–215. Inscription on the ephebes: *IG* 2².1039, with *SEG* 22.110. Cf. the dedication to a winner of the *Sylleia*, *SEG* 13.279.

Sylleia was not an entirely original event in the Athenian liturgical calendar. In fact, they bear striking similarities with the *Theseia*, the games in honour of the mythical founder of the city, which required a participation of the epebes as in the *Sylleia*, consisting in a torch race. It is reasonable to believe that the short-lived games established in honour of Sulla were probably celebrated along with the *Theseia*, pretty much reproducing the same ritual.⁶

This is not the only festival that we know to have been organised in the honour of Sulla: there is an important parallel at Rome. The similarity between the *Theseia* and the *ludi uictoriae*, which Sulla annually organised at Rome from 1 November 81 BC, is quite striking.⁷ The festival he created in Rome was part of a strategy of self-celebration that aimed to portray him as a saviour and second founder of Rome. The dictatorship, and decisions like the enlargement of the Senate were surely legitimated through a parallel with Romulus, which also appears to have influenced the antiquarian tradition on early Rome.⁸ The motif was to be used polemically by Sulla's political foes too: in his speech recorded by Sallust, Lepidus called him *scaeuos iste Romulus*.⁹ By renaming the *Theseia* after Sulla, the Athenians showed that they were aware of the image Sulla was trying to impose, and they chose a parallel strategy to that he adopted at Rome. There is no need to insist

⁶ Raubitschek 1951; see also Bertrand 1978, 802.

⁷ Vell. 2.27.6; ps.-Ascon. Cic. *Verr.* 1.10.31 (p. 217 Stangl). On these *ludi*, see Keaveney 1983c, 189–191; Behr 1993, 136–143; on Sulla's use of the cult of Victoria, see Hölscher 1967, 142–147. Weinstock 1971, 102 rightly notes that the adjective *Sullanus* was added only later, probably to distinguish the Victoria celebrated by Sulla from the *Victoria Caesaris*; cf. *RRC* 445–446, no. 421. Sumi 2002, 419 is therefore inaccurate.

⁸ On the analogy between Sulla and Romulus, cf. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.7–29 and 5.77, with Gabba 1960 (= Gabba 2000, 69–108), esp. 206–225 (= Gabba 2000, 87–108); Evola Marino 1974, 26–30; 162–166; Gisborne 2005, 119–121. On Sulla's self-representation as *parens et seruator*, see Alföldi 1952, 225 and Alföldi 1953, 104. See also, in general, the useful collection of sources in Sumi 2002. Marius had probably received the title of *seruator r. p.* from the Senate in 101 BC, after the battle of the Campi Raudii: Liv. *Per.* 68.8. Plut. *Mar.* 27.9 (οἱ πολλοὶ πτίστην τε Ῥώμης τρίτον ἐκείνον ἀνηγόρευον, “most people called him the third founder of Rome”) is no firm evidence that he was hailed as ‘third founder’ of Rome: Muccioli 1994, 194–197.

⁹ Sall. *Hist.* 1.55.5: *quae cuncta scaeuos iste Romulus quasi ab externis rapta tenet, non tot exercituum clade neque consulum et aliorum principum, quos fortuna belli consumpserat, satiatius, sed tum crudelior, cum plerosque secundae res in miserationem ex ira uertunt* (“this sinister Romulus holds all these things in his possession, as if they had been seized from foreigners, and he is not content with the destruction of so many armies, consuls, and other leading men, destroyed by the destiny of the war, but he is even more cruel, at a time when success usually brings most men from anger to compassion”). *Scaeuos* is opposed to *felix*: Reggiani 1994, 211–221. A useful discussion in Ver Eecke 2005, 223–233.

on the meaning of the analogy between Theseus and Romulus, which must have been apparent to everyone.¹⁰ The Athenians were capable of using it in the most straightforward way, exploiting this equivalence and restoring the traditional calendar after Sulla had left the scene and when his legacy had become controversial in Rome.

It is in light of this analogy between Theseus, Romulus, and Sulla that the transfer of the columns from the Athenian Olympieion to Rome must be seen. Back in Rome, Sulla had to deal with the reconstruction of a central sanctuary of Roman public religion and, indeed, of the city's very identity. Therefore, he decided to use some material from a temple he was certainly very familiar with, after the long period spent in Athens, and which was dedicated to the same god. In this process, which redefined the identity of Rome as centre of the empire and of Sulla as maker of the empire itself, both the cult of Zeus Olympius and the foundation myth of Athens played an important function in their own right.

Sulla's propagandistic genius extended to the Olympic games, the panhellenic competition organised in honour of Zeus himself. According to Appian, during the 175th Olympics, in 80 BC, Sulla summoned "the athletes and the other attractions" of the Olympic games to Rome. For this reason no one took part in the competitions at Olympia, and only the chariot races were held in the stadium where the Games usually took place.¹¹ As V.J. Matthews has shown, Sulla's decision was not about giving a new home to the Olympic Games, but rather about

¹⁰ A theme unfortunately overlooked in a recent collective book on the relations between the myths of Theseus and Romulus: Greco 2005. Same omission in Dench 2005, 96–98. The parallel drawn by Behr 1993, 141 between the *ludi uictoriae Sullanae* and the ἀγόνες and θυσίαι organised at Oropus ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡγεμονίας τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ῥωμαίων (l. 48–49) is therefore misleading. The *ludi uictoriae* and the *Sylleia* were much more than the celebration of a military success. Their parallel must be explained in light of the analogy between the two city founders. Ver Eecke 2005, 114–129 has interesting thoughts about Mithridates Eupator's anti-Romulism, which was an important aspect of his anti-Roman propaganda in the Greek world.

¹¹ App. *b. c.* 1.99.463–464: Ῥωμαῖοι... αὐθις ἐπειρῶντο βασιλείας, ὀλυμπιάδων οὐσῶν ἐν Ἑλλήσιν ἑκατὸν ἐβδομήκοντα πέντε καὶ οὐδενὸς ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ τότε ἀγωνίσματος πλήν σταδίου δρόμου γιγνομένου· τοὺς γὰρ ἀθλητὰς καὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεάματα πάντα ὁ Σύλλας ἐς Ῥώμην μετεκέκλητο ἐπὶ δόξῃ τῶν Μιθριδατείων ἔργων ἢ τῶν Ἰταλικῶν. πρόφασις δ' ἦν ἀναπνεῦσαι καὶ ψυχαγωγῆσαι τὸ πλῆθος ἐκ καμάτων ("thus the Romans... resorted to monarchical government again. This was in the 175th Olympiad, according to the Greek calendar, but there were no competitions in Olympia then except for the race in the stadium, since Sulla had exported the athletes and all the shows to Rome to celebrate his deeds in the Mithridatic and Italian wars. The pretext was that the masses needed a breather and some recreation after their toils"). Cf. Eus. *Chron.* I, p. 211:

offering the Roman people a major celebration of his victory.¹² It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the best athletes of the Greek world were involved in the celebration of the *ludi uictoriae*, probably on 1 November 80. They may have found it impossible to take part both in the Olympics and in the Sullan celebrations at Rome, and for this reason the Olympic races were a complete fiasco. Only the chariot races were unaffected by Sulla's competition, because they were deeply linked to the stadium of Olympia and to the religious dimension of the Games: the winner was usually granted the privilege of lighting the fire at the altar of Zeus.

Appian claims that Sulla organised these lavish games at Rome with the sole aim to please the people and make them forget the distress caused by decades of wars and instability. The parallel evidence we have for the dismantling of the Athenian Olympicion and for the creation of the *Sylleia* at Athens suggests that things were more complex than that. The temporary exportation of the Olympic races to Rome was a feature of a broader process, which aimed at representing Rome as the centre of an empire that irreversibly included the Greek world. The response of the Delphic oracle had been important in acknowledging Rome's kinship with Venus and in pointing to the special relationship with Aphrodisias. Carrying parts of the shrine of Olympian Zeus was much more than a contribution to Roman architecture: it was a step in the process of re-thinking Rome as the centre of a Greco-Roman world. Of course, this new image of Rome could not be conceived without renegotiating the role of Athens itself. The city whose reconquest had made possible the victory over Mithridates and the return of Rome into the Hellenistic world was then to contribute to the reconstruction of a crucial part of Rome itself—a symbolically much more demanding and complex task, after years of civil strife and open warfare throughout Italy.

Sulla never became a patron of Athens or, at least, there is no evidence for a relationship of that kind. However, the Athenians had some reasons to be grateful to Sulla and the ties he created with the city were certainly remarkable. Sulla's attitude after the war was no doubt

¹² Ἄνδρες γὰρ οὐκ ἡγωνίσαντο, Σύλλα πάντας εἰς Ῥώμην μεταπεμφαμένου ("the men did not take part in the competition, as Sulla summoned everybody to Rome").

¹² Matthews 1979; accepted by Newby 2005, 26; cf. Behr 1993, 141–142. *Contra*, Crowther 1983, 270–271, 273; Ferrary 1988, 519, fn. 52; Stürpe 2002, 181–182 (= Musti 2005, 257–259).

an example to the Greek world that cooperating with Rome and her representatives could only be profitable. A story like that of the *Sylleia* is a clear indication of the ultimate success of Sulla's strategy in the Greek East. After Sulla had won the war and demonstrated the strength of Rome and the potential virulence of her revenge, the Greek elites were compelled to accept Roman rule and to take active part in the reorganisation of the empire. It was Sulla, with the systematic repression of anti-Roman dissent and the promotion of civic autonomy within the framework of Roman rule, who paved the way for the emergence of a consistently pro-Roman Greek elite, which quickly learned how to interact with the Romans and how to pull its weight in the diplomatic relations with the only super-power left in the Mediterranean world.

Back in Italy, Sulla did not need to exploit the myth of the kinship with Venus as intensively as he did in the East. In fact, only the colony of Pompeii is safely known to have received the name *Veneria*, which may have something to do with the presence of earlier Italic cults.¹³ Significantly, the Venus motif disappeared from the coin issues he struck in Italy during the Civil War, probably in 82 BC (*RRC* 367 and 368), to be replaced by the helmeted head of Rome on the recto of one issue and by the customary laureate head of Janus on the recto of the other assis. The echo of the use that Sulla had made of the kinship between Rome and Venus reached Italy thanks to the circulation of *RRC* 359, and it contributed to this aspect of Sulla's self-representation.

On the other hand, Sulla recovered some of the religious eclecticism he had shown before putting Venus at the core of his self-representation strategy, and which is evidence of a continuous interest in religion.¹⁴ At Tarentum he performed a sacrifice, whereby the liver of the victim turned out to have the shape of a crown. Interestingly, the sacrifice was performed by Postumius, the same haruspex who had celebrated another sacrifice for him during the siege of Nola in the Social War.¹⁵ Soon afterwards, at Silvium, he was visited by the slave of a

¹³ Cf. Lambrechts 1952 about the discovery of two statues of Venus at Alba Fucens, in an area that may be dated to the Sullan age; see however De Ruyt 1982, 79–83, dating the statue to the end of the first century BC at the earliest. The territory of the city is known to have been affected by the proscriptions: Plut. *Sull.* 31.11.

¹⁴ Cf. the evidence for Sulla's devotion to Apollo, which never gained the public prominence of that to Venus: Front. *Strat.* 1.11.11; Val. Max. 1.2.3; Stat. *Silv.* 4.6; Plut. *Sull.* 29.11–13. On Sulla's eclecticism, see Vollenweider 1958/1959, 27–28.

¹⁵ Aug. *civ. Dei* 2.24; cf. Plut. *Sull.* 27.7. On Postumius, see Haack 2006, 99–101, no. 74. The evidence is too fragmentary to enable safe conclusions on the relations

certain Lucius Pontius, who appeared to be in a mystical frenzy and declared himself to be a messenger from Bellona charged to announce his victory.¹⁶ Sulla manifested his devotion to this goddess on other occasions too. Just before the march on Rome of 88 BC, he claimed that the goddess had appeared in his dreams, put a thunderbolt in his hand and made him smite all his enemies, who of course had all fallen and vanished.¹⁷ It is perhaps significant that the Senate meeting in which he presented the project of the proscriptions took place in the temple of Bellona.¹⁸ Sulla's generous grant of land and privileges to the Diana sanctuary of the Mount Tifata has already been discussed in the previous part. Back in Rome, he also showed a great attachment to Hercules. He paid tribute to the hero before celebrating the triumph over Mithridates, by devolving one tenth of his patrimony to him. He also appears to have supported his cult by financing the refurbishment of the shrine of Hercules Custos near the Circus Flaminius.¹⁹

Sulla's main aim at the time was to portray himself as the legitimate representative of Rome and the only true defender of the *res publica*, who came to Italy to bring order after reconquering the East. The verso of *RRC* 367 bears an image of the goddess Victoria in a quadriga, with a caduceus in her hand, accompanied by a reference to *L. SVLLA IMPE(rator)* (or *IMP*): a celebration of the past victory and an anticipation of the imminent one, both reported in the name of Rome.²⁰ At the end of the Civil War, the cause of the Republic was at the forefront. Sulla was by then interested in representing himself as a victorious refounder of Rome. His role in the reconstruction of the Capitol,

between Sulla and the Etruscan *haruspices*: Rawson 1978, 141–142 (= Rawson 1991, 304–305).

¹⁶ Plut. *Sull.* 27.12–13.

¹⁷ Plut. *Sull.* 9.7–8.

¹⁸ Plut. *Sull.* 30.3; Dio 33–35, fr. 109.5; cf. *RRC* 480.1. See Vollenweider 1958/1959; Kragelund 2001, 92–95; Harris 2003, 26. However, the role of Bellona in Sulla's religious discourse has sometimes been overrated: Palmer 1975; Alföldi 1976, 149–158.

¹⁹ See Plut. *Sull.* 35.1 and Ov. *fast.* 6.209–212, with Coarelli 1996. On the cult of Hercules at Rome in the aftermath of Sulla's death, see the interesting suggestions of Wiseman 2000. On Sulla's surplus of wealth after the Civil War, see Shatzman 1975, 272.

²⁰ For a full analysis of these coin issues, see Frier 1971, 602–603 (the whole article is very important); *RRC*, 1.386–387 and 2.732. Cf. *RRC* 1.369–371. See also Zehnacker 1973, 574 (earlier bibliography at fn. 4).



Fig. 2. Denarius struck by the proquaestor L. Manlius in 82 BC: note the reference to Sulla's triumph and the presence of the goddess Victoria (*RRC* 367, *British Museum Catalogue of Coins of the Roman Republic* East 13; © copyright The Trustees of the British Museum)

which was, however, accomplished only a decade after his death, was of course part of such a programme.²¹ However, the extension of the *pomerium* was the most significant element of this strategy.²² It is almost self-explanatory that, before the 'antiquarian emperor' Claudius, it was decided only by him and by Augustus. Sulla had several reasons to consider himself a new founder of Rome, like Romulus and Servius Tullius.²³ He had regained control of the empire, and had put an end to more than a decade of civil strife and war in Italy. Italy was pacified, and the body of citizens had been considerably extended. It is perhaps

²¹ Val. Max. 9.3.8; Plin. 7.138; Tac. *hist.* 3.72.3; Plut. *Publ.* 15.1. Not much is known about the works that Sulla carried out in the Forum, although some changes certainly took place in this period: see Van Deman 1922 and Coarelli 1985, 134–135, 190–209.

²² On the Sullan extension of the *pomerium*, Sen. *brev.* 13.8; Tac. *ann.* 12.23; Gell. 13.4.4; Dio 43.50.1 and 44.49.1; cf. Dion. Hal. 4.13.3. See Sordi 1987; Gros 1990, 843–844; Ramage 1991, 119–120; Giardina 1995, 135–136 (= Giardina 1997, 126); Lo Cascio 1998, 340–345 (= Lo Cascio 2000, 87–92); Giardina 2000, 30–31; Sumi 2002, 425–428.

²³ The importance of the model of Servius Tullius is stressed by Ver Eecke 2005, 187–200.

in this light that the extension of the *pomerium*, the sacred boundary of the city, must be explained.

Sulla knew perfectly well that the age of Rome as a city state with a hegemonic function in the Mediterranean was over for good. An empire was taking shape, and Roman religion had to contribute to the definition of a new strategy, by going back to the very origin of Rome. The use of the cult in Venus in the East was a first contribution to the confrontation with the Greek culture. In Rome, the same theme could be exploited as far as it involved the theme of foundation, and to the extent that Venus was seen as the daughter of Jupiter, whose most sacred temple had been destroyed during the Civil War. Sulla's interest in Hercules may be explained in a similar way, as part of an upsurge of devotion for his father Jupiter.

Sulla's religious legacy was soon taken up by Pompey, who adopted Venus and Hercules as his favoured gods, and appeared to view them mainly as divinities presiding over victory.²⁴ Sulla's son-in-law C. Memmius, the dedicatee of Lucretius's *de rerum natura*, displayed a similar devotion for Venus, as the prologue of the poem powerfully suggests. Moreover, his was one of the *familiae Troianae*.²⁵ With Caesar, of course, Venus gained an even more central role at the intersection between religion and politics, and the Trojan myth would be revived and further developed throughout the Augustan age.²⁶

Sulla's contribution was inevitably overshadowed, and the dictator was remembered by the authors of the Imperial age more for his *felicitas* than for his relationship with Venus.²⁷ The importance of his role in the development of the cult of his goddess, however, can hardly be denied. It was he who first managed to unite the theme of the kinship between

²⁴ For a discussion of Pompey's approach to religion, see Santangelo 2007.

²⁵ Lucr. 1.1–2. About C. Memmius, see Marx 1890, 116–117; Münzer 1931; de Chaisemartin 2001, 195–196. See Serv. *ad Aen.* 5.117, with *RRC* no. 313 (106 BC, struck by a L. Memmius); *RRC* no. 349 (87 BC, struck by another L. Memmius, probably son of the former).

²⁶ The reference discussion remains Weinstock 1971, 80–132. There is some clever speculation on the 'Sullan' aspects of Augustus' self-representation in Gisborne 2005, 122–123.

²⁷ On Cicero's views on Sulla's *felicitas*, see Desrosiers 1969, 194–214 and Diehl 1988, 111–115; on Seneca's representation of Sulla, see Mazzoli 1977; on Sulla in Lucan, see Bagnani 1955. In general on Sulla's literary portraits from Sallust to Augustine, see Laffi 1967, 274–277; Lanciotti 1978, 195–210; Barden Dowling 2000, 313–336; Thein 2006, 241–244.

Venus and Rome with the theme of a new foundation of Rome and her empire. That was perhaps the most fascinating achievement of a political life that had been restlessly engaged on two fronts of the empire, Italy and the Greek East.

Sulla's experience showed that the similarities between these two worlds could be as striking as the differences. In the next, concluding section I will try to summarise the main aspects of Sulla's imperial policies. It will be apparent that Sulla often used similar methods, and had similar aims in the diverse contexts where he operated. Narrative histories usually overlook this aspect. It is one of the aims of this study to bring it to light and to stress its importance.

CONCLUSIONS

So far I have developed a parallel discussion of the contexts in which Sulla deployed his initiatives. The approach I have used to deal with Sulla's attitude to the local elites, his contribution to the development of Roman administration, and his development of several ideological motifs, is mainly contrastive. During the late Republic, Italy and the Greek East were in several respects completely different worlds, and it was important to do justice to their differences.

It is undeniable, however, that at the beginning of the first century BC there was increasing interdependence within the empire. This was especially the case with Italy, the centre of the empire, and with the Greek East, its richest part. Cicero raised this problem most forcefully in a memorable passage of the *de imperio Cn. Pompei* which I have already referred to in the introduction (7.19): if taxes are not regularly levied in Asia Minor, the financial stability of Italy is to collapse in a short time. The years preceding the Mithridatic War showed this economic relationship most impressively, and Cicero made the case for Pompey's extraordinary command in 66BC precisely by claiming that Rome could not afford such a crisis to occur again.

In concluding my discussion, I will set out to stress the relations between the initiatives that Sulla took in the East and those that he took in the West. There are two possible approaches to this problem. The first is the biographical one, which I have intentionally avoided in this study, even if some narrative sections have inevitably been included at various stages. The strongest factor that links the impact of Sulla on the Greek East to the impact he had in Italy is of course the relation between the Mithridatic War and the Civil War. Had he not been compelled to head back to Italy to face the final fight for supremacy, Sulla may well have chosen to defeat Mithridates completely, and possibly conquer his kingdom. Instead, he offered him a peace deal that left the geo-political situation in Asia Minor as it was before the war. Moreover, when he was back in Italy, Sulla certainly took advantage of the experience he had gained in the East, especially in his relations with the local communities.

There are, however, several substantial factors linking the destinies of these two areas of the Mediterranean world even more strongly than the chronological and biographical ones. It is on these aspects that I would like to focus here. The central element is the economic and financial relationship between Italy and Asia Minor, which became very close after the creation of the province of Asia. Its trajectory can shed light on many crucial developments that took place before and after Sulla. When the Attalid kingdom came under the control of Rome, the senatorial elite soon realised the importance of the event. Not only was it an advantageous source of revenue, but it represented a formidable chance for the Roman elite too. The nobility used it to finance its internal competition by ruthlessly exploiting the new province, while the members of the *ordo equester* who were involved in the revenue collection took advantage of their public contracts to increase their wealth and influence. As I have argued at the beginning of the first part, it was this very model of exploitation that alienated much of the support for Rome in the Greek East by the end of the second century BC, and ultimately determined the overwhelming support of the Asiatic cities to Mithridates.

When he was sent to fight the King, Sulla had the crucial task to restore the revenue flow from the East to Italy, and he brilliantly achieved that. For this reason some attention has been devoted here to the reorganisation of the province of Asia, which implied a range of fiscal measures. The effects of this reorganisation, however, were not the solution to all problems. The increasing economic ties between Italy and the East started to create a new range of complications. The extension of Roman citizenship to the Italian allies, for instance, implied a different distribution of costs for the maintenance of the Roman army. As soon as the former *socii*, then citizens, were not expected to finance their contingents any more, the Roman army had to be paid for with new resources.

This enhanced the need for further Roman expansion in Asia Minor. Moreover, piracy had not been defeated yet, and apparently the Roman elite did not intend to consider its relations with Mithridates as a settled issue. The Senate's decision not to ratify the Dardanus agreement was a clear hint that more Eastern campaigns were not being ruled out already in the late 80s. It was in fact with Pompey's victory in the Third Mithridatic War and the creation of the province of Pontus-Bithynia that this phase of the Roman expansion in Asia Minor was accomplished. The role of Sulla in this process of increasing integration

and exploitation is of course significant, because it reversed a phase of crisis for the Roman imperial strategy, and also because it led to the emergence of a new compromise between Rome and the Greek elites.

The attention I have devoted to the local elites may be explained by recalling Rome's well known attitude to a close relationship with the *domi nobiles*. Sulla is no exception in this respect, although I have tried to show that his position is remarkable in an important respect, as he lived in a period when many local elites became openly hostile to Rome. He was extraordinarily ruthless in punishing the enemies of Rome, and in punishing his personal enemies too. The same pattern occurs in the Greek East, as well as in Italy. In both contexts retaliation involved individuals and communities, as two binary strategies. One of the central arguments of this study is that the punishment he chose was part of a precise political plan, as much as the rewards he offered to those who supported him.

In Asia Minor he sentenced to death the Greek leaders of the revolt, and he severely punished the formerly pro-Mithridatic cities by imposing a fine and by claiming back the tax arrears from the previous five years. A result of this measure was to consolidate and spread the interest of the Greek communities in acquiring the patronage of Roman magistrates and notables. The evidence offered by the inscriptions shows that the first cases of Roman patronage to Greek cities of Asia Minor are recorded in the 90s, and that nearly fifty of cases of patronage are recorded between the victory of Sulla and Actium. There is no steady increase, but this model of relationship definitely becomes more widespread and common after the Sullan settlement. As I have argued above, this can hardly be mere chance. The increasing importance of the *koinon* of the province of Asia after Sulla is further confirmation of how important the interaction between Rome and the local elites became in this period. It is unlikely that Sulla did not foresee such a development when he put forward the reorganisation of the province of Asia. In fact, it may be argued that the harsh measures he took were partly intended to compel the provincial elite to embark on a closer cooperation with the Roman rulers.

In Italy Sulla punished the hostile communities with land confiscations and, in some cases, with the withdrawal of Roman citizenship. The land assignments were usually carried out as planned, although there is evidence that they were not accomplished in the territories of some cities, such as Volaterrae and Arretium. The impact of the law on citizenship was predictably more devastating, and the communities

affected—Volaterrae, Arretium, and probably others—were compelled to seek support and patronage from members of the Roman elite. The effects of such measures, which were certainly no longer enforced after 69 BC, were therefore comparable to those of the measures taken in Asia. The local elites who had fought Sulla and supported his foes were compelled to change their attitude towards Rome and to seek new allegiances. Sulla may have wanted them to stay out of the game for a while, but his retaliation had the ultimate effect of persuading them to play an active part in Roman Italy.

As his relations with the elites show, Sulla's career was often played on the double front of personal ambitions and the promotion of Rome's interest. The political use of religious motifs that he made at various stages of his life has often been regarded as part of his personal propaganda. In the third part, I have tried to view Sulla's attitude to religion, and especially to a goddess like Venus, in the context of his imperial strategy and of his relations with the local elites. In the Greek East he developed the theme of the kinship between Venus and Rome, while in Italy he tended to represent himself as a new founder of Rome. In this respect, his link with Venus was mainly functional in supporting his claim to be an ideal successor of Romulus, and possibly of Servius Tullius too. On both sides of the empire, Sulla's aim was to convey the idea of a new beginning: a new era of order and stability, in which the extension of Roman citizenship to Italy coexisted with a new relationship, based both on affinity and on difference, between Rome and the Greek world.

The central aim of this study has been to show that the attempt to stabilise the empire was central to Sulla's agenda. To some extent, his effort was successful. He reached a stabilisation of the Mediterranean empire and he brought about the political integration of Italy. His constitutional reforms, which I have deliberately not discussed in this study, show a similar concern as that underlying his imperial strategy. They were an impressive attempt to stabilise the internal situation in Rome, again by enforcing traumatic, and in some cases unprecedented, measures.

The stabilisation that Sulla appears to have envisaged, however, was not bound to last long. The financial costs of integrating the new citizens, the growing Roman presence in the East, and the increasing competition within the senatorial elite made a further expansion of the empire an absolute necessity. After Lucullus and Pompey's victories, it became clear that the stakes were much higher than before—and than

previously expected. The consequence was a new struggle for political supremacy, leading to a new civil war, in which local elites would play a considerable role.

The outcome of decades of conflict was not just a new political settlement. It is only after Actium that the empire started to go through a phase of economic stability and growth. In this respect, too, the situation of Italy was quite similar to that of the Greek East already in Sulla's day. Both regions paid the price for a lasting economic crisis, which had causes as diverse as endemic warfare, the cost of the enfranchisement of the Allies, or piracy. From the early first century BC until the age of Augustus, their economic history is scattered with moments of crisis, and there is evidence for shortage of resources in the cities' budgets, indebtedness, and devaluation of currency, which I have discussed in the second part. If this is more apparent in Asia Minor and Greece, it is a distinctive feature of several periods of Italian history too, from the years preceding Catiline's conspiracy down to the debt crisis of 49 BC. Sulla was too busy fighting his many enemies to attempt a definitive solution to this critical issue. However, he managed to achieve stability on a number of crucial fronts, and to create some preliminary conditions that made the solution of the crisis somewhat more feasible. His greatest achievement in this respect, as I have tried to show in the second part, was the reorganisation of the province of Asia—the greatest *beneficium* that the Italian elites could possibly hope for at the end of the 80s.

With the proscriptions and the constitutional reforms Sulla unsuccessfully tried to make a new civil war impossible. In fact, the background to the wars fought in the 40s and in the 30s is closely related to the legacy of his imperial strategy. It is certainly true that the 'example' of Sulla had crucial consequences in Roman political history. It played a crucial role in triggering the final dissolution of the Roman Republic, and it certainly inspired all the protagonists of this process. I hope to have shown, however, that the ways in which Sulla took part in the consolidation and development of Rome's hegemony over Italy and the Greek East were even more substantial contributions to the painstaking process of redefinition and regeneration of the Roman empire that we have been taught to call the Roman revolution.

APPENDIX

SULLA IN THE EPIGRAPHICAL EVIDENCE

Here follows a list of the inscriptions in which the name of Sulla is recorded. The titulature is mentioned for all the cases where it is attested.

- SEG* 44.1227 Mopsuestia: *asylia* grant to the temple of Serapis, accompanied by a letter of Sulla dictator.
- Syll.*³ 745 Rhodes: honorific dedication to a local notable, who met a number of Roman magistrates, including Lucius Sulla στρατὰ γὼν ἀνθύπατον Ῥωμαίων.
- Plut. *Sull.* 19.9–10; 34.4 Chaeronea: inscriptions on two trophies put up after the battle of 86 BC; at least one mentioned Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Σύλλας Ἐπαφρόδιτος.
- RDGE* 17 Tabae: *s.c. de Tabenis*, passed in 81–80 BC, mentioning Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Σύλλας αὐτοκράτωρ (but voted during the dictatorship).
- RDGE* 18 Lagina Sanctuary, Stratonicea: *s.c. de Stratonicensibus*, passed in 81 BC, mentioning Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Λ]ευκίου [νιός] Σύλλας Ἐπαφρόδιτος | δικτάτωρ.
- RDGE* 19 Cormus: *s.c. de Cormis*, mentioning Σύλλας (very fragmentary).
- RDGE* 20 Thasus: *s.c. de Thasiis*, passed in 80 BC, mentioning Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Σύλλας Ἐπαφρόδιτος ὕπατος.
- RDGE* 21 Thasus: letter of the proconsul Cn. Cornelius Dolabella to the city, mentioning an earlier decision of Sulla.
- RDGE* 49 Cos: two letters of Sulla Ἐπαφρόδειτος δικτάτωρ to the city, dealing with the status of the artists of Dionysus.
- RDGE* 70 Chius: letter of a proconsul to the city, mentioning an earlier decision of Sulla δεύτερον ὕπατος.
- ILS* 8771 Halicarnassus: dedication to Sulla στρατηγὸς ἀνθύπατος.
- ILLRP* 349 Delos: dedication to Sulla *proconsul*.
- ILLRP* 350 Delos: dedication of the *collegia* to Sulla *proconsul*.
- AE* 1971, 448 Akraiphia: dedication to Sulla ἡμπεράτωρ, σωτήρ, εὐεργέτης.
- ILLRP* 224 Sicyon: dedication of Sulla *imperator* to Mars.
- IG* 2².410 Athens: dedication of a statue to Sulla (very fragmentary).
- ILLRP* 346 Pompeii: graffito (*L. Sul/a*).
- ILLRP* 347 Pompeii: graffito (*L. C(ornelius) Sulla*).
- ILLRP* 348 Pompeii: graffito (*L. Cornelius Sulla*).
- ILLRP* 351 Suessa: dedication to Sulla *imperator*.
- AE* 1975, 219 Larinum: dedication to Sulla *dictator*, *patronus* of the city.

- ILLRP* 352 Vicus Laci Fundani, Rome: dedication to *Sulla Felix dictator*.
ILLRP 353 Minturnae: dedication to *Sulla Felix dictator* from a group of freedmen.
ILLRP 355 Alba Fucens: dedication to *Sulla Felix dictator*.
ILLRP 356 Clusium: dedication to *Sulla Felix dictator*.
RDGE 23 Oropus: *s.c. de Oropiis*, passed in 73 BC, referring to earlier decisions of Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Σύλλα.

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